Moyar Mark. A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq
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Officer (Boston: Houghton Miin, 2005), 315–317; David Rie, “Blueprint for a Mess,” New York
Times Magazine, November 2, 2003; Galbraith, End of Iraq, 111–113.
11. Ricks,
Fiasco, 155 (rst quotation), 167; Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life in the Emerald City,
54–55, 67–68; Diamond, Squandered Victory, 36–37 (second quotation), 71.
12. Diamond,
Squandered Victory, 299.
13. Bob Woodward,
State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III (New York: Simon and Schuster,
2006), 249; Diamond, Squandered Victory, 39, 91–94, 115–116, 180–181, 194–196, 289–290, 298–299;
Ricks, Fiasco, 205–211; Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life in the Emerald City, 64–65, 91–94; Peter Fos-
ter, “America’s Rebuilding of Iraq Is in Chaos, Say British,” Daily Telegraph, June 17, 2003; Cordes-
man, Iraqi Security Forces, 55–56; Zinsmeister, Dawn over Baghdad, 54–55.
14. Packer,
Assassins’ Gate, 190–198; Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 482–484; Ricks, Fiasco,
159–160; West, Strongest Tribe, 7.
15. James Fallows,
Blind into Baghdad: America’s War in Iraq (New York: Vintage Books,
2006), 160–161; Packer, Assassins’ Gate, 193–195, 240; Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 479–485;
Ilene R. Prusher, “US Antiguerrilla Campaign Draws Iraqi Ire,” Christian Science Monitor, June 16,
2003; Bing West, “American Military Performance in Iraq,” Military Review 86 (September–Octo-
ber 2006), 3; West, Strongest Tribe, 8–9, 13–17; Mansoor, Baghdad at Sunrise, 108; Travis Patriquin,
“Using Occam’s Razor to Connect the Dots: e Ba’ath Party and the Insurgency in Tal Afar,” Mili-
tary Review 87 (January–February 2007), 20–24; Cordesman, Iraqi Security Forces, 11–14, 61. e
Counterinsurgency Leadership Survey, taken in 2008, found that 73 percent of American veterans
of Iraq agreed, and only 8 percent disagreed, that the Iraqi security forces would have been much
better by that time had the United States not purged the supporters of Saddam Hussein’s regime.
Appendix, question 11.
16. Allawi,
Occupation of Iraq, 162 (rst quotation), 361–368; Hannah Allam, “Audit: Fraud
Drained $1 Billion from Iraq’s Defense Eorts,” Knight Ridder Washington Bureau, August 12,
2005; Packer, Assassins’ Gate, 141–142; Michael Isiko and David Corn, Hubris: e Inside Story
of Spin, Scandal, and the Selling of the Iraq War (New York: Crown, 2006), 224–225; Inspectors
General, U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense, “Interagency Assessment of
Iraq Police Training,” July 15, 2005, 16 (second quotation), http://oig.state.gov/documents/organi
zation/103475.pdf; Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, 305–307; Fouad Ajami, e
Foreigner’s Gi: e Americans, the Arabs, and the Iraqis in Iraq (New York: Free Press, 2006), 148;
Cordesman, Iraqi Security Forces, 226.
17. Gordon and Trainor,
Cobra II, 490–494; West, No True Glory, 22; Nora Bensahel, “Mission
Not Accomplished,” in Mahnken and Keaney, War in Iraq, 136; West, Strongest Tribe,
12–15; Peter R.
M
a
nsoor, “Counterinsurgency in Karbala,” in Mahnken and Keaney, War in Iraq, 195.
18. Ricks,
Fiasco, 173–176 (quotations on pp. 173 and 174); John Agresto, Mugged by Reality:
e Liberation of Iraq and the Failure of Good Intentions (New York: Encounter Books, 2007), 162–
163; Yon, Moment of Truth in Iraq, 63; West, Strongest Tribe, 23.
19. Packer,
Assassins’ Gate, 240–241; Ricks, Fiasco, 227.
20. Fick,
One Bullet Away; Robert D. Kaplan, Imperial Grunts: e American Military on the
Ground (New York: Random House, 2005), 265–271; M. D. Capstick, “Establishing Security in Af-
ghanistan,” in Georey Hayes and Mark Sedra, eds., Afghanistan: Transition under reat (Water-
loo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier Press, 2008), 264–265; Yon, Moment of Truth in Iraq, 95. For this
reason, Marines were more likely than soldiers to believe that adaptive leadership could overcome
lack of training and education specic to a particular type of conict. See Appendix, question 42.
