Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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TheCommunistswerenotshowingsimilarrestraint.OnApril13a

CambodianmilitaryoutpostinKampotprovinceneartheSouthVietnamese

borderwasoverrun.OnApril13and14severalCambodianmilitarypositionsin

TakeoprovinceSouthofPhnomPenhwerecaptured.TheCambodian

governmentreporte donApril14anattackby“severalhundred”VietCongon

KohRocar,PreyVengprovince,abouttwenty‐fivemilestotheNort hEastof

PhnomPenh.OnApril15,aCambodianpostatSreKhtuminMondolkiriprovince

felltotheNorthVietnamese,leavingthetownofORang,fartherEastonRoute

131,cutoff.AlsoonApril15,amilitaryoutpostatKrekinKompongCham

provincewastakenbytheCommunists,denyingCambodiansaccesstothe

provincialcapitalofMimot,astrideRoute7.OnApril16theprovincialcapitalof

TakeowasattackedbyVietnameseCommunistforces,whowererepulsed.Buton

April16theyoverranthetownofTukMeasinKampotprovince.Thesamedaya

smallenemyforceattackedanoutpostNorthofKratieandalsoattackedthetown

ofChhlongSouthoftheprovincialcapital(seethemapabove).Thestrategywas

clearlytocutoffPhnomPenhfromtheprovincesandtobringaboutthecollapse

ofLonNol.



PremierLonNoldeclaredinabroadcastonApril14that“becauseofthe

gravityofthesituation,itisdeemednecessarytoacceptfromthismomentonall

unconditionalforeignaidfromallsources.”HeaccusedtheCommunistsof

mounting“anescalationofsystematicactsofaggression.”WhenIbroughtthisto

thePresident’sattention,Nixonsaidhewasdeterminednot toletthenew

CambodiangovernmentcollapseunderCommunistpressure.Icalledameetingof

theWSAGforApril14.TheWS AG’scompositionwasessentiallythesameasthe

earlierforum,butmorestaffpersonnelwerepermittedtoattendandits

documentswerehandledinformalchannels.Theshiftreflectedthattheproblem

ofCambodiahadgrownbeyondtheintelligenceframework.Amajorpolicy

decisionwaslikelytoberequiredinthenearfuture.



Thecommitteemightbenew,buttheparticipantshadnotchangedtheir

reluctancetoseeAmericainvolveitself.IaskedtheWSAGtorecommendalevel

andtypeofmilitaryaidthatwouldprovidepsychologicalreassurancetoLonNol

withoutfurnishingapretextforanevenstrongeroffensivebyHanoi.The

consensuswastosendupto3,000capturedCommunistAK‐47riflesfromSouth

Vietnamesestocksand,tomaintainourdissociation,tohavethemdelivered

throughSouthVietnamesechannels.Everyone,includingmyself,agreedthatit

was“premature”toprovideAmericanM‐1rifles.ForthatveryreasonIreported

totheWSAGthatthePresidentwasnotyetpreparedtoapprovethedeliveryof

1,000‐manpacksofAmericanequipment(CIApackagesofhandweaponsthat

wereoccasionallysuppliedtofriendlyforcesonacovertbasis).Therewasno

discussionofheavierequipment.TheStateDepartmentwasreluctanttodeliver

evenmedicalsuppliesovertly;itwasfinallyagreedthatthechoiceoftheirmode

ofdeliveryshouldbelefttotheCambodians.Inshort,threew eeksafterthe

NorthVietnamesehadlefttheirsanctuariesandwereseekingtoisolatePhnom

Penh,theUnitedStatesmadeavailableexactly3,000capturedriflesdelivered

clandestinely.Wegavenootheraid.



ThenextdaytheCambodiangovernmentsubmittedarequestformilitary

andeconomicassistancetoexpandtheirarmyto200,000men.Thisrequest

clearlywentbeyondtheframeworkofexistingpolicy;italsofarexceededwhatin

ourjudgmentCambodiacouldabsorb.AnotherWSAGmeetingwasheldonApril

15.ItwasdecidedthatratherthanstartaformalUSarmssupplylinewewould

channel$5milliontoCambodiathroughafriendlygovernment(whichwewould

thenreimburse);Cambodiawouldthushavefundstobuyitsownarmsonthe

openmarket.Thesumwasofcoursesymbolic;itcorrespondedinnowayto

Cambodianneeds,muchlesstoCambodianrequests.Itcanhardlybecalledan

heroicorurgentresponsetothepleasofagovernmentonwhosesoilthousands

ofNorthVietnameseweresystematicallyunderminingitsauthority,killingits

citizens,andannexingitsterritory.



