Rawls J. Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy

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tion is to apply. We must specify the end to which the constitution of hu-

man nature is directed and by reference to which its organization can be

understood. In the Preface: par. 11, he compares human nature to a watch.

We can talk about the constitution of a watch because a watch is organized

to tell time. This purpose enables us to understand why its parts are orga-

nized as they are. Similarly, Butler describes the constitution of human na-

ture as adapted to virtue: the parts are organized as they are—with the

principle of reﬂection or conscience authoritative and supreme—in order

that we may be prompted to act virtuously, to do what is right and good for

their own sake.

(3) At ﬁrst sight, this comparison between the constitution of human

nature and the organization of a watch seems unsatisfactory. We are not ar-

tifacts designed to fulﬁll certain purposes of superior beings who have

made us for their ends. But, as soon as we say this, we know that Butler

does believe this; only for him there is but one such superior being, namely,

God. Thus, speaking generally, we are made for God’s purposes, although

God’s purposes and scheme of government, both in nature and in revela-

tion, are imperfectly comprehended by us.

This religious doctrine might seem less foreign to us if we look at the

details of our own moral constitution. Butler’s view might be put more in-

structively if we said this: our constitution is adapted to virtue, and virtue is

in turn those forms of conduct which adapt us to our daily life as members

of society. The content of the virtues and of the deliverances of our con-

science give due allowance both to the claims of society and to other per-

sons, as well as to the claims of reasonable self-love (which, of course, is

not the same as selﬁshness). We are beings who must be in part concerned

with ourselves, since we have appetites and affections and attachments of

various kinds; but also, we must live in society in view of our social nature,

a point that Butler repeatedly emphasizes. Thus, when Butler says that our

constitution is adapted to virtue, he can be taken to mean that our constitu-

tion is adapted to forms of conduct which enable us to be reasonable mem-

bers of society.

We are able to engage in forms of social life which give due allowance

and scope for our own and others’ good. Regarded in this way, we can see

how the notion of the constitution of human nature is directed against

Hobbes. We shall see later how the notion of the authority of conscience is

directed against Shaftesbury; and how Butler’s conception of the content of

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conscience (of its judgments) is directed against Hutcheson (on the latter,

see the Dissertation of Virtue).

lecture ii

The Nature and Authority of Conscience

§1. Introduction

Last time I discussed the moral constitution of human nature, its parts or

elements, the relations between these parts—how they are organized into

a moral constitution by the supremacy and authoritative role of con-

science—and ﬁnally, the end of this constitution which Butler describes as

the adaptation of our nature to virtue. I glossed the adaptation of our na-

ture to virtue as: Our nature is adapted to virtue, and virtue in turn is those

principles and forms of action and conduct which adapt us to our life in so-

ciety; that is, which make us ﬁt to conduct ourselves as members of society

concerned as we must be with our own interests and those of people we

care for, but able to give due whether to the interests and concerns of oth-

ers. Our moral constitution makes us ﬁt for society by enabling us to act in

accord with the due claims of the good of the community and of our pri-

vate good. This emphasis on the moral constitution of human nature as

making us ﬁt for society, and Butler’s emphasis on this moral constitution,

is the centerpiece of Butler’s reply to Hobbes.

(1) Today I shall make some observations on Butler’s view concerning

the nature and the authority of the principle of reﬂection, or conscience. It also

proves useful here to note what he regards as the content of conscience.

By this I mean the kinds of actions and forms of conduct, and the kind of

temper and character in our nature, which conscience approves of. For

example, in the Dissertation on Virtue II (an appendix in the Analogy), Butler

argues against Hutcheson that the content of our conscience is not utilitar-

ian. This means that the deliverances of our conscience are not in accor-

dance with principles of utility; or as Butler puts it, “benevolence, and the

want of it, singly considered” is not the “whole of virtue and vice” (par. 12).

