Potter David. Henry VIII and Francis I

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470 conclusion

of growing preparations. Were these being directed against the Emperor

(as the English were told) or against the English (the story given to the

Emperor)?

Francis I sent Christophe Richer to the King of Denmark

in November 1546, asking him not to conclude any treaty with the

King of England (he had heard that Henry had oered his daughters to

Christians III’s sons!). In his instructions, Francis seemed quite clear that

he thought Henry unlikely to return Boulogne and thought he would

have to nd other means. Nor had he any illusions about the Emperor’s

ambition to submit Germany to his will.

For that reason above all, both France and England needed peace

with each other and for the rest of 1546 royal advisers were content to

gloss over diculties. ese were great. Towards the end of the year,

Anglo-Scottish relations worsened again and it was clear to the French

that a new war was being prepared (see chapter 2). Nor was Henry

averse from such gamesmanship as giving fairly frequent audiences to

the Imperial ambassador, Van der Del, when he moved to Windsor in

October. ese were duly reported to Francis. Selve carefully observed

mysterious movements of large sums money from England to the Low

Countries in November and speculated on their meaning. ey might

be destined to repay debt, to help the Protestants or even the Emperor.

e more likely reason, though, was to purchase arms. All this testi-

ed to continuing lack of trust.

But, as we have seen, Annebault had

tried to draw Henry into some kind of religious alignment in during

his visit to England in August 1546. One of the objectives seems to

have been to get the English to act as mediators with the princes and

open the possibility of joint aid to them. It could also help to put pres-

sure on Pope Paul III, who had been too pro-Imperial in French eyes.

e General Council of the Church, so long in the planning and so

suspected by Henry, was about to open at Trent and French envoys

Wallop to Council, 5 March 1547, CSPF Edward VI, Calais Papers, 55; Edward

Wotton, 25 March 1547; intelligence from a spy at Corbie, 7 Feb. 1547, BL Harl 288,

fo. 57; Edward Wotton to Cobham, 28 March 1547, BL Harl 284, fos. 16–17.

N. Camusat, Mémoires du sieur Richer (Paris, 1625); idem., Mélanges historiques

(Paris, 1644), fo. 12r, 15bis: ‘ledict Roy d’Angleterre faict cognoistre chascun iour par

plusieurs eaicts & demonstrations qu’il n’est deliberé eectuer ledict traicté pour

le regard de la restitution de Boulongne. En quoy faisant le Roy par raison ne luy

pourroit demourer ami.’

Selve to Francis I, 18, 28 Oct., 17 Nov. 1546, Lefèvre-Pontalis, nos. 44, 47, 57.

the end of two reigns 471

already despatched with the objective of fending o any interference

in French aairs.

If Scotland remained an insoluble stumbling block to Anglo-

French rapprochement, the relationship with the Schmalkaldic princes

remained by far the most important common Anglo-French interest.

As the Emperor’s army took all too visible shape, Henry and Francis

exchanged notes through their envoys on the scope of the threat. Henry

mischievously harped on the idea that Charles was really intending to

attack Francis in Piedmont, not such a far-fetched idea in France.

French diplomacy in Germany gained momentum as the threat from

the Emperor grew with his capture of Donauwörth in August 1546,

while Sturm in France and Bruno in England solicited concerted aid

from both kingdoms. Serious subventions of money were sent to

Germany via the Lyon bankers.

However, neither Francis nor Henry

was willing to move without rst being sure of the other, to the point

that the English Council feared that Francis would ‘slip to the Emperor’

if England concluded an agreement with the Germans.

On the other

A. Tallon, ‘Claude d’Urfé ambassadeur de François Ier et de Henri II au Concile

de Trente-Bologne,’ Revue d’histoire diplomatique 1997, 197–217; A. Tallon, La France

et le concile de Trente, 1518–1563 (Rome, 1997).

Selve to Francis I, 8, 14 July 1546, Lefèvre-Pontalis, nos. 5, 8.

Bassefontaine, in particular, was active in Germany during the rest of 1546 and

was at Regensburg in July (cf. his letter to Reckerode, 24 July 1546, SAM, Pol.Arch.

