Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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groupofHarvardprofessors,mostofwhomhadheldhighgovernmentalposts,at

theirrequest,Iofferedtoengageinacandiddiscussionofthereasoningbehind

thedecision,butonanoff‐the‐recordbasis.Mosthadbeenmyclosecolleagues

andfriends.Theywouldnotacceptthisoffer.Theyweretherenotaseminent

academiciansbutaspoliticalfiguresrepresentingaconstituencyathome,a

campusinflamedbytheKentStatetragedyasmuchasbythewar.Theyhad

proclaimedtothenewspapersbeforehand—butnottome—thattheywerethere

toconfrontme;theyannouncedthattheywouldhenceforthrefuseanyresearch

oradvisoryrelationshipwiththegovernment.



TheirobjectionstotheCambodiandecisionillustratedthathyperbolewas

notconfinedtotheAdministration. Onedistinguishedprofessorgaveitashis

consideredanalysisthat“somebodyhadforgottentotellthePresidentthat

Cambodiawasacountry;heactedasifhedidn’tknowthis.Hadweundertakena

largecommitmenttoCambodia?Ifwehad,thiswasrottenforeignpolicy.Ifwe

hadn’t,thiswasrottenforeignpolicy.”Hewasconvincedthatthisaction“clearly

jeopardizedAmericanwithdrawals”—thoughinfactitdidtheopposite.This

professorwaspreparedtobelieve,onthebasisofnoevidencewhatsoever,that

SecretaryofDefenseLairdhadbeenunawareofthemilitaryoperationsbefore

thePresidentannouncedthem.Heheldtheamazingviewthat“itwasagamble

thatshouldn’thavebeentakenevenifitsucceedsonitsownterms.”Otherssaid

thedecisionwas“incomprehensible,”“morehorriblethananythingdonebyLBJ.”

“disastrous,”“dreadful.”Oneprofessoradvancedtheextraordinaryhypothesis

thatanoperationlastingeightweekstoadistanceoftwenty‐onemilesmightlead

ourmilitarycommanderstobelievethattheuseofnuclearweaponswasnow

conceivable.Anotherdeclaredthatwehadprovokedalltheactionsoftheother

side.



Themeetingcompletedmytransitionfromtheacademicworldtothe

worldofaffairs.Theseweretheleadersoftheirfields;menwhohadbeenmy

friends,academicianswhoselifetimeofstudyshouldhaveencouragedasenseof

perspective.Thattheydisagreedwithourdecisionwasunderstandable;Ihad

myselfgonethroughalongprocessofhesitationbeforeIbecameconvincedthat

therewasnoalternative.Butthelackofcompassion,theoverweening

righteousness,therefusaltoofferanalternative,reinforcedtwoconvictions:that

fortheinternalpeaceofourcountrythewarhadtobeended,butalsothatin

doingsoontermscompatiblewithanyinternationalresponsibilitywewouldget

nohelpfromthosewithwhomIhadspentmyprofessionallife.Thewounds

wouldhavetobehealedafterthewarwasover;intheevent,thesewerenot.



Cambodiawasnota moralissue;neitherNixonnorhisopponentsshould

everhavepresenteditinthoseterms.Whatwefacedwasanessentiallytactical

choice:whethertheuseofAmericantroopstoneutralizethesanctuariesfora

periodofeightweekswasthebestwaytomaintaintheestablishedpaceand

securityofourexitfromVietnamandpreventHanoifromoverrunningIndochina.

Reasonablemenmightdiffer;instead,rationaldiscussionended.ThePresident’s

presentationthatelevatedhisdecisiontothesamelevelofcrisisassomeofthe

crucialchoicesofWorldWarIIwascounteredbythecriticswiththeimageofan

out‐of‐controlPresidentactingtotallyirrationally,whohadprovokedtheenemy

andwhoseactionswereimmoraleveniftheysucceeded.