21. Matthew Morgan,
A Democracy Is Born (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2007), 90; Appendix,
question 17; interviews with U.S. military personnel.
22. James Mattis, interview with author, August 6, 2008.
23. Max Boot, “Reconstructing Iraq,”
Weekly Standard, September 15, 2003; Michael R.
Gordon, “Leathernecks Plan to Use a Velvet Glove in Iraq,” New York Times, December 12, 2003;
Carl E. Mundy III, “Spare the Rod, Save the Nation,” New York Times, December 30, 2003; West,
Strongest Tribe, 8, 13–17; U.S. military personnel, interviews with author.
24. Linda Robinson,
Masters of Chaos: e Secret History of the Special Forces (New York: Pub-
lic Aairs, 2004), 217–223; James A. Gavrilis, “e Mayor of Ar Rutbah,” Foreign Policy, Novem-
ber–December 2005, 28–35 (quotation on p. 33); Ricks, Fiasco, 152–154.
324 Notes to Pages 216–221
25. Rick Atkinson, In the Company of Soldiers: A Chronicle of Combat (New York: Henry Holt,
2004), 35–38 (quotations); Robinson, Tell Me How is Ends, 50–67.
26. Isaiah Wilson, “Rediscovering the Way of Lawrence,” in Mahnken and Keaney,
War in
Iraq, 236–238; Robinson, Tell Me How is Ends, 68–72; Ricks, Fiasco, 228–232, 270–271; Ajami,
Foreigner’s Gi, 118–121; West, Strongest Tribe, 12–13; Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 243–
244.
27. David Petraeus, interview with author, June 4, 2008.
28. Leonard Wong, “Developing Adaptive Leaders: e Crucible Experience of Operation
Iraqi Freedom” (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004); Wright et al., On Point II, 191–204;
Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, 322; Vernon Loeb, “Instead of Force, Friendly
Persuasion; Armor Division in Baghdad Attempts Makeover into Intelligence Gathering Unit,”
Washington Post, November 5, 2003; Ralph O. Baker, “Humint-Centric Operations: Develop-
ing Actionable Intelligence in the Urban Counterinsurgency Environment,” Military Review 87
(March–April 2007), 12–21.
29. Peter W. Chiarelli, “Winning the Peace: e Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations,”
Military Review 85 (July–August 2005), 16.
30. Petraeus, “Learning Counterinsurgency,” 52.
31. Petraeus said of his time at Mosul in 2003, “ere were a few commanders that did not get
it right o the bat, and were a little uncomfortable with, or were reluctant to carry out, the stability
and support operations, nation building. In those cases, you work it with the brigade commander:
explain that you’d like a back-brief in a couple of days from those individuals on their nation-
building plans and send the assistant division commander for operations down ahead of time. By
the time you get down there, they are doing nation building.” Petraeus, interview with author.
32. Eliot A. Cohen, “Conclusion,” in Mahnken and Keaney,
War in Iraq, 252.
33. Ricks,
Fiasco, 274–277; U.S. military personnel, interviews with author.
34. Prusher, “US Antiguerrilla Campaign Draws Iraqi Ire”; Hashim,
Insurgency and Counter-
Insurgency in Iraq, 100–101; Ricks, Fiasco, 142–144, 193–195, 261; Packer, Assassins’ Gate, 303; Allawi,
Occupation of Iraq, 186; Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 243.
35. In the Counterinsurgency Leadership Survey, 65 percent of Army respondents and 83
percent of Marine respondents agreed that most mistreatment of indigenous civilians by U.S. mili-
tary personnel was the result of poor leadership, while only 4 percent from each service disagreed.
Appendix, question 21.
36. Sean Herron,
Twice the Citizen: e New Challenges of Serving in the Army Reserve and
National Guard (Bloomington, Ind.: AuthorHouse, 2004), 31; Sean Michael Flynn, e Fighting
69th: One Remarkable National Guard Unit’s Journey from Ground Zero to Baghdad (New York:
Viking, 2007), 201; U.S. military personnel, interviews with author.