It is not the case that (slightly adapted) “we...approve of benevolence

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to some persons rather than to others, or disapprove injustice and false-

hood upon any other account, than merely as an overbalance of happiness

was foreseen likely to be produced by the ﬁrst, and misery by the second”

(par. 12).

What is of interest here is not simply that Butler rejects utilitarianism as

an account of the content of conscience (as a correct conception of right

and virtue) but the kind of argument he uses to support his rejection, and

the interpretation he gives of the conclusion he draws.

(2) Thus two preliminary comments: ﬁrst, Butler’s argument rests sim-

ply on an appeal to our common-sense moral judgments, which he as-

sumes everyone, or most everyone, agrees upon. The judgments he has in

mind are those of any fair-minded person who is impartial and considers

the matter in a cool hour. Here I have used Butler’s phrases: “fair-minded,”

“impartial,” “cool hour.” Of course, he takes for granted various other con-

ditions which I need not spell out here. Let’s call such judgments “consid-

ered judgments.” Butler takes these as more or less given, that is, as com-

monly recognized facts of our moral experience. His moral doctrine rests

on this appeal to moral experience, as opposed to revelation or to rational-

ist philosophical views. While he appears to agree with a rationalist such as

Clarke, his argument takes another form. This feature of Butler’s method is

a distinctive shift. Moreover, he regards this moral experience as sui generis;

he does not suppose that moral notions can be resolved into non-moral no-

tions (assuming some such line between notions can be drawn indepen-

dently in some useful way). Here he contrasts with Hobbes and possibly

with Hume (this remains to be seen); and in this respect he does agree with

Clarke and the rational intuitionists.

The second preliminary comment on Butler’s rejection of utilitarianism

(pars. 12–16) is that for him a moral doctrine is an account of the moral

constitution of our human nature. Butler is prepared to entertain the view,

as a speculative possibility, that God acts solely from the Principle of Benev-

olence. But for him this is, I think, simply a speculative possibility; it is not

our business to speculate about such matters so far beyond our comprehen-

sion. Our conscience is to be our guide, given the station and place in the

world God has called us to; and our conscience is not utilitarian. That we

know, and that’s all we need to know. Butler insists that the happiness of

the world is God’s happiness, not ours: “. . . nor do we know what we are

about, when we endeavor to promote the good of mankind in any ways,

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but those which He [God] has directed; that is indeed in all ways, not con-

trary to veracity and justice ...itisourbusiness and our duty to endeavor,

within the bounds of veracity and justice, to contribute ease, convenience,

and even cheerfulness and diversion of our fellow creature” (par. 16).

For us the principle of benevolence is approved within the bounds and

limits speciﬁed by justice and veracity and the other relevant virtues. Ob-

serve, further, here that a great shift will later come with Bentham, who

will emphatically say that happiness of the world is our business (Hume

does not say this, as we shall see). Ask yourself why this shift occurs and

what lies behind it.

§2. Features of Our Moral Faculty

(1) It is this faculty of conscience and our moral nature that makes us

capable of moral government. Here by our “moral nature” (as opposed to

our moral faculty or conscience), Butler means our moral emotions: com-

passion, resentment, indignation, and so on; or our natural sense of grati-

tude, etc. We distinguish between harm and injury, as it were, spontane-

ously (“unavoidably,” Butler says) (Dissertation II: par. 1).

(2) Nor are the deliverances of conscience on general matters, with re-

spect to the particulars, doubtful. There is an acknowledged universal stan-

dard; it is that which in all ages and countries has been professed in public

in the fundamental laws of all civil constitutions; namely, justice, veracity,

and regard to the common good. There is no problem of lack of universal-

ity (par. 1).

(3) It is manifest that we have such a faculty of conscience. Some fea-

tures of it are:

(a) Its object—what it judges and approves of—is those actions and ac-

tive practical principles which, when ﬁxed and habitual in us, specify our

character (par. 2).

(b) Thus its object is actions—as distinct from events—where the no-

tion of an action involves the notion of a person doing something from will

and design, including under design the intention of bringing about such-

and-such consequences (par. 2).

within our power, either in what we do or what we fail to do (par. 2).

