Moyar Mark. A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq
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294 Appendix
20. Do you agree with this statement: Good ocers can switch easily and
quickly between conventional operations and counterinsurgency operations.
USA USMC
Strongly agree 20% 37%
Agree 37% 46%
Neither agree nor disagree 16% 7%
Disagree 24% 9%
Strongly disagree 2% 0%
Don’t know/ not applicable 2% 0%
21. Do you agree with this statement: Most mistreatment of indigenous
civilians by U.S. troops in Iraq/Afghanistan is the result of poor leadership.
USA USMC
Strongly agree 41% 46%
Agree 24% 37%
Neither agree nor disagree 8% 7%
Disagree 2% 1%
Strongly disagree 2% 3%
Don’t know/ not applicable 24% 4%
22. Success in obtaining information on the insurgents depends on
the quality of the ocers in charge of intelligence collection.
Iraq Afghanistan
Entirely 3% 0%
Heavily 41% 46%
Somewhat 39% 36%
Slightly 11% 4%
Not at all 1% 4%
Don’t know/ not applicable 6% 11%
Counterinsurgency Leadership Survey 295
U.S. Leadership Methods
23. How oen did American commanders at higher echelons visit units in the
eld to see how well subordinate commanders were performing?
USA USMC
Constantly 8% 15%
Very oen 24% 43%
Sometimes 33% 27%
Rarely 25% 10%
Never 4% 0%
Don’t know/ not applicable 6% 4%
24. How oen did American commanders at higher echelons attempt to
micromanage operations in the eld?
USA USMC
Constantly 4% 7%
Very oen 18% 12%
Sometimes 45% 54%
Rarely 27% 19%
Never 2% 3%
Don’t know/ not applicable 4% 4%
25. How would you describe the eects of micromanagement on
counterinsurgency eorts?
USA USMC
Very helpful 0% 1%
Helpful 0% 6%
Neither helpful nor harmful 14% 13%
Harmful 55% 36%
Very harmful 24% 34%
Don’t know/not applicable 8% 9%
296 Appendix
26. Do you agree with this statement: Higher headquarters have put too
many restrictions on the use of information operations.
Iraq Afghanistan
Strongly agree 24% 4%
Agree 24% 25%
Neither agree nor disagree 15% 29%
Disagree 17% 29%
Strongly disagree 4% 4%
Don’t know/ not applicable 16% 11%
27. Do you agree with this statement: Emphasis from higher headquarters on
force protection has unnecessarily reduced the ability of security forces to
accomplish their mission.
USA USMC Iraq Afghanistan
Strongly agree 18% 22% 17% 21%
Agree 45% 39% 43% 39%
Neither agree nor disagree 14% 16% 16% 18%
Disagree 24% 16% 18% 18%
Strongly disagree 0% 3% 2% 0%
Don’t know/ not applicable 0% 3% 3% 4%
28. Do you agree with this statement: Higher headquarters have put too many
restrictions on the use of force.
USA USMC Iraq Afghanistan
Strongly agree 6% 10% 8% 7%
Agree 12% 13% 11% 21%
Neither agree nor disagree 27% 13% 19% 18%
Disagree 51% 51% 49% 39%
Strongly disagree 0% 9% 9% 7%
Don’t know/ not applicable 4% 3% 4% 7%
Counterinsurgency Leadership Survey 297
29. American forces in Iraq/Afghanistan spend of their time
completing paperwork.
USA USMC Iraq Afghanistan
Far too much 24% 10% 13% 18%
Too much 41% 45% 45% 39%
e right amount 20% 31% 26% 25%
Too little 4% 3% 3% 4%
Far too little 0% 0% 0% 0%
Don’t know/ not applicable 12% 10% 14% 14%
U.S. Personnel Practices
30. My service selects ocers for company or battalion
commands in Iraq/Afghanistan who are less likely to succeed in leading
counterinsurgency operations than ocers who were not selected.
USA USMC
Invariably 2% 1%
Frequently 22% 9%
Occasionally 25% 25%
Rarely 12% 33%
Never 0% 0%
Don’t know/ not applicable 39% 31%
31. e current tour length of company and battalion commanders in my
service is .
USA USMC
Much too long 6% 0%
Too long 10% 0%
Just right 53% 49%
Too short 25% 45%
Much too short 0% 3%
Don’t know/not applicable 6% 3%
298 Appendix
32. Do you agree with this statement: U.S. commanders who perform well
in Iraq/Afghanistan should be given a subsequent command in Iraq/
Afghanistan sooner than is currently the case.
USA USMC
Strongly agree 4% 13%
Agree 29% 45%
Neither agree nor disagree 29% 24%
Disagree 25% 9%
Strongly disagree 4% 4%
Don’t know/ not applicable 8% 4%
33. U.S. company and battalion commanders should be removed for poor
performance .
USA USMC
Much more oen than now 14% 12%
More oen than now 45% 37%
As oen as now 31% 42%
Less oen than now 8% 0%
Much less oen than now 0% 0%
Don’t know/ not applicable 2% 9%
34. Do you agree with this statement: In Iraq/Afghanistan, my service is
reluctant to relieve its commanders for poor performance because the
bureaucratic procedures for relief are onerous.
