Rawls J. Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy

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munist society we are considering. Recall that communism equals radical

egalitarianism without coercion. This idea still holds and it involves:

(a) The equal claim of all to have equal access to and use of society’s

means of production.

(b) Everyone’s equal claim to take part along with others in the public

and democratic procedures by which the economic plan is formed.

wants to perform, if there is such work (presumably there is some).

Hence the distribution of goods is just if we accept equality as just.

Moreover, the equal right of all to the use of resources and to participation

in democratic public planning is respected, so far as such planning is neces-

sary. So in this sense—with this idea of justice—communist society is cer-

tainly just.

2. But in another sense, communist society is, it seems, beyond justice.

That is, while it achieves justice in the sense just deﬁned, it does so without

any reliance on people’s sense of right and justice. The members of com-

munist society are not people moved by the principles and virtues of jus-

tice—that is, by the disposition to act from principles and precepts of jus-

tice. People may know what justice is, and they may recall that their

ancestors were once moved by it; but a troubled concern about justice, and

debates about what justice requires, are not part of their common life.

These people are strange to us; it is hard to describe them.

However, this absence of concern with justice was a feature that at-

tracted Marx. We should ask ourselves whether this is indeed an attractive

feature. Can we really understand what it would be like? Consider what

Mill says in On Liberty, III: 9.

It is easy to reject Marx’s limitless abundance

as utopian. But the question of the desirability of the evanescence of jus-

tice raises a much deeper question.

To me it is both undesirable as such, and also as a matter of practice.

Just institutions will not, I think, come about of themselves, but depend to

some degree—although not of course solely—on citizens having a sense of

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A Society of Freely Associated Producers

12. Mill says that it is “by cultivating [what is individual in themselves] and calling it

forth, within the limits imposed by the rights and interests of others, that human beings

become a noble and beautiful object of contemplation. ...Asmuchcompression as is nec-

essary to prevent the stronger specimens of human nature from encroaching on the rights

of others cannot be dispensed with. ...Tobeheld to rigid rules of justice for the sake of

others, develops the feelings and capabilities which have the good of others for their ob-

ject.”

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justice learned in the contexts of those very institutions themselves. The

absence of concern with justice is undesirable as such, because having a

sense of justice, and all that it involves, is part of human life and part of un-

derstanding other people and of recognizing their claims. To act always as

we have a mind to act without worrying about or being aware of others’

claims, would be a life lived without an awareness of the essential condi-

tions of a decent human society.

Concluding Remarks

I have tried to explain the central place in Marx’s view of the idea of a soci-

ety of freely associated producers conducting their species-life—as he called

it—in accordance with a public and democratically arrived at economic

plan which all understand and in which all participate.

When society conducts itself in this way, ideological consciousness dis-

appears and there is no alienation or exploitation. There is a unity of the-

ory and practice: we all understand why we do what we do, and what we

do realizes our natural powers under conditions of freedom. The idea of a

society-wide public and democratic economic plan has very deep roots and

fundamental consequences in Marx’s thought. It is important to see this, es-

pecially now when the collapse of communism may easily tempt us to

overlook these connections and to suppose that the very idea of a demo-

cratic economic plan is discredited. Although we may reject it, we must try

to understand why this idea had such a central place in the socialist tradi-

tion and what signiﬁcance it has for us now.

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marx

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appendixes

Four Lectures on Henry Sidgwick

Five Lectures on Joseph Butler

Course Outline

index

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four lectures on henry sidgwick

(Fall 1976, 1979)

lecture i

Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics

§1. Preliminary Remarks

(1) You will recall that in the ﬁrst lecture on Hume, I remarked that

the historical tradition of utilitarianism extends roughly from 1700 until

1900. And what I call the “classical line” within that tradition is repre-

sented by Bentham, Edgeworth, and Sidgwick (the “BES line,” let’s say).

Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics (1st edition, 1874; 7th and last edition, 1907)

is the most reﬁned and complete philosophical statement of the doctrine

(combining Bk. I, Ch. 9; Bk. II, Ch. 2; Bk. III, Chs. 13 & 14; Bk. IV, entire)

and may be said to conclude that phase of the historical development.