1837, fo. 10). La Croix was sent to the Landgrave (cf. Ribier, Lettres et mémoires, I,

pp. 607–609) and Bassefontaine to the Elector of Saxony, ibid., pp. 609–610).

On the Hilfgesuch missions to England and France, it should be noted that,

besides the information in L&P there is much information to be derived from Pol.

Corr. IV, 270–609 passim, the correspondence of Sturm and Burckhardt, Protestant

envoys in France, with the Landgrave and Elector of Saxony. ibid., 376 is a report by

Bruno an his mission to England. e letters of Francis I to Bassefontaine, Aug.–Dec.

1546 are also essential. See Archives du Château de Villebon (Eure-et-Loire), liasse 21

(mostly now in AE, Acq. extraord. 11). On nancial aid, D. Potter, ‘Foreign policy in

the age of the Reformation,’ 525–544.

L&P, XXI, ii, 619. Sturm observed that Francis’ conditions for aiding the Prot-

estants were: (1) the election of a new Emperor by a Protestant League; (2) the entry

of Henry VIII into it; (3) the sequestration of Boulogne into Protestant hands until all

the money owed should be paid. Cf. Sturm’s report, dated October 1546, printed in

H. Baumgarten, ‘Zur Geschichte des Schmalkaldischen Kriegs’ Historische Zeitschrift,

36, (1876), p. 69. In December, when Sturm, Burckhardt and Lersner had audience

with Francis I, he again stressed that an oensive-defensive alliance was impossible

without English co-operation. Cf. C. Schmidt, La vie et les travaux de Jean Sturm,

cit. sup., p. 69, and the letter of Sturm to Jakob Sturm 4 Jan. 1547: when they were

received by the King on 22 Dec. ‘benigne et clementer audivit, respondit etiam benigne

causam belli honestissimam esse se iudicasse semper, belle etiam se causam nostram,

et nobis optare quot volumus, societatem belli nobiscum facere non posse absque rege

472 conclusion

hand, had Francis moved war against the Emperor without Henry’s

rm guarantee of aid, the English King was all too likely to take advan-

tage. What the French were not prepared to countenance was English

mediation of a peace between the Protestants and the Emperor. Word

leaked out in October 1546 that this was exactly what Mesnage was

talking to omas irlby about in the Emperor’s entourage. Mesnage,

who had been used to talking aably with the English ambassador

since the summer of 1545, received a sharp rebuke and had to grovel.

Yet he was quite lucid about the centrality of the Emperor’s plans for

both France and England:

When the Emperor had decided to make war against the Protestants,

many of his followers said publicly that that if he started that war, the

King would have peace not only in Piedmont but also in all his other

territories and thus would have better means to make war on the King

of England. Since the peace made between these two kings, they have

been saying that their Majesties could be certain that the Emperor would

do them no harm while he was at war with the Protestants and that

their Majesties would not wish the Emperor either to completely subject

them or come to terms with them, whatever agreement to his advantage

he could make, for fear that the Emperor, once united with Germany,

would attack them.

is view that the Emperor’s triumph in Germany could only harm

the interests of both England and France was the opposite view from

that of Paget in the summer of 1546: that English security could only

Angliae . . .’ (SAM, Samtarchiv, 66, 34a, fo. 9r–v). In October and November, Longueval

and La Planche were canvassing the possibility of an Ang1o-French-Protestant under-

standing beginning with a French rejection of the Papacy. Paget was dubious about

all this and thought it designed to get back Boulogne before time (St.P., XI, pp.

329–330).

Fragment of a letter in cipher either from Tournon or Annebault, Oct. 1546, BnF

fr. 17890, fo. 306: ‘ce sont choses où il ne se fault iamais ingerer sans bien expres com-

mandement du maistre.’ Mesnage to [Tournon?], Oct. 1546, BnF, fr, 17890 fos. 14–15:

‘Quant l’Empereur eust conclud faire la guerre contre les Protestans, plusyeurs de sa

suite disoient souvent publicquement que s’il commencoit lad. guerre, ce pendant le

