Moyar Mark. A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq
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x Foreword
great armies in the eld to the modes of ghting employed by irregulars, ter-
rorists, and insurgents. Wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere have posed
dicult problems for those nations that need to engage and defeat unconven-
tional forces that threaten their national interests and security. In this up-to-
date study, A Question of Command, Mark Moyar brings a new focus to the
problem of counterinsurgency warfare: leadership.
Some have argued that modern counterinsurgents win by creating superior
human “networks” or by sustaining the popular will to endure the onerous
costs of counterinsurgency. Other views center on the belief that the best way
to defeat insurgents is to destroy them with force. e most popular view, em-
braced by the highly inuential U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency
Field Manual and most other recent texts, holds that defeating insurgency
hinges on understanding the nature of the insurgency and selecting methods
that will win the people’s hearts and minds.
Mark Moyar challenges all of this conventional wisdom, asserting that
the key to counterinsurgency success is selecting commanders who are rich
in certain leadership attributes. He rejects the view of the hearts-and-minds
school that economic, social, and political reforms deserve high priority in
resource allocation, and instead recommends focusing resources on security,
civil administration, and leadership development. In addition, he calls for a
new calculus in determining whether to intervene in future insurgent con-
icts, arguing that cost projections should be based primarily on evaluation of
the elites that will provide the leaders for the insurgents and the counterinsur-
gents.
rough a series of case studies stretching from Ulysses S. Grant to Gen-
eral David Petraeus, Moyar identies the ten critical attributes of counterin-
surgency leadership and shows why some governments have fared much better
than others in developing and selecting counterinsurgency leaders. From the
history of these conicts, he draws out lessons that can be applied now and
in the future. His analysis of today’s U.S. military and its allied partners in
Afghanistan and Iraq oers compelling guidance for a dramatic revamping of
personnel systems.
e events of the past decade foretell American engagement in counterin-
surgency for years to come, making it imperative that we educate our policy-
makers, military leaders, and citizens on this crucial subject. A Question of
Command should shake up the study of counterinsurgency and take a place
Foreword xi
among the standard readings on irregular warfare. Wholly original, this book
makes a thoughtful and well-supported case that “counterinsurgency is ‘leader-
centric’ warfare, a contest between elites in which the elite with superiority in
certain leadership attributes usually wins.”
Donald Kagan and Frederick Kagan
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xiii
Preface
T
he inspiration for this book germinated in the early 1990s with inter-
views of American and South Vietnamese veterans of the Phoenix
program, a counterinsurgency initiative aimed at destroying the Viet
Cong’s leadership during the later stages of the Vietnam War. Having read
the standard Vietnam War histories before conducting the interviews, I asked
these veterans why the South Vietnamese forces were ineective at counter-
insurgency. To my surprise, the interviewees almost invariably responded
that the premise of the question was incorrect, as some of the South Viet-
namese forces were very eective. Having read many of the standard counter-
insurgency texts, I asked whether those forces were eective because of good
training, favorable social and economic conditions, use of sound counter-
insurgency methods, or U.S. advisory and nancial support. It was none of
those things, they said. e eectiveness of South Vietnamese units, the inter-
viewees explained, was determined by the quality of their commanders. If the
unit’s leader was good, then the unit obtained intelligence and other forms
of cooperation from the villagers, aggressively hunted down insurgents, and
captured or killed large numbers of enemy personnel. If the unit’s leader was
poor, then the unit alienated the population, shunned contact with the enemy,
and endured heavy losses when attacked. Over the next een years, my re-
search for two books on the Vietnam War turned up overwhelming evidence
that leadership was the key to success at all times and in all aspects of counter-
ing the Viet Cong insurgents.
