Kissinger Henry. White House Years

Подождите немного. Документ загружается.

deniedthattheUnitedStatesandSouthVietnamwereauthorizedtoconduct

suchraids.Thatsameday.whileIwasstillonvacation,Lairdhadcalledonthe

Presidenttoprotestthesuspensionofcross‐borderoperations.Ihadinstructed

Haigbytelephonetotrytode layaresponseuntilaftermyreturnandinanycase

nottoauthorizefurthercross‐borderoperationsbeforemymeetingwithLeDuc

ThoscheduledforApril4.ThePresidentoverruledmyrecommendations.He

orderedHaigtoinstructBunkerbybackchanneltoreinstatecross‐border

operations,providedtheywerekepttothelevelofthosecarriedoutpriortothe

moratoriumandwerecoordinatedwiththeCambodianarmedforces.AsfarasI

candeterminenow,fourshallowcross‐borderoperationstookplaceduringthe

firstthreeweeksofApril—allaftermymeetingonApril4withLeDucTho,none

lastingmorethanaday.



InthelasttwoweeksofApril,Communistforcessteppedupassaultson

Cambodiantowns. OnApril22thebordertownofSnuolwasattackedandthe

CambodiangovernmentmadeanewappealtotheUnitedNationsforhelpin

fightingtheinvaders.Itwasignored,asallothers,thoughitwouldhavebeen

difficulttofinda moreflagrantcaseofaggression.InWashington,April22was

theoccasionofamajorNSCmeetingonCambodia;italsosawastreamof

typewrittenmessagesfromthePresidenttomethatreflectedhisincreasingly

agitatedframeofmind.



Inthefirstmessage,dictatedat5:00a.m.,Nixonstressedtheneedfora

“boldmove”inCambodia,andexpresseddeterminationto“dosomething

symbolictohelp[LonNol]survive”eventhoughhefearedLonNolwouldnotbe

abletodoso.Hethoughtwehad“droppedtheball”byworryingthatAmerican

helpwoulddestroyLonNol’sneutralityandgivetheNorthVietnameseanexcuse

tocomein;theCommunistsneverwaitedforan“excuse,”asdemonstratedin

Hungaryin1956,Czechoslovakiain1968,andinLaosandCambodia.The

PresidentsuggestedsendingAmbassadorRobertMurphytoreassureLonNol.“In

theeventthatIdecidetogoonthiscourse,”Nixonwantedmetostresswith

“someofthelily‐liveredAmbassadorsfromourso‐calledfriendsintheworld”

thattheirpostureonthisissuewouldshowus“whoourfriendsare.”(Thetextof

thismessageisintheback.)



Asecondmissivelaterinthedayreiteratedthesametheme—thatIshould

callintheJapanese,French,British,andotherfriendlyambassadorsandstress

thatwecountedonouralliestobackus.Athirdmemorandumcommentedona

recentletterfromSihanouktoSenatorMansfield.Sihanoukhadcomparedthe

LonNolregimewithHitlerandsaidthat“themostsevereideology—aslongasit

isbasedonsocialjustice—isinfinitelypreferabletoaregimecomposedofgreatly

corruptedpeopleandanti‐popular reactionaries…”Sihanouksaidhewas 

determinedtoliberatehiscountry,even“atthepriceofanideologicalchangein

Cambodia.’NixonsuggestedthatSihanouk“parrotstheCommunistlineinevery

respect,”andaskedmetopasstheletterdiscreetlytoRogersandHelms.Afourth

messageaskedmetocallintheSovietchargeandwarnhimthatthePresident

hadmadea“commanddecision” toreactiftheCommunistsmovedonPhnom

Penh.



Thepaceofeventsgavemenoopportunitytocarryouttheseinstructions.

