Moyar Mark. A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq

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284 How to Win

plete with all of the weaknesses and few of the strengths of the Baathist elites

they replaced. e Americans who made that choice paid too much attention

to cosmopolitan, English-speaking, power-seeking Iraqis, and too little to ex-

perts with a more dispassionate view of Iraq’s elites.

Reconstruction and Iraq also illustrated the perils of substituting new

groups for traditional elites. In these cases, as in many others, the traditional

elites outmatched the new elites in experience and knowledge, and they shared

powerful group identities with the masses. As a consequence, controlling the

population was usually much easier when the counterinsurgents allied with

long-standing elites, even if not of especially high caliber, as occurred, for

instance, in the Philippine Insurrection and the Salvadoran Insurgency. Of

course, if the traditional elite was very weak, then seeking a new elite was nec-

essary. e general importance of experience for counterinsurgent leaders, as

well as the results of Reconstruction and Iraq, indicate that introducing a new

elite on a crash basis is unlikely to produce success. e most fruitful eort to

build a new elite, in Vietnam during the rule of Ngo Dinh Diem, took seven

years to yield results, and it did not start entirely from scratch, for some of the

new leaders had already possessed experience as junior ocers when Diem

came to power.

In the future, to escape entanglement in an inordinately costly war or to

avoid partnership with the wrong elites once a war has begun, the leaders of

great powers must increase their comprehension of foreign elites. ey can

seek out experts in their own governments who have spent years or decades

covering the country in question. ey can seek out expatriates and academic

experts, while bearing in mind that both of those groups tend to be biased

in favor of indigenous elites who share their cosmopolitan worldviews and

who may not be representative of the country’s elites as a whole. Diplomats

and military ocers can build up knowledge of a society’s leaders by learning

the local tongue, immersing themselves in the local culture, and developing

relationships with local elites. In addition, intelligence personnel can recruit

sources within the various elite groups to gain inside perspectives, something

the United States did in Vietnam and, only belatedly, in Afghanistan and Iraq.

In the longer term, much can be gained by building up governmental and aca-

demic research centers dedicated to exploring politics and culture in specic

countries or regions.

During Reconstruction, the war in El Salvador, and the present conicts in

Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States supported elections that transferred

How to Win 285

power to new elites. According to population-centric theories, the elections

should have produced dramatic gains in the eectiveness of counterinsur-

gency initiatives because the majority that voted the government into power

would support it once it took oce. But no such improvement materialized in

three of these four cases, because the quality of the country’s leaders was much

more important to success than how they were chosen. In El Salvador, elec-

tions bolstered the capabilities of the counterinsurgents because reasonably

good elites won. In the other three conicts, elections did not have such an

eect because the election winners were weak, corrupt, disorganized, or other-

wise unendowed with leadership abilities. e electorate in each case lacked

the experience in democracy that helps individuals dierentiate the good can-

didates from the poor, a recurring problem in countries beleaguered by insur-

gents.

In the elections held during Reconstruction and the Iraq War, the tradi-

tional elites—former Confederates and former Baathists, respectively—were

barred from holding oce and, in the rst case, from voting, which shrank

the pool of good candidates and helped drive the traditional elites into insur-

gency. Elections also provided the means for parties hostile to the counter-

insurgency’s objectives to enter the government. In much of the South dur-

ing the early and mid 1870s, incumbents lost elections to whites who opposed

the basic counterinsurgent objectives of racial equality and federal oversight.

ese whites eventually won at the ballot box what they had failed to win as

armed insurgents. In Iraq, the anti-American zealot Muqtada Al Sadr gained

tremendous inuence in the government through elections, and he used that

inuence to promote sectarian violence that was inimical to the counterinsur-

gent goal of a peaceful and multiethnic Iraq. Democracy in counterinsurgency

is like dynamite in a coal mine, capable of reshaping the environment to the

user’s advantage or of destroying everything, the user included.