In the spring of 2005, as a recently arrived professor at the U.S. Marine
xiv Preface
Corps Command and Sta College, I was directed to create a new course to
prepare mid-level military ocers for Iraq, Afghanistan, and other conicts
that demanded recourse to forms of power other than conventional military
force. It was part of a broader Marine Corps eort to increase education in sub-
jects related to counterinsurgency. Perusing the huge list of counterinsurgen-
cies past and present, I chose for the course those that seemed most capable of
yielding lessons applicable in the twenty-rst century. Teaching the course in
the ensuing years revealed that leadership was as crucial, and as underappreci-
ated, in those conicts as in the Vietnam War. In the middle of 2007, with the
streets of Baghdad running red with American and Iraqi blood, with Ameri-
cans at home engaging in bitter recrimination, I decided to postpone the sec-
ond volume of a two-volume history of the Vietnam War to write this book on
counterinsurgency leadership, using as case studies many of the counterinsur-
gencies covered in the Marine Corps Command and Sta College course.
is book is intended to assist counterinsurgents in Iraq, where the situa-
tion has greatly improved in the year that passed during its completion; in
Afghanistan, where the situation has not improved so much; and wherever
else tyrannical insurgents threaten. Its conclusions are not to be found in the
counterinsurgency books currently in use at our service academies, military
graduate schools, counterinsurgency training facilities, or civilian national
security institutions. Nor are they found in e U.S. Army/Marine Corps
Counterinsurgency Field Manual that was published in December 2006 and
widely acclaimed as the new gospel on counterinsurgency. Although the
manual’s list of best counterinsurgency practices includes “Embed quality ad-
visors and special forces with host-nation forces,” it makes no mention of em-
powering quality American or host-nation commanders. at practice, I shall
argue, is the most important one of all.
xv
Acknowledgments
F
ew places in the world aord such a favorable setting for the study of
counterinsurgency and leadership as the U.S. Marine Corps University,
where I have been privileged to teach for the past ve years. Veterans of
the present wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and other recent counterinsurgen-
cies, like those in Somalia and Colombia, ll the halls and classrooms, carrying
with them knowledge and memories that are rarely found in so concentrated
a form. ey have a staggering range of perspectives and experiences, coming
from all of the U.S. armed services, a variety of civilian agencies, and dozens
of foreign countries. I would like to thank all of the students and faculty who
have graciously and patiently shared their thoughts and recollections with me.
is book is much the better for their assistance.
It would be impossible to name all of the military ocers in the United
States, Iraq, and Afghanistan who provided insights and served as sounding
boards for ideas, but I will mention those whom I interviewed formally or with
whom I spoke at great length. During 2007 and 2008, I had the good fortune to
discuss counterinsurgency leadership with General George W. Casey, Jr., Gen-
eral Charles C. Krulak, General James N. Mattis, General David Petraeus, Lieu-
tenant General David W. Barno, Lieutenant General John Cooper, Major Gen-
eral George J. Flynn, Major General John F. Kelly, Major General Douglas M.
Stone, Brigadier General H. R. McMaster, and Brigadier General John A. Too-
lan. I have also enjoyed the privilege of speaking with Colonel Anthony Abati,
Colonel Dale Alford, Captain Aaron D. Anderberg, Colonel Allen Batsche-
xvi Acknowledgments
let, Lieutenant Colonel Jason A. Beaudoin, Brigadier General Manuel Mar-
tins Branco, Colonel Willy Buhl, Lieutenant Colonel Frederick E. Cale, Major
Patrick J. Cashman, Major Brian S. Christmas, Major Mark H. Clingan, Major
Carl E. Cooper, Colonel Frank Corte, Colonel Lewis Craparotta, Colonel
Stephen W. Davis, Major J. R. Deimel, Major Oliver H. Dunham, Colonel
Todd Ebel, Major Keith A. Forkin, Lieutenant Colonel Mark Grdovic, Colo-
nel Timothy A. Green, Major Robert M. Hancock, Colonel Je M. Haynes,
Major Brendan Heatherman, Colonel Bill Hix, Colonel Michael L. Howard,
Major Kevin Hutchison, Lieutenant Colonel Darin S. Morris, Lieutenant
Colonel Jason L. Morris, Colonel Michael F. Morris, Colonel Nicholas F.
Nanna, Major Edward T. Nevgloski, Major Michael B. Prosser, Lieutenant
Colonel Larry Redmon, Colonel Patrick Redmon, Colonel Shawn M. Rein-
wald, Colonel Ritch Rodebaugh, Lieutenant Colonel Michael V. Samarov,
Colonel Jerey A. Schaf, Lieutenant Colonel Wayne A. Sinclair, Major Adam
Strickland, Major Jerey J. Stower, Major Robb A. Sucher, Lieutenant Colonel
Alex Vohr, Lieutenant Colonel Richard R. Warmbold, Colonel James L. Welsh,
and Colonel Billy West.
e U.S. Marine Corps and CENTCOM made possible a visit to Iraq
and Afghanistan in the spring of 2008 that enabled me to see contemporary
counterinsurgency rsthand. Colonel omas C. Greenwood and Lieutenant
Colonel William H. Vivian set me on the right track, and Lieutenant Colonel
Shawn Keefe and Colonel Patrick Kanewske pushed me along it. Once I
reached the CENTCOM area of operations, I was able to visit the right people
and places with help from Colonel Steve Boylan, Lieutenant Colonel John K.
