Rawls J. Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy

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righteous, implies in it the love of righteousness; to be benevolent, the love

of benevolence; to be good, the love of goodness; whether this righteous-

ness, benevolence, or goodness, be viewed as in our own mind, or in an-

other’s: and the love of God as a being perfectly good, is the love of perfect

goodness contemplated in a being or person” (p. 228).

This is restated in XIII: 3 (p. 230); XIII: and par. 6 (pp. 234f ), where But-

ler says: “To be a just, a good, a righteous man, plainly carries with it a pe-

culiar affection to or love of justice, goodness, righteousness, when these

principles are the objects of contemplation. Now if a man approves of, or

hath an affection to, any principle in and for itself; incidental things allowed

for, it will be the same whether he views it in his own mind, or in another;

in himself, or in his neighbour. This is the account of our approbation of,

our moral love and affection to good characters; which cannot but be in

those who have any degrees of real goodness in themselves, and who dis-

cern and take notice of the same principle in others.” Call this a basic prin-

ciple of reﬂective affection: a good affection—an affection to virtue—gener-

ates an affection to itself.

It also explains why we can’t violate conscience

without self-condemnation: we must dislike vice in ourselves.

(b) Next there are two principles which generate love: First, the Princi-

ple of Superior Excellence, XIII: pars. 7–8 (pp. 234–235). Second, the Princi-

ple of Reciprocity: good intentions and actions for our beneﬁt and good

generate a natural gratitude and returning love (XIII: 9–11, pp. 236–238).

work—particularly Principle (a) of reﬂective love—unless we have some de-

gree of moral goodness: i.e., an affection to goodness in our mind and char-

acter: XIII: 9, p. 236.

(d) Principle of Proper Aspiration: XIV: 3, p. 244, which Butler connects

with Resignation = fear-hope-love:

“Resignation to the will of God is the whole of piety: it includes in it all

that is good, and is a source of the most settled quiet and composure of

mind. There is the general principle of submission in our nature.”

(e) Principle of Continuity: XIII: 12, pp. 178f.

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6. See the statement in par. 16 of XI (p. 168) quoted above. See the selection immedi-

ately under section 2a above.

7. [It is not clear what this principle is. The lectures end here abruptly, without further

elaboration or a summary. —Ed.]

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appendix: additional notes on butler

Important Points in Butler

(Hobbes and Butler, the two great sources of modern moral philoso-

phy: Hobbes as posing the problem—the writer to refute. Butler supplied a

deep answer to Hobbes.)

(1) Authority vs. Strength

(2) Dissertation notion of RE = starts here

(3) On Method—Last par. Dissertation on personal identity

(4) Egoism contra Hobbes: Butler holds moral projects as much a part

of the self as other parts of the self: our natural desires, etc. Kant deepens

this by connecting ML (Moral Law) with the self as R+R (Rational and

Reasonable).

(5) In Dissertation Butler attacks Hutcheson’s explanation of the moral

sense.

(6) Butler’s general method is to appeal to experience; but there are dif-

ferent kinds of experience, moral vs. non-moral, memory vs. non-memory

(as in Ref. in 3).

(7) Hume responds to Butler in two ways:

(a) Hume tries to allow for Butler’s distinction of Authority vs. Strength

by the distinction between the calm vs. violent passions.

(b) Hume tries to reply to Butler’s critique of utilitarianism

(Hutcheson) re justice by the distinction between the natural and the arti-

ﬁcial virtues. (Hume concedes Butler is right in saying that justice is not al-

ways beneﬁcial.)

(8) Butler does not want to explain everything; or to go beneath or to

systematize the data of our moral experience. Systematic theory isn’t his

aim. We know enough for our salvation, and that knowledge we should be

clear about and hold ﬁrm.

Sturgeon: on Butler Phil. Review (Schneewind thinks wrong)

Whewell’s chapter on Butler in his History of Ethics: “Butler got the

data right; our task is to work out the theory” (or something like that).

(9) Connect this up with Kant; including his notion of reasonable faith.

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8. [“RE” seems to refer to reﬂective equilibrium, and “Dissertation notion of RE” re-

fers either to Butler’s “Dissertation: Of Personal Identity” or to Rawls’s own dissertation

and his initial account of reﬂective equilibrium worked out there, which was published in

“Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics” (1951), in Rawls, Collected Papers, ed. Samuel

Freeman (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), Ch. 1. —Ed.]

