Rawls J. Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy

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(a) Individuals can rank levels of well-being by introspection (com-

plete ordering).

(b) Individuals can rank differences between levels by introspection

(complete ordering of differences between levels). These ((a) and (b)) give a

cardinal individual measure.

uncertainty are involved.

(4) Re Correspondence Rules: These are needed to match up the mea-

sures of distinct individuals:

(a) Level comparability is a matching of levels.

(b) Unit comparability is a matching of units (how many units of in-

dividual A = 1 unit of individual B).

anism we need only unit comparability (utilitarianism interested in totals,

not levels).

(5) Zero-One Rule as Illustration:

(a) If we work out the consequences of this rule for a society of peo-

ple and cats, we get what may be odd results. But if we reject the rule for

people-cat correspondence, why do we do so? Is it just that we don’t want

to be slaves to cats? And what is the correct ratio, not exactly, but even

roughly? Very roughly?

(b) If the 0–1 rule fails to hold for people and cats, does it hold be-

tween all people? Why can’t the reasons that lead us to reject it for the

people-cat correspondence lead us to reject it between different kinds of

people? And can we, or should we, accept this implication? Again, how con-

sistent are the reasons for rejection with the classical utilitarian view? Do

they involve a doctrine of the different qualities of pleasure in a way utili-

tarianism can’t allow? (e.g., J. S. Mill, although his view is unclear).

satisﬁable pleasures as a matter of social policy? Or even further: simple

kinds of people who are easily made happy in ways that require few social

resources?

(d) What moral principle is implicit in the 0–1 rule: is it a claim to

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25. Here cf. Amartya Sen, Collective Choice and Social Welfare (San Francisco: Holden-

Day, 1970), Chs. 7 and 7*.

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equal or to maximal satisfaction on the part of all beings with a capacity for

satisfaction?

The 0–1 rule is a useful way simply to illustrate the problem of cardi-

nal interpersonal comparisons. And the conjecture is that any scheme of

correspondence rules seems to embody deep ethical assumptions that are

hard to get out of utilitarianism. It is here that the complexity of utilitarian-

ism starts to appear.

lecture iv

Summary of Utilitarianism (1976)

(1) In the past three classes we have been discussing the classical utili-

tarian doctrine as formulated by Sidgwick in Methods of Ethics.

(Think of

this as B-E-S utilitarianism, although there are variations between them.

Sidgwick’s statement is the most complete and consistent. He pushes the

classical view to its philosophical limits.)

Recall that the classical utilitarian view says to maximize:

∑∑

= u

+ u

+ ...+ u

;

where i = individuals and j = periods of time.

Where for each u

(a) The real number represents an interpersonal cardinal measure of

net well-being for individual i in period j; and where this net well-being is

interpreted hedonistically as the desirable feeling aspect of consciousness (cf.

ME, I: ix; II: ii; III: x).

(b) This cardinal measure is based on introspection: assessment by the

individual (who it is assumed can order levels of well-being and also order

differences between these levels: and all this by judgments that do not in-

volve risk and uncertainty (contra von Neumann–Morgenstern cardinal

measure of utility)).

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26. [The following remarks, entitled “Transition from Utilitarianism,” constitute the

ﬁrst section of a 1976 lecture on “Locke and Social Contract Doctrine.” —Ed.]

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’s is teleological: no notions of the right

are required for the deﬁnition of utilities.

(2) Now the intuitive idea of classical utilitarianism has a number of at-

tractive features. Indeed, it can seem self-evident that what we should do is

maximize the good; or that we should always do that action which, in the

circumstances, will most likely have the best consequences, all things con-

sidered. Classical utilitarianism seems a clear way of formulating this view.

So formulated, it has many admirable features:

(a) It is a single principle maximizing conception.

(b) Thus, it needs no priority rules, in theory; all working rules are ap-

proximations, rules of thumb, etc.

jects.

(d) It has but one basic notion—the good; and then introduces others

(right and moral worth) via the maximizing idea.

(e) It has often seemed to be readily expressible in mathematical form

suitable for reasoning using calculus, and it has been so used in economics.

One should keep these features in mind. Throughout these lectures I

have tried to stress the simple, underlying intuitive ideas that seem to guide

the development and formulation of ethical and political conceptions. So

understood:

Classical utilitarianism evolves from the notion of maximizing the good;

it readily ﬁts with the idea of using all means for the promotion of good

in the best way (the most rational husbanding of social instruments and

resources).

