Rawls J. Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy

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3. The other kind of ideological consciousness is delusions. These again

are or involve false beliefs; but they may also involve false or irrational val-

ues. These are values we would not espouse were we fully aware of why

we hold them, or were it not for certain psychological needs that press

upon us and subject us to special strains characteristic of those in our social

position and role.

As is well known, Marx thought religion was a form of ideological con-

sciousness in this sense. But Marx thought it is quite pointless to criticize re-

ligion as Feuerbach and the young Hegelians did, by maintaining that reli-

gious alienation is a ﬁxation on an imaginary fulﬁllment in an imaginary

world. Much of Feuerbach’s psychology of religion may be correct, but ex-

plaining it to people does not help them to overcome their religion.

The reason Marx thought such criticism pointless is that the psychologi-

cal needs to which Feuerbach’s account refers depend on existing social

conditions. Religion is part of people’s psychological adjustment to their

class position and social role. Until social conditions are changed so that

people’s true human needs can be effectively satisﬁed in a society of freely

associated producers, religion will persist. In Capital, I (Tucker, 327), Marx

says: “The religious reﬂex of the real world can, in any case, only then

ﬁnally vanish, when the practical relations of everyday life offer to man

none but perfectly intelligible and reasonable [durchsichtig vernunftig] rela-

tions with regard to his fellowmen and to Nature.”

This reminds us of the point of Marx’s Thesis XI—the last thesis—on

Feuerbach, which says, in its entirety, “The philosophers have only inter-

preted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it.” It re-

minds us also of Hegel’s remark: “Once we look at the world rationally, it

will look rationally back.” To this Marx adds, in effect, that we can’t look at

the world rationally until we are rational; and we can’t be rational until our

social world is rational. Therefore, when conditions allow, we must change

our social world so that it is made rational.

4. In Marx’s view, another kind of delusion rests on the needs of the so-

cial system and on the needs of the individuals in it if the social system is to

work properly. Now the capitalist system involves robbery and theft in that

it involves the appropriation of the workers’ surplus product in violation of

their equal claim of access to society’s means of production. Yet the cap-

italist mode of production has the historical role of building up the means

of production so that a society of freely associated producers is possible. It

is essential to the smooth working of capitalism (when it is serving its his-

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torical role) that this robbery and theft be hidden from view. This is be-

cause, seeing both capitalists and workers as decent people, capitalists don’t

want to be, or to be seen as robbers, and workers don’t want to be, or to be

seen as robbed. This is, as it were, part of Hegel’s List der Vernunft, “the cun-

ning of reason.”

So in its high period, the juridical conception of justice, which Marx

sometimes mocks as “the very Eden of the innate rights of man” (Capital,

Vol. I, Chapter VI, Tucker, p. 343), enables all economic agents, capitalists

and workers alike, to think of their position as just and their income and

wealth as deserved. This, along with the deceptive appearances of capitalist

institutions, smoothes the operations of the social order.

In a society of freely associated producers, these delusions are no

longer needed: the workings of the economy are guided by a publicly

known democratic plan and so are open to view, and this without disturb-

ing consequences.

§4. A Society without Alienation

1. The second of the requirements for a society of freely associated pro-

ducers is that there be no alienation and no exploitation. In the Paris Manu-

scripts of 1844, in a section entitled “Estranged Labor” (Tucker, pp. 70–81),

Marx discusses four aspects of the idea of alienation:

Under the capitalist mode of production the workers are alienated,

ﬁrst, from the product of their labor, from what they produce. It be-

comes an alien thing: that is, for one thing, it is owned and controlled by

others—the capitalists—who may dispose of the product of workers’ labor

as they—the capitalists—decide.

But more than this, the surplus labor of the workers builds up the great

mass of (real) capital, and hence it becomes the wealth of and in the control

of the class whose interests are antagonistic to theirs. The products of labor also

appear on the market, and the movement of prices—which are competi-

tively determined—is not understood by the workers (or by anyone else),

since there is no public democratically determined plan of production.

