Kissinger Henry. White House Years

Подождите немного. Документ загружается.

concludedthatwehadbestreturnSALTrapidlytoitssubjectmatter:thecontrol

ofstrategicnuclearweapons.WithNixon’sapprovalIinformedSmiththatwe

wouldinsistonlinkingoffensiveanddefensivelimitations—becauselimiting

SovietoffensiveweaponswasourmainobjectiveinSALT,andbecausewewould

notstopwithoutreciprocitytheonlynewweaponssystemwewereinfact

procuring.AndwewouldnotshatterourhopefulChinapolicyandimplyaUS‐

Sovietcondominiumbymakingagreementsdirectedagainstthirdcountries. The

bestcounterwouldbeaproposalmorerealisticthanOptio nsCandDonwhich

wecouldthentakeastandforthelongterm.



IthereforesubmittedtothePresidenta longmemorandumsuggestinga

newproposalalongthelinesofOptionB.However,Ithoughtitessentialtoget

offtheNCAproposal,which,asfaraswewereconcerned,amountedtoanABM

ban.Mypreferredpositionwastomaintainthedeploymentbothsideswere

actuallybuilding.ButanABMbanwasbetterthanNCAbecauseitwouldatleast

doawaywiththeSovietABM,whichIjudgedwastheprincipalbeneficiaryofthe

NCAscheme.More over,offeringanABMbanhadthesamepracticalbureaucratic

consequenceasputtingforwardOptionCearlierintheyear.Itwascertaintobe

rejected,especiallywhenlinkedtoanoffensivefreeze,andwouldenableusto

movefromtheretoinsistingthattheexistingsitesbecontinued.Itherefore

recommendedthatthePresidentauthorizeourdelegationtoproposeanABM

banasanalternativetoNCA(withoutasyetwithdrawingthelatter).The

Presidentapprovedmyrecommendationandadirectivetothateffectwasissued

onJuly9.Thisproposal,subjecttofurtherrefinement,wasspelledoutbythe

delegationfortheremainderoftheViennasession,untiladjournmentonAugust

14.



Thispositionwasamajorimprovement;itintroducedsomeofthe

elementsthatbecametheSALTagreementsof1972.Itallowedustoproceed

withacrucialtechnologicaldevelopment(MIRV),whereinlayourcounterweight

tothegrowingSovietnumbers(andwhichweknewtheSovietswereproceeding

toincrease);itstoppednooffensiveprogramwewerecontemplatingbuilding.It

committedustoafirmlinkbetweenoffensiveanddefensivelimitations;we

wouldnotlimitourABM—Congresswilling—exceptinexchangeforanendtothe

Sovietoffensivebuildup.ItmadeclearourrefusaltoallowSALTtolimitour

forward‐basedaircraftthatdefendedWesternEuropeandAsia.Andproposinga

banonABMwasthefirststeptowardgettingofftheuncomfortableNCA

position.



TheSoviets—assooften—provedtoogreedy.Theythoughttheycould

improvethetermsstillmorebywaitingoutourdomesticpressuresforunilateral

cutbacks.TheywantedtostopourABMprogram;theywereasyetunwillingto

faceanoffensivefreeze,perha psbecausetheirownbuilduphadnotproceeded

farenough.Nevertheless,inameetingwiththeMcCloyAdvisoryCommitteein

lateJuly1970,IpredictedaSALTagreementalongthelinesofourproposalwithin

twoyears.Webeatthisdeadlinebytwomonths.



Inthemeantime,IhadbecomeconcernedbythetendencyofSALTto

developinthemindsofmanyamomentumofitsown;Ifeared—asitturnedout,

correctly—thatSALTmighthavetobearthewholeweightofEast‐Westrelations.