InameetingwiththePresidentlaterinthemorningofApril22Iadvisedagainst

sendingMurphy(orDeanAcheson,hislatersuggestion)toCambodiabecauseit

wouldjusttriggeranenormousdebateandwouldprobablybeovertakenbythe

decisionsattheNSC.ThePresidentsaid, “Well,whatever,Iwanttomakesure

thatCambodiadoesnotgodownthedrainwithoutdoingsomething.”Hewent

on:“Everybodyalwayscomesintomyofficewithsuggestionsonhowtolose.No

oneevercomesinherewithasuggestiononhowtowin.”ThePresidentordered

areplacementforourcharge,LloydRives,inPhnomPenhandUSsupportfor

shallowcross‐borderoperations.AswithmanyNixonorderstofirepeople,itwas

intendedtoshowhisdispleasure;itwasnotmeanttobecarriedout;itneverwas

atlowerlevels.



Meanwhile,wehadreceivedalongbackchannelreplyfromBunkerand

Abrams,whichsketcheddireconsequencesifSihanoukre turnedtopowerasa

Communistfigurehead:VietCongandNorthVietnamesemoralewouldbe

strengthened;Hanoi’scapacityforprotractedwarfarewouldbeenhanced;there

wouldbeshockwavesinSouthVie tnam;Vietnamizationwouldbejeopardized.

BunkerandAbramsrecommendedbothanimmediateincreaseinshallowcross‐

borderoperationsandcombinedUS‐SouthVietnameseoperationsagainstthe

keyCommunistsanctuaries.



TheNSCmeetingwasgivenineffectthreetacticaloptions:doingnothing

(thepreferredcourseoftheStateandDefensedepartments);attackingthe

sanctuarieswithSouthVietnameseforcesonly(myrecommendation);andusing

whateverforceswerenecessarytoneutralizeallofthebaseareas,including

Americancombatforces,recommendedbyBunker,Abrams,andtheJointChiefs

ofStaff.



Twobaseareaswereofspecialconcern.Theso‐calledParrot’sBeak,

Cambodia’sSvayRiengprovince,juttedintoVietnamtowithinonlythirty‐three

milesofSaigon.IthadshelteredNorthVietnamesearmiesattackingtheSaigon

areaandtherice‐producingdeltaregionduringalltheyearsoftheVietnamwar.

FartherNorthwasasecondarea,code‐namedtheFishhook.Ourintelligence

analystsbelievedthatCOSVN,theCommunistheadquartersforalloperationsin

theSouth,waslocatedthere;italsowasthestagingarea fortheSeventhNorth

VietnameseDivision,whichperiodicallythreatenedSaigonandalwaysharassed

theadjoiningTayNinhprovinceofSouthVietnam.TheFishhookwaswell

defended;wedidnotthinktheSouthVietnamesearmywasstrongenoughto

handlebothoperationssimultaneously.Hence,torecommendthattheactionsbe

confinedtoSouthVietnameseforceswastantamounttooptingforoperations

againstonlyonebasearea.



Momentousdecisionsarerarelyproducedbyprofounddiscussions.Bythe

timeanissuereache stheNSCithasbeenanalyzedbysomanylower‐level

committeesthattheCabinetmembersperformlikeactorsinawell‐rehearsed

play;theyrepeatessentiallywhattheirsubordinateshavealreadyannouncedin

otherforums.IntheNixonNSCtherewastheadditionalfactorthatevery

participantsuspectedthattherewasalmostcertainlymoregoingonthanhe

knew.Asusual,therewasalsoanambiv alencebetweentakingpositions

compatiblewiththeircomplicatedchief’sdesignsandfearofthedomestic

consequences.Therewasasinkingfeelingaboutanythingthatcouldbe

presentedasescalationinVietnam.Noonearoundthetablequestionedthe

consequencesofaCommunisttakeoverofCambodia.Butweallknewthat

whateverthedecisionanotherroundofdomesticacrimony,protest,andperhaps

evenviolencewasprobable.IfCambodiacollapsedwewouldbeevenharder

pressedtopulloutunilaterally;ifweacceptedanyoftheotheroptionswewould

bechargedwith“expandingthewar.”Therewasnomiddleground.