Roy seroit en paix non seullement pour le Piemont mais pour tous autres ses pays

et qu’il auroit meilleur moyen pour faire la guerre au Roy d’A[ngleterre.] Depuys la

paix faicte entre cesd. seigneurs Roys, ilz ouy[sic] dire que leurs maiestés estoient bien

certains que l’Empereur ne leur feroit dommaige durant le temps qu’il feroit la guerre

contre lesd. Protestants et que icelles leurs maiestés ne vouldroient pas qu’il pensoit

forcer ny mectre en sa suiection lesd. Protestants ou se reposer avec eux, [quelque]

composition que fust à son advantage [de] crainte que led. Seigneur Empereur, uny

avec la Germanie, ne les feust oenser.’ omas irlby’s despatches, thin for this

period, do not shed much light on his relations with Mesnage, except that he used the

French ambassador’s post to send letters to Wotton on France.

the end of two reigns 473

depend on the reconciliation of the Emperor and the Protestants.

More surprising, perhaps was irlby’s suggestion that the English

staple be transferred from Antwerp to France on the grounds that it

would be cheaper and that the English government would always be

better disposed to France. Mesnage wondered whether this might not

just be a way for the English to surprise a French harbour.

At all

events, Mesnage was well aware that Anglo-French relations had again

gone into a freeze at the end of 1546 because of the insoluble problem

of Scotland (see chapter 2) but continued his friendly talks with irlby,

advising his master that ‘the Emperor will do what he can to divide the

friendship between you and the King of England.’

Francis was willing enough to encourage the princes to oppose the

Emperor and on the very eve of his death told the Germans he would

send to England to negotiate an alliance to help them.

Eectively, the

Anglo-French relationship was crucial to a general league against the

Emperor.

Elsewhere, it was hoped to draw Venice into this league

and the Fieschi in Genoa were encouraged in their conspiracy against

the ruling Doria regime.

Despite protestations by the King and his ministers of loyalty to the

alliance with the Emperor,

it is certain, then, that Francis I was plan-

ning war with the Emperor when he died. Henry professed astonishment

early in November that Francis had scaled down his military mission to

the Protestant camp and was fortifying his frontiers; he thought Francis

must be planning another war in Italy. is was just shing.

In one of

Instruction for what Malestroict is to say to the Admiral and Tournon, Nov.

1546, BnF fr. 17889, fo. 36v.

Mesnage to Francis I, 20 Jan. 1547, BnF fr. 17889, fos. 250–251 (dra), Ribier,

Lettres, pp. 593–600 (from orig.): ‘l’Empereur fera ce qu’il poura pour diviser l’amitié

d’entre vous et le Roy d’Angleterre.’

Francis I to Bassefontaine, 17 Feb. 1547: ‘n’y manquez pas, jusques à ce que vous

le voyez bien deliberé (i.e. the Elector of Saxony) et resolu à soûtenir la guerre contre

l’Empereur, luy donnant toutes persuasions à cette n dont vous vous pourrez advi-

ser,’ printed in Ribier, Lettres et mémoires d’estat, I, pp. 617–618. SAM, P.A. 921, fos.

31–34, Pol. Arch., IV, pp. 683–685 (report dated 18 April 1547).

Pariset, Les relations entre a France et l’Allemagne, p. 62.

Council of Ten to Giustiniani, 24 Dec. 1546, BnF it.1716 (CSP Venice V, p. 188

no. 448).

Francis told Saint-Mauris via his agent at court in December 1546 that ‘ne scau-

rons prendre meilleure alliance que celle de l’Empereur’ and that Mesnage should

only communicate with irlby to get information from him, without giving anything

away. (Malestroict to Mesnage, 12 Dec.[1546], BnF fr. 17888, fos. 214v–215v) is let-

ter was in cipher and so unlikely to have been meant for Imperial consumption.

Selve to Francis I, 4 Nov. 1546, Lefèvre-Pontalis, no. 49.

474 conclusion

Francis’ last letters to Mesnage, he noted the Emperor’s protestations

that he would never again go to war with him but wryly indicated that

he had put his defences in order.

