Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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LonNolhasheretoforebeencontenttobeNumberTwo,butthisappearstobea

straightpowerchallenge.InpopularangeragainstVietnameseCommunistincursions,hehas

foundagoodissuetochallengeSihanouk(andtheArmyfannedupthatanger),butLonNol’s

dealingswiththeCommunistsdonotsuggestthatheisaferventanti‐Communistoranti‐

Vietnamesepatriot.

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FutureChoices.Thissituationwillprobablymoveinoneofthreeways:

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‐ALonNol/SirikMatak‐dominatednewGovernmentsupportedbytheArmy,withlittle

popularsupportandforcedtobuypopularitywithanti‐Vietnameseslogansandeconomic

progress.

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‐Ashakycompromiseakintothebarons’trucewithKingJohnin1215,permitting

SihanouktocomebackasChiefofStatebutwithmuchlimitedpowers.Thiswouldbean

unstablesituation,asSihanoukmaneuvered,probablysuccessfully,tooutflankandeliminate

hischallengers.

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‐ASihanoukvictory,byturningtheArmyagainstLonNol.

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TheImplicationsforForeignPolicyandforUs.Khmernationalismhas[been]aroused

againsttheVietnameseCommunistoccupation.Anyfuturegovernmentwillprobablyhaveto

bemorecircumspectandcovertaboutitscooperationwiththeVietnamese.LonNolhas

chosenthisissue,andhewillneedtobeabletodemonstratepubliclythatheistakingaction

againsttheVietnameseoccupation.Similarly,Sihanoukwillnotforsometimeopenhimselfto

thechargeofbeing“softontheViet namese.”

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ThiswillcreateseriousproblemsfortheVC/NVA,whichwillhaveconsiderablereasonto

takeamorehostilelinetowardCambodia.

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NoneofmyreportstothePresidentdiscussedanyUSintelligence

involvementorexpressedanyparticularpleasureatthecoup.NorwasCIA

reportingmoreprescient,doubtlessinpartbecausetheAgencyhadbeenbanned

fromPhnomPenh.ItwasnotuntilMarch 18—thedayofSihanouk’souster—that

aCIAreportwascirculatedinWashington.Itsburden:thattheLonNol‐

encouragedriotswereaprecursortoacoupagainstSihanoukifSihanoukrefused

togoalongwithananti‐Hanoipolicy.Theinformationhadbeenacquiredthe

weekbeforefromanAsianbusinessmannototherwiseidentified.Thedelayin

distributingthisreportandtheCIA’sfailuretopredicttheoverthrow ofSihanouk

werelaterthesubjectofaninvestigationbythePresident’sForeignIntelligence

AdvisoryBoard.Idonotrecallanydoc umentpredictingthecoupthatcametomy

attentionbeforetheevent,andIhavenotunearth edoneinmypapers.Of

chargesofintelligencefailure,itshouldberememberedthattheleaderagainst

whomitwasdirectedhadafargreaterincentivetoknowthetruthinhiscountry,

andhefailedtoanticipatetheplot.

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OnMarch20NixonandIdiscussedaforthcomingpressconferencebyhim.

IrecommendedthathenotcommentonCambodiabeyondurgingrespec tfor

Cambodianneutrality.Nixonagreed,addingthatSihanouk“maycomebackand

takeitoveragain.”Atthenewsconference,whichtookplaceonMarch21,Nixon

calledthesituationinCambodia“unpredictable”and“fluid”andexpressedhope

thattheNorthVietnamesewouldrespectCambodia’sneutrality.Herepeated

publiclywhathehadtoldmeprivately,thathestillexpectedSihanouktoreturn

toPhnomPenh:

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…wehave,asyounote,establishedrelationsonatemporarybasiswiththegovernment

whichhasbeenselectedbytheParliamentandwillcontinuetodealwiththatgovernmentas

longasitappearstobethegovernmentofthenation.Ithinkanyspeculationwithregardto

whichwaythisgovernmentisgoingtoturn,whatwillhappentoPrinceSihanoukwhenhe

returns,wouldbothbeprematureandnothelpful[emphasisadded].