Theinitialdecisiontoattackthesanctuarieswasthustakenatasubdued

andratherrandomNSCmeeting.Rogersopposedsubstantialcross‐border

operationsevenbySouthVietnamese,buthetookitforgrantedthatunrestricted

bombingofCambodiawouldfollowtheoverthrowofthegovernmentinPhnom

Penh.Lairdhadbeenthestrongestadvocateofshallowcross‐borderoperations,

butheopposedGeneralAbrams’srecommendationofdestroyingthesanctuaries

altogether.Helmswasinfavorofanyactiontoneutralizethesanctuaries.Nixon

normallyannouncedhisdecisionsafter,notduring,anNSCmeeting;hewould

deliberateandthenissueinstructionsinwritingorthroughintermediaries.Hedid

thistoemphasizethattheNSCwasanadvisory,notadecision‐making,bodyand

toavoidachallengetohisorders.OnthisoccasionNixonalteredhisusual

procedure.Hetoldhiscolleaguesthatheapprovedattacksonthebaseareasby

SouthVietnamesefo rceswithUSsupport.SincetheSouthVietnamese could

handleonlyoneoffensive,WheelerrecommendedthattheygoafterParrot’s

Beak.ThisledtoadebateaboutAmericanparticipation;LairdandRogerssought

toconfineittoanabsoluteminimum,opposingevenAmericanadvisersortactical

airsupport.



AtthispointVicePresidentSpiroAgnewspokeup.Hethoughtthewhole

debateirrelevant.Eitherthesanctuarieswereadangerortheywerenot.Ifitwas

worthcleaningthemout,hedidnotunderstandallthepussyfootingaboutthe

Americanroleorwhatweaccomplishedbyattackingonlyone.Ourtaskwasto

makeVietnamizationsucceed.HefavoredanattackonbothFishhookand

Parrot’sBeak,includingAmericanforces.Agnewwasright.IfNixonhated

anythingmorethanbeingpresentedwithaplanhehadnotconsidered,itwasto

beshownupinagroupasbeinglesstoughthanhisadvisers.Thoughchafingat

thebit,headroitlyplacedhimselfbetweentheVicePresidentandtheCabinet.He

authorizedAmericanairsupportfortheParrot’sBeakoperationbutonly“onthe

basisofdemonstratednecessity.”HeavoidedcommittinghimselftoFishhook.

Thesedecisionswerelatersentoutinwriting.Afterthemeeting,Nixon

complainedbitterlytomethatI hadnotforewarnedhimofAgnew’sviews,of

whichIhadinfactbeenunaware.IhavenodoubtthatAgnew’sintervention

acceleratedNixon’sultimatedecisiontoorderanattackonallthesanctuariesand

useAmericanforces.



Thenextday,April23,begantheeffortofthevariousagenciestoposition

themselvessoastodeflectontosomebodyelsethepublicuproarcertainto

ensue.RogersaskedforpermissiontotellCongressionalcommitteesofthevery

largeCambodianaidrequests;hisreasoningwasthatthiswouldmakethe

plannedoperationsappearrestrainedincomparison—indeed,looklikeawayof

avoidingafull‐scalemilitaryaidprogram.Lairdwantedtomakesurethatno

AmericangroundpersonnelwouldenterCambodia,notevenaircontrollersfor

thetacticalairsupportapprovedbyNixononlythedaybefore.IheldtwoWSAG

meetingsonApril23tosortouttheimplementationofNixon’sdecisions.Not

surprisingly,theWSAGmembersechoedtheviewsoftheirprincipals.The

DefenseDepartmentwantedauthorityforeachtacticalairstriketocomefrom

Washington.Itwashardtoimaginewhattargetswouldholdstilllongenoughfor

suchcumbersomeprocedures. AftertwomeetingstheWSAGmembersagreed,

somewhatreluctantly,togiveGeneralAbramsgeneralauthoritytouseUStactical

aircraftwhenneededandauthorizedUSaircontrollerstoaccompanytheSouth

Vietnamese.NixonapprovedbothWSAGrecommendationsonApril24.