ThiscausedmeonJuly13tosendamemorandumtothePresidentwarning

againsttreatingaSALTagreementastheadventofthemillennium.Ipointedout

thatevenunderconditionsofSALTtheSovietUnionwouldbeableintimeto

threatenourland‐basedmissilesthroughacombinationofthrowweight,

improvementinaccuracy,andthedevelopmentofMIRVs.“TheSovietscouldbe

fairlyconfidentthattheywouldneveragainbeinapositionofstrategic

inferiority.Indeed,theywouldexpecttoderiveconsiderablepoliticalgainfrom

theformalratificationofstrategic‘equa lity.’“TheChinesewouldundoubtedly

fearthataSALTagreementforeshadoweda US‐Sovietcondominium:“They

wouldforeseeaprospectforageneralrelaxationontheUSSR’sWesternfront,

andmightsuspectatacitdealinwhichtheU.S.grantedafreehandtotheSoviets

todealwithChina.”AsforUS‐Sovietrelations,theywouldcontinuetobemarked

bytheambiguouscombinationofthreatandpromiseinherentinideological

conflictplayedoutagainstthebackdropofawfulweaponsofmassdestruction:



NoneofthepostwararmscontrolagreementswiththeUSSRhaveprovedtheturning

pointthattheiradvocateshopedfor.YetaSALTagreement,eveniflimited,wouldprobably

haveamuchmoredeep‐seatedeffect.



TheSovietsarecurrentlydraftingthenextfiveyearplan,andpreparingforthe24th

PartyCongress.Inaddition,thereisconsiderableevidencethatthetopleadershipwillprobably

bereshaped.Anagreementinthesecircumstancescouldnothelpbutinfluencethegeneral

courseofSovietpolicies…



Atthesametime—andweshouldbequiteclearaboutthis—thiswouldnotprevent

SovietleadersfrommovingdrasticallyinEasternEuropeiftheyfeltthattheeffectsof

“détente”underminedSoviethegemonythere;itwouldnotstoptheSovietsfromseekingto

advancetheirinterestsandtodamageoursinWesternEurope,theMiddleEastand

Mediterraneanandelsewhere.Moreover,theSovietrulingelitewouldstillremainhighly

sensitivetoanycontaminationoftheirsocietythroughincreasedexchangesandthelowering

ofbarrierstofreemovementofpeoplesandideas.TheSovietswouldprobablyreasonthatour

ownstakeinpreservingtheagreementissufficientlygreattoobligeustotoleratesucharange

ofSovietactions,especiallyiftherewerenoplausibleevidencethattheUSSRwasviolatingthe

actualtermsoftheSALTagreement.



InmyviewSALTwasnotacure‐all.Isawinitanopportunitytoredressthe

strategicbalancebutalsotocreatetheconditionsforpoliticalrestraintwithout

whichescalatingcriseswereinmyviewinevitable,whateverhappenedtoSALT.

Militarily,SALTwoulddelaytheSovietbuildupandthustheultimatethreattoour

land‐basedforces.Itcouldhelpuspreservethesinewsofourdefenseandto

catchupnumericallyinthefac eofthestormydissentproducedbyVietnam.SALT

couldbegintheprocessofmutualrestraintwithoutwhichmankindwouldsooner

orlaterfaceArmageddon.Itwouldhavetoleadtosomechangeinpolitical

conduct.SALT,moreover,wouldhavetobeembeddedinanoverallstrategythat

preservedthecoherenceoftheWesternAllianceandleftroomforanopeningto

China.SALTwasindeedimportant;butwemustnotmakeourentireforeign

policyahostagetoit.



ItremainsonlytodealwiththefinalparadoxoftheSALTprocess:the

SenatevoteonABM.Wewereinaweirdposition.TheSenatewasbeingaskedto

proceedwithconstructionofoneadditionalABMsiteandpreliminaryworkon

fiveothersattheverymomentourViennadelegationwasproposingtothe

SovietseitheratotalABMbanorasystemlimitedtoWashingtonforwhichwe

hadnotevenrequestedfunds.Indeed,wealreadyhadatentativeSoviet

agreementonABMdefenseofcapitals.Thisconfusionwasemphaticallynotthe

proudesthouroftheNixonAdministration.