Forbynowthepatternofoutsideaggressionwaspatent.North

VietnameseforceswereattackingalloverCambodia,concentratingespeciallyon

provincialcapitalsandcommunicationstoandfromPhnomPenh.



AgainstthisbackdropofmountingNorthVietnamesemenace andhisown

growingfrustration,thePresidenttookaperso nalhandinspeedingaidto

Cambodia.AtameetingwithHelmsandCushmanonApril16calledprimarilyto

establishtheCIAstationinPhnomPenh,Nixonordereddeliveryofthe1,000‐man

packsIhadrejectedathisinstructionforty‐eighthoursearlier.Afewdayslaterhe

doubledthecontingencyfundapprovedbytheWSAGto$10million.Infact,none

oftheseinstructionscouldbeimplementedbeforetheywereovertakenbymore

escalationfromHanoiandNixon’sdecisiontwoweekslatertomoveagainstthe

sanctuaries.



Therewasabriefflurryofhopefirst.YakovMalik,theSovietPermanent

RepresentativetotheUN,suggestedatanewsconferenceonApril16that“only

anewGenevaConferencecouldbringanewsolutio nandrelaxthetensiononthe

Indochinapeninsula.”ASovietcallforanewGenevaConferencewasa

sensationalevent;itwasboundtosuggestparallelstotheendingoftheKorean

War;itwasanalyzedsolemnlybytheUSgovernmentandreceivedmassivemedia

attention.Wewouldhavebeenmosteagertoexploreit.Iconsideredit

practicallyimpossiblethatMalikcouldhavespokenwithoutHanoi’sprior

knowledge—especiallyasLeDucThowasatthatmomentinMoscow. Igavethe

Presidentthefollowingpossibleexplanations:



‐TheNorthVietnamesepositionisweakerthanourintelligencereportshaveindicated,

andHanoiisparticularlyworriedaboutyetanotherlongwarinCambodia.Itneedsabreathing

spell.Itmaythentrytosuspendtheconferenceafterithasgainedsomerespite.(Boththe

1954and1961‐62conferenceswereinterruptedforperiodsofvaryinglength).



‐Afterthebreak‐downofallvalidcontactsinParis,Hanoifeelsthatitneedssome

forumtodealwithusseriously.Also,itmaywanttodealseriouslywiththeGVN,whichitcan

domoreeasilyinalargerframework.



‐AnytalkofaGenevaConference(evenifnoconferenceisintheoffing)wouldrestrain

ourretaliationagainstanynewmilitarymeasuresHanoimighttake.(Butwedoubtthatthe

Sovietswouldletthemselvesbeusedthiswaywhentheyhavesomeseriousbusinesswithusin

Vienna[i.e.,SALT].)



Butbeforewecouldreturnareply,MalikonApril18retractedhis

“proposal.”Hedidsowiththecold‐bloodednessofSovietdiplomatslong

practicedinsuddenreversalsthatarethenpresentedasthelogicalessenceof

orthodoxy.Maliksuddenlyandwithoutexplanationasserte dthataGeneva

Conferencewouldbeunrealisticandthat“theAmericanshavetogetoutof

Vietnambeforeanythingmuchcanhappen.”Thenegotiatingroutewasslammed

shutonceagain.Therewastobenoconference;thepreconditionfor

negotiationsremainedunilateralAmericanwithdrawalfromVietnam.



Nixon’sirritationattheslowpaceofourreactioncontinuedtomount.

ReadingonereportofaVietCongbaseinsomemountainareadeepinside

Cambodia,heorderedaB‐52strikewithintwohours.Thisprovedsomewhat

impracticalbecauseitwouldhavetakenmorethantwohoursfortheB‐52stoget

thereandbecausethereportwasnotconfirmed;alsobecauseoftheundesirable

symbolismofaB‐52attackdeepinsideCambodiabeforeotherfundamental

decisions.NixonurgedapsychologicalwarfarecampaigntotieSihanouktothe

CommunistsandtodramatizeUSsupportforLonNol.Hehadanexaltedviewof

theCIA’scapacityfor“blackpropaganda”andevenmoreofitsimpact.This

approach,too,wasrapidlyovertakenbyevents.