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(10) Butler proposes a new basis for the authority of morals—not reve-

lation or divine will; but moral experience (as available to common sense

and conscience).

Conscience and the Authority of Conscience

Preface: 24–30, esp. 26–28; Sermon I: 8–9; II: entire

Social Nature of Man

Sermon I: 9–13; cf. esp. 10, 12

There is no self-hatred in man, or the desire to hurt others for

their own sake, or of injustice, oppression, treachery, ingratitude, etc. (also

Kant).

Preface: 26–28: to violate conscience is to be self-condemned, we can-

not so act without “real self-dislike.”

Conﬂict [of] Conscience vs. Self-Love

Preface: 16–30; esp. 24; III: 9; XI: 20

Analogy: 87 and 87n

religious and temporal interest of self-love cf. 70f

Conscience in Analogy:

(1) Cannot depart from with[out] self-condemnation: 111

(2) Its dictates are the laws of God, laws as including sanctions: 111

Conﬂict [of] Conscience and Self-Love

: (Passages)

Preface:

Conﬂict with one’s own interest, happiness left without a remedy by

Shaftesbury: 26; 27–30 also relevant

Conﬂict resolved by epistemic certainty [of] conscience: 26

Sermon I:

Paragraph 15: appears to put conscience and self-love on a par

Sermon II: (avoids comparing conscience and self-love)

Conscience principle in the heart, and supreme: 8, 15

Sermon III: discussion 6–9:

Narrow self-interest impossible for us: 6–7

Self-Interest (present and temporal) as maximizing satisfactions

generally

Coincides with virtue and its course of life: 8

And will do so in the ﬁnal distribution of things: 8

Conscience and self-love properly understood co-equal, but we are to

follow conscience always: 9

Sermon XI: 20–21

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Butler’s Aim: To Show Us to Ourselves: II: 1

On Conscience

Its role in Constitution of Human Nature:

The parts of Human Nature set out (Const = Econ): P:14

Supremacy of conscience defs constitution of human nature: P:14

All parts governed by conscience, gives idea of constitution or sys-

tem of human nature: P:14; This system adapted to virtue: P:14

That our constitution is at times disordered doesn’t make it not a

constitution: P:14

In virtue of conscience and our constitution we are moral agents and

accountable: P:14

Nothing more contrary to our nature than vice and injustice: P:15

Constitution of our nature requires us to govern ourselves by con-

science: P:25

Our constitution makes us a law to ourselves and liable to punish-

ment, even when we doubt the sanction: P:29

Its Authority: P:16–30

Conscience as approbation of some principles or actions, etc.: P:19

Conscience and its authority is what distinguishes man from animals:

P:18–24

Conscience claims absolute direction of our constitution: P:24

This claim made independent of strength of inﬂuence: P:24

Shaftesbury’s error: to have a scheme where strength decides: P:26

Why conscience overrides: epistemic argument from certainty and

authority: P:26

We cannot violate our conscience without self-condemnation and

self-dislike: P:28

Conﬂict of conscience and self-love: 16–30

Does not depend on Religion but issues from our own mind: Analogy

I: 7:11

Conscience necessary for governing and regulating other elements of

human nature: II: 8

Argument from disproportion II: 40

Method and Intuitionism

Relation to Clarke, etc. P:12

Appeal to moral facts as Butler’s own method: P:12, 27; II: 1

Appeal to moral experience as sui generis: P:16

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Appeal to moral sense of each person’s heart and natural con-

science: II: 1

(Compares to appeal to the sense re knowledge of things)

Appeal to moral emotions and their role: e.g. shame: II: 1

They cannot be wholly mistaken: II: 1

Why is our nature social?

(1) Shown by appetites and affections, etc. (On resentment, on compas-

sion, Sermons XI–XII)

(2) By general principle of benevolence

(3) By context of conscience

(4) By fact that reasonable self-love would lead us to be social

Is the Constitution of Human Nature Actual or Merely Ideal?

(1) The parts are actual, including conscience.

(2) It is ideal in that it can be disordered; and conscience is not generally

followed.

(3) It is manifest in the actual deliverances of conscience of impartial

and fair-minded persons, given a cool hour.

(4) The const. is then what we would be like in our actions if we gener-

ally followed conscience.

(5) This const. and supremacy of conscience makes us a law unto

ourselves; it makes us responsible and accountable moral and reasonable

agents.