ThecontradictionbetweentheSALT positionandthebudgetrequest

becameincreasinglyawkwardastheSALTpositionbegantoleakout.OnJuly23,

therefore,ImetwithtenkeySenatorsandCongressmentopersuadethemto

staywiththeAdministrationplanonABMinordertostrengthenourhandin

SALT.ThefinalvoteintheSenatetookplaceonAugust12,1970.Anamendment

offeredbySenatorsJohnShermanCooperandPhilip Harttosetasideallfurther

constructionwasdefeated52‐47.Thevotewasaccompaniedbyacontretemps

overatelegramtoSenatorsfromGerardSmithinVienna,wherethetalkswere

abouttowindup.Smithhadsentacautious messageaffirmingthat“Safeguard”

wasanimportantelementinhisnegotiations—whichwasaboutasfar ashecould

stretchhisconvictionsindefe rencetotheAdministrationthatheloyallyserved.

AccordingtotheNewYorkTimes,Smith’stelegra mwasdecisive inswitchingthe

votesofSenatorsThomasMcIntyreandJamesPearson.McIntyretoldthepress

thatahighlyplacedsourceinVienna“madeitveryclearthatthesuccessofthe

negotiationsrestsalmostexclusivelyonournotremaining‘static’inourABM

posture.”ThusGerrySmith,thepassionateadvocateofacompletebanonABM

andthebuttofNixonangerinApril,savedthedayfor“Safeguard.”



<<Contents>>



****



PursuingaMoscowSummit



oonerorlatereveryPresidentsinceRoosevelthasbecomeconvincedthathe

shouldtakeapersonalhandinEast‐Westrelationsthroughface‐to‐face

meetingswiththeSovietleaders.Itishumantoyearntomakeadecisive

breakthroughtowardpeace.Andnooneismoreconsciousofthecataclysmic

possibilitiesofnucleartechnologythanthePresidentwhobearstheburdenofthe

ultimatedecision.PresidentsarestrengthenedinthistemptationbyanAmerican

publicthatfindsitdifficulttoaccept theexistenceofirreconcilablehostilityand

tendstoseeinternationalrelationsintermsoftheplayofindividualpersonalities.

AndaPresidentrarelyreacheshiseminencewithoutanabnormalego;norishis

entouragelikelytodisabusehisestimateofhimself.Almostbydefinitionhehas

enormousconfidenceinhispowerofpersuasion;afterall,itgothimwhereheis.

NorarePresidentsunmindfulofthepoliticalbenefitsofawell‐publicizedsummit,

especiallyinanelectionyear.Itistheultimate“photoopportunity.”



Nixonwaslessgiventothesetendenciesthanmost.Hewastooskepticalto

believethatonemeetingcouldalterthecourseofevents.Hewastoo

experiencedininternationalpoliticsnottoappreciatethatdecades‐longtensions

betweengreatpowersarenottheresultofpersonalanimosities.Furt hermore,he

didnotmuchlikeface‐to‐facenegotiating;itmadehimrestless.Andforhimthere

was—asalways—astrongpers onalelement.HavingseenJohnson’spopularity

soaraftertheGlassboromeetingwithKosyginandthencollapsewhentheresults

provedephemeral,Nixon,whohadbeenbrieflypanickedthatGlassboro

threatenedhisownPresident ialprospects,drewtheconclusionthatheshould

avoidasimilartrap.ForallthesereasonsNixonenteredoffice convincedthat

summitscouldsucceedonlyiftheywerewellprepared.Hisoriginalintentionwas

tousethepros pectofasummitonlywhenitcouldbeameanstoextract

importantSovietconcessions.