37. Huba Wass de Czege, “Of ‘Intellectual and Moral’ Failures,”
Army, July 2007, 10.
38. Zinsmeister,
Dawn over Baghdad, 106–107; West, Strongest Tribe, 157; “Switching Gears in
the Counterinsurgency Fight,” Army, September 2006, 78–81; “Resilient Leadership,” Army, May
2007, 75; U.S. military personnel, interviews with author.
39. Mansoor,
Baghdad at Sunrise, 128–129; Wright et al., On Point II, 287–288; Cesar G.
Soriano and Steven Komarow, “Poll: Iraqis out of Patience,” USA Today, April 29, 2004; Appendix,
question 26.
40. Rod Nordland, “Iraq’s Repairman,”
Newsweek, July 5, 2004; Jim Michaels, “Colonel Walks
Baghdad ‘To Make People Believe,’” USA Today, August 22, 2006; Diamond, Squandered Victory,
243–245.
41. Greg Jae, “Change of Command,”
Wall Street Journal, February 24, 2005.
42. Julian Barnes, “An Open Mind for a New Army,”
U
.S. N
ews and World Report, October 31,
2005. For corroboration of this assessment, see Appendix, question 1.
43. West,
Strongest Tribe, 46.
44. Wright et al.,
On Point II, 463–464; “Training Iraqi Forces,” Army, March 2006, 71–73;
Tyson F. Belanger, “e Cooperative Will of War,” Marine Corps Gazette 90 (January 2006), 63.
45. Mark Etherington,
Revolt on the Tigris: e Al-Sadr Uprising and the Governing of Iraq
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005), 80–81, 137, 155–156, 166–168, 225–227 (quotations on
pp. 155 and 227).
Notes to Pages 222–227 325
46. Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 248–255; Bing West, “Streetwise,” Atlantic
Monthly 299 (January–February 2007), 70–76; West, Strongest Tribe, 44, 51, 79–81; Kalev I. Sepp,
interview with author, May 2, 2008; Ricks, Fiasco, 392–394; George Packer, “e Lesson of Tal
Afar,” New Yorker, April 10, 2006, 48–65.
47. West,
Strongest Tribe, 396–397.
48. Allawi,
Occupation of Iraq, 349–369; Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq,
291, 300–303, 310–311; Cordesman, Iraqi Security Forces, 65, 88–90; Tony Karon, “Why Iraq’s Not
Getting Better,” Time, September 15, 2004; Aamer Madhani, “Among Iraqi Units, 1 Really Earns Its
Stripes,” Chicago Tribune, December 26, 2005; Bryan Bender, “Report Paints Bleak Picture of Iraqi
Forces,” Boston Globe, January 8, 2005.
49. Kaplan,
Imperial Grunts, 309–312; West, No True Glory, 49–52.
50. West,
No True Glory, 74–88, 94–111, 124–133, 317–318, 323.
51. Carter Malkasian, “e First Battle for Fallujah,” in Mahnken and Keaney,
War in Iraq,
170–171; West, No True Glory, 58–60; L. Paul Bremer, My Year in Iraq: e Struggle to Build a Future
of Hope (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006), 317.
52. John F. Sattler and Daniel H. Wilson, “Operation AL FAJR
: e Battle of Fallujah—Part II,”
Marine Corps Gazette 89 (July 2005), 12–13; West, No True Glory, 208–251; Malkasian, “First Battle
for Fallujah,” 177–181; John Toolan, interviews with author, 2008 (quotation); Mattis, interview
with author; Belanger, “Cooperative Will of War,” 63; Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Scott Wilson, “11
Troops Killed in Attacks in Iraq,” Washington Post, May 3, 2004; Tony Perry, Patrick J. McDonnell,
and Alissa J. Rubin, “How Marines Kept Fallujah from Becoming Dresden,” Los Angeles Times,
May 18, 2004; Brian Bennett, “Shooting with the Enemy,” Time, September 20, 2004; Bremer, My
Year in Iraq, 353, 381.
53. Zachary J. Iscol, “CAP India,”
Marine Corps Gazette 90 (January 2006), 57–60.
54. Ricks,
Fiasco, 406.
55. West,
Strongest Tribe, 71, 82–83, 108–111; Ricks, Fiasco, 414–418; Sepp, interview with au-
thor.