(6) Butler would say: All this is based on facts of our moral experience.

Is Butler an intuitionist? e.g. like Clarke?

Preface

Butler’s acceptance of intuitionism à la Clarke: Pref: 12

Butler’s own method: Pref: 12f

appeal to moral experiences as matters of fact: 12, 27

Const. (or econ) of human nature: Pref: 12f; 14

the various parts: 14

relations of parts and supremacy of conscience: 14

purpose: adopted to virtue: 14

as watch to tell time: 14

Irrelevance of disorders: 14

Constitution of agents accountable for disorders in the const.: 14

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Nothing more contrary with human nature than vice, injustice: 15

Poverty and pain not and why: 15; III: 2

Principle of self-love: 35

Particular passions and appetites: 35

Variety of human motives, as taking turns: P:21

Notion of Authority of Conscience: 14, 16, 19

Difference of kind of moral experience re Harding: 16

Has authority over other parts of our const.: 24

This authority distinguished from strength: 24

This authority implied by reﬂect approbation: 25

Critique Shaftesbury: who omits this authority: 26–30

Conﬂict of conscience vs. rational self-love: 26, 41; III: 5–9; XI: 20–21

Why conscience always overrides (epistemic explanation): 26

Appeal to interest and self-love: 28

Transgression conscience leads to self-condemnation, self-dislike: 28

Man a law to himself: 29

Why punishment still just of unbelievers: 29

Accepts Shaftesbury’s thesis: virtue tends to happiness, vice to

misery: 26, 30

How obligations proved; what our nature and condition require: 33

Moral experience sui generis: 16, 24

Sermon I

Virtue the NL we are born under: 2

Our whole const. adapted to virtue: 2

Social nature of man: complementarity of parts of our const.: 4f; 10

we were born for society and our own good: 9

Principle of Benevolence: 6

Principle of self-love: 6; (cool self-love) 14; II: 10–11 Analogy: I: 3–7

Coincidence Benevolence and Self-love: 6; III: 9: cf III: 5–9

Superior to Passions: II: 10–11

Particular Affections and Passions: 7

How distinct from principles of benevolence and self-love: 7

Why they are viewed as instruments of God: 7

Principle of Reﬂection, or Conscience: 8

Shown by appeal to moral experience: 8

No such thing in human nature as:

Self-hatred: 12

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Ill-will: 12

Love of injustice: 12

Cause of evil and wrong-doing: 12; Broad: 56

Nature of man judged by bulk of mankind: 13

Authority of Conscience vs. Inﬂuence: II: 1–8, 12–14; III: 2

Sense in which natural: II: 8

Ofﬁce of Conscience: II: 8; III: 2 (to manage and preside)

Makes us law to ourselves: II: 4, 8, 9; III: 3

Prerogative, natural supremacy of conscience: 8, 9; III: 2

Example to illustrate unnatural conduct: II: 10

God placed conscience in our const. to be our proper governor: II:

15; III: 3, 5

Right and Wrong can be discerned by the fair-minded without bene-

ﬁt of principles and rules (of philosophy): III: 4

We have the rule of right within: III: 4

Conscience carries its own authority: obligation to obey rests on its

being the law of our nature: III: 5

Conscience as voice of God: III: 5 (Bernard’s interpretation), see

Analogy I: 3:15–16; I: 7:11; II: 1:25; I: 3:13

Virtue as suitable to our nature: III: 9

Appeal to experience: II: 1; 17

Butler’s Aim: II: 1

Equal rank of conscience and self-love: III: 9

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course outline

Philosophy 171:

Political and Social Philosophy—Spring 1983

This class will consider several social contract and utilitarian views

which have been important in the development of liberalism as a philo-

sophical doctrine. Attention will be given to Marx as a critic of liberalism;

and time permitting, the class will end with some discussion of TJ [A Theory

of Justice] and other contemporary views. The focus of the class is narrow

in the hope of achieving some depth of understanding.