ButitwasnottheincursionintoCambodiathatwastherealsubjectof

debate.ItwasthesameissuethathadtornthecountryduringtheMoratorium

thepreviousyear:whethertherewereanytermsthattheUnitedStatesshould

insistonforitshonor,itsworldposition,andthesa crificesalreadymade,or

whetheritshouldcollapseitseffortimmediatelyandunconditionally.Apolitical

settlementasurgedbySenatorFulbright—otherthanthequickimpositionofa

CommunistgovernmentinSaigon—waspreciselywhatHanoihadalways

rejected,asLeDucThohadconfirmedtomeinthemostunqualifiedtermsnot

threeweeksearlier.Whatnoneofthemoderatecriticswaswillingtoadmitwas

thatifwefollowedtheirrecommendationsofrefusingaidtoCambodia,wewould

soonhavenochoicebuttoacceptHanoi’sterms,whichnoneofthemsupported.

Ouropponentskeptproclaiminganassumptionforwhichtheredidnotexistthe

slightestevidence—thattherewassomeunspecifiedpoliticalalternative,some

magicformulaofneutrality,whichwasbeingwillfullyspurned.Thepanicky

decisiontosetaJune30deadlinefortheremovalofourforcesfromCambodia

wasoneconcreteresultofpublicpressures.



Theinsecuritywasevengreateratthemiddlelevelsofgovernment.Here

theimpactofthepublicprotestwastoshiftdiscussionfromhowtomakethe

operationsucceedtoanelaborationofvariousrestraints:ontheuseoftacticalair

strikes;onSouthVietnameseoperationsinCambodiaafterweleftonJune30;on

theroleofAmericanadvisers.TheambivalenceofthegovernmentinWashington

wasboundtobetransmittedtothoseinthefieldwhosoonsensedthat

Washingtonwasnothandingoutprizesforimaginativeandboldeffo rtstopursue

theenemyinCambodia.InthissenseCambodiawasamicrocosmofourwhole

effortinIndochina.



Therearenowinnerswhenthedialogueinademocracybreaksdownso

completely.Therecanbenoseriousnationalpolicywhenanattemptismadeto

coercedecisionsbyanoutpouringofemotionandwhenthoseinhighofficeare

forcedtotakemeasurestheydonotreallybelieveinsimplytocalm protestsin

thestreets.Perhapssomeofthecriticsmighthavebeenmoreunderstandinghad

theyknownofmyconversationswithLeDucTho,whichwereconcealedbythe

Administration’sconvictionthatsecrecywasneededforsuccessfulnegotiations.

Andyetitisimpossibleto avoidtheimpressionthatmostofthecriticsdidnot

needPresidentialerrorsotherthanasapretext.(Theywouldprobablyhave

denouncedtheoperationforjeopardizingallprospectsformynegotiationshad

theyknownofthem.)Wewereconfrontedbyanundifferentiatedemotionthat

dismissedeveryexplanationasarepetitionofexcessiveclaimsofprevious

administrations.Thecriticsrarelyaddressedourrootdilemma:howwecould

responsiblywithdrawforcesandreducemilitaryoperations—asweweredoing—

whilepermittingtheenemytoopenupanewfront.



Theefforttofindamoderatealternativetoourpolicyledtoarenewalof

pressuresfora fixeddeadlineforourtotalwithdrawal.OnJune7,theLosAngeles

TimescalledforanimmediateandcompletewithdrawalfromSouthEastAsia:

“ThetimehascomefortheU.S.to leaveVietnamandtoleaveitswiftlyand

withoutequivocation.”Aneighteen‐monthtimeperiod,saidtheTimeswithout

evidence,“wouldbemuchlesshazardousthanthepolicythePresidentis

presentlypursuing.”InJuly,Lifemagazinefollowedsuit.



Unfortunately,theargumentsforawithdrawaldeadlinehadnotimproved

withage.EitherthedeadlinewascompatiblewithVietnamization,inwhichcaseit

coincidedwithourownpolicybutwoulddepriveusofnegotiatingleverage.Orit

wasarbitrary,inwhichcaseitwasaeuphemismforacollapse;anditwouldhave

beennearlyimpossibletojustifyriskinglivesintheintervalbeforethedeadline

expired.SoweendedtheCambodiaoperationstillonthelongrouteoutof

Vietnam,confrontinganimplacableenemyandane quallyimplacable domestic

opposition.

