Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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TheseattributesofAmericannegotiatorshadcomplicatedoureffortsin

1969;theywerecompoundedbyourdomesticdebate.WithintheAdministration

wehadtofightaseeminglyendlessbatt leagainstthosewhowantedtofuelthe

momentumofnegotiationswithgesturesofgoodwill.Notafewargued,for

example,thatweshouldforgoourABMandMIRVprogramslestwedoomthe

prospectsofstrategicarmslim itation—thoughinfactABMandMIRVturnedout

tobeamongourfewplayablecards.Similarly,wewerewarnedthatanopening

toChinawouldcauserelationswiththeSovietUniontoregress;infact,the

openingwouldbreakalogjamonseveralissueswiththeUSSR.



Ourinternaldivisio nshandedtheSovietleadershipanirresistible

opportunitytowhipsawus.TheKremlinwouldstressitseagernesstobegin

negotiationsonSALT,forexample.WhiletheWhiteHousewouldtrytogearour

responsetooverallSovietconduct,therestofourgovernmentwouldfind

innumerableways,frompressleakstoinformalhints,toletitbeknownthatit

wasready,nayeager,tostarttalking.TheSovietEmbassy,underDobrynin’s

sophisticatedleadership,wouldspreadthewordamongjournalistsand

Congressionalleadersthattradewouldmakeamajorcontributiontotheeasing

oftensions.WhentheWhiteHousesoughttoinsistthattradeaccompanyand

notprecedeanimprovementofpoliticalrelations,thevariousdepartments,as

wellasleadingmembersoftheCongress,pressedinsistentlyforearlyrelaxation

oftraderestrictions.Thusthebetterpartofourfirstyearwasspentinconvincing

boththeSovietsandourownbureaucracythatweintendedtobaseour

negotiationsonacalculationofthenationalinterest,notabstractslogans,andon

strictreciprocity,not“gestures”or“signals.”Bytheendof1969neithersidehad

achievedanyofitsinitialobjectives,butitalsoseemedthatthecarefulfencing

wasabouttoend.TheChannel—mytalks withSovietAmbassadorAnatoly

Dobrynin—hadbecomeincreasinglyactiveattheendof1969,usuallyonSoviet

initiative.WehadsucceededinmakingitcleartotheSoviets,andwithalittle

timelagtothebureaucracy,thatthePresident’sviewwasthedecisiveone.But

whatpassedthroughtheChannelearlyin1970wasasinconclusiveasanopening

chessgambit.Eachplayerwasdeterminedtoavoidanirreparablemistake;the

moveswerecareful;theyrevealedaslittleaspossibleofintentionsand therefore

inspiredevengreatercautiononthepartoftheopponent.



WhenDobryninandImetforageneralreviewonDecember22,1969,he

remarkedingratiatinglythatMoscowexpectedtohavetodealwithNixonfor

sevenmoreyears.ThiswastoolongatimeforMoscowtowaitusout;indeed,it

shouldbetoolongforHanoi.Amazingly,hesuggestedthatMoscowhadnoreal

interestsinSouthEastAsia;ithadbecomeinvolvedonthebasisofa

“misunderstanding”;hedidnotexplainwhatthemisunderstandingconsistedof.

China,accordingtoDobrynin,wasthesolebeneficiaryofacontinuationofthe

war.



DobryninlistedwhathesaidweretheSovietUnion’sfrustrations:the

Administration’spressureforABM,thestalledMiddleEastnegotiations,the

refusaltoinviteGromykototheWhiteHousewhileNixonreceivedtheDeputy

ForeignMinisterofRomania,ourattempttomakeeachnegotiationcondit ional

onsomeotherone(linkage).Allthisculminatedinhisquerywhetherwemight

beginfundamentaldiscussionsintheChannelevenifwedecidedtodelay

implementinganyunderstandingsuntilthewarinVietnamwasover.Itold

DobryninthatIthoughtapositiveanswerprobable.



WemetagainonJanuary20,1970.ThepretextwasaSovietnote

protestingmeetingsofcommitteesoftheWestGermanParliamentinWest

Berlin.Significantly,thenotewaspassedinthePresidentialChannelwhereit

wouldreceivenopublicity;Moscow,obviously,didnotwantacrisisinCentral

Europe.