Such is the structure of the classical view.

(3) In discussing this doctrine I have suggested that its simplicity may be

deceptive:

(a) That in deﬁning the good itself, what the u

’s are a measure of, we

must be careful to abide by the constraints of a teleological theory: the u

’s

cannot include an adjustment for feelings of resentment, or disinterested aver-

sions to unreason (Sidgwick); for attitudes regarding distribution (Gini-coef-

ﬁcient), and so on.

(b) The procedures of interpersonal comparisons may themselves em-

bed principles of right, which need to be then made explicit and require an

explanation: e.g. zero-one rule; other standard assumptions.

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’saretobesummed rather than, e.g., multiplied is itself an

ethical assumption; e.g. only summing is indifferent to distribution.

(d) Moreover, all the various constraints (a), (b), (c) above may naturally

suggest, or even force, a certain conception of the person: e.g. that of a con-

tainer-person (as found in Sidgwick).

Thus the thought is this: if we pay attention to what is going on in the

classical doctrine we see that it is not so simple as it at ﬁrst appears. Of

course, this is no objection. But it alerts us to the fact that any reasonable po-

litical conception is bound to have a complex structure, even if it does de-

velop from some simple intuitive idea. Presumably, social contract theory

will show the same features.

(4) A ﬁnal comment on the use of the notion of a utility function. This

term is often used (in economics and elsewhere) as a mathematical repre-

sentation of someone’s preferences, choices, decisions, etc. For example,

one could use a utility function to represent the decisions, or judgments, of

an intuitionist (TJ, §7). Or these functions could be used to represent the

collective social decisions made by a society; or by its members as they

make choices via their constitution.

In my view, it is very unfortunate that the notion of utility function is

used in this broad way: it would be much better to do the following:

(a) Adopt some other term as appropriate in each case: such as, (multi-

ple) objective function; social decision function; or constitutional choice

function. Avoid terms like “utility”- or “welfare-functions” that have special

and restrictive connotations.

(b) Realize that such objective- or decision- or judgment-functions

merely represent or describe for purposes of some theory what some agent’s

choices or decisions are (the agent may be a person, ﬁrm, association, soci-

ety, etc.). The function may not take any account at all of how this agent de-

cides, of what complex of principles they actually employ. E.g., take the

case of an intuitionist judgment-function.

not representation in the thin sense, but grasping the complex of principles

that enter into and regulate the judgments actually made, or that would be

made in reﬂective equilibrium.

(d) Also, mathematically speaking, the representation-function may be

such that there is no natural sense in which it describes the agent as maxi-

mizing anything. E.g., there may be multiple objectives; or lexical orderings

(no continuous representative function).

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(e) Finally, we will not have a classical utilitarian theory unless the rep-

resentation-function observes all the restrictions of the appropriate teleo-

logical theory.

To sum up the main point overall:

Anyone’s moral or political judgments can, let’s assume, be represented

by some mathematical function. In terms of this function, one can say:

they judge as if they think that in each case society should maximize this

function, promote the best consequences (as deﬁned by this function).

But this way of speaking implies no speciﬁc political conception. The

question then is: what is the shape, or what are the special features of this

function; and what conceptions and principles stand behind it in the thought

and judgments of agents (individuals and society)?

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five lectures on joseph butler

lecture i

The Moral Constitution of Human Nature

§1. Introduction: Life (1692–1752), Works, and Aims

(1) Joseph Butler was born at Wantage, Berkshire, in 1692. His father

was Presbyterian and wanted his son to enter the Presbyterian ministry.

Butler attended a well-known Dissenting Academy at Gloucester (later

moved to Tewksbury) where, in due course, he decided to convert to the

Church of England. In 1714, at the rather mature age of 22, he entered

Oriel College, Oxford, as a commoner, and took his arts degree in 1718.

That same year he was ordained deacon and then raised to the priesthood

by Bishop Talbot at St. James, Westminster. Also that year, 1718, he was

made preacher at Rolls Chapel, London—a post he held until 1726. During

these years he wrote the Sermons on which his reputation in moral philoso-

phy largely rests. These were ﬁrst published in 1726. Butler held various

other positions, eventually becoming Bishop of the wealthy See of Durham

in 1750. He died two years later.