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OurprioritieswerereflectedinameetingoftheWSAGonMa rch19called

todiscussLaosandCambodia;mostofthediscussionconcernedLaos. Mystaff’s

briefingpapersformeshowedasmuchconcernfortheColumbiaEagle,an

AmericanshipimpoundedbytheCambodiansaftertwosailor smutiniedand

divertedittoSihanoukville,asforthelong‐rangeimplicationsofthecoup.Onthe

politicalsituationtheyregardedtheoutcomeasuncertainandstillleftopenthe

possibilityofSihanouk’sreturn.Mybriefingpaperaskedakeyquestion:“Does

thepresumablymorepro‐WesternorientationofLonNolmakeupforthe

assumptionthatSihanouk’sdeparturemayleadtoincrease dinstability?”

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However,ignorancedidnotprotectusagainstthenecessityofdecision.

Notsurprisingly,theExecutiveBranchwasevenmoredividedoverCambodia

thanithadbeenoverLaos.Nixonfromthefirstwasinfavorofamoreactive

policy.NexttothepassageinmymemorandumofMarch17informinghimofLon

Nol’splanstoexpandtheCambodianarmyby10,000men,Nixonwrote:“Let’s

getaplantoaidthenewgovernmentonthisgoal.”Ihadnotyetactedonthis

notewhenNixonreturnedmymemorandumofMarch19informinghimof

Sihanouk’soverthrowwiththefollowing note:“IwantHelmstodevelopand

implementaplanformaximumassistancetopro‐USelementsinCambodia.Don’t

putthisoutto303[

The303Committee,bythenrenamedthe40Committee,wasthe

interagencycommitteesupervisingcovertintelligenceactivities.]orthebureaucracy.

Handlelikeour[Menu]airstrike.”HaigconveyedthePresident’srequestdirectly

toHelmsonMarch22andIsetupameetingwithHelmsforMarch23.

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Helms’sreplywaslargelyprocedural.HearguedthattheCIAcouldmake

fewrealisticrecommendationsunlesspermittedtoopenastation(theCIAterm

foraresidentoffice)inPhnomPenh.Heoutlinedpossibleactionsrangingfrom

clandestineairliftingto obtaininginternationalsupportforLonNol,butimplied

thattheAgencycouldnotputforwardaconcreteproposaluntilithadbetter

information.ThePresidentthereforedecidedtoletCIAsetupastationinPhnom

Penh.Thisprovednosimplematter,fortheStateDepartmentfoughtitbitterly,

partlyoutoffearofwhatMansfieldwoulddotoitinCongress.OnApril1,whileI

wasawayonvacation—anothersureindicationthatIdidnotconsiderthe

situationcritical—thePresidentcalledRogersandHelmsintotheOvalOfficeand

conveyedhisorderthataCIAofficebeopenedinPhnomPenhimmediately.

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Nevertheless,whetherbecauseNixonwasellipticalasheoftenwasinhis

face‐to‐facemeetingswithRogers,orbecauseStatefeltstronglyenoughto

ignoreadirectorder,thePresident’swishesweresimplynotcarriedout.OnApril

2,thenextday,CIAnominatedanofficerandacommunicatortomoveinto

PhnomPenh.ButRogerscalledHelmsandsaidthathedidnotbelievethiswas

wisebutagreedtolookintothecommunicationsproblem.Therewasfurther

delaywhiletheStateDepartmentdecidedwhethertomakeaformalrequestto

theCambodiangovernment.OnApril7,chargeLloydRiveswenttoseealow‐

levelCambodianofficial;thismaximizedthelikelihoodofarefusaloratleastofa

delay.TotheevidentdismayoftheEastAsianBureau,interimpermissionwas

grantedonthespot,withthepromiseofanofficialnotificationina shorttime.

TheDepartmentinsistedonwaitingfortheofficialreply,andinanotherdelaying

tacticrecommendedthatthecommunications equipmentbeflowninby

commercialratherthanmilitaryaircraft.



ByApril16,fifteendaysafteradirectPresidentialorder,neitherCIAofficer

norcommunicatornorequipmenthadyetmoved.WhileNixonhatedgivingdirect

orders,hecouldbebrutalifsufficientlyaroused. HecalledinHelms,hisdeputy

GeneralCushman,Haig,andme(backfromvacation)toregisterhisoutrageat

theprocrastinationanddefianceofhisinstruction.Asasignofhisdispleasure,no

StateDepartmentrepresentativewasinvitedtothemeeting.Nixongavea

twenty‐four‐hourdeadlineforintroducinga CIAofficerandcommunicator.He

addedavindictiveslapatState.SinceStatehadprotestedthatthesmallsizeof

ourEmbassywasoneoftheobstacles,NixonorderedoneStateDepartment

officialtoleavePhnomPenhtomakeroom.