Carroll, Master Sergeant Marcial Flores, Lieutenant Colonel Claudia Foss,
Captain Rebecca Garcia, Colonel Robin Gentry, Major Chris Gillette, Lieu-
tenant Colonel Mark S. Harrington, Colonel omas R. Kelly, Master Sergeant
Richard A. Krause, Chief Warrant Ocer 2 Michael M. Osilla, Major Corinna
Robinson, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Yoswa, and the sta of the 201st Corps
advisory group.
I am grateful to the veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan who
lled out the survey on counterinsurgency leadership that is located at the
back of this book. ese respondents, most them holding ranks from captain
to colonel, provided hard data on subjects for which the evidence had previ-
ously been thin. eir written comments, too lengthy to include in this vol-
ume in their entirety, inuenced my thinking on a variety of leadership issues.
Acknowledgments xvii
Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl at Fort Riley and Dr. James Willbanks at Fort
Leavenworth went beyond the call of duty in helping me nd suitable veterans
for the survey.
I was also most fortunate that dras of the historical chapters were re-
viewed by some of the world’s leading experts on the counterinsurgencies in
question—Andrew Birtle, John Coates, Anthony James Joes, Brian M. Linn,
and Kalev Sepp. ese individuals were invaluable in helping to sort facts from
the ctions that appear in some accounts of these wars, and their critiques
helped me rene my interpretations, even if we did not always agree entirely.
Anonymous readers commissioned by Yale University Press and the Smith
Richardson Foundation also oered useful comments. Bert Moyar and Susan
Vohr read the entire manuscript and corrected errors and infelicities. In addi-
tion, I beneted from correspondence with other experts on these conicts,
including Sarah Chayes, Sandy Cochran, Conrad Crane, Ali Jalali, Peter Man-
soor, Sultana Parvanta, Lewis Sorley, and Amin Tarzi. Responsibility for any
errors or omissions is, of course, mine alone.
While working on this book, I had opportunities to discuss some of my
preliminary ndings with a number of senior government ocials and mili-
tary ocers. I hope that they gained from our interaction; I know I did, and
for that I owe them an extra dose of appreciation.
Special thanks go to Kim T. Adamson, the U.S. Marine Corps University
Foundation, and the Smith Richardson Foundation for providing funding
for this project. Brigadier General omas Draude and Lieutenant Colonel
John Hales of the Marine Corps University Foundation and Nadia Schadlow
and Marin Strmecki of the Smith Richardson Foundation were generous of
their time and energy. Major General Donald R. Gardner, the president of
the Marine Corps University, was also instrumental in advancing this project.
Susan Vohr and Carol-Anne Parker accelerated its completion through their
help with a broad array of tasks, bringing to bear their extraordinary attention
to detail and putting in extra hours at crunch time.
I enjoyed the services of an indefatigable agent, Alexander Hoyt. At Yale
University Press, Chris Rogers was quick to see the potential of this project
and bring it to fruition, and Mary Pasti took the book through the editorial
process with exceptional vigilance and diligence. Don Larson and Mary Swab
of Mapping Specialists promptly and eciently produced the maps that ap-
pear at the beginning of the chapters. Frank Smith of Cambridge University
xviii Acknowledgments
Press gave me a reprieve from my other publishing commitments to get this
book done. As always, my parents, Bert and Marjorie Moyar, were a constant
source of support.
My largest debt of gratitude goes to my wife, Kelli, and our children, Greta,
Trent, and Luke. Hours that I would have liked to have spent with them were
spent instead completing this study. I devoted those extra hours in order to
publish the book as rapidly as possible, in the hope that it will benet the
American troops serving in Iraq and Afghanistan and their allies, for whose
toils all Americans should be thankful.
A Question of Command