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(d) Such action and conduct is the natural object of the moral faculty,

as speculative truth and falsity is the natural object of speculative reason

(par. 2).

(4) The remainder of the Dissertation is an appeal to moral experience

to show aspects of the content of conscience. (Here see the statement at

the end of par. 1, p. 53: “And as to these inward feelings themselves; that

they are real, that man has in his nature passions and affections, can be no

more questioned, than that he has external senses.” See also Sermon II, end

par. 1.) For example:

(a) Our moral faculty associates with moral good or evil actions of

good or ill desert; this association is natural (part of our constitution) and is

not artiﬁcial or accidental (par. 3).

(b) Our moral faculty approves of prudence as a virtue and disapproves

of folly as a vice (cf. pars. 6–7).

virtue. Here Butler sets forth a critique of Hutcheson (pars. 8–10).

(5) Recall that in the Preface and Sermon I the role of the Principle of

Reﬂection or conscience is supreme and regulative. Its ofﬁce is to adminis-

ter and to govern. In Sermon I, Butler’s account is brief and found in pars.

8–9. In par. 8 he deﬁnes conscience and is concerned to prove its existence

by describing two actions such that it would be absurd to deny that we ap-

prove of one and disapprove of the other when we coolly reﬂect.

§3. Outline of Butler’s Arguments

for Conscience’s Authority: Sermon II

(References: Preface: pars. 24–30, esp. 26–28; Sermon I: pars. 8–9).

(1) Our constitution as a creature and its adaptation to certain ends is a

reason to believe that the Author of our nature intended it for these ends.

Note Butler’s deistic-shared premises: see also par 3: lines 9–11 (par. 1).

(2) The objection to be resisted: granted there is such a faculty as the

moral faculty, why is it authoritative? Why not say: let each follow their na-

ture, so conscience directs only when it is strongest? What sign is there that

the Author of our nature intends otherwise? (par. 5).

(3) The objection assumes there is no distinction between violating jus-

tice for the sake of present pleasure and acting justly when there is no

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temptation to the contrary. Both are equally following our nature. But if

this were true:

(a) The idea of deviating from our nature would be absurd;

(b) Then what Paul says re our being a law unto ourselves would be er-

roneous;

Thus the objection rejects what Paul says, though seeming to allow it.

Language shows that following nature is not acting as we please (par. 6).

(4) We need to explain what is meant by saying: every man is naturally

a law unto himself, and may ﬁnd within himself the value of right and obli-

gation to follow it (par. 6).

(5) Two senses of nature are not relevant (pars. 7–9).

(6) The third sense is that of St. Paul and explains the sense in which a

man is a law to himself. The argument is this (all from pars. 10–11):

(i) Our passions and affections to public and to private good conﬂict.

(ii) These passions and affections are in themselves natural and good,

but there is no way of seeing how deeply each kind belongs to us by nature.

(iii) None of these passions and affections can be a law to us.

(iv) But there is a superior principle of conscience which asserts itself

and approves or disapproves.

(v) This faculty makes us a law to ourselves.

(vi) It is not a principle of the heart to regulate us by its degree of inﬂu-

ence but is a faculty different in kind and supreme over all the other ele-

ments of our nature and bears its own authority.

(vii) Still, it is a principle that does inﬂuence us and prompts us to com-

ply with its dictates.

(7) The illustrative example Butler uses (an animal caught by bait)

would be in the case of man an action disproportionate to our nature, and

hence unnatural (par. 13). This action is unnatural not because it involves

going against self-love merely as natural, since the same is true of repress-

ing passion for the sake of self-love (merely, as natural) (par. 15).

(8) There must be another distinction: namely, the principle of self-

love is superior to passions. To act from our nature, self-love must govern.

This gives an example of a superior principle without invoking conscience

(par. 16).