Thus the adjustment to market forces of the prices of what the workers

produce appears to the workers as controlled by an alien power. This power

is independent of them as producers, and it holds them in servitude to the

products of their labor.

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Second, the worker is alienated from the productive activity of labor it-

self. That is, work is external to the workers, as it does not realize their na-

ture. Their work does not exercise or develop their natural powers; nor is it

voluntary, but forced, undertaken only as a means for satisfying other

needs. In short, work is not meaningful.

2. Third, workers are alienated from their species and from their spe-

cies-life (Gattungswesen). So likewise are the capitalists. Now the idea of spe-

cies-life is offhand rather obscure. But it is characteristic of German Ideal-

ism, and it is important not to trivialize it. We trivialize it when, for

example, we say that calling human beings “species beings” means that

they are by nature social beings. Or that they have reason and self-con-

sciousness, and that they are aware of themselves and other human beings

as belonging to one species, each member of which likewise has reason and

self-consciousness.

Rather, I think Marx’s idea is much fuller than this. He means some-

thing like the following: Human beings are a distinctive natural kind—or

species—in the sense that they collectively produce and reproduce the con-

ditions of their social life over time. Yet, along with this their social forms

evolve historically and in a certain sequence until eventually a social form

develops that is more or less adequate to their nature as rational and active

beings who, as it were, create, working with the forces of nature, the condi-

tions of their complete social self-realization. The activity by which this col-

lective self-expression is accomplished is species-activity: that is, it is the co-

operative work of many generations and is completed only after a long

period of time. In short: it is the work of the species over its history. The

species will enter the promised land—full communist society—but not all

of its members will. (Recall Rousseau’s idea of the perfectibility of man in

the Second Discourse.)

An essential part of this social self-creation of human beings over time

is economic activity. To be alienated from species activity is ﬁrst of all not

to comprehend or to understand this process; and second, it is not to partic-

ipate in this activity in a self-realizing way.

If we ask what it means for all to participate in this way, the answer is

provided by the kind of economic scheme that exists in a society of freely

associated producers. We get some idea of what this is from what Marx

says in Gotha about the ﬁrst stage of socialism. I shall come back to this.

The fourth aspect of alienation is that we are alienated from other peo-

ple. Under capitalism, this alienation takes the special form given by the

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free market. In this case the workers are subject to the power of the cap-

italists indirectly. Their power to extract surplus labor is via the market and

not open to view. And the relation between capitalists and workers is one

of antagonism; the members of these classes are alienated from one an-

other, and are in an economic system which tends to make individuals mu-

tually indifferent to one another’s concerns.

3. Thus Marx’s claim about the absence of alienation and exploitation

in a society of freely associated producers I take to be this: If we survey

these four kinds, or aspects, of alienation, then in a society of freely associ-

ated producers, alienation disappears, just as ideological consciousness dis-

appears. This is because all may participate in the democratic and public

planning process and everyone does their share in carrying out the plan

that results.

§5. Absence of Exploitation

1. The second feature of the second requirement of a society of freely

associated producers is the absence of exploitation. Recall that for there to

be exploitation, it is not sufﬁcient that s/v > 0, where s is surplus or unpaid

labor, and v is labor necessary to produce goods for the worker’s own con-

sumption. This is satisfactory in capitalism since capitalists control and

beneﬁt from surplus value. But in a society of freely associated producers—

a socialist society—there is no surplus or unpaid labor. This is because in a

socialist society, as in any just society, there must be a surplus to be used for

the beneﬁt of the worker—for social expenses such as public health, educa-

tion, and welfare. Also, as Marx says: “A deﬁnite quantity of surplus labor is

required as insurance against accidents, and by the necessary and progres-

sive expansion of the process of reproduction in keeping with the develop-

ment of the needs and the growth of population” (Capital, Vol. I, Tucker,

p. 440). Thus, as we saw, what makes s/v > 0 exploitation is the nature of

the basic structure of society within which it arises. The reason there is no

exploitation under socialism lies in the fact that economic activity follows a

public democratic plan in which all participate equally. This respects the

equal claim rooted on Marx’s idea of justice that all have equal access to so-

ciety’s resources.