56. Kalev I. Sepp, “e U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” in Mahnken and Keaney,
War in Iraq, 220.
57. Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 248–255; West,
Strongest Tribe, 77–83, 113; Liz Sly
and Aamer Madhani, “Iraqi Forces Better, but GIs to Be Needed for Some Time,” Chicago Tribune,
December 1, 2005; Cordesman, Iraqi Security Forces, 151–235; Inspectors General, “Interagency As-
sessment of Iraq Police Training,” 16 (quotation).
58. Agresto,
Mugged by Reality, 175; Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, 315;
Allawi, Occupation of Iraq, 400–401, 419–423; West, Strongest Tribe, 104–105, 108, 191 (quotation on
p. 104).
59. Babak Dehghanpisheh and Michael Hirsh, “Reckoning in Iraq,”
Newsweek,
October 24,
2005 (q
uo
tation); Galbraith, End of Iraq, 189.
60. Patriquin, “Using Occam’s Razor to Connect the Dots,” 16–25; H. R. McMaster, E-mail to
author, July 23, 2008; Packer, “Lesson of Tal Afar” (quotation); Ricks, Fiasco, 422–424; Ricardo A.
Herrera, “Brave Ries at Tall Afar, September 2005,” in William G. Robertson, ed., In Contact!
Case Studies from the Long War (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006),
125–152; Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 251–252.
61. Yon,
Moment of Truth in Iraq, 37–46 (quotation on p. 44).
62. Hannah Allam and Mohammed al Dulaimy, “Marine-Led Campaign Killed Friends
and Foes, Iraqi Leaders Say,” Knight Ridder Washington Bureau, May 16, 2005; Kirk Semple and
Edward Wong, “U.S.-Iraqi Assault Meets Resistance Near Syrian Border,” New York Times, Novem-
ber 15, 2005; Kurt Wheeler, “Good News in Al Anbar?” Marine Corps Gazette 91 (April 2007),
36–40; Charles Crain, “Counterinsurgency Strategy: Staying Put,” Christian Science Monitor, June
7, 2006; Michael D. Visconage, “Turning the Tide in the West: New Initiative and New Oppor-
tunities,” Marine Corps Gazette 92 (February 2008), 8; West, “Streetwise”; Malkasian, “Counter-
insurgency in Iraq,” 252; Austin Long, “e Anbar Awakening,” Survival 50 (April 2008), 78–79;
West, Strongest Tribe, 98–102 (rst quotation on p. 102); George Casey, Jr., interview with author,
September 16, 2008; Dale Alford, interviews with author, spring 2008 (second quotation); Brendan
326 Notes to Pages 228–236
Heatherman, interview with author, August 1, 2008; Robb Sucher, interview with author, August
13, 2008; Stephen W. Davis, interview with author, August 8, 2008.
63. Davis, interview with author.
64. West,
Strongest Tribe, 104, 108, 220 (quotation).
65. Jonathan Finer, “reat of Shiite Militias Now Seen as Iraq’s Most Critical Challenge,”
Washington Post, April 8, 2006; David Voorhies, “Making MiTT Work: Insights into Advising the
Iraqi Army,” Infantry 96 (May–June 2007), 30–34; Leila Fadel, “Iraqi Security Forces Tied to Kid-
nappings, Killings,” Fort Worth Star-Telegram, May 9, 2006; Adrian T. Bogart, Block by Block: Civic
Action in the Battle of Baghdad, January–November 2006 (Hurlburt Field, Fla.: Joint Special Opera-
tions University Press, 2007), 26–28.
66. Allawi,
Occupation of Iraq, 443; Kirk Semple and Richard A. Oppel, Jr., “Shiite Drops Bid
to Keep His Post as Iraqi Premier,” New York Times, April 21, 2006.
67. U.S. Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: Report to Congress
in Accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2006 (Section 9010)” (Wash-
ington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Oce, 2006), 51; International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Civil
War, the Sadrists and the Surge,” Middle East Report no. 72, February 7, 2008, 2–6, http://www
.crisisgroup.org; West, “American Military Performance in Iraq,” 6; West, “Streetwise”; Edward
Wong, “Doubts Increase about Strength of Iraq Premier,” New York Times, September 20, 2006.