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TheBalanceSheet



heultimatevictimsofourdomesticanguishwerethegentlepeopleof

Cambodia.Yearslater,whentheCambodiangovernmentthatwesupported

fellunderCommunistrule,thosewhohaddemandedforyearsthatweabandon

Cambodiaacquiredavestedinterestintryingtoevadebyanycontortionthe

responsibilityforthehorrendousconsequencesthattheiradvocacyhadapartin

bringingabout.ThereareassertionsthatthetensionswithinCambodiathat

toppledSihanoukresultedfromtheWestwardmovementofCommunistforces

allegedlycausedbyourincursionofMay1970

orourbombingsince 1969.

In

reality,asthemaponpage471makesobvious,theWestwarddriveoftheNorth

VietnamesebeganinearlyApril,beforeourincursion,provokedonlybya

CambodiangovernmentthathadtheeffronterytoaskthemtoleaveCambodian

soil.

T



Withoutourincursion,theCommunistswouldhavetakenoverCambodia

yearsearlier.Thattheruleofthesefanaticalideologueswouldhavebeenmore

benignunderthoseconditionsisnotverylikely;whentyrantsaresoremotefrom

theirpeople,socommittedtofrightfulexperimentsofsocialtransformation,so

doctrinaire,nonormalcriteriaapply.Thesewerenomisunderstood

humanitarianswho,inafitofpiqueatouractionsfiveyearsearlier,weredriven

tomassacretheirownpopulation.Thebizarreargumenthasindee dbeenmade,

withaglaringlackofsubstantiation,thatthecrueltyoftheKhmerRougein

victorywastheproductoffiveyearsofAmericanandCambodianeffortstoresist

them.

Noonecanacceptthisasanadequateexplanationexceptapologistsfor

themurderousKhmerRouge.Sihanoukdoesnotbelievethis;theyweremenhe

hadkickedoutofCambodiain1967becausetheywereamenacetohiscountry.

HetoldmeinApril1979thattheKhmerRougeleaderswere“alwayskillers”from

thebeginning.

TheactionsoftheKhmerRougeinpowerwereamethodical

applicationofeconomictheoriesnurturedindecadesofideologicalfanaticism.

LeaderKhieuSamphaninhisdoctoraldissertationinParisinthelate1950shad

writtenthattheCambodianeconomyandsocialstructurehadtobetransformed

bymobilizing“thedormantenergyinthepeasantmass”againstthecorrupt

cities—atheoryappliedtwodecadeslaterwithbreathtaking thoroughnessand

brutality,tothepointofgenocide.



ThatHanoiwouldhaverespectedtheindependenceofaneutralist

SihanoukwhenitlatersquelchedafellowCommunistregimepreciselyforthesin

ofindependencedefiesplausibility;itisrebuttedbyeverystatementevermade

tousbyLeDucTho. WewouldhavetakenourchancesonaneutralistSihanouk.

UnfortunatelybylateApril1970,eventsandhisoutragehadputhimintoa

positionwherehecouldhavecomebackonlyastheagentoftheCommunists.It

wasHanoi—animatedbyaninsatiabledrivetodominateIndochina—thatinvaded

CambodiainthemiddleSixties,thatorganizedtheKhmerRougelongbeforeany

AmericanbombsfellonCambodiansoil;itwasNorthVietnamesetroopswho

weretryingtostrangleCambodiainthemonthbeforeourlimitedattack;anditis

NorthVietnamesetroopswhohaveoverthrowntheKhmerRougein1978‐1979.

HadwenotinvadedthesanctuariesCambodiawouldhavebeenengulfedin1970

insteadof1975.Ifanything doomedthefreeCambodians,itwaswarwearinessin

theUnitedStates.



PoorCambodiagraduallyturnedintothebuttofournationalfrustra tions.