BythemiddleofApril,then,overamonthaftertheCambodiancoup,the

UnitedStateshadbarelyliftedafinger.Wehadasyetgivennomilitaryaid,no

intelligencesupport,andhadonlyformalisticcontactswiththenewgovernment.

Thecoupitselfhadcomewithoutwarning;itsconsequencesthreatenednotonly

thefreedomofCambodiabutourentirepositioninVietnam.Insteadofastripof

isolatedsanctuariesclosetotheVietnameseborderwewould,afterthecollapse

oftheLonNolgovernment,confront allofCambodiaasaCommunist base,

stretching600milesalongtheborderofSouthVietnamandwithshortlinesof

supplyfromthesea.VietnamizationandAmericanwithdrawalwouldthencome

unstuck.SowewerebeingdriventowardsupportofLonNolhesitantly,

reluctantly,inresponsetotheevolvingcircumstancesinCambodiawhichwe

couldneitherforecastnorcontrol,andwithaseriesofhalfmeasuresthatalways

laggedbehindtherapidlydeterioratingsituation.Ofallthepartiesthatmade

crucialdecisionsinthatperiod—Hanoi,LonNol,Sihanouk,andtheUnited

States—wehadtheleastfreedomofchoice.Therecordleavesnodoubtthatthe

NorthVietnamese,alsocaughtbysurprisebytheMarchcoup,beartheheaviest

responsibilityforeventsinCambodia.Theirillegalandarrogantoccupationof

CambodianterritoryhadtornapartthefragileunityofSihanouk’sneutralist

country;theycreatedtheKhmerRougeasaforceagainstSihanoukwellbefore

hisoverthrow;theyusedhimtogivecredencetothattinybandwhenhewent

intoexile.OnApril4LeDucThohadrejecteddiscussionnotonlyofacease‐fire

anywhereinIndochina,butofanysche mefortheneutralityofCambodia.Itwas

they,notwe,whohaddecidedonafighttothefinishonthebleedingbodyofa

smallneutralistkingdomwhichwantedonlytobeleftalone.



Cambodia’sagony,then,unfoldedwiththeinevitabilityofaGreektragedy.

TheCommunistsweredeterminedontotalvictory;Sihanouk’swoundedpride

causedhimtomakecommoncausewithhiserstwhilemortalenemies;andwe

werebythenonthewayoutofIndochinaandlosingourpowertocontrolevents.



Butbeforethediewasfinallycasttherewasabriefinterlude,duringwhich

tomaintainourpositioninVietnamwehadtotakeanotherunilateralstep

towardweakeningit;itwastimeforanewtroopwithdrawaldecision.

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<<Contents>>

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TheApril20TroopWithdrawalAnnouncement.

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nthesurface,theissuewasstraightforward.Themostrecentwithdrawal

(announcedDecember15,1969)hadbeen50,000overafour‐monthperiod

endingonApril15,1970.With115,000troopsalreadyout,itwasclearthatthe

nextincrementwouldbegintocutsharplyintoourcombatstrength.Thedilemma

wasplaintosee.Troopcutspoulticedpublicsoresathome,buttheywere

evaporatingHanoi’sneedtobargainaboutourdisengagement.Andif

Vietnamizationwasnotmakinggoodthedefensivegapscreatedbyour

withdrawals,wehazardednotonlythenegotiatingleverbutSouthVietnam’s

independenceandtheentirebasisofour sacrifices.

O



ThougheveryagencypaidlipservicetoVietnamization,atleastthree

schoolsofthoughthaddevelopedbymid‐1970.SecretaryRogers’sexperience

hadbeenindomesticpolicy.HewasacutelysensitivetopublicandCongressional

opinion.Hehadlessofaninstinctforthegeopoliticalconsequencesofan

Americandefeatorforwhatdecisionsmotivatedbydomesticconsiderations

mightdotoournegotiatingpositions.Hefavoredthelargestpossiblewithdrawal

intheshortestpossibletime;themilitaryeffectheconsideredbeyondthescope

ofhisoffice.HisDepartmentdelugedSaigonwithastreamofproposalsabout

politicalreformmoreattunedtoourCo ngressionalpressuresthantotherealities

ofawar‐torncountrywithlimiteddemocratictraditions,overrunbyseveral

hundredthousandenemytroopsandguerrillas.