Besides the Sermons, Butler is well known for his later work, The Analogy

of Religion, published ten years after the Sermons, in 1736. I shall not say

much about this work, but it is important to keep it in mind, as it tells us a

great deal about Butler’s background conceptions and the framework of

ideas within which his moral philosophy is to be understood. To forget this

background is precisely the kind of mistake in interpretation I want to

avoid. I should add that the Analogy contains two short Appendices, one on

personal identity, the other a brief dissertation (as he calls it) of virtue. The

latter we shall also read.

(2) Although it is clear from his style that Butler did not enjoy the

rough-and-tumble of controversy, his works are nevertheless designed to re-

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fute certain deﬁnite views and writers in his day. Butler’s aims were in the

following sense practical:

(a) He did not trouble to prove truths that no one denied. He took no

interest in ﬁnding new or more elegant ways of establishing received truths.

(b) He only attacks what he regards as dangerous, that is, morally cor-

rupting or tending to undermine beliefs and virtues necessary for human

society, or the integrity of Christian faith. Essentially, Butler is an apologist

in the old sense: a defender of morals and reasonable belief. For him, phi-

losophy is defense, as it is also, in an interestingly different way, for Kant.

his opponents. He is happy to recognize shared assumptions and to de-

fend morals and reasonable religious belief from this common ground. His

style is respectful and moderate, although there are occasionally strong

statements concerning the pernicious consequences of the views he is at-

tacking.

(3) Butler’s philosophical temperament is practical also in another sense:

he takes little interest in metaphysical or epistemological or other philo-

sophical questions for their own sake. He avoids philosophical subtleties;

speculative questions are beyond our reach. There are two chapters in the

Analogy, the titles of which express this attitude: Part I, Chapter 7, “Of the

Government of God, Considered as a Scheme or Constitution Imperfectly

Comprehended,” and Part II, Chapter 4, “Of Christianity, Considered as a

Scheme or Constitution Imperfectly Comprehended.”

Thus, Butler’s practical aim is simply to conﬁrm us in our moral and re-

ligious practice in everyday life. He is not concerned to elaborate new

moral values or to work out a new basis for the moral virtues, and similarly

for religious practice. He is a conservative, a defender of morals and rea-

sonable Christian belief. We do not need philosophy for practical life in so-

ciety; we do need it, however, when the basis of our practical life is attacked

by philosophical means. We must, as it were, ﬁght philosophy with philoso-

phy, and only with philosophy so far as necessary.

§2. Butler’s Opponents

We can divide Butler’s opponents into two groups as follows:

(1) Certain moral philosophers, especially Hobbes, but also Shaftesbury

and Hutcheson, among others. Where Butler differs from them is clear

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from the Sermons, where the references are explicit. His main antagonist

is Hobbes and the various writers Hobbes inﬂuenced, or who expressed

related views, such as Mandeville. Concerning Hobbes, it is useful as a

schema for looking at the history of modern philosophy to see it as begin-

ning with him. Hobbes was seen in his day as the most dramatic expression

of modern inﬁdelity, and no wonder, in view of the enormous power of

his work, The Leviathan, perhaps the greatest work on moral and political

philosophy in the English language, even though its main thesis must be

considered false. Hobbist doctrines we understand to imply materialism,

determinism, and egoism. He was thought to deny a reasonable basis for

morals—hence, Hobbism involved amoralism and recognized rational cal-

culation of interests as the only kind of practical or rational deliberation.

Hobbes was said to base political obligation on relations of power, and to

deny any objective or shared basis for morals. It was left to the Sovereign to

decide upon the content of society’s laws, which represent, therefore, pub-

lic conventions enforced by the Sovereign’s monopoly of power when the

Sovereign is effective.

Plainly, Butler is much concerned to refute this view (as were

Cudworth and Clarke, and the utilitarians, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and

Hume). Butler is concerned with this task not only in those places where

Hobbes is explicitly referred to (e.g. Sermon I: 4, footnote), but Butler’s

conception of the constitution of human nature is itself the centerpiece of

this reply. Clearly it differs from Hobbes (as interpreted) in ascribing to hu-

man nature a principle of benevolence and the supreme principle of con-

science which directs us to the moral virtues and prompts us to act from

them for their own sake.

