Moyar Mark. A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq
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CHAPTER 1
Leader-Centric Warfare
H
ad someone predicted ten years ago that counterinsurgency would
be a leading topic in the White House in 2009, or that popular tele-
vision shows would run features on counterinsurgency doctrine, or
that the U.S. government would be spending billions of dollars on counterin-
surgency research, the prophecy would have been relegated to the company of
Al Capone’s vaults and the Jupiter Eect. In 1999, Americans viewed counter-
insurgency as passé, of interest only to antiquarians, for Vietnam had taught
us to steer clear of insurgencies. On the rare occasion when a conference on
counterinsurgency was held, it was attended by a few grizzled Vietnam veter-
ans and an even smaller number of scholars who had haplessly devoted years
to such an unfashionable subject.
e National Security Strategy that the United States published in 1999
made no mention of counterinsurgency; it deemed America’s principal na-
tional security challenges to be negotiating international peace agreements,
reforming international commerce, and curbing proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction. It discussed the U.S. military mainly in terms of how
it could deter aggression and promote cooperation with other nations.1 Most
elements of the American military were themselves focused on either conven-
tional warfare or peacekeeping. Even within the military educational system,
where the study of warfare was exalted, counterinsurgency specialists were
generally viewed as purveyors of eight-track tapes in an age of digital music.
Tragically, the outbreaks of insurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq turned
2 Leader-Centric Warfare
counterinsurgency into the most important problem confronting the United
States in the early twenty-rst century. ey also made counterinsurgency a
high-growth industry, attracting attention and money from defense contrac-
tors, military research institutes, and private think tanks. e result has been a
deluge of counterinsurgency studies. e most valuable ones have focused on
individual cases of counterinsurgency or on specialized topics across multiple
subjects, such as disarmament, doctrine, or advisory duty.2 Considerably less
progress has been made in identifying how to achieve success in counterinsur-
gency. e trees have been seen better than the forest.
e forest has not been misperceived for want of eort. eorizing about
success in counterinsurgency has surged since 2001, with most of it emanating
from political scientists and military ocers trained in political science.3 e
“network-centric warfare” concept of the 1990s, which held that future wars
would be won by technologically driven networks, was seemingly vindicated
by the initial successes in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003, respectively,
but the bubble of technological omnipotence was soon burst by the failure of
high technology to defeat Afghan and Iraqi insurgents. New theorizing about
network-centric warfare has emerged, however, according to which modern
counterinsurgencies are to be won by human-driven networks that employ all
types of power with little hierarchical direction.4 Another novel theory main-
tains that success in counterinsurgency is determined by a country’s willing-
ness to tolerate the horrible brutality and heavy casualties supposedly inherent
in eective counterinsurgency.5
Most of the recent theorists have written works supporting a somewhat
older theory of counterinsurgency, the “population-centric” or “hearts-and-
minds” theory, and as a consequence, this theory suuses the new U.S. Ar-
my / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual and most other texts as-
signed to military ocers today. According to the theory’s adherents, success
in defeating insurgents lies in understanding the nature of the insurgency and
devising sound methods, both military and nonmilitary, to deprive the insur-
gents of the support of the people, whose opinions are the primary determi-
nant of the war’s outcome.6 Social, political, and economic reforms must be
implemented, say the theorists, to redress the grievances that cause people to
support the insurgents. Examples of these reforms include promoting public
participation in government, providing jobs or services to the poor, and re-
cruiting people into self-defense organizations. Counterinsurgents should use
as little force as possible because the use of force tends to alienate the popu-
Leader-Centric Warfare 3
lation. Security forces should not be used to seek out and destroy insurgent
armed forces but only to protect the population from exploitation and harm
by the insurgents. While some of these theorists acknowledge that leadership
can be a factor in the outcome of an insurgent conict, they treat it as one of
many factors of relatively similar weight, such as training, logistics, foreign
support, morale, and economic conditions.