Andyetin1970,foroneofthefewtimesinhisPresidency,Nixonthrew

sobercalculationtothewindsandpressedforasummit.Tormentedbyantiwar

agitators,hethoughthecouldparalyzethembyadramaticpeacemove.Meeting

theSovietleadersinthewakeofCambodiamightshowHanoithatitcouldprove

expendableinalargergame;thisindeediswhathappenedin1972.Heforesaw

benefitsfortheCongressionalelectionsinthefallaswell.Thus,astheyear

proceeded,NixongrewincreasinglyeagerforaMoscowsummit.Whatstartedas

amaneuverreachedapointofnearobsessionuntilonlytheeternalSoviet

eagernesstosqueezeone‐sidedgainsfromanegotiationsavedusfromserious

difficulties.



AsIhavesaid,thesummitideawaslaunchedinnocuouslyenoughwhen

DobryninonJanuary20,1970,madeoneofhisperiodicfeelersforit.Following

ourestablishedpolicy,Ithrewcoldwaterontheidea.ButbyAprilNixon’s

attitudehadchanged.Heforesawnomajorforeignpolicyachievementsin1970

andheturnedlonginglytothenotionofasummit.



Imaintainedgravedoubts.Thoughtherewereoccasionaltactical

disagreementsandstrainscausedbytheinterplayofourpersonalities,thiswasto

beoneoftheraretimesinourassociationthatItotallydisagreedwithNixonona

majorforeignpolicyquestion.Ibelievedthatthereasonsthathadcausedustobe

alooftowardasummitin1969wereevenmorevalidin1970.TheSovietshad

givenusnohelpinVietnam.SALTwasstillsubstantiallydeadlocked.TheSoviets

hadjustintroducedcombatpersonnelintotheMiddleEast—thefirstsuchSoviet

actioninthepostwarperiod.NonegotiationwiththeSovietshadprogressedtoa

pointwheresuccesswasguaranteed.OurChinainitiativewasstillinthebalance;

itcouldeasilybewreckedbytheappearanceofcollusion withtheSoviets.A

summitmightthuseasilyfail;orelse,inordertorescueit,wewouldbeinduced

toagreementsandundertakingswemightlaterbitterlyregret.Finally—thoughI

couldnotmakethisexplicit—Ididnotthinkthatface‐to‐facenegotiationonthe

manyunresolvedissueswasNixon’sforte.



ButNixonwasadamant.EarlyinAprilheinstructedmetoexplorethe

possibilitiesofasummitin1970intheDobryninChannel.Idisagreedontactical

grounds;butitinvolvednoissueofmoralprinciple.SoIplungedahead,

reservationsandall.OnApril7DobrynininvitedmetotheSovietEmbassy.He

hadsomefilmsabouttigerhuntinginSiberia thatheerroneouslybelievedwould

fascinateme.Duringdinnerhegavemeanopeningbysayingthatevery

AdministrationinhisexperiencehadalwaysmovedtooslowlyonUS‐Soviet

relationsatthebeginningofitstermandtoorapidlyattheend,whenitnolonger

madeanysense.HecitedtheexampleofLyndonJohnson’seffortstohavea

summitduringhislastsixmonthsinoffice.Irepliedwarilythatforusasummit

wasapracticalmatter;everythingdependedonitsprobableoutcome.Wewere

notopposedinprincipleifwehadsomeassuranceofconcreteresults.



Dobryninwasathoroughgoingprofessionalandgraspedimmediatelywhat

Iwassaying.Thusfar,heandhisleadershadoperatedontheassumptionofno

summitbefore1971‐1972,hesaid.Hadtheybeenwrong?Iansweredcautiously

thatasummitmightbepossibleifamajorbreakthroughwere imminentonsome

topicofmutualconcern,suchasVietnamorSALT.Iwasprepared,however,to

discussthegeneralprinciple s now.Dobrynin,thoughclearlywithoutinstructions,

decidedtotestourea gerness.Hesuggestedthattheeasiestwaywouldbefor

PremierKosygintoheadtheSovietdelegationtotheUnitedNationsGeneral

AssemblyinthefallandtomeetwiththePresidentinthatcontext.(Thesummit

in1970wasstillperceivedbybothsidestoinvolveNixonandKosygin,not

Brezhnev.)IwasconfidentthatthePresidentwouldnotwishtorepeatJohnson’s

experienceofmeetinginaUNcontext.ButItoldDobryninthatIwouldobtainthe

President’sviews.