2. Recall the main features of the background institutions of capitalism

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that lead to exploitation (make the ratio s/v > 0 an indicator of exploita-

tion). They are simply the prerogatives of private ownership in the means

of production, namely:

(a) The aggregate social surplus (total of things produced by surplus la-

bor) falls into the hands of other people (than the workers) who own the

means of production (via procedures of the legal order, just contracts, etc.).

Thus the owners as a class own the output of production.

(b) The owners of the means of production also exercise autocratic

control over the labor process within the ﬁrm and industry. They and not

the workers decide on the introduction and use of new machinery, the ex-

tent and the details of the division of labor, and the rest.

and the direction of the ﬂow of new investment; they decide—each ﬁrm in-

dividually (assuming competition)—where their surplus funds are best in-

vested to maximize long-run proﬁt, etc. Thus, this class determines (as a

whole but not jointly) the use to be made of the social surplus, and the rate

of growth of the economy.

3. Thus, the upshot is that Marx thinks that when these prerogatives

are in the hands of freely associated producers, and exercised through a

public and democratic economic plan that all understand, and in the fram-

ing of which all may participate, there is no exploitation. Nor is there ideo-

logical consciousness or alienation. A society of freely associated producers

achieves the “unity of theory and practice.”

Put another way, their shared understanding of their social world, as ex-

pressed in the public economic plan, is a true description of their social

world. It is also a description of a social world that is just and good. It is a

world in which individuals fulﬁll their true human needs for freedom and

self-development, while at the same time recognizing the claim of all to

have equal access to society’s resources.

§6. Full Communism: First Defect of Socialism Overcome

1. So far, in surveying the idea of a society of freely associated produc-

ers, my aim has been to stress the importance for Marx of the idea of a

public and democratically arrived at economic plan, which all understand

and in which all participate.

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He believed that if a society of freely associated producers follows such

a plan, ideological consciousness disappears and there is no alienation or ex-

ploitation. A unity of theory and practice obtains: we understand why we

do what we do, and what we do realizes our natural powers under condi-

tions of freedom. In the ﬁrst stage of communism—following tradition,

call this stage “socialism”—however, there is still much inequality, due to

the inequality of native endowments and to the fact that labor is rewarded

for its duration and intensity in consumption goods. This reward to un-

equal endowments has been called socialist exploitation.

There is also still division of labor, since, as Marx suggests (Gotha,

Tucker, p. 531), it is only in the higher phase of communist society—again,

following tradition, call this “communism”—that division of labor is sur-

passed. Marx seems to think of these two defects of inequality and division

of labor as inevitable in a society that has just emerged after a prolonged

struggle from capitalist society, as in the case of the ﬁrst stage, socialism.

I am going to accept, for our purposes here, Marx’s idea of a public and

democratic economic plan. I accept also his thought that such a plan elimi-

nates ideological consciousness as well as alienation and exploitation (ex-

cept possibly for the socialist exploitation, as deﬁned by Roemer, above).

There are many difﬁculties with the idea of a public and democratic eco-

nomic plan, and Marx leaves the details extremely vague. He left it as a

problem for the future. I shall not discuss those difﬁculties. Instead, I shall

discuss several other questions closer to our concerns with Marx’s ideas

about justice and his criticism of the liberal tradition.

2. I start by discussing the ﬁrst defect of socialism, the inequality of

shares of consumption goods that results from unequal individual endow-

ments, which results as a “natural privilege.” Recall the passage from Gotha

(Tucker, pp. 530–531):

“Equal right ...isstill in principle bourgeois right.”

“Equal right is still . . . stigmatized by a bourgeois limitation.”

“The right of the producers is proportional to the labor they supply.”