USA USMC
Strongly agree 14% 18%
Agree 37% 27%
Neither agree nor disagree 12% 15%
Disagree 16% 27%
Strongly disagree 4% 4%
Don’t know/ not applicable 18% 9%
Counterinsurgency Leadership Survey 299
35. My service innovation and improvisation by company and
battalion commanders.
USA USMC
Strongly encourages 12% 33%
Encourages 63% 61%
Neither encourages nor discourages 14% 1%
Discourages 12% 0%
Strongly discourages 0% 3%
Don’t know/ not applicable 0% 1%
36. My service risk-taking by company and battalion commanders.
USA USMC
Strongly encourages 4% 6%
Encourages 24% 52%
Neither encourages nor discourages 31% 9%
Discourages 33% 27%
Strongly discourages 8% 3%
Don’t know/ not applicable 0% 3%
37. Since the beginning of counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq, my service has made changes to how it recruits and promotes
ocers.
USA USMC
Sweeping 2% 0%
Major 8% 3%
Moderate 27% 13%
Minor 24% 15%
No 35% 37%
Don’t know/ not applicable 4% 31%
300 Appendix
38. My service now needs to make changes to how it recruits and
promotes ocers in order to get ocers who are highly capable of leading in
a counterinsurgency environment.
USA USMC
Sweeping 12% 3%
Major 29% 15%
Moderate 35% 28%
Minor 4% 18%
No 8% 25%
Don’t know/ not applicable 12% 10%
Doctrine
39. In counterinsurgency operations in Iraq/Afghanistan, the quality of local
U.S. and indigenous leadership is the quality of doctrine.
USA USMC
Much more important than 53% 46%
Somewhat more important than 22% 33%
As important as 22% 18%
Somewhat less important than 2% 0%
Much less important than 0% 0%
Don’t know/ not applicable 2% 3%
40. How much inuence has the Army–Marine Corps counterinsurgency
manual (Field Manual 3-24/ Marine Corps Warghting Publication 3-33.5)
exerted upon the conduct of counterinsurgency operations since it was
published?
USA USMC
Extremely inuential 6% 7%
Very inuential 39% 16%
Somewhat inuential 24% 46%
Slightly inuential 18% 6%
Not at all inuential 2% 3%
Don’t know/ not applicable 12% 21%
Counterinsurgency Leadership Survey 301
41. If there were no ocial counterinsurgency doctrine, American conduct of
the war would be .
USA USMC
Entirely dierent 12% 3%
Somewhat dierent 45% 31%
Slightly dierent 20% 27%
Almost the same 20% 33%
Exactly the same 2% 4%
Don’t know/not applicable 2% 1%
42. Do you agree with this statement: A unit that is well led will thrive in
Iraq/Afghanistan even if it did not receive extensive training and education
focused on counterinsurgency prior to deployment.
USA USMC
Strongly agree 20% 18%
Agree 33% 52%
Neither agree nor disagree 6% 7%
Disagree 25% 13%
Strongly disagree 16% 6%
Don’t know/ not applicable 0% 3%
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Chapter 1. Leader-Centric Warfare
1. e White House, “A National Security Strategy for a New Century,” December 1999,
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/other_pubs/nssr99.pdf.
2. For studies of individual counterinsurgencies, see, for example, Todd Greentree,
Cross-
roads of Intervention: Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Lessons from Central America (Westport,
Conn.: Praeger, 2008); Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi, eds., e Taliban and the Crisis of Af-
ghanistan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008); Cyrus Hodes and Mark Sedra, e Search
for Security in Post-Taliban Afghanistan (New York: Routledge, 2007); International Crisis Group,
“Countering Afghanistan’s Insurgency: No Quick Fixes,” November 2, 2006, http://www.crisis
group.org; Anthony H. Cordesman and Adam Mausner, Iraqi Force Development: Conditions for
Success, Consequences of Failure (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2007); Daniel Marston and Carter
Malkasian, eds., Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare (Oxford, England: Osprey, 2008); Bing
West, e Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq (New York: Random House, 2008).
Topical studies include Michael Bhatia and Mark Sedra, Afghanistan, Arms and Conflict: Armed
Groups, Disarmament and Security in a Post-War Society (London: Routledge, 2008); Andrew J.
Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942–1976 (Washing-
ton, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2006); Robert D. Ramsey, Advising Indigenous
Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat
Studies Institute Press, 2006).
3. In this book, insurgency and related terms are dened according to the Department of
Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint Publication 1–02). us, an insur-
gency is “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use
of subversion and armed conict.” Among the forms of armed conict are conventional warfare;
guerrilla warfare, which is dened as “military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-
held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces”; and terrorism, which is
dened as “the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate
fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are
generally political, religious, or ideological.” Counterinsurgency is “those military, paramilitary,
political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.”
4. omas X. Hammes,
e Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (St. Paul, Minn.:
Zenith, 2006).
5. Gil Merom,
How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France
in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2003).
Notes