TheNorthVietnamese,inanyevent,werefreeofsuchinhibitions.On

Thursday,April23,NorthVietnameseandVietCongforcesattackedthe

CambodiantownsofMimotandAngtassomandcapturedanimportantbridgeon

Route13linkingthetownofSnuolandthecapitalofKratieprovince.The

CambodianmilitaryheadquartersatHungLoiinKandalprovince,undersiegefor

severaldays,hadtobeabandonedonApril23despiteSouthVietnameseair

strikes.TwobridgesWestofSvayRiengonRoute1werecapturedbytheenemy.

BeginningonApril23andcontinuingonApril24,Communistforcesstagedhit‐

and‐runraidsonthecoastalcityofKep.



TheCommunistsescalatedpoliticallyaswell.OnApril24,a“Summit

ConferenceoftheIndochinesePeoples”wasconvenedatanundisclosedlocation

intheLaos‐Vietnam‐Chinafrontierarea,summonedatSihanouk’sinitiativeto

coordinatestrategyamongthethreeinsurgentgroups.Inattendancewere

Sihanouk,PrinceSouvanouvongofthePathetLao,NguyenHuuThooftheViet

Cong,andPhamVanDong,PremierofNorthVietnam.AlengthyJointDeclaration

publishedbySihanoukonApril27inPekingple dged“reciprocalsupport”inthe

“struggleagainstthecommonenemy,”thatis,“USimperialism.”Sihanoukinhis

closingspeechtotheconferencehailedthebirthof“People’sCambodia.”



Theperiodinvolved muchtension.IdidnotbelievethateitherCambodiaor

SouthVietnamcouldsurviveunlesswereactedtotheCommunistoffensive.ButI

waspainfullyconsciousofthepoliticalupheavalthatwouldcertainlyfollowan

attackonthesanctuariesaswellasofthedivisions onmystaff.Ihaddeliberately

recruitedtheablestyoungmenandwomenIcouldfind.Ithoughtitimportantto

taptheirvitalityandidealism;itseemedtomecrucialthattheconcernsomany

oftheircontemporariesexpressedinprotestfindanoutletalsointhewillingness

toworkonthemoremundanemattersbywhichagovernmentgropesforpeace.

ThreeofthoseclosesttomewereTonyLake,RogerMorris,andWinstonLord.

TheyhadnogreatuseforNixon;emotionally,eachofthemwouldprobablyhave

preferredaDemocratic President.Iworkedhardtomaintaintheircommitment

becausetheproblemsbeforeourcountrywerenotpartisanandbecauseI was

convincedthattheyhadtolearnthatinsomecircumstancesmoralitycanbestbe

demonstratednotbyagrandgesturebutbythewillingnesstoperseverethrough

imperfectstagesforabetterworld.LakeandMorrishadalreadytoldmein

Februarythattheyhaddecidedtoleave;inviewoftheirambivalencestheywere

nolongerwilling toworkthelonghoursrequired.Ikeptthemoninless

demandingplanningfunctionsuntilthefallwhenLakereturnedtograduate

schoolandMorrisjoinedSenatorMondale’sstaff.WinstonLordstayed;he

becameaninvaluablecollaboratorandcherishedfriend.



JustpriortothefinaldecisionIspentmuchtimewithLake,Morris,and

Lord.Thebest‐reaso nedandarguedobjectionstothecoursewewereplanning

camenotfromthedepartmentsbutwereexpressedinajointmemorandumthat

theywroteme.Ironically,theirreasoningacceleratedtheconclusiontowhichI

wasreluctantlymoving:thatouronlyrealisticoptionwastodestroythe

sanctuaries.Theirbasicdiagnosiswasthesameasmine.Oneofourmajor

objectives,theyargued,hadtobetoavoidthereturnofSihanouk:



Ifhereturned,itwouldbetheresultofaCommunistdecisiontoallowthis,which

impliesmeaningfulassurancesthathewoulddotheirbidding…Moreimportantly,Sihanouk’s

returnasaCommuniststoogewouldhaveaseriouspsychologicaleffectinVietnamandLaos,

andwouldatleastprovideanissueforThieu’sopponentsagainsthim,especiallyand

dangerouslyamonghard‐linersintheArmy.