Ourdomesticcritics,thwartedintheirvariousschemestolegislateanendofthe

warinVietnam,weremoresuccessfulinimposingabdicationinCambodia.Even

thoughthesameenemywasusingCambodiaasabase,eventhoughHanoihad

nomeansofreinforcingbeyondwhatitwasalreadydoingsothatanyincreasein

Cambodianstrengthwasboundtoweakenitorputitonthedefensive,American

adviserswerebarredbylawfromCambodia,andAmericanaidwastightly

constrained.TheCambodianstieddownmuchofHanoi’smanpowerintheSouth,

butouraidfundsweredoledoutgrudgingly,amountingtoabout$200millionin

1970,andtheywereencumberedwiththerestrictionthattheycouldnotbe

expendedto“maintaintheLonNolgovernment”—anastoundingpolicyof

helpingacountrywithoutassistingitsgovernment.Thisreflectedboththefear

thatwemightget“boggeddown”inCambodia,asintheothercountriesof

Indochina,andthebynowprevalentmyththatwewerebeingheldhostageby

ThieuratherthanbyHanoi.Itwasnevermadeclearhowthedeteriorationofour

allies’positioninCambodiaandLaoswouldmakeiteasierforustodisengage

fromVietnam.



TheCongressionalbanonmilitaryadvisersinCambodiawastakenso

literallybyourAmbassadorthatheprohibitedourmilitaryattachesevenfrom

travelingtoinformthemselvesoftheconductofCambodianunits.Cambodia

becameabackwater;SouthVietnameseforcesoperatedinitsborderarea;

Americanplanesbombedenemycommunications—andtheweakerthe

Cambodianforceswere,inlargepartasaresultofthelimitsonouraid,themore

theyhadtorelyonourplanesastheironlystrategicreserve.Nottheleastirony

wasthatthecriticsproducedwhattheyprofessedtoabhor:increasingrelianceon

airpower.Nothingdecisivewaspermitted;theNorthVietnameseweregiven

timetobuilduptheKhmerRougeforceswhentheymighthavebeenhard

pressedearlyon.TheCambodianarmyhadtolivebythedoves’versionofthe

NixonDoctrine,languishinguntilitsmercilessCommunistenemyhadgathered

thestrengthforanall‐outassaultandwhileadoctrinaireAmericagradually

throttleditscapacityforresistance.



Cambodia’sdilemmatouchedeventwostaffersoftheSenateForeign

RelationsCommittee,RichardM.MooseandJamesG.Lowenstein,whoseannual

visitstoSouthEastAsiahadbeentheterrorofourofficialsbecausethetwo

opposedthewarandwereadeptatturningupbureaucraticbungling.Their

reportswereasemiannualsalvointheCongressionalassaultonourVietnam

policy.OnavisittoCambodiaattheendof1970,however,Mooseand

Lowensteincametoconclusionsnotverydifferentfromourown,andhadthe

couragetostatethem.ThethrustoftheirreportwasthattheUnitedStateswas

reallydoingverylittleforCambodia,thattheCambodiangovernmenthadbroad

popularsupport,andthattheUnitedStateswaslettingCambodiadown:



ItappearedtousthatthereisconsiderablesupportforthegovernmentofGeneralLon

Nolamongtheyouthandintellectuals,inmarkedcontrasttothesituationinSouthVietnam,

andamongcivilservantsandmembersoftheSenateandtheAssembly…Thereisanevident

senseofnationalidentityandpurposeandadeterminationtodefendthecountrywithout

foreigntroops.…



Cambodiansfinditdifficulttounderstandthecomplicatedandinvolvedelementsofthe

AmericandilemmainSouthEastAsiatoday.LookingbackatthepatternofAmericanbehaviorin

Asiaoverthepasttwodecades,theyseemmystifiedbythesignsofAmericanhesitancyin

armingthemtodefendagainstaninvadingforcearmedbyChinaandtheSovietUnion.



WhereastheearlierMoose‐Lowensteinreports,supportingprevalent

preconception,hadbeenprintedinfancybookletsandwidelydistributed,this

reportwasbottledupforseveraldaysincommittee.Then,apparentlyunder

pressurefromsomemembers,itwasreleased—butinasinconspicuousawayas

possible.SenatorFulbrightsimplyinserteditintotheCongressionalRecordon

December16,1970,alongwithafewnewspapereditorials,withoutcalling

attentiontoitandwithoutapublicreading.