DobrynintooktheoccasiontoaskaboutourrecentroundofWarsawtalks

withtheChinese.HehopedIunderstoodthatthiswasa“neuralgic”pointwith

Moscow.WouldIbriefhim?ThisconstantSovietfrettingaboutChinaisas

inexplicabletomenowasthen;thesameinsecuritywasinevidencenearlya

decadelaterwithrespectto theSino‐Japanesetreaty.Theincessantinquiries

couldyieldnopositivebenefit.IftheSovietUnionhadarealreasonforconcern,it

wasunlikelytoreceiveatruthfulreply;itwasmorelikelytoremindusofour

strategicopportunity—thiscertainlywastheresultin1969.Undoubtedly,

Dobrynin’ssuperiorsinMoscowintheirbureaucraticwaythoughtthattheycould

notbeblamedforignoranceabouttheWarsawtalksiftheycouldproducea

recordofhavingasked—withnosenseofhowinsecurethismadethemappear.



IhadalwaysopposedbriefingMoscowonourconversationswiththe

ChinesebecauseitgavetheSovietstooeasyanopportunitytoplaytheirversion

backtoPekingtostimulateChinesefearsofaSoviet‐Americancondominium.I

thereforerepliedthatifMoscowwereso“neuralgic,”hissuperiorswouldnot

believeanythingItoldhimanyway.Evenwithoutabriefingitshouldbeclearthat

wewereinnopositionto“use”Chinaasamilitarythreat.Atthesametime

Moscowhadtounderstandthatwetoohadour“neuralgic”point,whichwas

Vietnam.IpointedoutthatrecentbroadcastsbyAmericanprisonersofwaron

MoscowRadiowereanunfriendlyact.



Dobrynin’srealpurposeforthemeeting,however,wastocontinuethe

exchangeofDecember22onusingtheChannel.Hefirstmadean

uncharacteristicallyheavy‐handedattempttosoundmeoutonasummit,asking

aboutasupposedre markbytheJapaneseAmbassadorthatNixonwasaimingto

meetwiththeSovietleadersinlatesummerorearlyfall.Iassuredhimthatwhen

wewerereadyforasummitwewouldnotmakeourapproachthroughanother

country.



Atlast,DobryninconveyedMoscow’s reactiontoourpreviousexchange.

TheSovietleadershipwelcomedseriousdiscussionsintheChannel.Heproposed

thatwetakeuponesubjectatatime.HewouldshortlypresentSovietviewson

Europeansecurity;perhapsbeforetheSALTtalksresumedinAprilIcouldoutline

ourbasicapproach.Iagreedtothisprocedure.



Thus,bytheendofJanuary1970weseemedtobeatthebeginningofa

seriousdialogue.But,assooften, theSovietsveeredunpredictablyoffcourse.

ThepromiseddiscussiononEuropeansecuritynevertookplace;Dobryninsimply

didnotreturntothesubject.NorweretheresubstantiveconversationsonSALT. 

Instead,DobryninappearedinmyofficeonJanuary31withawarningfrom

PremierKosyginaboutIsraelimilitaryactionsalongtheSuezCanal.IfIsraeliair

raidsdeepintoEgyptcontinued,saidthenote,theSovietUnion“willbeforcedto 

seetoitthattheArabstateshavemeansattheirdisposal”to“rebuff”Israel.A

coolbutpoliteletterfromNixonrejectedtheallegationsandleftnodoubtthat

theUnitedStateswouldresistanySovietescalationintheMiddleEast.[

Fordetails,

seeChapterXIV.

]OnFebruary10Dobrynin,somewhatchastened,returnedtothe

charge,arguingthatKosygin’sletterhadbeenintendednottoconveyathreatbut

todefineadilemma.



Aweeklater,Dobrynincameinwithanextraordinarycomplaintthatagain

demonstratedthecongenitalSovietinse curityandatthesametimeskillfullyput

usonthedefensive.HepointedoutthatintherecentlypublishedPresidential

ForeignPolicyReport,anepicof40,000words,theonlyforeignleaders

mentionedbynamewerePresidentsThieuandCeauşescu.Hisleaderswerelikely

toconcludethatwewerenottakingthemseriously.Iturned thisamazingpoint

asidepolitely,somewhatdisingenuouslytellinghimthatthereportwaswritten

primarilyforanAmericanaudience.Dobryninnextaskedaboutaninnocuous

phraseintheEuropechapterofthesamereporttotheeffectthat“theonly

constant”intheworldwas“theinevitabilityofchange.”Didthismeanweno

longerrecognizedtheexistingdividinglinesinEurope?Irepliedthatitwasodd

foraMarxisttoobjectto aphilosophicalreferencetotheinevitabilityofchange.