In his last – and masterly – survey

of Francis’ intentions before his death, the Imperial ambassador Jean de

Saint-Mauris, relying as usual on a range of informants, some highly

placed, in the royal entourage, reported a crisis gathering at court of

the provincial governors and military chiefs. Orders were issued for the

fortresses to be put in a state of defence, 2000 light horse to be raised for

Piedmont under Brissac and for the legions to be mobilised as secretly as

possible. Saint-Mauris considered this ‘tressuspecte.’ He asked his infor-

mants what it portended about the King’s war plans. Firstly, he was told

that the King and all his people were fearful (in a ‘mirable craincte et

grande perplexité’) that the Emperor would declare war over Piedmont.

Francis had hoped that his negotiations with the princes would keep the

Emperor busy but the Emperor’s successes had convinced the French

that, once Germany was under control, the Emperor would move the

Reichstag to demand the return of Piedmont and would declare war

when Francis refused. Francis was advised to take measures for defence

by all his ministers, including the Dauphin, on the argument that none

of them could be construed by the Emperor as aggressive and, according

to these informants, he intended no aggressive war against the Emperor

or the King of England. But Francis could not but fail but fear the ‘gran-

deur et prosperité’ or be jealous of the Emperor and would undoubtedly

seek to draw the Turks in against Charles. From Queen Léonor, Saint-

Mauris learned that Francis had ill-will (‘quelque chose de maulvais en

son estomach’) against the Emperor and had some plan to be carried out

at the right moment. is may have been conjecture but the ambassador

had no doubt ‘that the King could not have a worse attitude towards

Your Majesty than he has.’

In England, as the end of the year 1546 approached, it was evi-

dent that Henry’s health was worsening. Selve reported regularly on

the ups-and-downs of Henry’s health from his arrival in England; the

King was ill in July and mid-September but was told it was only stom-

Francis I to Mesnage, 17 Feb. 1547, Ribier, Lettres et Mémoires, I, pp. 616–617.

In his last letter, March 1547, Francis came close to breaking with Charles, ibid., I,

pp. 626–627.

Saint-Mauris to Charles V, 12 March 1547, HHSA, Frankreich 14, ‘Saint-Mauris

an Karl V, berichte, 1547, III, fos. 28r–30v: ‘que led. roy ne scauroit avoir pire volunté

encontre vred. Majesté de celle qu’il a.’ An intelligence report to England in February

observed the same events: ‘Tous les capitaines des ordonnances et chevaulx legiers ont

esté mandez à la court.’ (NA SP68/13, fo. 30).

the end of two reigns 475

ach trouble or a cold; again Henry was ill at Windsor in mid-October

and then taking medicinal baths at Whitehall in November. e fatal

recurrence of the King’s ulcer in December required Hertford to con-

duct the audience with Selve on 1 January. e King disappeared

from public view and was rumoured dead as early as the rst week of

January. Despite optimistic reports, Selve was sure he was dying but

details remained concealed.

Furious power struggles were going on

behind the scenes in view to the succession. By December Surrey was

in the Tower awaiting execution and Norfolk and Gardiner now in

danger. e King’s death on 28 January 1547 inevitably brought fur-

ther uncertainty to relations with Francis I. On 21 March a requiem

mass was celebrated at Notre-Dame in Paris well attended (‘où il se

trouva bien grande multitude de peuple.’) ere to report in detail

was, fortunately, Jean de Saint-Mauris. Leading the attendance were

cardinals Givry, Meudon and Armagnac and for the princes, Enghien,

Montpensier and Aumale. ere followed the ambassadors, (the nun-

cio, because Henry was a schismatic, and Portugal, because of ilness

did not attend the heralds’ summons). Six bishops walked behind

them. Other than the accustomed service, there was a ‘déploration’

in French in which Henry was highly praised (‘l’on loua principalle-

ment de sa magnanimité, liberalité et prudence.’) is seems to have

been the Oraison, composed by the scholar Jacques Peletier du Mans,

which indeed focuses on Henry’s cultural achievements as restorer of

letters and careful patron.

As recorded by Saint-Mauris, this praise

of Henry’s publication of learned books was followed by more political

observations:

is eulogy concluding, Sire, that where the late King of England had

nally treated the last peace so as from then on to take his ease, God gave

him this fruit, and added to this at the end an exhortation to the English

in the form of an admonition that they should take care to keep their

young king in good and perpetual peace with the King, who for his part

desired to do the same in good faith.

Selve to Annebault, 19 Sept., to Francis I, 28 Oct., 10 Nov. 1546, 1, 8, 10, 31 Jan.