Whethertoattackthesanctuarieswasaclosecall,onwhichhonestand

seriousindividualsmightwelldiffer.ButoncetheNorthVietnameseforceshad

spreadalloverthecountry,oncea“liberatedzone” hadbeencreatedunder

Communistcontrolasasteptowardoverthrowingthenon‐Communist

governmentinPhnomPenh(allantedati nganyAmericanresponse),thediehad

beencast.Attackingthesanctuariespreventedanimmediatecollapseof

Cambodiabutcouldnotremovethelong‐termthreat.Thosewhohadopposed

theoriginaldecisionnowsoughttoundoitbyblockingfurtherassistancetothe

Cambodiangovernment.Butthisneitherundidthedecisionnorpreventedan

expansionofthewar;allitaccomplishedwastogiveHanoiandtheKhmerRouge

abreathingspelltobuildupforthefinalassault.Itdoomedwhatwasleftofhope

foranindependent,free,andneutralCambodia.Whateverthemeritsofthe1970

debate,astrongcasecanbemadeforthepropositionthatCambodiawas

ultimatelythevictimofthebreakdownofourdemocraticpoliticalprocess:Both

governmentandcriticscouldblockeachother’sgoalsandfrustrateeachother’s

policies,preventinganycoherentstrategy.FromthismélangeofNorth

Vietnamesedetermination,Cambodianrivalries,andAmericaninternalconflicts,

everythingfollowedwiththeinevitabilityofaGreektragedyuntilthere

descendedonthatgentlelandahorrorthatitdidnotdeserveandthatnoneofus

havetherighttoforget.



InJune1970wedidnotbelievethatmatterswereforeordainedto end

tragically.Westillsoughtforthebalancebetweenfirmnessandconciliationwhich

wouldprovidethemaximumincentiveforanegotiation.Thisiswhyweasked

GeneralWalterstodeliveramessageonMay8,1970,proposinganothermeeting

withLeDucTho.IdidnotexpectHanoitoacceptimmediately.OnMay6,Hanoi

had“postponed”thescheduledpublicnegotiatingsessionatAvenueKléberuntil

May14andmadeanotherstatementinsupportoftheKhmerRouge.Buteven

thispostponementwascarriedout,asmystaffputit,“inasomewhatcautious

manner”revealinganeagernesstokeepthenegotiatingchannelopen—ifonlyto

giveusnopretexttoabrogatethebombinghalt.Hanoididnotreplyformany

weekstotheoffertoresumesecrettalkswithLeDucTho.OnJune5itturned

downourproposalforanothermeeting,callingita“temporarysuspension.”



Butitwasclearthattherewouldbeanewroundofdiplomacyasthedust

settledandanewbalanceofforcesemergedontheground.OnMay25I

thereforerequestedfromthedepartmentsandagenciesastudyofdiplomatic

initiativestheUnited StatesmighttakeinIndochina.Ialsoproposedtothe

PresidentthatweappointanewseniornegotiatorinParis.The,North

Vietnamesehadinsistentlydemandedthisinboththepublicandtheprivate

talks.Ihadneverthoughtthatmerelynaminganegotiatorwouldmovethe

negotiationsoffdeadcenter;Hanoi’smaininterestintheParisforumwastokeep

usfromresumingbombingtheNorthonthegroundthatnoserioustalkswere

takingplace.Nevertheless,Ithoughtthataseniorappointmentwoulddeprive

Hanoiofapropagandaissue.IsuggestedDavidK.E.Bruce;Nixonenthusiastically

agreed;Bruceacceptedwiththatsenseofdutysocharacteristicofthis

extraordinarydiplomat.



Ihavenevermetamore distinguishedpublicservantorafinermanthan

DavidBrace.ScionofanoldMarylandfamily,hehaddeeprootsinbothMaryland

andVirginiaandhadbeenatdifferenttimesamemberofbothstatelegislatures.