Nevertheless,theirmemorandumopposedAmericanmilitaryoperations

againstthesanctuaries.Whattheyfavoredwas



aneutralCambodiangovernmentundercurrentorothernon‐Sihanoukleadershipwhichhas

reachedaprivateunderstandingwiththeCommuniststhattheymayusetheborderareasin

thesamefashionasearlier.ThiswouldmeanthattheCambodiangovernmentwouldlookthe

otherwaybutnotpubliclyacquiesce.ThiswouldimplythepossibilityofcontinuingMenu[the

secretbombing]anddefensivecross‐borderoperationsbytheGVN‐withoutactiveCambodian

oppositiontomilitaryactivitybyeitheroftheVietnameseforcesinthelimitedborderarea.

Althoughnotagoodsituation,thiswouldbebetterthanaSihanoukgovernmentwhichactively

opposedtheGVNandwouldpubliclyopposeMenu,etc.



Inotherwords,mythreeyoungfriendsandassociatesregarded

continuationofthesecretbom bing ofCambodiaandshallowcross‐border

penetrationofa fewmilesasessential,butdeeppenetrationsasindefensible—a

distinctionwhosemoralsignificancecontinuestoescapeme.Theirpreferred

outcome,restorationof“thestatusquoantewithoutSihanouk,”wasattractive

butunattainable. TobringitabouttheyurgedthatweencouragetheLonNol

governmenttoreachanaccommodationwithHanoiwhilewarningHanoithatwe

wouldresistbyforcetheimpositionofSihanouk. Therewasnopossibilityofsuch

acompromiseinthefaceofLeDucTho’sstateme ntsofApril4thatHanoiwould

neverdealwithLonNol.Morelikely,theveryattempttoarrangesucha

“solution”wouldhaveledtothecollapseofPhnomPenhandaCommunist

victory.NorcouldIconceivehowthemeasurestoconvinceHanoithatwewould

opposeSihanoukwouldhavebeencompatiblewithacompromise.Cambodia

unfortunatelyhadalreadybeenpolarized,asaresultofforcesoverwhichwehad

nocontrolandbeyondourcapacitytoreconcile.Thealternativesproposedwere,

inshort,anevasionofourhardchoices,asoptoconsciences,notaguideto

action.



IwasbecomingincreasinglyrestlesswiththedecisionattheNSCmeeting

thatwasineffectmyrecommendation:tolimittheattackonthesanctuariesto

SouthVietnamesefo rces.Agnewwasright;weshouldeitherneutralizeallofthe

sanctuariesorabandontheproject.Itwashardtoimaginehowalimited

operationintojustonesanctuary,inwhichSouthVietnameseforceshadatbest

strictlylimitedAmericanairsupport,couldmakeadecisivedifference.Wewere

indangerofcombiningthedisadvantagesofeverycourseofaction.Wewouldbe

castigatedforinterventioninCambodiawithoutaccomplishinganystrategic

purpose.



BeforeIcouldpresenttheseviewstoNixon,thereoccurredanotherof

thoseseeminglytrivialeventsthatacceleratetheprocessofhistory.Journalist

WilliamBeecherintheNewYorkTimesreportedthecontentsofahighly

classifiedcableinformingourchargeinPhnomPenhthatwehaddecidedto

providecapturedCommunistriflestotheCambodiangovernment.Nixon

exploded.Leaksinfuriatedhiminthebes tofcircumstances;thisoneseemedto

himaclearattemptbythebureaucracytogenerateCongressionalandpublic

pressuresagainstanyassistancetoCambodia.Tomakemattersworse,atabout

thesamemomentNixonfound outthatthesignalequipmentandCIA

representativethathehadorderedintoPhnomPenhonApril1andagainonApril

16hadstillnotbeensent.