1547, Lefèvre-Pontalis, nos. 32, 47, 52, 83, 88, 90, 106.

e only entry in the city registers is a brief note that the obsequies began on

20 March and were completed on 21st (Registres . . . Paris, III, p. 117). BnF Latin,

4813, fos. 43–45, MS corrected by Peletier, extracts by C. Jugé, Jacques Peletier du

Mans (1517–1582). Essai sur sa vie, son oeuvre et son inuence (Paris/Le Mans, 1907),

pp. 44–45: ‘quel prince a jamais aspire à plus grandes choses? . . . Or a bon droit, nous

pouvons donner cette gloire et pre-eminence d’avoir fait naître les lettres en son

royaume, lesquelles auparavant y étoient en nulle ou bien petite recommandation.’

476 conclusion

Saint-Mauris said that the greater part of the nobility had attended and

that the cardinals had spent time talking to the English ambassador,

Nicholas Wotton, underlining that the King wished to nourish the

amity with the new king of England.

e death of his old rival was

undoubtedly a shock for Francis. It was reported that the dying Francis

was in ‘a remarkable fear of dying, which began when an English gentle-

man came recently to report the death of the late King of England and

give on his master’s part a message on the point of death that he should

remember that he was mortal. is admonition astounded him . . . and

from that time he fell ill.’

Even more of a shock was the realisation that

Henry’s death had removed the coping stone from the anti-imperial alli-

ance. e new regime in England, more concerned with Scotland, was

unlikely to send help to Germany, as the Venetian envoys discovered.

e status of Boulogne also remained a problem. Francis seems

to have begun to hope for an early return of Boulogne by the new

regime in England and in less than a month La Garde, who had been

in England since early December trying to settle the matter of the

Boulonnais boundaries, had concluded this business and also concluded

a treaty of defensive alliance that more or less conrmed the treaty

of Ardres-Guînes.

is immediately alerted Habsburg observers.

Saint-Mauris thought that the French council ‘show willingness or

pretend to wish to maintain peace with the English’ letting it be known

Saint-Mauris to Charles V, 22 March 1547, HHSA, Fr. 14, ‘Saint-Mauris an

Karl V, berichte, 1547, III, fo. 52: ‘Tombant, Sire, lad. harenge en ceste conclusion, que

où led. feu Roy d’Angleterre avoit en n traicté la paix derniere, pour des lors vivre

à repos, Dieu luy avoit voulsu donner ceste fruytion et joinctement en conjoignant à

la n d’icelle se feyt une exhortation aux Anglois et avec forme d’admonition qu’ilz

deussent tenir soigneuse advertance à contenir leur jeusne Roy en bonne et perpetuelle

amitié avec le Roy, lequel desiroit de sa part y correspondre playnement et de bonne

foy.’ is is especially valuable as Wotton’s despatch describing this event has not

survived; indeed his depatches are very poorly preserved for this period.

Saint-Mauris to Granvelle, Paris, 25 March 1547, HHSA, Frankreich 14, ‘Saint-

Mauris – Karl V’ 1547, III, fos. 69–72: ‘une mirable craincte de morir en laquelle il entre

dez que ung gentilhomme anglois luy vint naguerres declarer le trespas du feu Roy d’An-

gleterre et dire de sa part selon qu’il l’avoit ainsi enjoinct à l’article de la mort qu’il deust

penser qu’il estoit mortel comme luy, laquelle admonition l’estonna . . . lors et advint que

au mesme instant il tomba malade.’

Giustiniani and Cavalli to Doge, 5 Feb. 1547, BnF, it. 1716, pp. 27–33.

De La Garde negotiated two treaties on 11 March 1547, one of conrmation or

defensive league (Rymer, Foedera, 3rd ed., VI, pp. 153–155; CSPF Edward VI, no. 46)

and the other for clarication of frontier disputes discussed above. (Rymer, Foedera,

VI, pp. 135–139). A dra of this treaty is to be found in BnF fr. 5120, fos. 95–102.

ough the Treaty was signed and sealed in England, Francis I died before the ratica-

tion and Henri II never agreed to ratify it.

the end of two reigns 477

that they were happy with La Garde’s negotiations and ready to make

the rst payment of the perpetual pension in October.