Bentham and Edgeworth are both more original in contributing basic ideas

to the classical principle of utility as a sharp and deﬁnite notion subject

to mathematical interpretation, in contrast to Hume’s much looser no-

tion of utility as the happiness and necessities of society; although if we

press Hume’s account of the point of view of the judicious spectator in

a certain way, a natural transition to the classical principle is latent in it.

(See Hume Lecture II and the discussion below.) Sidgwick’s originality

lies in his conception of moral philosophy itself: what it is, how to do it,

and so on.

(2) In considering the three utilitarian writers—Hume, Sidgwick, and

J. S. Mill—we are ﬁxing in the ﬁrst instance upon the notion of utility and

paying attention to how it is deﬁned and understood. And we shall ﬁnd

three quite different notions of utility in Hume, Sidgwick (or BES), and in

J. S. Mill.

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In Hume Lecture II we looked at Hume’s account of the point of view

of the judicious spectator

to see:

(i) How Hume understood the role of this point of view in his psy-

chological and naturalistic account of morality; and

(ii) Whether it contained an intuitive way of arriving at a sharper

(more exact) notion of utility than Hume uses in the Treatise, the

Enquiry, and in “Of the Original Contract,” which notion we saw

did not present a clear contrast with Locke’s Social Contract cri-

terion, when both are used as normative principles.

I made the suggestion that such a natural or intuitive way can be found

as follows:

(a) We pick up on Hume’s idea that moral approvals and disapprovals

are continuous with natural human emotions—original passions of our na-

ture (and innate to it)—namely, love and hatred. Or in the Enquiry, continu-

ous with the principle of humanity (benevolence).

(b) These approvals and disapprovals are founded on the principle of

humanity as aroused from the point of view of the judicious spectator. In

this connection note the important paragraph 5 of Sec. VI of the Enquiry,

where Hume says: “The same endowments [qualities of character] of the

mind, in every circumstance, are agreeable to the sentiment of morals and

to that of humanity; the same temper is susceptible of high degrees of the

one sentiment and of the other; and the same alteration in the objects, by

their nearer approach or by connexions, enlivens the one and the other.”

Hume goes on: “By all rules of philosophy, therefore, we must con-

clude that these sentiments are originally the same [he means, in origin

they are the same in the self now]; since, in each particular, even the most

minute, they are governed by the same laws [and to the same degree], and

are moved by the same objects.”

moral judgments, and it is not unnatural to say that from the point of view

of the judicious spectator we approve more strongly, to a higher degree, of

one institution or set of qualities than another, if it produces (or seems de-

signed to produce) more happiness. Greater happiness enlivens our senti-

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appendix

1. For the term “judicious spectator” see Treatise on Human Nature, Bk. III, Pt. III, Sec.

1, ¶14.

2. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, pp. 235–236.

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ments more. And thus we are on the way to the Bentham-Edgeworth-

Sidgwick deﬁnition of utility.

There are some signs of this sharper notion in Hume, but not many. At

one point in the Enquiry he refers to the “balance of good” (App. III); and at

another he shows an awareness of the principle of diminishing marginal

utility: in the discussion of the impracticality of perfect equality (in Sec. III,

par. 25, p. 194). But essentially, the sharper notion must wait for the BES

line. By calling it “sharper” I do not mean to imply that all things consid-

ered the sharper notion is better, philosophically speaking. It does, how-

ever, pose a clearer contrast with other views, and that is a gain: we can

now see more clearly, at least, where some of the differences lie between

utilitarianism and the social contract tradition. It is partly to gain this sharp-

ness and clarity that we take up Sidgwick.

(3) The Methods of Ethics as a philosophical work: I regard this book, no

doubt somewhat eccentrically, as important both as a philosophical work

and as having a distinctive historical signiﬁcance.

(a) For one thing, the book is symbolic of the re-entry of Oxford and

Cambridge into the English philosophical tradition in an unconstrained and

serious way. Remember how recent all of this is; it can be dated from 1870

roughly. Sidgwick played some part in this by refusing to subscribe to the

Thirty-nine Articles in 1869,

and resigning his fellowship at Trinity College.