Wedidnotchallengeexistingnationalfrontiers,butwedidnotrecognizetheEast

Germanboundaryasanationalfrontier.Iknew thattheSovietswereaboutto

begindelicatenegotiationswithChancellorWillyBrandtaboutinternalGerman

arrangementsandIwasnotabouttoaddtotheirleverage.



Dobryninassuredmeagainthathisleadershipwaseagertocontinuehis

confidentialexchangeswithme,particularlyonSALT.Hewasstillwithout

instructionsonwhatspecificsubjecttopursue,however.ThenonMarch10,

shortlybeforetheofficialSALTtalkswerescheduledtoopen,Dobryninraisedthe

questionwhetherheandIshouldconcentrateona“comprehensive”ora

“limited”SALTagreement.Itoldhimthemainproblemwastogetconcreteabout

something.Withinaweekofthisconversationwelearnedthatthemost

advancedSovietantiaircraftmissiles(theSA‐3S)werearrivinginEgypttogether

withSovietpersonneltomanthem.So,withintendaysImetagainwithDobrynin

andtoldhimfirmlythatthiswasreminiscentoftheirbehaviorduringtheCuban

missilecrisis.Wewouldsurelyseetoitthatthemilitarybalance wasmaintained.

OnApril7DobryninagainexploredthepossibilityofanexchangeonSALT:

MoscowwouldconsideritasignofgoodfaithifIoutlinedourpositionbeforeit

wastabledatVienna.Thiswouldpermitconsidera tionatthehighestlevelsinthe

Kremlinbeforetheexpertsintheministriesmaneuveredthemselvesintototal

inflexibility.



Beforewecouldpursuethesesubjects,DobryninwasrecalledtoMoscow

forconsultation,andthecrisisinCambodiaintervened.Butenoughhadtaken

placetomakeclearthattheKremlinhadnoclearline.Itwastryingpressureand

accommodationsimultaneously.Itopenedsubjectsitdidnotpursueand

provokedaconfrontationintheMiddleEastwithoutdefinablepurpose.Whatlay

behindthisconfusingbehavior?



<<Contents>>



****



TheRiddleofSovietConduct



veninthecalmestperiods,thepictureofaSovietleadershipoperatingonthe

basisofprofoundlong‐rangecalculationsislikelytobeoverdrawn.The

Politburo,acommitteeofusuallyfifteenpowerfulleaders,makesthefinal

decisions.Tobesure,thePartyGeneralSecretary—LeonidBrezhnevsince1964—

hasthemostimportantvoice.HecandeterminetheagendaofPolitburo

meetings;hecontrolstheSecretariat;hehasdecisiveweightinselectingnew

members.Nevertheless,sinceStalinnoGeneralSecretaryhashadunbridled

discretion—eventhoughBrezhnevclearlywasincreasinglypreeminentsince

1971.Hemustbuildaconsensus;undoubtedly,therearecompetingschoolsof

thoughtandcentersofinfluencetobereconciledoneveryissue.



Theponderousnatureofthismachineryismagnifiedbythesharp

separationbetweenthepolicymakingbody,thePolitburo,andtheexecutive

organsofthegovernment.Thebureaucracyisentitledtoaviewonlyinitsareaof

competence;itappearsnottohavetherighttoanopinionregardingsomeother

department’sspecialization,evenifitisrelatedinsubstance.ThustheMinistryof

ForeignAffairscanexpressitsviewsonthepoliticalimplicationsofarmscontrol

proposals,butnotonmilitaryaspects.TheMinistryofDefenseisthesole

authorityonmilitaryquestions;itenjoyslittlevoiceindiplomacy. Alldisputes

betweendepartmentsmoveforresolutiontothePolitburo.Until1973,when

GromykoandMarshalAndreiGrechkojoinedthePolitburo,neithertheForeign

norDefenseMinistries,whichtheyheaded,hadbeenrepresentedonthatbody

foradecade.BeforehewaselevatedtothePolitburoIoccasionallyhadthe

impressionthatIwasbetterinformedaboutSovietmilitarydeploymentsthan

Gromyko.OurSALTnegotiatorsclearlymadethemilitaryofficersontheSoviet

delegationuncomfortablewhentheydiscussedSovietmilitarydispositionsin

frontofSovietdiplomats;earlyon,oneoftheirofficerssuggestedtoour

delegationprivatelythatitwouldbebetteriftechnic a lmilitarysubjectswerenot

raisedinfrontofdiplomats.