68. Julian Barnes, “General Explains Baghdad Buildup,”
Los Angeles Times, July 27, 2006;
West, Strongest Tribe, 160–165; Casey, interview with author.
69. Cordesman and Mausner,
Iraqi Force Development, 156–160; West, Strongest Tribe, 162–
165; U.S. Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” 58; David S. Cloud and
Michael R. Gordon, “Attacks in Iraq at Record Level, Pentagon Finds,” New York Times, December
19, 2006; James Kiteld, “e in Iraqi Line,” National Journal, June 9, 2007 (quotation).
70. Megan K. Stack and Louise Roug, “Fear of Big Battle Panics Iraqi City,”
Los Angeles Times,
June 11, 2006; Niel Smith and Sean MacFarland, “Anbar Awakens: e Tipping Point,” Military
Review 88 (March–April 2008), 42; Martin Fletcher, “Fighting Back: e City Determined Not to
Become Al-Qaeda’s Capital,” Times (London), November 20, 2006; Andrew Lubin, “Ramadi from
the Caliphate to Capitalism,” Proceedings 134 (April 2008).
71. Lubin, “Ramadi”; Jim Michaels, “An Army Colonel’s Gamble Pays O in Iraq,”
USA
Today, April 30, 2007; Robert M. Hancock, “Task Force 1/6 in Ramadi: A Successful Tactical-Level
Counterinsurgency Campaign” (M.M.S. paper, U.S. Marine Corps Command and Sta College,
2008); Robert M. Hancock, interview with author, May 2008; Fletcher, “Fighting Back”; Mark Ku-
kis, “Turning Iraq’s Tribes against Al-Qaeda,” Time, December 26, 2006; Wheeler, “Good News in
Al Anbar?” 36–39; Bing West and Owen West, “Iraq’s Real ‘Civil War,’” Wall Street Journal, April
5, 2007; John F. Burns, “Showcase and Chimera in the Desert,” New York Times, July 8, 2007; Greg
Jae, “Tribal Connections: How Courting Sheiks Slowed Violence in Iraq,” Wall Street Journal, Au-
gust 8, 2007; Smith and MacFarland, “Anbar Awakens,” 42–52; Martin Fletcher, “How Life Returned
to the Streets in a Showpiece City at Drove Out al-Qaeda,” Times (London), August 31, 2007;
Multi National Force–West personnel in Ramadi and Fallujah, interviews with author, May 2008.
72. Appendix, question 27.
73. Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warghting Publication 3-33.5,
Counterinsurgency,
1–27.
74. Petraeus, interview with author.
75. Donald E. Vandergri, “Old Dogs Teaching New Tricks,”
Army, November 2007, 59–66;
December 2007, 49–62.
76. Mattis, interview with author.
77. Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warghting Publication 3-33.5,
Counterinsurgency, A-3.
78. Ibid., 1-25, 7-6.
79. Ibid., A-8.
80. Todd S. Brown,
Battleground Iraq: Journal of a Company Commander (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2007), 247–263.
81. Robinson,
Tell Me How is Ends, 215–216; Greg Jae, “A Camp Divided,”
Wall Street Jour-
nal
, J
une 17, 2006; U.S. military personnel, interviews with author.
Notes to Pages 237–245 327
82. Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warghting Publication 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency,
1–9.
83. Headquarters Multi-National Force–Iraq, “Multi-National Force–Iraq Commander’s
Counterinsurgency Guidance,” June 21, 2008, copy in author’s possession (quotation); Petraeus,
interview with author; Mattis, interview with author.
84. Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warghting Publication 3-33.5,
Counterinsurgency,
5–15, A-6.
85. Packer, “Lesson of Tal Afar.”
86. e principle that U.S. forces should be kept to a minimum became popular aer the
ghting in Vietnam and El Salvador. See, for instance, Ernest Evans, “El Salvador’s Lessons for
Future U.S. Interventions,” World Affairs 160 (Summer 1997), 45–46; John T. Fishel and Max G.
Manwaring, Uncomfortable Wars Revisited (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2006), 272;
Max G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, eds., El Salvador at War: An Oral History of Conflict from the
1979 Insurrection to the Present (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1988), 407,
457, 471; Victor Rosello, “Lessons from El Salvador,” Parameters 23 (Winter 1993–1994), 102–103;
Ricks, Fiasco, 192.