Wemetagaintwodayslater,afterIhadconsultedthePresident.Itold

DobryninofficiallythatwepreferredthatasummitbeseparatefromtheUN.Its

purposeshouldbeeithertoblessacompletedSALTagreementortobreaka

deadlockintheSALTnegotiations.Dobryninnow hadtheinformationheneeded.

HepromisedusareplyafterhereturnedfromconsultationsinMoscow.

Cambodiadidnot interruptthisexchange.DobryninreturnedinearlyJunewhile

theCambodiansanctuarieswerestilloccupiedbyAmericanforces.Nixon’s

yearningforasummithadincreasedindirectproportiontothepublicbuffetingof

thepreviousweeks.Whatwouldmorediscomfithisshrillopponentsthan

emergingunexpectedlyasapeacemakerandsittingdownwiththeSovietswhile

beatingupontheirallies?Hedecidedtomakeanall‐outeffortforasummit

beforetheCongressionalelections.Accordingly,IinvitedDobrynintohavedinner

withmeonthePresidentialyachtSequoia,andtoreviewthewholerangeofUS‐

SovietrelationswhilewecruisedonthePotomac.



Beforeweleft,NixonjoinedDobryninandmebrieflyintheWhiteHouse

MapRoom.HetoldDobryninthathewaspreparedtoletbygonesbebygones;

thetimehadcometoputUS‐Sovietrelationsonanewbasis.Hewaspreparedto

engagehimselfpersonallyinthiseffort.Dobryninagreedthattherewasnosense

debatingaboutthepast.Neatlyavoidingthehintaboutasummit,Dobryninmade

astrongpleaforUS‐SovietcooperationintheMiddleEast,wheretheSovietshad

justescalatedtensionstounprecedentedheightsbysendingadvancedanti‐

aircraftmissilesmannedbySovietcrews.ObviouslyMoscowwantedtobepaid

forthesummitinadvance;themoreeagerweappearedthehigherwouldbethe

price.



ThecruiseontheSequoiadidnotchangethisimpression.Dobryninwas

keentodiscussindetailalloutstandingissues—especiallythoseofconcernto the

SovietUnion.HeraisedSALT,theMiddleEast,andSouthEast Asia.Butaboutthe

summithewasopaque.HeclaimedthattheKremlin’sinitialreactionhadbeen

favorablebutthenCambodiahadraisedthethoughtthatourproposalwasa

maneuvertoobtainSovietacquiescenceinatoughIndochinapolicy.Ideniedthis

andindicatedthatourinterestcontinuednowthattheCambodianoperationwas

drawingtoaclose.Dobryninnomorerosetothisbaitthanhehadrisento

Nixon’s.HereturnedtothequestionofhowtodealwithSALTandtheMiddle

East,urgingthatwepursuetheminourChannel.Obviouslytwocouldplayat

linkage.



WemetagainonJune23.Thistimethesummitwasnotmentioned

directly.Instead,aftertouchingontheMiddleEastassetforthinthenext

chapter,IaskedaboutSovietintentionsinSALT.Dobryninclaimedhehadno

instructionsbutpromisedanearlyreply.TheSovietresponse,infact,wasquickin

coming.ItwastheJune25aide‐mémoire,whichproposedtheearlyconclusionof

anagreementtolimitABM,coupledwiththeschemetoreducethedangerof

“accidentalwar.”