SovietpolicymakingisthuscumbersomeevenwhentheGeneralSecretary

ispreeminentandthePolitburounified.Ittendstobecomemuscle‐boundduring

periodsofchangeintheleadership.Insuchcircumstances,themainlinesof

policy,oncedecided,arepursuedwithasingle‐mindedrigidityreinforcedby

Russianstubbornness.Duringpowerstrugglesitisquitepossibleforincompatible

coursestobepursued,untilsomecrisisimposestheneedfor aclear‐cutdecision.

TheSovietUnionhadslidintocrisesthatweresubstantiallyunplannedand

jeopardizedgoodwillbecausesomeevent—suchasaforthcomingParty

Congress—monopolizedtheattentionofthetopleadershiporgavegreater

weighttosomepartofitshuge,complexbureaucraticmachinery.



Suchaperiodwasearly1970.WhenNixonbecamePresident,Alexei

Kosygin,thePremier,seemedtobethedominantfigureonforeignpolicyinthe

Politburo.CommunicationsfromtheSovietleadershipweresentinhisname;he

hadmetPresidentJohnsonatGlassboro.Whenfee lerswereextendedfora

summitmeetinghiswasthenameinvariablymentioned.But,equallyobviously,

throughoutthisperiodBrezhnevwasgainingininfluence.Heseemedtoextend

hisrolefromthemanagementofpartyaffairsandthedomesticeconomyinto

internationalpolitics.APartyCongress,usuallyheldeveryfo uryears,was

scheduledfor1970.(Itdidnot,infact,takeplaceuntilthespringof1971.)This

wouldbetheoccasionforestablishingBrezhnev’spreeminence;afterthespring

of1971almostallhigh‐levelexchangeswerewithhim.



Thismeantthat1970wasayearoftransitioninwhichtheSoviet

leadership,perhapsabsorbedinitsowninternalmaneuvering,reactedtoevents

tactically.Moreover,thedomesticturmoilinAmericaoverthewarinVietnam

temptedittoexploitopportunitiesformakinggains.



OnFebruary2,IsentamemorandumtothePresidentpointingoutthatthis

periodofadjustmentwasexacerbatedbyseriousandchronicSovietdomestic

difficulties.Theeconomicgrowthratewasdeclining,largelybecauseof

technologicalbackwardness.AfterthefallofKhrushchevthenewleadershadset

outtoincreasethesupplyofconsumergoodsandatthesametimetoraise

spendingfordefense,includingalargebuildupontheChineseborder.Though

thisstretchedtheeconomy,theSovietleadershiphadhopedthatindustrial

reformwouldprovideanewstimulustoinvestmentandgrowth.Thesehopeshad

beendisappointed:“Thereason,ofcourse,isthattheSovietleadersarereluctant

tofaceuptothefailureoftheirownindustrialreforms.Noneoftheleaderscan

suggestanewprogramofreformwhichwouldspureconomicprogressandatthe

sametimepreservecentralpoliticalcontrol.ThisisacentralSovietdilemma.”(To

thisNixonaddedhismarginalcomment:“Thecriticalpoint.”)



Atug‐of‐waratthetopwasthereforelikely,Iconcluded:



ThePartyCongress,whichisexpectedthisyear,mightbringproblemstoahead.Allof

thetopleaderswillwanttoensurethattheirsupportersretainkeypositions.Theoldergroup

underBrezhnevmaytrytoexpanditsmandateattheCongress,whiletheyoungergroupwould

beinclinedtoblockthisprospect.



Intheend,theintern altensionsdidnotgotothebreakingpoint.Buttwo

oftheindividualsIidentifiedasbelongingtothe“younger”group—Dmitri

PolyanskyandAleksandrShelepin—weresoonpurgedfromhighoffice.Brezhnev

apparentlyagreedwithmyanalysisofwhowaslikelytograspforpower.



TheuncertaintiesofKremlinpoliticscontinuedthroughthespring.Ina

memorandumofMay5tothePresident,Ilistedfurthersignsofconfusedand

contradictorySovietpolicies,suchasproposalsrapidlyretractedandreferencesin

speechestodecisionsalreadychanged:



Theconsensusinsidethegovernment,andconcurredinbysomeleadingscholars,

seemstobethattherehas,infact,beentroubleintheleadership,butthattheresolution,if

onlytemporary,hasbeeninBrezhnev’sfavor.