87. Petraeus, interview with author.
88. Robinson,
Tell Me How is Ends, 104–106; West, Strongest Tribe, 250–251, 273–274; Babak
Dehghanpisheh and Evan omas, “Scions of the Surge,” Newsweek, March 24, 2008; Kimberly
Kagan, “How ey Did It,” Weekly Standard, November 19, 2007; Farook Ahmed, “Multi-National
Division—Center’s Operations during the 2007–2008 Troop Surge,” Backgrounder no. 28, Insti-
tute for the Study of War, April 10, 2008, http://www.understandingwar.org.
89. Peter Mansoor, E-mail to author, August 21, 2008.
90. Conrad Crane, conversation with author, December 12, 2007, and E-mail to author, Au
-
gust 24, 2007.
91. Appendix, question 35. Although some of the survey respondents had not been to Iraq or
Afghanistan since the publication of the counterinsurgency manual, most were in regular contact
with those who had been, and thus their responses reect, by and large, current conditions.
92. Appendix, question 40.
93. Appendix, question 36.
94. Dominic J. Caraccilo and Andrea L. ompson,
Achieving Victory in Iraq: Countering an
Insurgency (Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole, 2008), 24–25; U.S. military personnel, interviews with
author.
95. Casey, interview with author.
96. Ann Scott Tyson, “Petraeus Helping Pick New Generals,”
Washington Post, November 17,
2007.
97. West,
Strongest Tribe, 247.
98. Joshua Partlow, “Maliki’s Oce Is Seen Behind Purge in Forces,”
Washington Post, April
30, 2007; U.S. Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” 18; David S.
Cloud and Damien Cave, “Commanders Say Push in Baghdad Is Short of Goal,” New York Times,
June 4, 2007; Robinson, Tell Me How is Ends, 157.
99. James Kiteld, “More Art an Science,”
National Journal, June 9, 2007; Bing West, “Start
of the Surge,” National Review, May 28, 2007; Julian Barnes, “A Trying Test of U.S.-Iraqi Team-
work,” Los Angeles Times, July 6, 2007; Kiteld, “in Iraqi Line” (quotation).
100. Trudy Rubin, “U.S. Envoy’s Challenge: e Political Iraq,”
Philadelphia Inquirer, June 17,
2007; Sudarsan Raghavan, “Maliki’s Impact Blunted by Own Party’s Fears,” Washington Post, Au-
gust 3, 2007; Robinson, Tell Me How is Ends, 156–157; Cordesman and Mausner, Iraqi Force De-
velopment, 79–106.
101. Kiteld, “in Iraqi Line”; Cordesman and Mausner,
Iraqi Force Development, 2–9, 115–
151.
102. Petraeus, interview with author.
103. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Over
-
sight and Investigations, “Stand Up and Be Counted: e Continuing Challenge of Building the
Iraqi Security Forces,” 2007, 102–103, http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/OI_ISFreport062707/
OI_Report_FINAL.pdf.
328 Notes to Pages 245–251
104. Ibid., 134–136; U.S. Army advisers at Fort Riley, Kans., interviews with author, May 8,
2008; Appendix, question 15; Tyson, “Petraeus Helping Pick New Generals.”
105. Cordesman and Mausner,
Iraqi Force Development, 190.
106. Cloud and Cave, “Commanders Say Push in Baghdad Is Short of Goal”; Ann Scott Tyson,
“Military Reports Slow Progress in Securing Baghdad,” Washington Post, June 5, 2007.
107. Kiteld, “in Iraqi Line.” In May 2007, Bing West observed that “the local eectiveness
of the [Iraqi] army is dependent upon the battalion commander and one or two aggressive com-
pany commanders.” West, “Start of the Surge.”
108. U.S. Government Accountability Oce (GAO), “Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding
Iraq: Progress Report—Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed,” Report to Congressional
Subcommittees, June 2008, 29–30, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08837.pdf; Cordesman and
Mausner, Iraqi Force Development, 192–206; West, Strongest Tribe, 273–276, 295–308.
109. Colum Lynch and Joshua Partlow, “Civilian Toll in Iraq at ‘Higher Levels,’”
Washington
Post, June 12, 2007; Cordesman and Mausner, Iraqi Force Development, 192–206; West, Strongest
Tribe, 273–276, 325–326.
