Chapter 18 Capital structure and the required return 505
qualify for tax allowances. A highly geared company could find itself unable to
exploit the other tax-breaks offered by governments when a favourable opportuni-
ty is uncovered.
5 Remember that interest rates fluctuate over time. If interest rates move from what
seems a ‘high’ level, financial managers should take advantage of the reduction. For
example, if 10 per cent seems like the ‘normal’ long-term level of interest rates,
when rates next fall below 10 per cent, and bankers are offering variable rate loans
at, say, 9 per cent, one should not be afraid to take a fixed rate loan at, say, 9.5 per
cent. Readiness to work with a slightly higher than minimum rate in the short term
could have significant payoffs in the longer term. Anyone who thinks that rates will
continue to fall should reserve some borrowing capacity to retain flexibility.
6 Firms should avoid relying on too many bankers, as with syndicated loans, despite
the benefits of access to a variety of banking facilities. If the company hits trading
and liquidity problems, it is hard enough to convince one banker that the company
should be saved. But if it has to persuade 10 or 20, and their decision has to be unan-
imous, it is virtually impossible to reach a satisfactory conclusion about capital
restructuring. The UK entertainments group Brent-Walker had to negotiate with
47 banks in its efforts to rebuild its capital structure during 1991, while the liquida-
tors of Polly Peck had to deal with 70. Eurotunnel had to deal with 225 at one stage
of its troubled existence, later reduced to a mere 200.
7 The finance manager should question whether debt is the most suitable form of
funding in the circumstances. For example, there should be a clear rationale to sup-
port the case for debt rather than retentions (i.e. lower dividends) or a rights issue.
He or she should recognise the value of retaining reserve borrowing capacity to
draw upon under adverse circumstances or when favourable opportunities, like
falling interest rates, arise.
8 These considerations are reflected in two popular theories that attempt to explain
how firms address long-term financing decisions. These are:
■ The Trade-off Theory. This recognises that firms seek to exploit the lower cost
benefits of borrowing, especially the tax shield, but at the same time, they are
reluctant to increase the financial risk entailed in entering contractual commit-
ments to make ongoing interest and capital repayments. In other words, they
trade-off the returns (the cost benefits) against the risks. We might thus expect
to find that firms enjoying higher and more stable profit levels, that offer
greater scope to shelter profits from tax, should operate at higher borrowing
levels.
■ The Pecking Order Theory. This suggests that firms have an order of priorities in
selecting among alternative forms of finance:
– First, they prefer to use the internal finance generated by operating cash flow.
– Second, they prefer to borrow when internal sources are drained.
– Third, they regard selling new shares almost as a last resort.
The reason for this order of preference lies in information asymmetry – managers
know far more about the firm’s performance and prospects than outsiders. They are
unlikely to issue shares when they believe shares are ‘undervalued’, but more
inclined to issue shares when they believe they are ‘overvalued’. Naturally, share-
holders are aware of this likely managerial behaviour and thus regard equity issues
with suspicion. For example, they may interpret a share issue as a signal that man-
agement thinks the shares are overvalued and mark them down accordingly – a
very common occurrence – thereby increasing the cost of equity. Investors would
expect managers to finance investment programmes, first, using internal resources,
second, via borrowing up to an appropriate debt/equity combination, and finally
through equity issues. Yet again, signalling considerations are crucial.
information asymmetry
The imbalance between man-
agers and owners of informa-
tion possessed about a firm’s
financial sate and its prospects
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