e most well-known school of thought aer the population-centric
school is the “enemy-centric” school, which contends that the best way to de-
feat insurgents is to destroy their will and capabilities with coercion and armed
force.7 One group within this school advocates using violence against the in-
surgency’s civilian supporters as well as its armed forces, a position with few
advocates in the West today because of Western sensitivity to civilian casual-
ties.8 A larger group maintains that counterinsurgent violence need only focus
on the armed insurgents, for the rest of the population can be suciently
cowed through threats, nonviolent punishments, and the annihilation of in-
surgent armed forces.9
is book holds that counterinsurgency is “leader-centric” warfare, a con-
test between elites in which the elite with superiority in certain leadership at-
tributes usually wins. e better elite gains the assistance of more people and
uses them to subdue or destroy the enemy elite and its supporters. Elements
of this view of counterinsurgency have been articulated by counterinsurgency
practitioners and a small number of historians and contemporary commenta-
tors, and some are contained in such classic counterinsurgency treatises as the
Small Wars Manual of the U.S. Marine Corps and Counterinsurgency Warfare:
eory and Practice by David Galula.10 But no previous attempt has been made
to present this interpretation comprehensively or to nd supporting evidence
from a wide range of cases. Nor, indeed, has any previous book focused on
counterinsurgency leadership, despite the proliferation of books analyzing
either counterinsurgency or leadership.
Whereas the population-centric theory considers the people’s social, po-
litical, and economic grievances to be the foremost cause of popular insurgen-
cies, the leader-centric theory maintains that a talented insurgent elite, which
may or may not be motivated by such grievances, is the principal cause. e
masses, however aggrieved, do not turn into insurgents on their own; they
become insurgents only by following an elite that has decided to lead an insur-
gency, and only if that elite appears to be more virtuous and capable than the
governmental elite. Consequently, insurgencies tend to be strongest where the
4 Leader-Centric Warfare
insurgents enjoy the greatest advantage over the counterinsurgents in leader-
ship quality, not where the people live in the most objectionable conditions.
e insurgent elite almost always has higher levels of education than
most of its followers, and dierent motives, although elites and followers may
share some of the same grievances. e elite tends to be more ideologically
driven, and it seldom relents when the government acts to redress grievances,
dismissing such eorts as devious counterinsurgent tricks. Only the threat
or use of force can stop the hard-core insurgent leaders from attacking the
counterinsurgents. To wield force in that manner with adequate consistency,
the counterinsurgents must establish security in and around the populace by
means of military domination. e establishment of security also prevents
uncommitted elites and the uncommitted masses from abetting the insur-
gent elite because it denies the insurgents the access required to persuade and
coerce civilians and because civilians of all cultures are inclined to favor the
militarily dominant side, as it is more likely to protect them from harm.
e foregoing realities conrm the assertion of enemy-centric theorists
that security is paramount in all counterinsurgencies. e enemy-centrists,
however, do not appreciate the importance of leadership in attaining secu-
rity. Nor do they recognize that talented leaders have won people to their side
through more than just force, principally through charisma, sociability, and
good governance, while poor leaders have driven people toward the opposing
side by their deciencies in these three areas. In assessing a government dur-
ing an insurgency, elites and masses put a premium on persuasive communi-
cations, impartial law enforcement, incorruptibility, and respect for personal
property, all of which depend on the character of the leaders. Major social,
economic, or political changes, to which population-centric theorists attach
great weight, have historically had much less impact. Such changes have, in
certain instances, gained the counterinsurgents some supporters among the
masses and uncommitted elites, but they have rarely turned a losing war into
a winning one, and they have never done so in the absence of good leadership
and armed force.
If, as the population-centric school of thought maintains, counterinsur-
gency were primarily a question of nding the right methods—or tactics,
techniques, and procedures, as they are known in military parlance—then
victory would be won easily once the proper methods were identied. History,
however, does not record such outcomes. Sound counterinsurgency methods
dictated from on high, in the form of orders or doctrine, have consistently
Leader-Centric Warfare 5
failed when good leaders were lacking. e installation of good leaders, by
contrast, has most oen produced success even if those individuals were not
told in detail how to do their job.11
Some broad principles do apply to every, or almost every, counterinsur-
gency. ey have been understood for centuries, and they have been inscribed
in countless publications. Examples are:
•
Obtaining intelligence on the insurgents is essential to success.
•
Civil and military authorities should work closely together in countering
the insurgents.
•
Counterinsurgents should strive to gain the assistance of the population.
•
Local self-defense forces are an eective means of obstructing insurgent
activities.
•
Counterinsurgent security forces should maintain a permanent presence
in populous areas.
Aside from basic administrative and military methods, however, the specic
tactics, techniques, and procedures for putting these principles into practice—
for instance, methods for obtaining intelligence or organizing self-defense
units—apply only in certain circumstances. Counterinsurgency requires dif-
ferent methods from one place to another because of dierences in the local
population, the insurgent forces, the counterinsurgent forces, and the terrain.