Onceagainwebeheldoneofthewondersofthemodernstate,therelative

inabilityofleaderstodominatetheirbureaucracyortocutshortitspowersof

endlessexegesis.Thetwenty‐four‐hourperiodwasconsumedinfurtherdithering.

ItwasafullweekbeforeanotherPresidentialexplosionfinallybroughtresults.

ThereductionofEmbassypersonnelwasneverimplementedbecauseevents

overtookthePresidentialdirective.



UntilthemiddleofApril,therefore,ourcapabilitytomonitororinfluence

thesituationinCambodiawasseverelylimited.Bythen,however,theissuewas

nolongeraquarrelbetweenCambodianfactions,thesuccessofeitherofwhich

wouldhavebeencompatiblewithourowninterests.ForinthelastdaysofMarch

Sihanoukmadehissecondfatefuldecision.EnsconcedinPeking(withwhichwe

hadnocontactofanykindatthatstage),SihanoukthrewinhislotwithHanoiand

turnedviolentlyagainsttheUnitedStates.OnMarch20—twodaysafterhewas

deposed—heeffectivelydeclaredwaronthenewgovernment.Heissueda

statementcallingforanationalreferendumanddenouncinghisremovalas

“absolutelyillegal.”Heblam edthe“turbulence”inCambodiaonCIAcollusion

withthe“traitorousgroup”thathaddeposedhim;hedefendedtheNorth

VietnameseinCambodiaonthegroundthattheywere“resistingAmerican

imperialism.”Thenextday,Sihanoukvowedastruggle“untilvictoryordeath”

againstthenewgovernment,whichhedenouncedas“stoogesofAmerican

imperialists.”Henceforth,Sihanouk’sreturnwouldhavemeantnotarestoration

ofneutralismbutthevictoryofhisnewCommunistpatrons,whomhehadlostall

capacitytocontrol.



Inretaliation,theCambodianNationalAssemblyonMarch21votedto

arrestSihanoukandtochargehimwithtreasonifhereturned.Newspapersand

broadcastsinPhnomPenhwerefilledwithluridaccountsofhiscorruptpersonal

lifeandattacksonhisyearsofleadership.OnMarch 22,afterthreedaysof

avoidingdirectcommentonCambodianevents,NorthVietnamlabeled

Cambodia’snewleadersa“pro‐Americanultra‐rightistgroup.”Theauthoritative

HanoipartynewspaperNhanDanclaimedthatSihanouk’sousterhadbeen

engineeredbytheUnitedStatesandaffirmedthat“ourpeoplefullysupportthe

struggleoftheCambodianpeople”againstthenewleadership.OnMarch23,

Sihanoukinafive‐pointstatementpromisedformationofa“liberationarmy”and

“nationalunitedfront,”lauding theanti‐USstruggleoftheCommunist

Vietnamese,Laotians,andCambodians.



InearlyApriltheNorthVietnameseandVietCongforcesbeganmaking

goodtheirpledgeof“support.”Communistforceslefttheirbaseareasand

startedpenetratingdeepintoCambodiatooverthrowthenewgovernment.By

April3,theNorthVietnamesebeganattackingCambodianforcesinSvayRieng

province.ByApril10Cambodiantroopswereforcedto evacuateborderpositions

intheParrot’sBeakarea.CommunistsstartedtoharassMekongRivertraffic.By

April16,theNorthVietnameseandVietCongtroopslaunche draidsonthecapital

ofTakeoprovinceSouthofPhnomPenh.ThusdidthewarbegininCambodia,

weeksbeforeanyAmericanaction.



Atthesametime,SihanoukonApril2denouncedtheUnitedStatesas“the

principalandsoleculpritresponsibleforthewarandpoliticalinstabilityinthe

threecountriesofIndochina.”OnApril3heappealedtohiscompatriotstotake

tothejunglesandjointhe“resistancezonesalreadythere.”OnApril4Premier

ChouEn‐lai,whileonavisittoNorthKorea,formallyendorsedSihanouk’s

resistancemovement.OnApril14RadioPekingreportedtheformal

establishmentonApril6oftheprovisionalcommitteeofSihanouk’s“national

unitedfront”inCambodia’sSvayRiengprovince.Inshort,bythemiddleofApril,

beforewehadundertakenanysignificantaction,Sihanoukhadirrevocablyjoined

forceswiththeCommunists,theCommunistshaddedicatedthemselvestothe

overthrowofthePhnomPenhgovernment,andNorthVietnameseunitswere

attackingdeepinsideCambodia.