(9) Similarly, conscience is superior to the passions which directly seek

objects without distinction of means necessary to obtain them. When these

means injure others, conscience disapproves and is to be obeyed. Here self-

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love is left out of consideration. Conscience is supreme without consider-

ations of inﬂuence (par. 17).

(10) Thus we get the distinction between power and authority, here ap-

plied not to civil law and the constitution of society, but to principles of hu-

man nature. From its nature and role, conscience is manifestly superior; it

involves judgment, direction, and superintending. And conscience has this

authority and role, regardless of how often we rebel against it (pars. 18–19).

(11) Butler gives a second argument (pars. 20–22). Suppose the contrary.

The bounds or limits of our conduct are then deﬁned by our natural power

on one side, or our not seeking harm for its own sake for ourselves or for

others. This results from supposing that only their relative strength is the

difference between principles of human nature. But the limits above make

us morally indifferent between, e.g., patricide and ﬁlial duty. But this is

absurd.

The Principles of this argument are:

(1) The way our nature works and is regulated indicates God’s intention

for how we should govern ourselves.

(2) For this knowledge of our nature, the appeal is to moral experience;

e.g. how our feelings of shame affect us, etc.; and re faculty of conscience.

(3) Butler assumes rough agreement of judgments of conscience.

What is Butler’s Argument for Conscience’s Authority and Supremacy?

(A) One Form:

(1) God fashioned us as reasonable and rational beings capable of being

a law unto ourselves.

(2) Such beings need a governing principle or faculty if, as we do, they

have numerous passions, affections, and appetites, and competing more

general affections such as benevolence and self-love.

(3) None of these other principles and passions, etc. can provide such a

governing principle.

(4) Conscience claims superiority and authority as such a principle or

faculty:

(a) First, via its approvals and disapprovals, and the agreement in

common content thereof between persons.

(b) Second, by the fact that we experience ourselves as self-con-

demned if we violate conscience.

demns us if we violate it.

(5) The use of language supports the claims of conscience.

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(6) It is shown very powerfully in the passion of resentment that con-

science is supreme and authoritative.

(B) Another Form:

(1) Revise the ﬁrst premise above by just supposing that we are capable

of being a law unto ourselves. (Leave out the theological background.)

(2) Then proceed largely as before.

§4. Summary of Butler’s Argument for the Authority of Conscience

(1) We have surveyed Butler’s argument for the authority of conscience

as he presents it in Sermon II, which is entirely devoted to this question,

and have mentioned points which he makes elsewhere (particularly in the

Preface, pars. 24–30, and Sermon I: 8–9). Let’s now ask what the argument

is, or indeed whether strictly speaking it is an argument at all. What I shall

say is at best an interpretation of Butler’s argument or presentation. Clearly

he does not try to make a rigorous case for his view.

Butler takes for granted, I think, what I have called the Deistic Assump-

tion, which implies that God is the Author of our nature, and that the de-

sign of our nature gives reasons for believing what God intended our na-

ture to be and how its various elements are to work together. Butler also

assumes that as reasonable and rational beings, we are capable of being a

law unto ourselves and of taking part in the life of society. By “reasonable”

I include what Butler means by “fair-minded.” Reasonable and fair-minded

are different notions from rationality. This latter has the sense roughly of

adoption of the most effective means to given ends, or of adjusting given

ends to one another when these ends compete and cannot be jointly satis-

ﬁed.

(2) Now if we are to be capable of being a law unto ourselves, our na-

ture must have what Butler calls a moral constitution adapted to some aim

and capable of governing itself. The question of the authority of con-

science, or the lack of any such authority, is to be settled by looking at our

moral experience to see if we ﬁnd any appropriate authoritative element

which can govern our nature and direct our conduct and adapt it to our life

in society.

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1. See the Lectures on Hobbes for the distinction between reasonable and rational.