Heflewintoamonumentalrage.OnthenightofApril23hemusthave

calledmeatleasttentimes—threetimesatthehouseofSenatorFulbright,

whereIwasmeetinginformallywithmembersoftheSenateForeignRelations

Committee.Aswashishabitwhenextremelyagitatedhewouldbarkanorderand

immediatelyhangupthephone.Hewantedourcharge,Rives,relieved

immediately;heorderedMarshallGreenfired;onsecondthoughthisdeputyBill

Sullivanwastobetransferredaswell;anAirForceplanewithCIApersonnel

aboardshouldbedispatchedtoPhnomPenhimmediately;everybodywithaccess

tothecableshouldbegivenalie‐detectortest;ageneralwastobeappointed

immediatelytotakechargeofCambodia.



Inthesecircumstancesitwasusuallyprudent nottoargueandtowait

twenty‐fourhourstoseeonwhichoftheseordersNixonwouldinsistafterhe

calmeddown.Asitturnedout,hecamebacktononeofthem.(IdidgettheCIA

communicationssentintoPhnomPenhbymilitaryplane.)ButhisApril23

outburstdidfinallypropelhimtoacceptAgnew’sadvice:toproceedagainst

FishhookandParrot’sBeaksimultaneously,usingAmericanforcesagainst

Fishhook.HecalledameetingonthemorningofApril24withAdmiralMoorer,

ActingChairmanoftheJointChiefs,andHelmsandCushmanoftheCIA.Nixon

wantedtodiscussthefeasibilityofacombinedUS‐SouthVietnameseoperation

againstFishhook,inparallelwiththeParrot’sBeakoperation.Itwasareflection

ofhisextremeirritationatbureaucraticfoot‐draggingthatheexcludedboth

RogersandLaird,onthepretextthathemerelywantedamilitaryandintelligence

briefing.HelmsandMoorerwerebothstronglyinfavorofanattackonthe

Fishhooksanctuary.TheyfeltitwouldforcetheNorthVietnamesetoabandon

theirefforttoencircleandterrorizePhnomPenh.Thedestructionofsupplies

wouldgainvaluabletimeforVietnamization.ButNixonwasnotpreparedto

announceadecisionyet.Instead,hehelicopteredtoCampDavidtoreflect

furtherandtofigureoutawaytobringalonghisCabinetonacoursetoward

whichhewasincreasinglytending.Inthemeantimeheleftmetomanagethe

bureaucracy.



Thesituationhaditsbizarreaspects.Thedepartmentswerestilldragging

theirfeetonAmericanairsupportofaSouthVietnameseoperationagainstone

sanctuarywhenthePresidentwasbeginningtoleanmoreandmoretoward

combinedSouthVietnamese‐Americanoperationsagainstallsanctuaries.Idid

notthinkitrighttokeeptheSecretaryofDefenseignorantofameetingbetween

theActingChairmanoftheJointChiefsandthePresident;IthereforecalledLaird,

describingitasamilitarybriefingofoptions,includinganAmericanattackon

Fishhook.Lairdstressedthatitwouldbehighlydesirabletoavoidauthorizingany

AmericanoperationbeforeRogers’stestimonytotheSenateForeignRelations

CommitteeonApril27;thiswouldenableRogerstostatetruthfullythatno

AmericanswereinvolvedinCambodia.Lairdreportedthateventheusually

hawkishArmedServicesCommitteeswererestiveaboutAmericaninvolvementin

Cambodia.Lairdalsoargued—ashewastodoonseveraloccasionsoverthenext

fewdays—thatAbramsandWheelerwerereallyopposedtotheFishhook 

operation.IcheckedwithAdmiralMoorer,whoclaimed(inaroughtranslation

fromhismorecolorfulnavaljargon)thathisSecretarywasundera

misapprehension.