At the start of the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, precious few

American civilian or military leaders understood the leader-centric nature of

counterinsurgency. As a consequence, the U.S. government made a plethora of

bad decisions on leadership matters, some of such import that they still haunt

the United States. Over time, through experience and the labors of gied

leaders, the United States has been able to use leader-centric policies and ac-

tions to correct many of those misjudgments. It invested many of its assets in

the improvement of Afghan and Iraqi leadership quality, and it started culti-

286 How to Win

vating traditional elites who initially had been shunned. It promoted creativity

and exibility among its military ocers. Still, much room for improvement

remains.

e odds are good that the future has additional counterinsurgencies in

store for the United States. Enemies of the United States have inferred from

the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that insurgency is a far more eective weapon

than conventional warfare in ghting Americans, and hence they will confront

the United States with more decisions on whether and how to intervene in

insurgent environments. If the United States is to steer clear of inordinately

costly wars, if it is to avoid falling behind in the rst act of the next war, it must

heed the principles of leader-centric warfare and the lessons oered by the his-

tory of past leaders. e choice for or against war must be based upon accurate

appraisals of the elites that will provide the insurgent and the counterinsur-

gent leaders. e United States must develop its most talented counterinsur-

gency leaders and those of its allies and place them into positions where they

can wage war without fetters, their unshakable initiative and creative brilliance

streaming across the plains and mountains.

287

e respondents consisted of 131 veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan who were

surveyed in the rst half of 2008. Most were U.S. Army (USA) or U.S. Marine

Corps (USMC) ocers ranging in rank from captain to colonel.

Because of rounding, the columns do not always total 100 percent.

Host-Nation Leadership

1. Do you agree with this statement: e primary determinant of success for

an Iraqi/Afghan unit is the quality of its commanding ocer.

Iraq Afghanistan

Strongly agree 41% 39%

Agree 50% 43%

Neither agree nor disagree 3% 11%

Disagree 3% 0%

Strongly disagree 0% 0%

Don’t know/not applicable 4% 7%

APPENDIX

Counterinsurgency Leadership Survey

288 Appendix

2. When Iraqi/Afghan military battalion and company commanders led

counterinsurgency operations, what percentage were:

Iraq Afghanistan

Outstanding 7% 21%

Good 19% 19%

Mediocre 37% 33%

Weak 24% 21%

Awful 12% 6%

3. When Iraqi/Afghan police commanders led counterinsurgency operations,

what percentage were:

Iraq Afghanistan

Outstanding 7% 19%

Good 16% 14%

Mediocre 30% 33%

Weak 28% 23%

Awful 19% 11%

4. How oen did Iraqi/Afghan commanders at higher echelons visit

companies and battalions to see how well subordinate commanders were

performing?

Iraq Afghanistan

Constantly 0% 0%

Very oen 17% 11%

Sometimes 31% 36%

Rarely 26% 29%

Never 2% 4%

Don’t know/ not applicable 23% 21%

Counterinsurgency Leadership Survey 289

5. Do you agree with this statement: In general, Iraqi/Afghan leaders who

perform well against the insurgents are promoted to positions of higher

authority.

Iraq Afghanistan

Strongly agree 1% 4%

Agree 19% 14%

Neither agree nor disagree 25% 14%

Disagree 17% 39%

Strongly disagree 5% 0%

Don’t know/ not applicable 32% 29%

6. Iraqi/Afghan leaders who perform well against the insurgents have

been demoted or red without cause.

Iraq Afghanistan

Invariably 0% 0%

Frequently 6% 4%

Occasionally 22% 25%

Rarely 16% 14%

Never 6% 7%

Don’t know/ not applicable 50% 50%

7. Do you agree with this statement: Iraqi/Afghan corruption has led to

serious shortages of equipment for indigenous forces.

Iraq Afghanistan

Strongly agree 25% 25%

Agree 39% 36%

Neither agree nor disagree 9% 11%

Disagree 7% 7%

Strongly disagree 0% 0%

Don’t know/ not applicable 20% 21%

290 Appendix

8. Do you agree with this statement: Among Iraqi/Afghan forces, desertion

and unauthorized absences are considerably higher in units with poor leaders

than in units with strong leaders.