SecretaryLairdwasthemostpoliticallysubtleofthePresident’ssenior

advisers.Heunderstoodthepublic’sambivalence,shownbyeverypoll.It

opposedunilateralwithdrawalyetitwantedthewarended,andsawthe

reductionofourtroopstrengthasasignofprogress.Lairdaspiredtostayintune

withthismood.HewaspreparedtogiveVietnamizationarealchance;foralong

timehefavoredaresidualUSforceofseveralhundredthousand.Buthewanted

toreducetothatresidualforcerapidly,andtomaintainpublicconfidencehe

thoughtitimportanttomakeourwithdrawallookasinexo rableaspossible.He

alsosawVietnamasanobstacletohisplanstomodernizeourarmedforces;

Congressionalpressurestocuthisdefensebudgetcouldbereduced,hethought,

ifhewasidentifiedwithtrooppullouts.Hesoughttoguaranteehispreferred

coursebygearingthewithdrawalratetothedefensebudgetinsuchawaythat

anyslowdownofwithdrawalswasboundtoreduceprocurement— thusenlisting

thesupportoftheservicesforrapidwithdrawalbythreateningtheircherished

newprojects.



Initially,IhadbeenthemostskepticalofthePresident’ssenioradvisers,

butonceembarkedonVietnamizationIdidmyutmosttogiveitachanceto

succeed.Moreover,itwascleartome—ifnottoallmycolleagues—thatour

commitmenttoVietnamizationwasprogressivelyreducingotheroptions.Hadwe

beenpreparedtoacceptSaigon’scollapsewecouldhaveadoptedanyofthe

manyproposalsfo rsettingadeadlinethathadbecomestaplesofthepublicand

Congressionaldebateandthathadsomesupportamongthemiddlelevelsofthe

Administration.Butifwemeantwhatwesaidabouttheglobalconsequenceofan

Americancollapse,wehadtogivetheSouthVietnamesetimetoreplace

Americanforceswithoutcatastrophe.Andifwewantedtohusbandnegotiating

assets,ourwithdrawalstrategyhadtoprovidethePresidentsomediscretionto

accelerateitorslowitdowninresponsetoenemyactions.ThiswasalsoNixon’s

view.

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Thesedifferencesofperspective,someofnuance,someofsubstance,were

givenaddedsharpnessbecauseeachchiefactorwasacutelyconsciousofthe

publicperception.Everybodywantedsomeofthecreditforthewithdrawal

program;nobodydesiredtheblameforfailuresordefeatsitmightproduce.

Memorandaproliferatedtobeavailable forlaterreference;theauthorsassumed

thathistorywoulddealkindlywiththoseadvocatinglargewithdrawals.The

President,eagertogarnerwhateverfavorablepublicitycouldbemadetocome

hisway,warilykepthisowncounsel.Hefearedthatifheweremoreconfidinghis

associateswouldleakhigherwithdrawalnumbersthanhewaspreparedto

authorizeandsoplacehimatadisadvantageinthepubliceye.



ThiswasagameinwhichLairdwasnoteasilybested.Hewasapatriot

whoseeveryinstinctwastowinthewar;hewasalsoarealistwhounderstood

thattheprospectsfordoingsowereproblematicalatbest.Hewasapoliticianto

thecore.Hewasperfectlypreparedtosupportastrongpolicysolongashewas

notidentifiedasitsprincipalauthor.Incriseshewasredoubtable.Intherun‐up

tothemheproducedablizzardofmemorandathatwouldmakeitnextto

impossibletodetermineeitherhisrealintentionsor—whatwasmoreimportant

tohim—hispreciserecommendation.



EverytroopwithdrawaldecisionsetthestageforanotherofLaird’s

amazingtoursdeforce.In1970Lairdhadstartedearly.OnFebruary27hewrote

thePresidentexplainingthathisbudgetarychoicesinallocatingthe“increasingly

scarceresources”fortheUSmilitaryoperationsinVietnaminFiscalYears1970‐

1971wouldbecomemoreandmoredifficult.Thebudgetarysituationwas“tight

byanyreasonablestandard”;changingcombatrequirementscouldalsoproduce

new“resourceproblems”forwhichreprogrammingoffundswould“notbean

easychore.”LairdremindedthePresidentthatbudgetaryplanningforFiscalYear

1971hadbeenbasedontheassumptionofreducedUScombatandsupport

efforts,andtheseconstraints“restricttoaconsiderabledegreeourabilityto

imposeaddedoperations.”InotherwordsLairdopposedneworexpanded

militaryoperationsbutsoughttoblameanymilitaryfailuresonbudgetary

constraintsthatpreventednewoperations.