A. Introduction

B. Two Social Contract Doctrines: (3 weeks)

1. Hobbes:

a. Human Nature and the Instability of the State of Nature

b. Hobbes’s Thesis and the Articles of Peace

c. Role and Powers of the Sovereign

2. Locke:

a. Doctrine of the FLN

b. Social Contract and the Limits of Political Authority

c. The Legitimate Constitution and Problem of Inequality

C. Two Utilitarian Doctrines: (3 weeks)

1. Hume:

a. Critique of the Social Contract Doctrine

b. Justice, Property, and the Principle of Utility

2. J. S. Mill:

a. The Principle of Utility Revised

b. The Principle of Liberty and Natural Rights

c. Subjection of Women and Principles of the Modern World

d. Private Property, Competitive Markets, and Socialism

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D. Marx: (2½ weeks)

a. The Role of Conceptions of Justice

b. Theory of Ideological Consciousness

c. Theory of Alienation and Exploitation

d. Conception of a Rational Human Society

E. Conclusion: Some Contemporary Views

a. Sketch of the Main Ideas of TJ

b. Their Relation to Some Other Views

Texts

Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Macpherson (Pelican Classics)

Locke, Treatise of Government, ed. Laslett (New American Library)

Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (Liberal Arts)

J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism and On Liberty (Hackett); Subjection of Women (MIT)

Marx, Selected Writings, ed. McLellan (Oxford)

Readings

Leviathan, Pt. I, esp. Chs. 5–16, Pt. II entire; Second Treatise, entire; Enquiry,

entire, and Of the Original Contract (Xerox); Utilitarianism, entire, On Liberty,

esp. Chs. 1–3; Subjection of Women, entire; in McLellan, ed., On the Jewish

Question, #6; Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, #8; On James Mill, #10;

Theses on Feuerbach, #13; German Ideology, #14; Wage-Labor and Capital, #19;

Selections from Grundrisse, #29; and Capital; and Critique of the Gotha Pro-

gram, #40.

Lectures are on Monday and Friday. There will be a ﬁnal examination and a

term paper of approximately 3,000 words.

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Course Outline

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Index

absolute regime, in Hobbes, 82–83

absolutism, 84; Locke on illegitimacy of,

15; royal, and Robert Filmer, 106; royal,

108; could not be contracted into

(Locke), 130; and principle of utility, 175

Ackerman, Bruce, 4, 136n; discourse ethics

of, 19

actions, as object of conscience, and the

moral faculty in Butler, 424–425

activities, higher and lower (Mill), 307–308

Adam, and original sin, 208

Alembert, Jean le Rond d’, 194

alienation: from others (Rousseau), 204; in

Marx, 359; four aspects of (Marx), 362–

363; from product of labor, 362–363;

from productive activity of labor, 363;

from species-life, 363; from other people,

363–364

amour de soi (Rousseau), 230, 236; natural

self love, 197, 201; vs. amour propre, 197–

198, 206; proper form of, 217–218

amour propre (Rousseau), 230, 233, 236; nat-

ural vs. unnatural form of, 198–199; dis-

tinct form of self-concern in society, 198–

200; as unnatural or perverted, 199, 201,

205; Kant on, 199–200; wide view of,

199–200; as natural desire for equality,

200, 205; proper form of, 218

anarchy, and Hobbesian state of nature, 84

Aristotelian principle, in Mill, 269, 300

artiﬁcial duties: vs. natural duties (Hume),

169; justice, ﬁdelity, and allegiance to

government (Hume), 169

artiﬁcial virtue(s): of justice, 177–184; in

Hume, 178, 180; justice as, 180–181; vs.

natural virtue, 180–181

assurance, sovereign’s role of providing,

78–79

Augustine, dark mind of western thought,

302

authority: of sovereign, achieved by its au-

thorization, 79–80; vs. power (Butler),

427; vs. inﬂuence, 429, 431. See also po-

litical authority

authority of conscience: in Butler, 420,

426, 427–428, 453, 454; Butler’s argu-

ments for, 425–432. See also conscience

authorization: of sovereign, 79–80; nature

of, 80

background culture, 6, 7

balance of powers: rejected by Hobbes,

86; check on power, 87

Barber, Benjamin, 2n, 4

basic liberties: equal, list of, 12; in Mill’s

principle of liberty, 288

basic structure of society, 17; and social

contract, 216; primary subject of jus-

tice, 234, 234n; and Mill, 267; and ex-

ploitation, 335, 346

benevolence: Hobbes recognizes, 40; and

human nature, 46–47; as natural virtue,

180–181; Butler’s view of, 418; a higher-

order principle (Butler), 420; and But-

ler’s response to Hutcheson, 425; not

authoritative principle of our nature,

429; not the same as principle of utility,

430; distinguished from affections

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