Iraq Afghanistan

Strongly agree 33% 32%

Agree 42% 39%

Neither agree nor disagree 4% 4%

Disagree 3% 7%

Strongly disagree 1% 0%

Don’t know/ not applicable 17% 18%

Indigenous Support

9. Do you agree with this statement: Many of the Iraqis/Afghans who possess

the attributes of an excellent leader are not currently serving in the Iraqi/

Afghan government or security forces.

Iraq Afghanistan

Strongly agree 6% 7%

Agree 39% 46%

Neither agree nor disagree 17% 21%

Disagree 9% 11%

Strongly disagree 2% 0%

Don’t know/ not applicable 27% 14%

10. Do you agree with this statement: Some of Iraq’s/Afghanistan’s most

talented leaders are serving on the side of the enemy.

Iraq Afghanistan

Strongly agree 3% 4%

Agree 35% 25%

Neither agree nor disagree 17% 29%

Disagree 20% 32%

Strongly disagree 4% 4%

Don’t know/not applicable 21% 7%

Counterinsurgency Leadership Survey 291

11. Do you agree with this statement: e Iraqi/Afghan security forces would

be much better today had the United States not removed supporters of the

former regime from the military and the government.

Iraq Afghanistan

Strongly agree 31% 4%

Agree 42% 29%

Neither agree nor disagree 7% 14%

Disagree 3% 18%

Strongly disagree 5% 14%

Don’t know/ not applicable 13% 21%

Advice

12. Do you agree with this statement: e U.S. knows enough about the

quality of the Iraqi/Afghan commanders to make judgments about which

ones should be removed.

Iraq Afghanistan

Strongly agree 6% 7%

Agree 49% 50%

Neither agree nor disagree 19% 21%

Disagree 17% 14%

Strongly disagree 4% 0%

Don’t know/ not applicable 5% 7%

13. In cases, the U.S. needs to do more to get the right Iraqis/

Afghans into leadership positions.

Iraq Afghanistan

All 19% 25%

Most 40% 39%

Some 30% 32%

A few 6% 0%

No 3% 4%

Don’t know/ not applicable 2% 0%

292 Appendix

14. Do you agree with this statement: e United States and its allies need to

provide more advisers to Iraqi/Afghan security forces.

Iraq Afghanistan

Strongly agree 36% 32%

Agree 30% 39%

Neither agree nor disagree 16% 11%

Disagree 10% 18%

Strongly disagree 4% 0%

Don’t know/not applicable 5% 0%

15. Do you agree with this statement: My service needs to assign better

ocers to advisory duty in Iraq/Afghanistan.

USA USMC

Strongly agree 53% 33%

Agree 22% 28%

Neither agree nor disagree 16% 13%

Disagree 6% 18%

Strongly disagree 2% 3%

Don’t know/ not applicable 2% 4%

U.S. Leadership Quality

16. Do you agree with this statement: e primary determinant of success for

an American unit is the quality of its commanding ocer.

USA USMC

Strongly agree 20% 25%

Agree 37% 45%

Neither agree nor disagree 24% 9%

Disagree 14% 18%

Strongly disagree 2% 1%

Don’t know/ not applicable 4% 1%

Counterinsurgency Leadership Survey 293

17. When American battalion and company commanders led

counterinsurgency operations, what percentage were:

USA USMC

Outstanding 18% 27%

Good 35% 33%

Mediocre 25% 23%

Weak 12% 12%

Awful 10% 4%

18. How many U.S. company and battalion commanders are overly concerned

with kinetic operations?

USA USMC

All 6% 3%

Most 47% 24%

Some 31% 48%

Few 8% 16%

None 0% 1%

Don’t know/ not applicable 8% 7%

19. Do you agree with this statement: Some commanders who excel in

conventional operations are ineective in counterinsurgency operations.

USA USMC

Strongly agree 37% 22%

Agree 49% 49%

Neither agree nor disagree 4% 15%

Disagree 6% 4%

Strongly disagree 0% 4%

Don’t know/ not applicable 4% 4%