Beyond these evident differences there is a more basic difference,

namely: Hobbes had drawn a picture of human nature that often describes

us as unﬁt for society—as driven by vanity and the desire for glory and self-

display. Even our reason is a hazard to us; it leads us to speculate and

to imagine that we can understand more things and to run society better

than anyone else. Our reason can make us fanatics (Hobbes has in mind

preachers of sects) and render society ungovernable, unless we somberly

recognize our situation and coolly calculate on the basis of our funda-

mental interest in our self-preservation. What Hobbes took to be the mad-

ness of the English Civil War lies behind this picture of our unﬁtness for

society. It is this picture of ourselves, as unﬁt for society, that Butler opposes

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with his conception of the moral constitution of human nature. This

should become clear in a moment when I sketch the outlines of this consti-

tution.

(2) The other group of Butler’s opponents, although they are not of di-

rect concern to us, are the English Deists of his day. These writers attacked

the necessity of Revelation and of the Scheme of Christian Faith (to use

Butler’s term) as based on Revelation. The Deists believed that natural

theology was sufﬁcient: reason can establish the existence of God as creator

of the world and a being of supreme intelligence and power, and an exem-

plar of justice and benevolence. Two of these writers were John Toland

(1670–1722) who wrote Christianity not Mysterious; and Matthew Tindal,

who wrote Christianity as Old as the Creation, which appeared after Butler’s

Sermons in 1730. It is works such as these that Butler attacks in the Analogy

(1736).

Thus notice that Butler accepts as premises the Deist view, as just

stated. Butler takes for granted that God exists as creator of the world, etc.,

both in the Sermons and in the Analogy. We must not forget these back-

ground premises in reading and interpreting the Sermons. For example,

there appears to be in Butler an inconsistency in what he says about the su-

premacy of conscience and the claims of cool and reasonable self-love.

Whether he is consistent here may depend on these background assump-

tions. We shall come back to this later.

§3. The Moral Constitution of Human Nature

This brings us to the main topic for today. But ﬁrst let me make a remark

about the content of the Preface and the ﬁrst three sermons.

(1) The Preface was added in the second edition and gives a survey of

the main theses of the Sermons. The prominence given to the constitution

of human nature shows that Butler regarded it as the centerpiece of his

moral doctrine. The ﬁrst Sermon describes this constitution in greater de-

tail; the second Sermon focuses on the notion of the authority of con-

science vs. the inﬂuence of the promptings of conscience. This is an impor-

tant distinction which Butler tries to explain and support by an appeal to

our moral experience. Next time, I shall try to examine what he says here in

more detail. The third Sermon takes up the question of the possible con-

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ﬂict between the authority of conscience and cool and reasonable self-love.

Butler also discusses this question in the Preface: pars. 29 and 41, and in Ser-

mon XI: 20–21.

(2) Let us turn to the notion of a constitution of human nature. Butler

thinks this notion involves various features:

(a) Human nature has various parts, or psychologies, or intellectual

powers and dispositions.

Butler distinguishes:

(i) Appetites, affections, and passions of various kinds, and here we

should include attachments to particular persons, places, and things, includ-

ing institutions and traditions.

(ii) The two general and rational or deliberative principles of benevo-

lence and reasonable self-love. There is some ambiguity in Butler’s account

of benevolence; he sometimes describes it as an affection or passion, and at

others as a general and deliberative principle. This is not a major difﬁculty,

and we can clear it up when we come to Sermons XI–XII. For the time be-

ing, let’s think of benevolence as a general and deliberative principle (and

so, as a higher-order principle).

(iii) The supreme principle of reﬂection (as Butler sometimes says), of

the principle of conscience. This is the principle or the power of moral

judgment, and the judgments of conscience prompt us to act from the

moral virtues—veracity, honesty, justice, gratitude, and so on, for their

own sake.

(b) Such are the parts of human nature. The notion of a constitution

requires that these parts stand in certain relations. They are organized in a

hierarchy and governed or directed by a supreme regulative principle. With

this requirement in mind, it appears that Butler describes the relation of

organization as having three levels: the lowest, the affections and passions;

next, the general and rational deliberative principles of benevolence and

reasonable self-love; and the highest, the principle of reﬂection or con-

science. Thus the idea of a constitution, for Butler, implies that normally

an authoritative decision of judgment is given when such a decision is re-

quired. To ascribe to conscience this authoritative and supremely regula-

tive role is to say that the deliverances or judgments of conscience, when

they are called for, specify conclusive or decisive reasons for what we are to

do. The appeal to conscience is ﬁnal; it settles the matter.

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