LeDucTho’sbehaviorinthesecrettalksremovedanydoubtthatHanoihad

formallylinkedCambodiatoitswarinVietnam.HeemphasizedHanoi’sintention

tooverthrowthePhnomPenhgovernment,toreplaceitwithpersonnel

acceptabletoHanoi,andtouseCambodiaasabaseforoperationsinVietnam.At

thesecretmeetingofMarch16—twodaysbeforeSihanoukwasdeposed—LeDuc

ThoaccusedusofhavingorganizedtheriotsinPhnomPenhfivedaysearlier,a

chargeIvigorouslydenied.IconsideredLeDucTho’shot‐temperedassertions

sufficientlyworryingtoreporttothePresident:“TheirremarksonCambodiawere

troublesomeandmayindicateincreasedpressurethere.”



FearsaboutHanoi’soverallintentionscouldonlybereinforcedbythe

suddenmilitary“highpoint”inSouthVietnam,whichbrokethelullthathad

lastedsinceSeptember.OnMarch31,whilenegotiationswithLeDucThowere

stillgoingonandinthefaceofourofferofde‐escalation,theNorthVietnamese

launchedscoresofattacksthroughoutSouthVietnam.Americandeadforthe

weekwere138,nearlydoublethepreviousweek’stotal.



ThissetthestageforourclimacticParismeetingofApril4.LeDucTho

blamedusonceagainfortheupheava linCambodiaandeffectivelydeclaredwar

onthenewCambodiangovernment:



YouthoughtyoucoulduseagroupofmilitaryreactionariestooverthrowNorodom

Sihanoukanditwouldbeallover.Itistoosimplethinking.Itispreciselyyouractionsthere

whichmakethewholepeopleofCambodiafightagainsttheagentsoftheU.S.Theyhave

respondedtotheappealofPrinceSihanoukandtheNationalFrontofCambodia.TheKhmer

peoplehavestoodupwithalltheirstrengthtodefendfreedomandneutrality.



Irebuttedhischargesemphaticallybutfutilely:



IdespairofconvincingtheSpecialAdviserthatwehadnothingtodowithwhat

happenedinPhnomPenh,althoughIamflatteredofthehighopinionhehasofourintelligence

services.IftheyknewIwashere,Iwouldtellthemofthishighopinion.



Again,thereisasimpletest.WhohastroopsinCambodia?NottheUS.Iamimpressed

againwiththelinguisticabilityofthepeopleoftheIndochinesepeninsula.Wediscoveredthat

thePathetLaospeakVietnamese,andnowwefindthesamephenomenoninCambodia.



Wehaveshowngreatrestraintvis‐à‐visthebasesyoumaintaininCambodiaandwhich

youuseinattackingourforcesinVietnam....



IstressedtoLeDucThothattheUnitedStatessoughtnoexpansionofthe

war.ToachievethisgoalIproposedtodiscussimmediatelyspecificstepsto

assuretheneutralityofCambodia:



Wearepreparedtodiscussimmediatelyconcreteandspecificmeasurestoguarantee

theneutralityofCambodiaandtomakeabsolutelycertainitdoesnotbecomeapawninany

internationalconflict.Wearewillingtodothisbilaterallywithyouorinaninternational

framework…WeshallbepreparedtoentertainreasonablepropositionstoguaranteethatLaos

andCambodia—especiallyCambodia,asitisanewproblem—remainneutral.



ButLeDucThodismissedanysuggestionofneutralizationorofan

internationalconference.TheconflictsinIndochinahadnowbecomeone,he

asserted;hewouldnotevendiscussconfiningthewartoVietnam.Cambodiahad

becomeatheaterofoperationsandHanoiwouldbrooknodiscussionabout

maintainingitsneutrality.Overthreeweeksbeforeouractions,LeDucThosaid:



ThethreepeoplesofIndochina—theVietnamese,LaoandKhmerpeople—havehad

traditionalunityinthefightagainstcolonialism.Thiscannotbebrokenbyyou.Now,facedwith

theextensionofthewartoCambodiabytheUS.,thethreepeopleswillcontinuetofightto

havevictory,nomatterhowgreatthesacrificesmaybe.



AccordingtoLeDucThotherecouldbenoformalagreementonthe

neutralizationofCambodia.Instead,theregimethathadseizedpowerinPhnom

Penhhadtobeoverthrown:“WedonotrecognizetheLonNol‐Matak

government.WesupporttheFivePointsofNorodomSihanouk.Weareconvinced

thatsolongastheLonNol‐MatakgovernmentremainsinCambodia,thenthe

Cambodianquestion cannotbesettled.”