CollusionagainstChinawastobetherealSovietpriceforasummit.It

surfacedagaininthebestspy‐noveltradition.SemenovencounteredSmithatthe

ViennaOperaandhandedhimanunsignedpaperoutliningtheSovietnotionof

anaccidental‐waragreement.Ifanuclear“provocation”werebeing“prepared”

byathirdcountry,eachcountrywastoinformtheother. Ifaprovocativeacttook

place,eachpartywouldbeobligedtotakeretaliatoryactionagainsttheoffending

country.Thetwopartiesweretoholdregularconsultationsonthesesubjects.We

wereineffectbeingaskedtogivetheUSSRafreehandagainstChina;itwasa 

blatantembodimentofcondominium.



Nixonmighthavebeenwillingtoactagainstmytacticaljudgmentona

summit.Heneedednoadvicewhenourfundamentalnationalinterestsorour

overallglobalstrategywasatstake.HeandIwereatonethattheaccidental‐war

proposalhadtoberejectedandpromptly.OnJuly9IsawDobrynintotellhim

thatSemenov’soverturewasunacceptable.Thereweretwoaspectstothe

accidental‐warproblem,Isaid.Onewasthepossibilityofgenuineaccidents

requiringtechnicalsafeguardsandmeansofnotification.This wewerereadyto

addressjointlywiththeSovietUnion.(Indeed,iteventua llyledtoanagreement

signedonSeptember30,1971.) Politicalcooperationimplyinga majorchangein

internationalalignmentsandclearlyaimedagainstthirdcountrieswasoutofthe

question.



DobryninsuavelypretendedtobeignorantofSemenov’soverture,an

inconceivableidea.(Ithadprobably,however,comethroughSemenovprecisely

toenabletheSovietstodisavowitifwereactedunfavorably.) Dobryninquickly

shiftedtheconversationtoanABMagreement.AtthispointIremindedhimthat

wehadbeentalkingaboutameetingatthehighestlevelsinceApril.Wehadnot

hadareply;itwastimetostopbeatingaroundthebush.Dobryninmumbled

somethingaboutCambodiaandthedifficultiesposedbytheforthcomingParty

CongressinMoscow.Hethenchosetherouteofpretendingthathehadnotfully

understoodourovertures.CouldhereporttoMoscow(1)thatthePresidentwas

proposingasummitmeeting;(2)thatitshoulddiscussafundamentalreappraisal

ofUS‐Sovietrelations?



WhenDobryninwasinstructedtostallhewasmasterly;hedidnoteven

mindpretendingthathewasalittledense.Ofcourse,hisquerieshadbeen

answeredseveraltimesinthepastthreemonths—mostrecentlybythePresident

himselffourweeksearlier.KnowingthePresident’syearningforasummitI

playedthegame;IsolemnlyassuredDobryninthathecouldreportinthesense

hehadindicated.Buthisperplexitiesonthisoccasionweresoendlessthatone

mighthavewonderedhowhehadrisensohighinthediplomaticserviceofhis

country.Werewethinkingof1971or1972?,hewishedtoknow.No,Ireplied,we

had1970inmind.Heconsideredthisgravely.Beforeoraftertheelection?,asked

thismeticulousSovietstudentofourdemocraticpolitics.ThiswasonetrapIdid

notyetneedtofallinto.IwouldlethimknowafterhearingMoscow’sreactionto

thegeneralproject,Ireplied.



ButnoSovietreactionwasforthcoming.Instead,Dobryninbroughtanaide‐

mémoireonJuly20askingforAmericanhelpinconveningaconferenceon

Europeansecurity.TheSovietleadershipclearlyhadalongshoppinglist,andthey

werenotabouttosatisfyNixon’seagernesswithoutgoingthroughthewholelist

toseehowmuchofittheycouldget.Butheretoowehada well‐settledstrategy;

Istonewalled.