However,

there was a complex inter-relationship between France and the aairs

of England and Germany. One of the last instructions issued in

Francis I’s name dwells on what had proved the insoluble problem of

England and Germany: ‘Concerning the duke of Saxony’s desire that

the King declare war on the Emperor, the said lord cannot easily do

it at the moment since he has a good understanding with the English

to recover Boulogne shortly, which is what he wants most in the

world.’ e French envoys in England hoped that the English would

aid Saxony with a great sum of money ‘and it is greatly to be feared

that if the English see him in open war with the Emperor, they would

change their view, both concerning the restitution of Boulogne and

in contributing aid, which must be avoided.’

News from Germany

was ominous. In January 1547, Duke Ulrich of Württemberg came to

terms with the Emperor and the cities of Ulm and Frankfurt submit-

ted. In Italy, the conspiracy of the Fieschi collapsed.

Despite all this, Francis remained ambiguous about the English

until his death. As late as mid-March 1547, he was complaining to the

English ambassador about the sending over of reinforcements to Calais

and Boulogne, materials for fortications and the keeping of a eet on

a war footing. is, he said was hardly a way to maintain the amity

(‘ne pouvoyent bien convenir à conservation de bonne amytié.’) For

his part, Wotton simply asserted that these were security arrangements

set up by the new government in England to cover all eventualities and

in turn complained about the preparation of a galley eet at Le Havre.

e purpose of this eet mystied observers. Saint-Mauris thought

that the death of Henry had diverted these from helping the Scots to

the Mediterranean, some said because Francis intended to start war in

that theatre during the next year. A document which probably stems

Saint-Mauris to Charles V, 22 March 1547, HHSA, Frankreich 14, ‘Saint-Mauris

an Karl V, berichte, 1547, III, fo. 52: ‘demonstrent ou faignent vouloir entretenir paix

avec le Roy d’Engleterre.’

Instructions to Bassefontaine, dated Rambouillet, 21 Mar. 1547 Ribier, Lettres

et mémoires d’estat, I, pp. 628–630 at 629: ‘A l’égard de ce que ledit Duc (de Saxe)

desire que le Roy ouvre la guerre à l’empereur, ledit Seigneur ne le peut pour cette

heure bonnement faire, pour autant qu’il est en tres-bon propos avec les Anglois, de

recouvrer en bref Bologne; ce qu’il desire sur toutes choses de ce monde.’ . . . ‘et est

merveilleusement à craindre que si les Anglois le voyoient en guerre ouverte avec

l’empereur, qu’ils changassent d’opinion, tant touchant la restitution dud. Bologne,

que de fournir ladite ayde, à quoy il faut obvier.’

478 conclusion

from this naval mobilisation indicates that the eet was a very sub-

stantial one.

e ill intentions of the King against the Emperor were

conrmed by the fact that ‘the French and English have a good under-

standing at the moment.’ e French ministers had pursued this and

its was said the English were even prepared to accept the inclusion of

the Scots in the peace, even that the Scots would attack the Emperor’s

land assisted secretly by the French. Saint-Mauris could discover little

about the La Garde treaty, though he dismissed the rumour that it

involved a grand coalition between France, England and Venice to

force the Emperor to back down in Germany. It was true that ‘all here

never cease saying that they will do all they can to prevent His Majesty

from increasing his forces’ and the English would have been in accord

with this argument. Words spoken by Wotton to a condant about

the discontent of the English with Charles V gave Saint-Mauris rea-

son to suppose that the La Garde treaty had something in it against

the Emperor. As for Boulogne, he had not heard of any new agree-

ment but thought the English intended to keep it while giving hope

of returning it. e French had le o the dispute in order to harm

the Emperor.

Wotton did not receive his commission to take Francis I’s oath to

the new Anglo-French treaty until aer the King’s death.

Hardly had

La Garde returned from England than Francis’s health, delicate at best

through 1546, began to worsen. Unlike in the case of Henry, Francis

I’s deathbed agonies were minutely chronicled by observers. In the

rst days of March, his fever returned and by 12th he was grievously

ill with his ulcer. On the night of 21st, the ulcer was so painful that

it caused him to cry out with through the night. An incision relieved

him on 24th but he began to go downhill on 27th. He breathed his last

at Rambouillet in the night of 30–31 March.