Oncehewaslaunchedonacourse,Nixon’sdeterminationwasequaltohis

tacticalresourcefulness.HedecidedtoadoptRogers’ssuggestionofscaringthe

CongresswiththeprospectofmonumentalaidrequestsfromCambodiabutto

useittojustifyAmericanoperationsinthesanctuaries,whichRogersnever

intended.



AtNixon’srequestIaskedtheChairmanoftheSenateArmedServices

Committee,SenatorJohnStennisfromMississippi,tomeetwithme.Stennis

belongedtothatgenerationofSenateleaderswho,havingachievedtheirposition

byseniorityandbeingsecureintheirconstituencies,embodiedintheir

accumulatedexperienceasenseofcontinuity.Ondomesticissues,especiallythe

raceproblem,theysometimeslaggedbehindthemoralcurrentsoftheirtime,but

onnationalsecurityandforeignpolicytheyweretowersofstrength.Manywere

Southerners,sonsofaregionthathadknownitsowntragedy.Theyunderstood,

asmostotherregionsofthecountrydidnot,thattherecanbeirrevocable

disasters,thatmankindisfallible,thathumanperfectioncannotbeassumed,that

virtuewithoutpowerisimpotent.Courtly,wise,andpatriotic,Stennis,likehis

distinguishedcolleagueRichardRussell,wasoneofthemenwhomadethe

separationofpowersfunctiondespiteitsformalintractability.Presidentscould

relyonhisintegrity;Cabinetmemberscouldcountonhisrespectfortheirefforts.



IsawStennisintheafternoonofApril24andexplainedtohimour

reasoningthataUS‐supportedincursionintoCambodiawasamilitarynecessityif

Vietnamizationweretoproceed.Ishowedhimamapwiththebaseareas,which

wereanintegralpartofthewarinVietnam.Inthemiddleofourconversation

Nixoncalledmyoffice,byprearrangement.InStennis’shearingIsummedupmy

briefingandreportedStennis’sgenerallyfavorablereaction.Stennisthentookthe

phoneandexpressedhissupportpersonallytothePresident.



OnceagainIreviewedtheplanningwithWheelerandHelms,askingHelms

foracontingencystudyofwhatmightgowrong.Istressedthatifhehadany

hesitationsheshouldtellme;ifhedevelopedsecondthoughtsIwouldtransmit

themimmediatelytothePresident.Helmsstoodbyhisprevious

recommendation.Hefeltthatwewouldpaythesamedomesticpricefortwo

operationsasforoneandthestrategicpayoffwouldbeincomparablygreaterin

thetwo‐prongedattack.



Ithenspentanhourwithmembersofmyseniorstaffwhoopposedthe

proposedoperation—BillWattsandLarryLynn,inadditiontoLord,Lake,and

Morris—togivethemonefinalopport unitytoexpresstheirobjections.Itwasa

painfulsession,fortheyfeltdeeplyaboutwhatwewereplanning.Lake,Morris,

andWattsresigned.



SincetheNSCmeetingtwodaysearlier,theSecretariesofStateand

Defensehadnotbeenhear dfrom.TheyknewofcontingencyplansinvolvingUS

forces;indeed.Lairdhadoriginallytransmittedthe JCSplansforanattackon

Fishhook.TheycouldnothavemissedthePresident’sincreasingagitation;but

theycouldnotbelievethatNixonmightseriouslydecidetoauthorizeaUS

incursion.Theyactedasiftheproblemwouldgoawayiftheyofferedno

alternativeorevenasystematiccritique.



IurgedNixontocallanNSCmeetingtogiveallpartiesanopportunityto

expressthemselves.AsItoldHelms:“Itismyjudgmentandstrong

recommendationthatanydecisionmustbediscussedwiththetwoCabinet

members—evenifthedecisionhasalreadybeenmadeandanorderisinthedesk