This is not to say that there were no important University ﬁgures before

Sidgwick: for there were, for example, F. D. Maurice, Whewell, and John

Grote; but they were all Anglicans and rejected utilitarianism and empiri-

cism (as represented by Hume, Bentham, the Mills, etc.). One might say

they were committed to opposing utilitarianism because they regarded it as

inconsistent with their religious convictions. There is no harm in that, as

such; but when it’s a condition of being at the University, the picture

changes.

(b) The Methods of Ethics is the clearest and most accessible formulation

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Four Lectures on Henry Sidgwick

3. [The Thirty-nine Articles were the principal confession of the Church of England,

set forth in 1563, and approved by the Anglican Convocation and by Parliament in 1571.

They were based in large part on the Lutheran Augsburg Confession (1530) and the Con-

fession of Württemberg (1562). They afﬁrm the orthodox Christian doctrines of the Trin-

ity, the Person of Christ, and human sinfulness, and they are Protestant, or “Reformed

Catholic,” in character in their emphasis on justiﬁcation by faith, the Scriptures, and only

two holy sacraments. See Stephen Sykes and John Booty, eds., The Study of Anglicanism

(New York: Fortress Press, 1988), pp. 134–137. —Ed.]

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of the classical utilitarian doctrine. This classical doctrine holds that the ul-

timate moral end of social and individual action is the greatest net sum of

the happiness of all sentient beings. Happiness is speciﬁed (as positive or

negative) by the net balance of pleasure over pain, or, as Sidgwick preferred

to say, as the net balance of agreeable over disagreeable consciousness. In

Sidgwick’s day the classical doctrine as just adumbrated had been long fa-

miliar from Bentham’s works and their wide inﬂuence on subsequent writ-

ers. What makes The Methods of Ethics so important is that Sidgwick is more

aware than other classical authors of the many difﬁculties this doctrine

faces, and he attempts to deal with these difﬁculties in a consistent and

thorough way while never departing from the strict doctrine, as for exam-

ple J. S. Mill did. Sidgwick’s book, therefore, is the most philosophically pro-

found of the strictly classical works, and it may be said to bring to a close

that period of the tradition.

truly academic work in moral philosophy (in English), modern both in its

method and in the spirit of its approach. It treats moral philosophy as any

other branch of knowledge. It undertakes to provide a systematic compara-

tive study of moral conceptions, starting with those which historically and

by present assessment are the most signiﬁcant. Sidgwick undertook this

study because he thought that a reasoned and satisfactory justiﬁcation of

the classical doctrine (and indeed of any other moral conception) could be

given in no other way. And such a justiﬁcation he hoped to give. To this end

Sidgwick tries to reduce all the main moral conceptions to three: egoistic

hedonism, intuitionism, and universal hedonism (the classical utilitarian

doctrine). After describing the subject of ethics and its boundaries in Book

I, the three subsequent books take up these three conceptions in the above-

mentioned order, although it should be observed that universal hedonism

has been explained and argued for as superior to intuitionism by the end

of Book III. The systematic justiﬁcation of universalistic hedonism over

intuitionism is given in Book IV. We expect Sidgwick to go on and to argue

that universalistic hedonism is also superior to egoistic hedonism, since it is

clear that his philosophical and moral sympathies are with the former. But

he ﬁnds that he cannot do so. He believes that both forms of hedonism

equally satisfy the standards of reasoned justiﬁcation he has so carefully for-

mulated. Sidgwick concludes with dismay that our practical reason seems

to be divided against itself; and whether and how this division can be re-

[ 378 ]

appendix

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solved he leaves as a problem, not for a work in ethics, but to be taken up

only after we have made a general examination of the criteria of true and

false beliefs.

(d) The Methods of Ethics has two serious defects that need not concern

us now: (i) it undertakes a somewhat narrow range of comparisons and

omits, I think, several fundamental aspects of a moral conception; (ii)

Sidgwick fails to see Kant’s doctrine as a distinct moral conception worth

of study in its own right. Still, Sidgwick does present a full and well-done

across-the-board comparison with intuitionism.

(e) Sidgwick’s originality lies in his conception of the subject of moral

philosophy, and in his view that a reasoned and satisfactory justiﬁcation of

any particular moral conception must proceed from a full knowledge and

systematic comparison of the more signiﬁcant moral conceptions in the

philosophical tradition. The Methods of Ethics is a fundamental work be-

cause it develops and displays this conception of moral philosophy with a

secure mastery and a full command of the necessary details. An accurate

understanding and informed assessment of the classical utilitarian doc-

trine—which is still highly relevant for the moral philosophy of our time—

may best start from a careful study of Sidgwick’s treatise.