Meanwhile,DobryninreturnedtoMoscowonceagainforconsultationson

thesamesubjectshehadsaidhehadbeenconsultingaboutinAprilandMay.In

earlyAugustanAmericanbusinessmanwhoclaimedhighSovietconnections

reportedthattheSovietleaderswereexpectingtoseethePresidentinthefall.I

usedthispretextonAugust13toinquireofDobrynin’sdeputy,YuliVorontsov,

whatwasgoingon.Wehadcomefullcircle:ThiswasthesameploythatDobrynin

hadusedinJanuarywhenhehadinvolvedtheJapaneseAmbassador.Andit

receivedthesameresponse.Vorontsovsaidpredictablythathewaswithout

instructionsbutheknewthatthesubjectwasunder“intensediscussion”in

Moscow.



OnAugust19wereceivedaformalreply.TheSovietleadershada“positive 

approach”totheideaofasummitmee ting,pro videditwascarefullyprepared.It

alsoinvitedourideasforanagenda.Theywereplayingourgameof1969.On

August24,onmybehalf,mydeputyAlHaiggaveVorontsovanagendathatlisted

SALT,Europeansecurity,theMiddleEast,“principlesofcoexistence,”andtradeas

possibleitems,withoutindicatingourpositiononanyofthesetopics.Weinvited

Sovietcounterproposals.Nonewasforthcoming.Wedidnothearfromthe

KremlinagainaboutthesummituntilDobryninfinallyreturnedtoWashingtonin

September,makingfurtherpositivenoisesbutaccompaniedbyaprocedural

proposalforpreliminarygroundworkthatwouldpushthesummitwellinto1971.

ItwasobviousthattheSovietswereusingthesummitasanotherformof

pressureonusinasummerfilledwithcrises.



Itwasthebestthingthatcouldhavehappened.I shudderathowasummit

wouldhaveunfoldedin1970.Itwasourlowpointdomestically.Wewerestillin

thestageoflayingfoundations,oftentativeprobes.Wehadnot yetachievedthe

breakthroughsandpoliticalsurprisesthatestablishedourgrandstrategyayear

later.Wewouldhavebeenundertremendouspressurestobringbacksome

success,andfailingthat,wewouldhavebeeninan evenworsepositionathome. 

ThecarefullinkageoftheGermantreatyandBerlinnegotiationsmighthavebeen

destroyed,andEuropeannegotiationswithMoscow,insteadofbeingcontrolled,

couldhavegotoutofhand. ThepressureforanABM‐onlyagreementmighthave

proveduncontainable;indeed,onJuly11Nixonspecificallytoldmethathewould

paythispricetogettoseetheSovietleaders.Iwaitedforhimtoturnitintoa

formalinstruction;heneverdid,partlybecausetheSovietsneversuppliedthe

opportunity.Butthereislittledoubtinmymindthatinthecontextofasummit,

Congressmightwell havekilledABMonitsown.TheMidEastcrisiswouldhave

accelerated.TheChinainitiative couldhavebeennippedinthebud.Since

agreementswouldnothavebeenhamme redoutinadvance,Nixonwouldhave

beenunderahandicapinbeingforcedintoprotractedanddetailednegotiations,

withwhichhewasalwaysuncomfortable.



TheSovietleaders,luckilyforus,hadthrownawayallthisinordertoscore

pettypoints.ThisisworthkeepinginmindforthosewhoperceiveeverySoviet

actionaspartofabrilliantlycalculatedmasterplan.Moscowrecognizedwell

enoughtheobvioustacticaladvantagefortheminNixon’seagernessfora

summit.ButtheyhadbeensoannoyedbyNixon’sRomanianvisit,hissnubof

Gromykoin1969,andouraloofMiddleEastposture,andtheyweresotempted

tosqueezethemaximumconcessionsoutofus,thattheymissedwhatcouldhave

beenagreatstrategicopportunity.Theywantedtobepaidinadvancefor

agreeingtothesummitandthenbepaidagainatthesummit.Theytriedto

obtainadefactoallianceagainstChina,aEuropeanSecurityConference,anda

SALTagreementontheirterms—allasanentrancepriceintothesummit.