InCambodia,asinVietnam,wewerenowfacedwiththepropositionthat

theonlykeytopeacewastheoverthrow oftheestablishedgovernment(which

mostnations,includingtheSovietUnion,continuedtorecognize).Aspokesman

forUnitedNationsSecretary‐GeneralUThantdeclaredonApril6thattheUnited

Nationswould“dealwiththeauthoritieswhicheffectivelyhavecontrolofthe

situationinCambodia,”ineffectrecognizingtheLonNolgovernment.



InCambodia,asinVietnam,therewasarefusalofnegotiationsanda

deliberateexpans ionofthewarbyHanoi.InCambodia,asinVietnam,Hanoi

woulddiscussonlytheseizureoftotalpower.Hence,thesituationinCambodia

hadbeentransformedfundamentally.Threeweeksearlier,wewouldonthe

wholehavepreferredthatSihanoukremaininoffice.Now,ifhereturnedthrough

themilitarypressuresofHanoiandasitsinstrument,allofCambodiawould

becomeanenemysanctuary;thesupplyroutethroughSihanoukvillewouldgrow

doublymenacing.Ournightmare,asastaffplanningpaperpointedoutonAprilI,

wasof“acommunist‐dominatedSihanoukgovernmentprovidingasecure

sanctuaryandlogisticsbasefor theVC/NVA.”



ThefirstofficialCambodianrequestforUSmilitaryassistancecameaswe

graduallyandreluctantlyperceivedtheimpossibilityofCambodia’sneutrality,

duetoHanoi’sinsistenceonCommunistdominationofallofCambodia.Onthe

eveningofApril9CommandantLonNon,LonNol’syoungerbrotherand

commanderofthePhnomPe nhgendarmerie,requestedameetingwithan

Embassyofficial.LonNonspokeoftheexpansionoftheCambodianarmyfrom

35,000tomorethan60,000men;therewasanimmediateneedfor100,000to

150,000weapons,andultimatelyfor200,000to250,000,includingammunition.



Ourcharge,LloydRives,consideredthesequantitiesexaggeratedandthe

needimpossibletoassess,sincenobreakdownwasgivenastotypesdesired.To

WashingtonRivesrecommended“seriousconsiderationofsupplyingweapons

throughathirdpartyorparties,ifsuchcanbefound.”LonNon’srequestwas

consideredatfirstinintelligencechannelsbecausewestillwereeagertoavoid

directintervention.DeliveringarmsclandestinelywouldavoidgivingHanoia

pretextforanall‐outassault,anditalsoplacedaninherentlimitontheamount

wecouldsupply.TheconsensuswasthatAmericanmilitaryforcesandAmerican

armsshouldstayoutofCambodia. Ourprincipalinterest,itwasagreed,wasto

preventCambodia’suseasasupplybaseforVietnam.Wewereevenpreparedto

acceptadegreeofaccommodationbetweenLonNolandtheVietCo ng ifthis

provedessentialtothesurvivaloftheCambodiangovernment.Wesoughtto

arrangemilitaryassistancethroughthirdpartiesasRiveshadrecommended.It

wasdecidedtoinstructRivestoestablishaprivatechanneltotheCambodian

government;toapproachFrancetoencouragemoreFrenchassistanceto

Cambodia;toexploreotherpossibleintermediaries;andtohavetheDefense

DepartmentascertainwhatcapturedCo mmunistarmsandammunitionwere

availableinSouthVietnamfortransfertothe(hithertoCommunist‐equipped)

Cambodianarmy.NoAmericanmilitaryassistancewasauthorized.



Rivescarriedouttheseinstructionswithselectiveexuberance,inharmony

withtheEastAsianBureau’spassionatededicationtoaversionofCambodian

neutralitymorestringentthanthatofCambodia’sgovernment(andtotally

rejectedbyHanoi).Heturnedtheoffertobehelpfulthroughthirdpartiesintoa

disquisitiononAmericanreluctancetoinvolveitselfdirectly.Hesuggestedtothe

CambodianForeignMinisterthatFrancewouldbethelogical sourceofmilitary

supplies,andreportedbackwithapprovaltheForeignMinister’sreplythatin

viewofthereluctanceoftheUnitedStatestobecomeinvolved,theCambodian

governmentwouldmaintainonlyminimumcontactwiththeUnitedStates

Embassy.