Hisimageissharper—astheresultofintensivenation‐widetelevisionexposure;his

confidenceisapparentlyreflectedinhiswide‐rangingspeechescoveringallimportantinternal

andexternaltopics.Andseveralsecondlevelpersonnelchanges…suggestheisontop.



InJune1970aCentralCommitteemeetingandelectionstotheParliament

oftheUSSR(theSupremeSoviet)confirmedBrezhnev’spredominance.InJuneI

analyzedforthePresidentthelikelyforeignpolicyconsequences:



Brezhnev’spredominanceandgrowingstrengthdoesnotimmediatelytranslateinto

policyterms.AttheCongressheidentifiedhimselfwiththeconsumerattheexpenseofheavy

anddefenseindustry,andwithhis“peaceprogram”.Hereiteratedboththemesinhisclosing

speech.Moreimportantmaybethatifheisgainingmorepowerandthereforeprobablysome

morefreedomofaction,hemaythusbeinclinedtomoveonsomeoftheinternationalissues

thatweareengagedin—SALT,Berlin,etc.



ButbeforetheSovietssettledonacourseofrelaxingtensionstheysought

toisolateusby“selectivedét ente”—improvingrelationswithourEuropeanallies

whileincreasingpressuresonus.TheSovietleaderssawanopeningforthis

maneuverinthepoliciesofthenewChancellorinWestGermany,WillyBrandt;

forsomemonthsOstpolitikheldthecenterofthestage.



<<Contents>>



****



Ostpolitik



sthemonthswentbyitbecameincreasinglyapparentwhyDobryninhad

neverfolloweduphisofferofJanuary20topresentSovietviewson

Europeansecurity.Moscowthoughtitcoulddobetterindealingdirectlywith

Bonnthanbyinvolvingus.Inthewinterof1969WillyBrandthadtakenthe

initiativewithofferstoboththeUSSRandEastGermanytorenouncetheuseof

forceandacceptthestatusquoinCentralEurope.TheSovietleadersandtheir

EastGermanprotégéswereclearlyintriguedbytheprospectofdealing forthe

firsttimesincethe1930swithaSocialDemocraticgovernmentinGermany.

MoscowhadopenednegotiationssimultaneouslywithPekingonthelong‐

simmeringborderdis pute.AstheSovietsprobablysawit,therewassomechance

ofrelievingpressureonbothfrontsatthesametime;iftheycouldsecure

Brandt’sacceptanceofthestatusquoinEurope,thiswouldcompoundthe

isolationoftheChinese.AndanaccommodationdirectlybetweenBonnand

MoscowwouldcarrywithittheadditionaldividendofexcludingtheUnitedStates

fromthesolutionofamajorEuropeanproblem,settingaprecedentthatmight

causeotherEuropeanstolookincreasinglytoMoscowratherthanWashington.

OvertimethiswasboundtoweakenNATOties.



WhileasIhaveindicatedIhadcometotheviewthatBrandt’sdecisionto

modifythepoliciesofhisChristianDemocraticpredecessorswasinevitableand

potentiallybeneficial,thiswouldbesoonlyifitdidnotgivetheSovietsthewhip

handoverGermanandEuropeanpolicy.Unlesswemanagedtogetsomecontrol

overtheprocessBrandtwouldbecomemoreandmoredependentontheSoviet

UnionanditsgoodwillforthefulfillmentofGermangoalsinthenewpolicy.On

February16IwrotetothePresidentofthepossibleconsequences:



ThemostworrisomeaspectsofOstpolitik,however,aresomewhatmorelong‐range.As

longasheisnegotiatingwiththeEasterncountriesovertheissuesthatarecurrentlyonthe

table—recognitionoftheGDR,theOder‐Neisse,variouspossiblearrangementsforBerlin—

Brandtshouldnothaveanyseriousdifficultyinmaintaininghisbasicpro‐Westernpolicy…



ButassumingBrandtachievesadegreeofnormalization,heorhissuccessormay

discoverbeforelongthatthehoped‐forbenefitsfailtodevelop…Havingalreadyinvested

heavilyintheirEasternpolicy,theGermansmayatthispointseethemselvesasfacing

agonizingchoices.Itshouldberememberedthatinthe1950s,manyGermansnotonlyinthe

SPDunderSchumacherbutinconservativequarterstraditionallyfascinatedwiththeEastor

enthralledbythevisionofGermanyasa“bridge”betweenEastandWest,arguedagainst

Bonn’sincorporationinWesterninstitutionsonthegroundthatitwouldforeverseal

Germany’sdivisionandprecludetherestorationofanactiveGermanroleintheEast.Thiskind

ofdebateaboutGermany’sbasicpositioncouldwellrecurinmoredivisiveform,notonly

inflamingGermandomesticaffairsbutgeneratingsuspicionsamongGermany’sWestern

associatesastoitsreliabilityasapartner.[SomethinglikethisseemstobehappeninginBonn

asthisbookisbeingwritten.]