110. GAO, “Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq,” 11–14.
111. Fletcher, “How Life Returned to the Streets in a Showpiece City at Drove Out al-
Qaeda”; Ann Scott Tyson, “U.S. Widens Push to Use Armed Iraqi Residents,” Washington Post,
July 28, 2007; Robinson, Tell Me How is Ends, 252–261; Burns, “Showcase and Chimera in the
Desert”; James Kiteld, “Shiing Strategies,” National Journal, September 15, 2007; West, Strongest
Tribe, 294–303; Erik Swabb, “e Lessons of Iraq,” Wall Street Journal, January 14, 2008; Visconage,
“Turning the Tide in the West,” 9.
112. International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Civil War, the Sadrists and the Surge,” 2–19; Jon Lee
Anderson, “Inside the Surge,” New Yorker, November 19, 2007; Peter Mansoor, “How the Surge
Work ed ,” Washington Post, August 10, 2008; James Kiteld, “Baghdad, Surged,” National Journal,
July 14, 2007; GAO, “Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq,” 22; Robinson, Tell Me How is
Ends, 166–168, 285–286; West, Strongest Tribe, 318–319, 325–326.
113. Kim Gamel, “Iraqi Prime Minister Vows to Fight Militias in Basra to the End,”
San Diego
Union-Tribune, March 27, 2008; Bushra Juhi, “1,300 Iraqi Troops, Police Dismissed,” USA Today,
April 13, 2008; Stephen Farrell and Qais Mizher, “Iraq Fires 1,300 Security Force Members Who
Quit Basra Fight,” New York Times, April 14, 2008.
114. Petraeus, interview with author.
115. Coalition military personnel in Baghdad, interviews with author, May 2008; Stephen Far
-
rell and Richard A. Oppel, Jr., “Big Gains for Iraq Security, but Questions Linger,” New York Times,
June 21, 2008; Michael R. Gordon, “e Last Battle,” New York Times Magazine, August 3, 2008;
Robinson¸ Tell Me How is Ends, 341–342.
116. Solomon Moore, “In Mosul, New Test of Rebuilt Iraqi Army,”
New York Times, March 20,
2008; Andrew Kramer, “Iraqi Military Extends Control in Northern City,” New York Times, June 1,
2008; coalition military personnel in Iraq, interviews with author, May 2008.
117. Coalition military personnel in Iraq, interviews with author, May 2008; GAO, “Securing,
Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq,” 27–32. See also Appendix, question 7.
Chapter 11. How to Win
1. Donald Vandergri, Raising the Bar: Creating and Nurturing Adaptability to Deal with the
Changing Face of War (Washington, D.C.: Center for Defense Information Press, 2006); John A.
Nagl and Paul L. Yingling, “New Rules for New Enemies,” Armed Forces Journal 144 (October
2006); Hy S. Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare (Annapo-
lis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2006); omas P. M. Barnett, Blueprint for Action: A Future Worth
Creating (New York: Putnam, 2005).
2. Studies of organizations have continued to show that the principal reason for organiza
-
tional change is a leader who has the desire and the right personality to eect change. James Q.
Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why ey Do It (New York: Basic Books,
2000), 227–232; Ann M. Van Eron and W. Warner Burke, “e Transformational/Transactional
Notes to Pages 251–261 329
Leadership Model: A Study of Critical Components,” in Kenneth E. Clark et al., eds., Impact of
Leadership (Greensboro, N.C.: Center for Creative Leadership, 1992), 149–167.
3. For detailed description of the personality types, see Otto Kroeger et al.,
Type Talk at
Work: How the 16 Personality Types Determine Your Success on the Job (New York: Dell, 2002);
David Keirsey, Please Understand Me II: Temperament, Character, Intelligence (Del Mar, Calif.: Pro-
metheus Nemesis, 1998).