OnMarch11IsoughtGeneralWheeler’sviewsontherelativemeritsof

onefour‐monthwithdrawalincrement(thelargestperiodthenbeingconsidered)

ortwowithdrawalsovertwomonthseach.WheelerrepliedonMarch20inan

unsignedmemorandum,whichhepassedtothePresidentthroughHaig,thus

avoidingtheinconvenienceofDefenseDepartmentchannelsandthecertaintyof 

Laird’swrath.Wheelerrecommendeda“onebiteapproach,”becausethelonger

periodprovidedgreaterflexibilitybymakingitpossibletoretainkeyunitsuntil

theendoftheperiod.However,Wheeleraddedthathepreferred“nofurther

redeployment”atallbecauseoftheuncertain“overallsituation.”Hestrongly

urgedholdingthenextwithdrawaldecisioninabeyanceforninetydays.



LairdreenteredthefrayonApril4withalongmemorandum,thethrustof

whichwastoremindeveryonethatoureffortinVietnamwas“largeandcostly.”

HerecommendedafixedmonthlyrateofwithdrawalandareductioninB‐52and

tacticalairoperationsinproportiontoourwithdrawals.Launchinganincursion

intotheprovinceoftheStateDepartment,Lairdrecommendedthatweseeka

diplomaticsolutiontoourdilemma.Heurgedthatweofferacease‐firein

Vietnamandmajornewproposalsforde‐escalationinLaosandCambodia,

appointanewseniorambassadorto thepeacetalksinParis,orexploreaFrench

proposalforanIndochinaconference.Otherthanthis,Lairdpledgedcomplete

dedicationtothePresident’spoliciesandprograms.



Lairdcannotbeblamedfornotknowingthattheseschemeshadallbeen

rejectedbyLeDucTho;itwas,infact,aweaknessofourmethodofgovernment

thattheSecretaryofDefensewasoperatinginsuchavacuum.Buthis

memorandumraisedissuesthatwentbeyondthescopeofhistacticalknowledge.

Andhismilitaryproposals,asIpointedoutinacovering memorandumforthe

President,allassumedthattheenemythreatwoulddeclineinparallelwithour

withdrawals.Theoppositewasmorelikely.



Throughoutthewarthereweremanyexhortations ,fromwithinand

outsidethegovernment,toeschewamilitarysolutionandtoseekadiplomatic 

one.Buttherawtruthwasthatthisdistinctionnotonlywasunacceptabletoour

adversary;itwasincomprehensibletohim.EverytimeImetwithLeDucTho,he

spentmostofourtimedepictingthehopelessnessofourmilitaryposition.This

wasthe“objective”factorthatheassumedwouldcompeloureventual

acceptanceofNorthVietnam’sdemands.Therewasnopurelydiplomatic

alternative.Unlessmilitaryandpoliticaleffortswerekeptintandem,bothwould

provesterile.Until1972Hanoinevergaveusapoliticaloption;itsnegotiating

positionwastodemandourunilateralwithdrawalonashortdeadlineandthe

overthrowoftheSaigongovernment.Itdidsobecauseitbelieveditselftobe

winning;itchosecompromiseonlyafteramilitarystalematehadbecome

apparent.



Iwasascommittedtoapoliticalsolutionandevenmorepreparedtocome

upwithnegotiatingformulasthantheothersenioradvisers,butitwasprecisely

forthisreasonthatIurgedamilitarystrategythatwouldpersuadeHanoito

compromiseandnegotiate.Fixeddeadlinesandautomatic withdrawalsdidnot

aidapoliticalsolution;theydissipatedournegotiatingassets.Wewereindanger,

Ithought,ofhavingawithdrawalprogramtooslowtosatisfyourcriticsbuttoo

drasticformilitaryorpoliticaleffectiveness.Thiswasnotapolicybutan

abdication;itwouldmakecollapseinevitablethroughtheveryattemptto

postponeit.