HehadwrittenabouttheearlyPresidents,andhisadmirersfoundinhimmanyof

thesamesturdyqualities.Hedevotedhislifetothepublicweal.Hehadproved

hiscourageintheOSSinWorldWarII.Handsome,wealthy,emotionallysecure,

hewasfreeofthatinsistenceonseeingtheirviewsprevailthroughwhichlesser

menturnpublicserviceintoanexerciseoftheiregos.Hisbearingmadeclearthat

heservedacausethattranscendedthelifespanofanindividual;heexudedthe

convictionthathiscountryrepresentedvaluesthatneededtendingandthatwere

worthdefending.Hisdignityforsworethesecond‐rate;hisunderstatedeloquence

confirmedthatinpersonsofqualitysubstanceandformcannotbeseparated.He

sawmanasuniquelycapableofimprovementthroughreasonandtactinaworld

whoseimperfectionswouldyield—ifonlygradually—topatienceandgoodwill.



Bruceneverturneddownhonorablerequestsbya President;nordidhe

evaluatethemintermsofpersonaladvantage.Forthirtyyearsheserved

PresidentsofbothpartiesasAmbassadortoLondon,Paris,andBonn.Hewasto

workforPresidentsNixonandFordintheVietnamnegotiations,inPeking,andin

NATO—alwayswithdistinction. Hespokehismind,ifnecessaryexplicitly,buthe

didnotusehisowntravailasameansofpersonaladvancement.Hehad,ina

word,character.



FewmenhavehadagreaterinfluenceonmethanDavidBruce.Onsomeof

mymostfatefuldecisionsIinstinctivelyturnedtohim.Ididnotalwaystakehis

advice;Ineverfailedtobenefitfromhisjudgment,hissenseofhumor,his

unfailingtact.Hekeptmefromtakingmyselftooseriously;heneverfailedto

inspiremewithhisconvictionthatournation’sfuturewasaserioustrust.



InJuly1970,DavidBruce,attheageofseventy‐twoandinfragilehealth,

embarkedonamissioninwhichheknewthathisoppositenumbershadastheir

primaryobjectivetowearhimdown.Heunderstoodthatdebatingskillcouldnot

substitutefortheobjectivebalanceofforcesonwhichhisinterlocutorsplacedso

muchstock.TherewouldbelittlegloryforhiminParis;nordidheseekit.Buthe

knewthatanation’shonorisnotatrivialmatter;wehadnotcomethroughthe

centuriestobetraythosewhohadreliedonourpromises.



Wewereonalongroad,certaintobepainful.ButwithDavidBruceasa

companionitsburdenswouldbecomemorebearable.Andanyefforttowhichhe

waswillingtocommithimselfhadastrongpresumptionofbeinginthe national

interest.



<<Contents>>



****



XIII



TheSovietRiddle:

Europe,SALT,andaSummit



HotandCold



hesuperpowersoftenbehaveliketwoheavilyarmedblindmenfeeling

theirwayaroundaroom,eachbelievinghimselfinmortalperilfromthe

otherwhomheassumestohaveperfectvision.Eachsideshouldknowthat

frequentlyuncertainty,compromise,andincoherencearetheessenceof

policymaking.Yeteachtendstoascribetotheothersideaconsistency,foresight,

andcoherencethatitsownexperiencebelies.Ofcourse,overtimeeventwo

armedblindmenina roomcandoenormousdamagetoeachother,nottospeak

oftheroom.

T



TheproblemwithUS‐Sovietrelationsisnotonlythattherearetwo

competingbureaucracieswiththeirassumptionsandguesses;therearealso

conflictingconceptionsofnegotiation.Americanstendtobelievethateach

negotiationhasitsownlogic,thatitsoutcomedependsimportantlyonbargaining

skill,goodwill,andfacilityforcompromise.Butifonesideinanegotiationhas

onlyavaguemandatecoupledwithageneraldesireforagreement,

negotiability—anelegantphrasemeaningwhatoneknowstheothersidewill

accept—becomesanendinitselfandtheoutcomeisforeordained:The

negotiationwillseetheconstantretreatofthepartythatiscommittedtoit.

Persistenceinanegotiatingpositionisdisparageddomesticallyas“rigid.”

“stubborn,”or“unimaginative.”Nopositioniseverfinal.Criticsdemandgreater

flexibility;soonthepropositionisadvancedthattheUnitedStateshasan

obligationtoovercomethestalematebyofferingconcessions.Theotherside,

awarethatweareineffectbiddingagainstourselves,hasthemaximum

inducementtostandrigidtodiscoverwhatelsewemayoffer.