4. Reg Lang, “Type Flexibility in Processes of Strategic Planning and Change,” in Catherine
Fitzgerald and Linda K. Kirby, eds., Developing Leaders: Research and Applications in Psychological
Type and Leadership Development (Palo Alto, Calif.: Davies-Black, 1997), 487–511; William Bridges,
e Character of Organizations: Using Personality Type in Organization Development (Palo Alto,
Calif.: Davies-Black, 2000); Lee Barr and Norma Barr, e Leadership Equation: Leadership, Man-
agement, and the Myers-Briggs (Austin, Tex.: Eakin Press, 1989), 154; Rothstein, Troubled Future of
Unconventional Warfare, 53–59; Greg A. Stevens and James Burley, “Piloting the Rocket of Radi-
cal Innovation,” Research Technology Management 46 (March–April 2003), 16–25. Leadership ana-
lysts have used a variety of other instruments to test personality and creativity, some of which
are more consistent with MBTI than others. Most of them, nevertheless, characterize the two
main organizational leadership types in terms similar to those describing the NT and SJ types,
as do numerous other studies that do not address personality types. See, for instance, Allan H.
Church and Janine Waclawski, “e Relationship between Individual Personality Orientation and
Executive Leadership Behaviour, Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology 71 (June
1998), 99–125; Joseph L. Moses and Karen S. Lyness, “Leadership Behavior in Ambiguous Envi-
ronments,” in Kenneth E. Clark and Miriam B. Clark, eds., Measures of Leadership (West Orange,
N.J.: Leadership Library of America, 1990), 327–335; Christa L. Walck, “Using the MBTI in Man-
agement and Leadership: A Review of the Literature,” in Fitzgerald and Kirby, Developing Leaders,
63–114; W. Scott Sherman et al., “Organizational Morphing: e Challenges of Leading Perpetually
Changing Organizations in the Twenty-rst Century,” in James G. Hunt et al., eds., Out-of-the-Box
Leadership: Transforming the Twenty-First-Century Army and Other Top-Performing Organizations
(Stamford, Conn.: JAI, 1999), 43–62.
5. For data on the distribution of personality types, see Dianna Lea Williams, “Frequencies
of Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) among Military Leaders,” Journal of Leadership Studies5
(Summer 1998), 50–56; Mary H. McCaulley, “e Myers-Briggs Type Indicator and Leadership,” in
Clark and Clark, Measures of Leadership, 381–418.
6. Stephen A. Stumpf and Roger L. M. Dunbar, “e Eects of Personality Type on Choices
Made in Strategic Decision Situations,” Decision Sciences 22 (November–December 1991), 1047–
1072; Bridges, Characters of Organizations; Barr and Barr, Leadership Equation, 146–150, 154;
Keirsey, Please Understand Me II, 104–109; Gordon Sullivan, “Foreword: From eory to Practice,”
in Hunt et al., Out-of-the-Box Leadership, xviii; Rickey Rife and Rosemary Hansen, “Defense Is
from Mars, State Is from Venus,” Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War
College, 1998).
7. Appendix, questions 37–38.
8. Keirsey,
Please Understand Me II, 163.
9. Paul E. Roush, “e Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, Subordinate Feedback, and Perceptions
of Leadership Eectiveness,” in Kenneth E. Clark et al., Impact of Leadership, 544.
10. A study of lieutenant colonels at two of the U.S. military’s top-level schools, published
in 1999, reached this conclusion. Michael L. McGee et al., “Conceptual Capacity as Competitive
Advantage: Developing Leaders for the New Army,” in Hunt et al., Out-of-the-Box Leadership, 221–
237. No comparable study has been done since that time, but the problem clearly has not gone
away, as indicated by the sources cited in the remainder of this chapter.
11. David W. Barno, interview with author, August 26, 2008. See also Walter F. Ulmer, “Mili
-
tary Leadership in the 21st Century: Another ‘Bridge Too Far’?” Parameters 28 (Spring 1998),
18–20.
12. Peter R. Mansoor,
Baghdad at Sunrise: A Brigade Commander’s War in Iraq (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2008), 350.
13. Charles Krulak, interview with author, July 15, 2008.
14. George Casey, Jr., interview with author, September 16, 2008.
330 Notes to Pages 263–270
15. Appendix, question 30.
16. Appendix, question 33. See also Appendix, questions 17 and 30.
17. Appendix, question 34.
18. Appendix, question 32.
19. Appendix, question 31.
20. is conclusion is based largely upon the written comments of respondents to the
Counterinsurgency Leadership Survey.
Notes to Pages 272–274 331
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