With the close of both

Etat de la provision qu’il fault faire pour l’armee de mer que le roy veult dres-

ser (BnF, Moreau 737, fos. 169–173, printed in Nawrocki, ‘Annebault’ (2009) II, pp.

841–847.

Saint-Mauris to Mary of Hungary, 25 March, 1 April 1547, HHSA Frankreich 15,

‘Berichte Saint-Mauris an Marie, 1547’: ‘les Franchois et Anglois sont en bonne intel-

ligence pour le present.’ . . . ‘tous ceulx d’icy ne cessent de dire qu’ilz empescheront par

tous les moyens qu’ilz auront que sa majesté n’accroisse plus ses forces.’ Saint-Mauris

gave further information on the treaty in his despatch of 12 April and conjectured

that the treaty ‘avoit esté pour le regard de la monarchie à laquelle ceulx d’icy dient

que l’empereur aspire.’

Council to Wotton, 1 April 1547, CSPF Edward VI, no. 48.

Saint-Mauris to Charles V, 1, 9, 25, 31 March 1547, HHSA, Fr. 14, ‘Saint-Mauris

an Karl V, berichte, 1547, III.

the end of two reigns 479

reigns, policies began again to shi and undermine the precarious bal-

ance of the last months of 1546. In France as well as in England there

was a serious upheaval in policy-making, reected in Saint-Mauris’

gratied reporting of the sudden shi in policy towards the Emperor

in the rst week of April. War, expected imminently, would not hap-

pen that year. Nicholas Wotton was by no means so contented and

felt the death of the King and the dismissal of Francis’ old councillors

keenly:

Saying that their mutual aairs had been well assured, to the extent that

they were at peace during the term of eight years before Boulogne is to

be restored. Notably, he regrets the loss of the Admiral, who, he said, was

very well disposed to their cause. I learn from a good source, Madame,

that by the command of the King of France the Admiral had accepted a

secret pension from the King of England, as also did Bayard.

In the other direction, it was thought that La Garde had induced the

new governors of England to accept pensions themselves.

Whether

or not these assertions were true, they testify to strong assumptions

of sympathy between the ruling groups in France and England before

the death of Francis.

On 19 April Nicolas Wotton was told by the French Council that the

new treaties, full of ‘obscuritez et absurditez’ had been sent back for

renegotiation and, though the treaty of June 1546 would be observed,

the new treaties would have to be modied.

at was the last to be

heard of them and the scene was set for the descent of Anglo-French

relations into new hostilities in Scotland and Boulogne. e new

court despatched Vieilleville to re-negotiate the treaty to bring the Scots

into it and to raise a protest against the English harbour workers at

Boulogne which were to develop into the famous ‘Dunette’ and the Tour

d’Ordre. It was a mission doomed to failure.

War seemed imminent in

Saint-Mauris to Mary of Hungary, 12 April 1547, HHSA, Frankreich 15, ‘Berichte

Saint-Mauris en Marie 1547, IV’ fos. 9–14: ‘Tenant propoz que leurs aaires avoient

esté tresbien asseurez avec eulx et tellement que ilz fussent demeurez hors de guerre,

du moins jusques au terme des huyt annees que Boullongne se doibt rendre. Signam-

ment il regrete la perte dud. admiral, lequel il dit estoit du tout aectionné à leur

party; et j’ay sceu de bon lieu, Madame, que par le commandement du Roy de France

led. admiral avoit acepté une pension secrete du Roy d’Angleterre et Sidus (Bayard)

aussi.’

BnF, fr. 18153 fo. 3r–v, procès-verbal, 19 April 1547; Council to Cobham, 21 May

1547, APC, II, 499; to Wallop, 13 June, ib. 508; to Cobham, 13 June 1547, ib. 509: ‘if

the Frenchmen did breke with us, it would be within this iij wekes.’

Council to gov. of Ambleteuse, 5 April 1547, APC II, 465–466; Grey to Somerset,

8, 18 April 1547, CSPF Edward VI, Calais papers, 47, 121.