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Certainly given the many elements in our nature, we need some such

governing or regulative principle. We have appetites, affections, and pas-

sions of various kinds, some more directly concerned with other persons,

some more directly with ourselves. These appetites, affections, and passions

focus on means to certain ends—states of affairs or whatever—and do not,

as such, take into account the wider effects on other persons generally.

These springs of conduct are, let’s say, narrowly focused, whether the focus

is on other persons or on ourselves. None of these springs of conduct can

provide a governing or regulative principle. This follows from the nature of

appetites, affections, and passions. They do not embody a reasonable or

rational principle by which self-government or self-regulation is possible.

Butler illustrates this by the example of the animal enticed into the baited

trap by the prospect of gratifying its hunger. Were we to behave in similar

fashion, contrary to the affection for ourselves expressed by the principle of

reasonable self-love, we would be acting wrongly as well. Butler uses this

example to exemplify the general idea of supremacy: the idea of how one

principle in our nature can be governing—have authority rather than

merely inﬂuence—over other elements in our nature.

(3) Next, I believe Butler holds that reasonable self-love is not the au-

thoritative principle of our nature, although he is anxious to maintain that,

in the long run at least, and given the moral government of God, there is

no essential conﬂict between the authority of conscience and reasonable

self-love. His view of ostensible conﬂict I shall postpone until later. But it is

easy to see that reasonable self-love, although a general affection in the

sense that it regulates particular appetites, affections, and passions, is an af-

fection for ourselves. The object of reasonable self-love is always partial: it

concerns the good of but one person among many. And so it cannot pro-

vide a principle suitable for our being a law unto ourselves as a member of

society.

The same is true of benevolence: benevolence is likewise often a gen-

eral affection (as self-love is) in that it regulates particular affections for

other persons’ good. This is the case when benevolence takes the form of

public spirit, or love of country (patriotism), and the like. But whereas the

persons who are the concern of reasonable self-love are always well-de-

ﬁned—namely the very person who is moved by self-love—the persons

who are the concern of benevolence shift and vary, and criss-cross, in all

sort of ways from person to person. C. D. Broad suggests that Butler means

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by benevolence the principle of utility: to maximize the happiness of soci-

ety. But this is not to be found in the texts and is indeed contrary to it. The

upshot then is that neither self-love nor benevolence, either general or par-

ticular, can provide the requisite authoritative principle so that we can be a

law unto ourselves.

(4) Of course, there may be no such principle; although Butler does not

entertain this possibility. To say that we are made in the image of God is to

say that there is such a principle in our nature. Butler believes that our

moral experience is sufﬁcient testimony that this principle is to be found in

conscience.

First, it is formal in the fact that every (normal) fair-minded person,

when impartial and able to consider the matter in a cool hour, approves of

some kinds of actions and not others. People recognize and judge that they

ought to do some things and not others; and that these judgments are deci-

sive and binding upon them. From these judgments there is no further ap-

peal: they specify conclusive reasons for how we are to act. Moreover, the

decisive and binding nature of these judgments does not depend upon their

hold and effective inﬂuence on our character and springs of conduct. Thus,

these judgments are authoritative: these features all together specify what

authority is, as opposed to inﬂuence.

Second, it is important that persons generally agree in their approvals

and disapprovals. Or to use the term introduced earlier, the content of the

deliverances of conscience is more or less the same in all ages and in all

countries. This enables the deliverances of conscience (imposing as always

the conditions on them required for considered judgments) to provide an

authoritative principle so that we can be a law unto ourselves as members

of society. Plainly, if each person’s conscience clashed with everyone else’s,

the requisite conditions would be lacking.

Third, Butler makes the further observation that when we act against

our conscience, we condemn ourselves before ourselves and incur our self-

dislike. I think he means to say that no other element in our nature has this

feature. Self-sacriﬁces of various kinds we may reject having to make; but

so long as they are reasonably necessary we don’t in the least stand self-

condemned. And even if in some cases we must sacriﬁce the interests of

others in certain hard cases (for example, when someone must lose out

and we are to decide, as it were, judiciously), we should be troubled by such

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