It requires dierent methods from one moment in time to another because the
insurgents change their behavior frequently, oen in response to the actions of
the counterinsurgents. Studying counterinsurgency methods that have worked
elsewhere is valuable in providing the commander with ideas, but the eective
commander must be able to determine which ideas are transferable and which
are not, and to adapt methods and create new ones, abilities in which not all
commanders are equal. en the commander must be able to implement the
methods eectively, usually the most dicult part of all.12
Decentralized command has been the hallmark of eective counter-
insurgency since ancient times, except in those cases where insurgents and
counterinsurgents clashed with large conventional forces. National leaders
and intermediate leaders—those between the national leaders and the local
leaders—typically communicate the mission and a list of restrictions to local
commanders and then let the local commanders decide how to accomplish
the mission. Neither today nor at any time in the past has decentralization
involved eliminating hierarchy entirely and replacing it with self-sustaining
6 Leader-Centric Warfare
“networks” that cooperate without leadership. Counterinsurgency command
remains hierarchical at the local level, with leaders—typically company or
battalion commanders or civil ocials with equivalent authority—providing
crucial direction to subordinates. Eorts to produce networks without strong
leadership have consistently failed because the various entities became inert or
unruly or because they went o in their own directions.
At the local level, successful counterinsurgency commanders select meth-
ods and adjust them repeatedly to capitalize on changes in the insurgent en-
vironment before the enemy does. National and intermediate leaders have
usually been most successful not when they have identied appropriate meth-
ods, although some have helped in this regard, but when they have installed
able subordinate commanders, monitored their performance, and coached
them. Regardless of how brilliant or dynamic the national and intermediate
leaders are, they do not achieve success in counterinsurgency when their local
commanders are devoid of leadership abilities. Good local commanders, on
the other hand, can succeed under poor senior commanders, provided that
the latter do not micromanage or impose undue constraints.
e talented local commander can also be thwarted if forced to comply
with poor counterinsurgency doctrine, poor strategy, or poor national policy.
A doctrine or strategy that dictates in detail how to defeat the insurgents will
compel at least some local commanders to adopt methods that are ill suited
to local conditions. Strategy or policy may permit hostile foreign forces to in-
trude into the counterinsurgency theater and wreak havoc on the counter-
insurgents, nullifying the achievements of good local leadership. At times,
strategy or policy allocates fewer personnel or material resources to local
counterinsurgents than even the best counterinsurgency commander needs in
order to succeed.
More oen, strategy or policy inhibits success by neglecting or under-
mining the process of appointing counterinsurgency commanders. Time and
again, when choosing which elites should lead the organizations prosecuting
the war, counterinsurgent strategists and policymakers have selected elites
without the proper leadership capabilities or, by accident or design, excluded
elites who did not take kindly to being excluded. Such decisions have resulted
in countless deaths and maimings and in the destruction of governments and
societies. For reasons of both humanity and national security, therefore, strate-
gists and policymakers must learn the dynamics of counterinsurgency leader-
ship before issuing any decrees that confer or strip authority.
Leader-Centric Warfare 7
Counterinsurgency experts who acknowledge the importance of leader-
ship in counterinsurgency oen treat it as a factor that is xed and thus not
worthy of much attention. Many a senior leader, adhering to this view, has
made no eort to upgrade counterinsurgency commanders. Yet, as the cases
in this book illustrate, numerous senior leaders have been able to eect major
changes in the quality of leadership at lower levels. ey have done so by re-
placing weak commanders with strong ones or, over an extended period of
time, by developing new leaders.
e tasks of nding and developing the right leaders and getting them into
key command positions are far more complex and daunting than is generally
recognized. Counterinsurgents vary widely in their ability to accomplish these
tasks, which results in massive dierences in overall eectiveness. e surest
way to test an individual’s suitability for counterinsurgency leadership is to put
that person in command of a unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations.
But determining how well a commander is performing can consume much
precious time, and the price of failure is tallied in blood, so every eort must
be made to estimate aptitude before handing authority to an ocer untested
in the cauldron of experience. e best way to predict the suitability of inex-
perienced candidates for counterinsurgency command or counterinsurgency
leadership development programs is to screen them for the characteristics
common to eective counterinsurgency commanders.13
Only a very few attempts have been made to identify those characteristics,
and they have been incomplete.14 As a consequence, one of the principal ob-
jectives of this book is to identify the critical attributes of eective counter-
insurgency leaders. Analysis of the seven past counterinsurgencies and two
present-day counterinsurgencies covered here reveals that ten attributes have
consistently been the most important. e most valuable attributes did not
vary from case to case despite wide variations in the nature of the insurgents
and the counterinsurgents, although the relative importance of each attribute
did vary according to the dynamics of the insurgency and the level of the
counterinsurgency commander in the counterinsurgency hierarchy.