“Equality consists [in applying] an equal standard, labor.”

“But one man is superior to another physically or mentally and so sup-

plies more labor in the same time.”

“Equal right is an unequal right for unequal labor.”

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7. See John Roemer, Value, Exploitation, and Class (New York: Horwood, 1986), pp. 77f.

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“Unequal individual endowment and thus productive capacity [are rec-

ognized] as natural privileges.”

“It is therefore, a right of inequality in its content, like every right.”

“Further, [some have larger families and other differing sound claims].”

“To avoid all these defects, right instead of being equal would have to

be unequal.”

3. Marx seems to accept this inequality as something inevitable in the

ﬁrst phase of communist society. He says: “Right can never be higher than

the economic structure of society and its cultural development conditioned

thereby” (Gotha, Tucker, p. 531). So, we have to wait for economic condi-

tions to change.

But why do we simply have to wait for conditions to change? Why, e.g.,

can’t society, adopting a principle like the Difference Principle,

impose vari-

ous taxes etc. and adjust incentives so that the greater endowments of

some work to the advantage of those with fewer endowments? Is it simply

an oversight on Marx’s part that he doesn’t think of this?

Following G. A. Cohen, let’s say that Marx holds what we may call a lib-

ertarian view that may be deﬁned as follows:

(a) “Each person has full self-ownership in his own person and powers;

and so each person has the moral right to do what he likes with himself,

provided that he does not violate the self-ownership rights of anyone else.”

Therefore,

(b) “He may not be required on pain of coercive penalty to help anyone

else, unless he has contracted to do so.”

Proposition (b) is viewed as a consequence of (a).

4. Still following Cohen, libertarianism, so deﬁned, “may be combined

with other . . . principles with respect to those productive resources which

are not persons”—land and minerals and powers of nature. What we may

call right-wing libertarianism (Robert Nozick in Anarchy, State and Utopia)

“adds that self-owning persons can acquire similarly strong rights in un-

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8. The Difference Principle is the second part of the second of the two principles of

justice in justice as fairness, which states that social and economic inequalities are to satisfy

two conditions: ﬁrst, they are to be attached to ofﬁces and positions open to all under con-

ditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest beneﬁt of

the least-advantaged members of society. Rawls, Restatement, pp. 42f.

9. G. A. Cohen: “Self Ownership, Communism, and Equality,” Proceedings of the Aristo-

telian Society 64 (Supplement), 1990, pp. 1f.

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equal amounts of external natural resources. Left-wing libertarianism is, by

contrast, egalitarian with respect to the distribution of raw external re-

sources: Henry George, Leon Walras, Herbert Spencer, and Hillel Steiner

have occupied this position.”

I would not say that Marx is a left-libertarian, as he certainly would not

put it this way. But it is a view that ﬁts what he says in several respects:

(a) First, it ﬁts his critique of capitalism as we have surveyed it. That cri-

tique bases exploitation on the fact that capitalists own all the means of

production. Now, I have suggested that on Marx’s view everyone has an

equal claim of access to and use of these resources. It is the class monopoly

of the means of production that is the root of exploitation.

(b) Marx does not suggest that the better endowed should be required

to earn their greater consumption shares in ways that contribute to the

well-being of those less well endowed. Beyond respecting everyone’s equal

right of access to external natural resources, no one owes anything to any-

one else, other than what they want to do voluntarily. Those less well off

don’t lack access to external resources; they are simply less well endowed.

not one in which people are told to help one another; or have impressed on

them by its culture various duties and obligations. Rather, it is a society

without such moral teaching, a society in which people have no serious

conﬂicts of interests with one another, and may do as they have a mind to

do, with division of labor overcome (The German Ideology, Tucker, p. 160).