The academic nature of the work, and no doubt certain features of

Sidgwick’s style, make the work hard going; it can easily seem dull and tir-

ing, but academic works are not seldom dull, even when of the ﬁrst rank,

unless one gets into the ideas and comes to the work sufﬁciently prepared.

How could it be otherwise? So my job is to try to tell you enough about

The Methods of Ethics and its background so that you are in a position to ap-

preciate the argument at least. You won’t ﬁnd it entertaining. Take it a little

bit at a time.

(4) Sidgwick’s Life: Sidgwick’s entire life fell within the reign of Queen

Victoria (1837–1901): he was born on May 31, 1838, and died on August 28,

1900. Grandson of a well-to-do cofﬁn manufacturer, his father went to Trin-

ity College Cambridge and became an Anglican clergyman, and then was

appointed master of the grammar school in Skipton, Yorkshire. He died in

1841.

Henry Sidgwick attended Rugby, then went to Trinity in 1855 and after

a brilliant career as an undergraduate became a Fellow of Trinity in 1859 (at

the age of 21). Sidgwick resigned his fellowship in 1869 (at age 31) because

of his religious doubts; subscription to the Thirty-nine Articles of the

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Four Lectures on Henry Sidgwick

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Church of England was required by law for the tenure of fellowship.

was promptly given a special position that did not require subscription to

the Articles; and he was re-appointed Fellow when the law requiring sub-

scription was repealed. Sidgwick became Knightbridge Professor (following

Birks, successor to F. D. Maurice) in 1883, at the age of 45. He never taught

elsewhere. William James wanted him to come to Harvard for the year

1900, but Sidgwick seemed not interested in pursuing the opportunity.

In 1876 at age 39 Sidgwick married Eleanor Balfour, who was the sister

of Arthur Balfour, subsequently the Prime Minister. She founded Newn-

ham College, the ﬁrst place of higher education for women in Cambridge.

Of G. E. Moore, his student, Sidgwick said: “His acumen—which is re-

markable in degree—is in excess of his insight.”

§2. The Structure and Argument of The Methods of Ethics

(1) Perhaps the ﬁrst thing to notice about The Methods of Ethics is that is

does not set out to advocate or to justify some particular moral and philo-

sophical, or theological, doctrine. In this way, it is different from most of

the works that precede it: e.g. by Hobbes and Locke, Bentham and J. S.

Mill. Of course, this is part of what I meant by saying that The Methods of

Ethics treats moral philosophy as any other branch of knowledge.

But more than this, note Sidgwick’s remark in the Preface to the ﬁrst

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appendix

4. [The following remarks were among Rawls’s notes on Sidgwick, on the thoughts

that led him to resign his fellowship. The remarks appear to follow J. B. Schneewind’s dis-

cussion in Sidgwick’s Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

1977), pp. 48–52. —Ed.] “Sidgwick on ‘The Ethics of Conformity and Subscription’ (1870):

What is the duty of progressive members of a religious community to that community,

with regards to expressing dissenting views? Sidgwick thinks one must choose between

two evils: loss of veracity and absolute unchangeability. One must accept some insincerity,

the evil of which can be lessened only if: (1) there is some maximum thereof [of insincer-

ity]; (2) we encourage open avowal of dissent. Three main features [of Sidgwick’s essay]:

(1) It is a realistic appraisal [of actual practice], not ideal [society]; (2) There are no clear

common-sense rules to guide us in deciding how to act when two duties conﬂict [e.g. the

duty of veracity and duty of ﬁdelity to one’s chosen church]; (3) Difﬁculties and conﬂicts

are to be resolved by some form of appeal to the utilitarian principle.”

5. See J. B. Schneewind, Sidgwick’s Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy, pp. 15–17. For

those who wish to consult a secondary work on Sidgwick’s ethics, Schneewind’s book is

highly recommended. It provides a comprehensive discussion of Sidgwick’s doctrine and

locates it within the history of English moral philosophy.

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