YettherewasnosenseinseekingtoderailBrandt’spolicy;thesoleoption

availabletouswastogivetheinevitableaconstructivedirection.Brandt’s

coalitionhadbeenelectedontheprogramhewasnowimplementing.Wecould

aborthisOstpolitikonlybymassiveinterventioninGermaninternalpolitics,the

alienationofourallies,and(asPresidentPompidoufeared)therefashioningof

NATOintoaGerman‐AmericanalliancefortheliberationofEasternEurope.And

wehadnoalternativetooffer.ItwastheirfearofaGerman“liberationpolicy”

thathadcausedPompidouandHaroldWilsontoendorseBrandt’sapproach

publiclyandtopressusprivatelytofollowsuit.Norwouldourpublicopinion

understandapolicyofinsistingonGermanreunificationagainstthewishesofthe

Germangovernment;wecouldnotbemoreGermanthantheGermans.Onthe

contrary,wewouldbecomeincreasinglythebuttofthechargethatwehad

destroyedhopefulprospectsforeasingtheharshconsequencesofthedivisionof

Germany.



IthereforeurgedNixontogoalongwithBrandt’spolicyandtouseour

influencetoembeditinawiderframeworkthanGermannati onalism.Brandtdid

hispartinassuaginganxietybykeepinginclosetouch.Tobesure,thenew

Germangovernmentinformedratherthanconsulted.Theyreportedprogress;

theydidnotsolicitadvice.Butthiswasalsowhatwepreferred.Thelastthingwe

wantedwastobeheldresponsibleforGermannegotiatingpositionsthatwere

turningintoabitterdomesticissueinWestGermany.IurgedNixon“thatany

endorsementwegiveBrandtshouldbenomorethangeneralsupportforthe

improvementoftheFRG’s[FederalRepublicofGermany’s]relationswiththe

East—withoutapprovingspecificFRGmoves.”



NorwerewewithoutresourcesinpreventingtheSovietUnionfromusing

OstpolitiktodivideusfromourEuropeanallies.Foronething,noWestGerman

leadercouldaffordtoconductapolicyofwhichwestronglydisapproved.His

domesticpositionwouldnotsustainit;hisownconvictionsbeliedit;norational

calculationofbenefitswouldencourageit.Moreover,thefurtherBrandt went

towardrecognizingEastGermanythemoreimperativeaBerlinagreement

becameforhim.Berlinbecamethekeytothewholepuzzle,foronesimple

reason.WhatevertreatiesBrandtnegotiatedwiththeUSSRandEastGermany

wouldhavetoberatifiedbytheWestGermanParliament,inwhichhiscoalition

hadtheslimmestofmajorities.AnagreementimprovingthesecurityofBerlin

wasthemosttangibleandconvincingquidproquoforBrandt’scontroversial

treaties,whichessentiallyembodiedGermany’sacceptanceofitsdivision.It

becameclearthatonlywithaBerlinagreementwouldBrandt’sEasterntreaties

beratified.ABerlinagreementrequiredtheconcurrenceofallfourwartime

powers(theUnitedStates,Britain,France,andtheUSSR).Thusouractive

cooperationwascrucial;wealonehadthestrengthtocounterbalancethereality

ofBerlin’sisolation;intimewewouldachievetherebyamajorvoiceinthe

process,howeveritwasstarted.



Inthisframework,withoutenthusiasmbutnotwithoutconfidence,we

gaveoursupporttoBrandt’shistoriccourse. InadeclarationofpolicyonJanuary

14,1970,helaiddownsixprinciplesfornegotiationswiththeEast,including

maintenanceofFour‐PowerrightsinBerlinandimprovementofconditionsinthe

city.Fivedayslater,theEastGermanCommunistPartyleader,WalterUlbricht,

agreedtonegotiatewithoutpreconditionsoninter‐Germanrelations.Inanother

surprisemove,onFebruary11theEastGermanPremier,WilliStoph,proposed

directtalks.Aftersomehagglingoverlocationitwasagreedthatthetwoleaders

wouldmeetinErfurtinEastGermanyonMarch19.Paralleltothemoves