I conclude that Marx would reject the difference principle and simi-

lar principles. As Cohen puts it, he thinks of communism as radical egalitar-

ianism—equal access to society’s resources—without coercion. This last

means that no one can be required to beneﬁt himself only in ways that con-

tribute to others’ well-being. That would be coercive. It would amount to

giving rights to some people (those being aided) as to how other people

shall use their powers—granting that all respect the left-libertarian principle

of right to equal access. I, on the other hand, think we must introduce prin-

ciples like the Difference Principle or other such measures to maintain

background justice over time.

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10. Ibid., p. 118.

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§7. Full Communism: Division of Labor Overcome

1. What makes it possible for division of labor to be overcome? But

ﬁrst, what is bad about division of labor? Well, many things, some listed in

the well-known passage from The German Ideology: “...assoon as the distri-

bution of labor comes into being, each man has a particular, exclusive

sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot es-

cape.He...mustremain so [in that sphere of activity] if he does not want

to lose his means of livelihood; while in communist society, where nobody

has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in

any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus

makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another thing tomorrow

. . . just as I have a mind” (Tucker, p. 160).

2. What, for Marx, are the attractive features of this description of com-

munism? First, we can do “just as we have a mind.” Our activities proceed

harmoniously with those of everyone else. We do as we please, they do as

they please, and we may do things together. But there is no sense of moral

constraint or moral obligation; no sense of being bound by principles of

right and justice.

Communist society is one in which the daily awareness of a sense of

right and justice and of moral obligation has disappeared. In Marx’s view, it

is no longer needed and it no longer has a social role.

3. Another attractive feature for Marx is that each of us may, if we wish,

realize all our various powers and engage in the full range of human activi-

ties. We may all become—if we want to—all-around individuals exhibiting

the full range of human possibilities. This is part of what it means to get

around the division of labor.

Consider that if we were musicians we might want to take turns play-

ing all the instruments in the orchestra. (If this seems far-fetched, let the or-

chestra represent the range of human activities.) On the other hand, there

is a contrasting idea, stated by Wilhelm von Humboldt and further illus-

trated by the analogy of the orchestra in A Theory of Justice, §79, note 4.

This idea [of social union] is that by a division of labor we can cooperate in

realizing one another’s full range of human powers and moreover enjoy to-

gether, in one joint activity, its realization.

This is a different idea: it sees the division of labor as making possible

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what would otherwise be unattainable, and as acceptable provided certain

conditions are met—that it is not forced and exclusive—the same things

Marx objects to. But this is not Marx’s idea. His idea is that of our becom-

ing all-around individuals and joining with others only as we have a mind to

do so. This idea is consistent with the idea of self-ownership as deﬁned ear-

lier, and it is not restricted by an awareness of a sense of right and justice.

4. What makes the overcoming of the division of labor possible? It

seems essentially three things:

(a) Limitless abundance, which results from the building up of the

means of production.

(b) Labor becomes life’s prime need: people need to work and it is no

longer necessary to entice them to do so via incentives.

of (b).

Two passages in Marx are especially relevant for this. In a passage from

Gotha (Tucker, p. 531; McLellan, p. 615), Marx says: Only in the higher

phase of communism is “the narrow horizon of bourgeois right” surpassed

(the inequality we discussed earlier). “The antithesis between mental and

physical labor, has vanished.” Labor has become “not only a means of life

but life’s prime want”; and Society puts on its banner: “From each accord-

ing to his ability, to each according to his needs!”

The other passage, from Capital, Vol. III (Tucker, p. 441), concerns the

realm of freedom beginning “only where labor which is determined by ne-

cessity and mundane considerations ceases.”

5. How should we interpret the precept “From each according to his

ability, to each according to his needs”? It is not, I think, a precept of justice,

or a principle of right. It is simply a descriptive precept or principle that is

accurate to what is done and to how things happen in the higher phase of

communism.

§8. Is the Higher Phase of Communism a Society Beyond Justice?

1. Many people have wanted to say that communism is a society be-

yond justice. But in what sense is it true? It depends on what aspect of com-

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11. This precept is from Louis Blanc, added to his Organization of Work, 9th edition

(Paris, 1850).

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