In some of the cases, the insurgents operated primarily in rural areas;
in others, they were almost exclusively in the cities. Insurgents operated in
small, loosely connected groups that seldom mustered more than a few dozen
men for battle, or they had strong hierarchical organizations that elded con-
ventionally outtted soldiers in battalion strength. Whereas some insurgent
groups sought radical political and social change, others were ghting simply
8 Leader-Centric Warfare
to displace a governing elite that they considered alien or unjust. Established
elites, newly empowered elites, foreign elites, and transnational elites played
varying roles on both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent sides, and for-
eign militaries operated independently as counterinsurgents, under the con-
trol of indigenous authorities, or as advisers to indigenous forces. e states
on whose behalf the counterinsurgents fought included both democracies and
autocracies, both independent nations and colonial possessions. Some of the
states were scions of Western or Latin American civilizations, others of Middle
Eastern or Far Eastern civilizations. e same leadership attributes produced
success in these diverse circumstances because all of the insurgent environ-
ments shared two essential characteristics: they all hosted contests between
human elites, and they all presented variations and changes that demanded
frequent adaptation.
e Ten Attributes of Effective Counterinsurgency Leaders
1. Initiative
is attribute has two parts, both of which are critical for success. e rst
is the ability to act without specic guidance from above, which is of obvious
importance in an enterprise like counterinsurgency where authority is usually
decentralized. e second is the propensity to act energetically and aggres-
sively, which enables counterinsurgents to preempt the insurgents, ght them
on favorable terms, and invigorate all counterinsurgent programs, military as
well as nonmilitary. When commanders lack initiative or when their initiative
is stied by others through excessive demands and restrictions, their troops
lack enthusiasm and vigor, their enemies organize the population and prepare
for battle without hindrance, and counterinsurgency assets suer attacks at the
time and place of the enemy’s choosing.
2. Flexibility
Counterinsurgency’s changing circumstances and numerous activities de-
mand the exibility to switch rapidly from one type of thought or action to
another. No matter how much training and education the counterinsurgent
leaders have received and no matter what doctrinal publications they hold in
their hands, they will encounter unfamiliar challenges that require divergence
from established practices. Individuals lacking exibility, of whom there are
Leader-Centric Warfare 9
many, will rely on standard tactics, techniques, and procedures rather than
accept new ones of greater utility. Flexibility also helps leaders deal eectively
with the moral and political ambiguities endemic to counterinsurgency war-
fare.
3. Creativity
With counterinsurgency leaders, as with anyone, creativity comes in
many varieties. Ocers at higher levels may generate new counterinsurgency
methods that have broad applicability across the theater of operations. More
oen, creativity occurs at the local level, where counterinsurgents regularly
encounter new problems of such diversity and unpredictability as to render
them immune to textbook solutions. Creative thinkers who prefer abstraction
oen come up with new methods that solve recurring problems across a given
area, while more practical creative thinkers excel at improvising solutions to
immediate problems. Recent pronouncements about “adaptive leadership”
sometimes give the impression that creativity and exibility are the same, but
in fact one quality is oen present without the other. Flexible ocers who are
not very creative do not develop new methods well but are adept at imple-
menting new methods created by others. Creativity without exibility entails a
reluctance to challenge constraints, which limits the space in which creativity
can operate.
4. Judgment
Judgment, the use of logic and intuition to evaluate information and make
sound decisions, enables commanders to discern which methods and actions
will work against the particular insurgents they face. Weighing the multitude
of complex, competing, and changing factors that shape, and are shaped by,
counterinsurgency actions challenges the most powerful of human intellects.
A decision on whether to shoot back at insurgents ring from a village, for in-
stance, necessitates an estimate of the insurgent casualties that the return re
would inict, the damage it would cause to the village’s economy, the inuence
it would exert on the minds of the villagers and village ocials, the reaction it
would generate through national and international media, and the impact it
would have upon the morale of the counterinsurgents who are under re. At
higher levels of command, judgment is also required to determine how well
subordinate commanders are performing and to decide whether underper-
forming commanders should be reprimanded or relieved.