ByApril8GeneralAbrams’sassessmentreachedtheWhiteHouse.(Ithad

actuallybeensentnearlythreeweeksearlier,butbecauseitsrecommendations

didnotfindfavor,ithadbeenheldupinthePentagonfor“staffing.”)Itsupported

Wheeler’srecommendationof aninety‐daymoratoriumonwithdrawals.Andit

seriouslychallengedLaird’sproposedreductionintacticalairoperationsandB‐52

sorties.AbramsstressedthatourwithdrawalsforcedhimtousetheSouth

Vietnameseforcesinastaticdefenserole.TheB‐52Sthusbecamehissole

strategicreserve.OnApril15IsentthePresidentamemorandumarguingthat

sinceVietnamizationgainswere“fragile”andalliedforceswere“stretchednearly

tothelimitoftheircapabilities ,”thesharpcutbacksinairoperationsimpliedby

thedefensebudgethaddisturbingimplications.I recommendedthatthe

Presidentorderastudyofwhatairoperationswererequiredtosupport

Vietnamization.SuchanorderwasissuedonApril17.Itputanendtoreductions

duringtheimmediatecrisis,butthecutbacksinairoperationsweretoresume—

almostimperceptibly—inthefall,forcingustosendsubstantialreinforcements

whentheenemyoffensivebrokein1972.



ItookseriouslyAbrams’sandWheeler’spleastomaintaintrooplevels,

especiallyinthelightofNorthVietnameseoffensivesinLaosandCambodia.ButI

knewalsothattostopwithdrawalsforninetydayswouldtriggerthesamepublic

protestsashadoccurredintheprevioussummerandmaketheeventual,

inevitableresumptionofwithdrawalsappearasadefeat.Iconcludedthata

primaryflawlayintheapparentlyimmutabletimetable.Anannouncementwas

expectedeveryfewmonths,alwaystriggeringadebatewithintheExecutive

Branchaswellasinpublic.Theseself‐inflicteddeadlinesweresappingour

enduranceandraisingdoubtsaboutourpurposes.



ForallthesereasonsIproposedthatNixonannouncealargewithdrawal

andstretchitoveroneyear.AfterconsultationwithGeneralWheeler,I

recommendedatotalreductionof150,000men.Thisrepresentedaslight

increaseinthemonthlyrateofwithdrawal;buttocompensateforthisIproposed

thatonlyaverysmallwithdrawaltakeplaceoverthenextninetydays,withthe

bulkofwithdrawalsplannedfor1971.Nixonunderstoodthestrategicdiscretion

thisgavehimandthefavorablepublicimpact.Buthewasalsoconvincedthatif

herevealedhisintentionstohisassociateshewouldrapidlybeembroiledin

controversyonatleastthreefronts:Theywouldseektotransformhisplanintoa

fixedmonthlyrate;theywouldurgethattheratebeincreased;andtherewasin

theendthenearcertaintyofaleakarrangedinsuchawayastocreatethe

impressionthatothershadrecommendedanevenlargerfigure.



TheresultwasacomplicatedbureaucraticchessgamewherebyNixon,with

myassistance,movedtowardaforeordaineddecisionwhileconfusinghisCabinet

astohisplans.WefirstneededBunker’sandAbrams’sreactions.OnApril6Ihad

sentabackchannelmessagetoboth:



...anyannouncementwhichissubstantiallylessthanthepatternsetheretoforecould

bethesourceofmajorproblemswithdomesticcritics.Heisthereforeconsideringannouncing

adecisiontowithdrawatleast150,000troopsoverthenextyearwithjustatokenwithdrawal,

ifany,overthenextfewmonths.Iwouldbegratefulforyourviewsontheimplicationsofthis

formulation.



AbramsandBunkerinformedmeonApril8thatthey,andintheir

judgmentPresidentThieualso,couldaccept awithdrawalof150,000extended

overayearprovidedthebulkoftheforcesremainedthroughout1970.In

addition,BunkerandAbramsinsistedthatB‐52sortiesbeheldatthehighest

possiblelevel,particularlyinthefirsthalfof1971whentroopreductionswould

berapidandlarge.



AtthispointbureaucraticgamesinWashingtonreachednewdegreesof

intricacy.ThePresident’swritersbegantodraftaspeechannouncingnew

withdrawalsbutleavingthenumbersandtimingblank.OnApril11Inotified

BunkerandAbramsthatthePresidentnowneededThieu’sconcurrence.I 

stressedtheneedfor“absolute secrecy,”sincenooneinWashingtonexcept

NixonandmeknewofthePresident’sintentions;BunkerwastostresstoThieu

theimportanceofpreventinganyleaks.Atthesametimetheagencieswere

sendinginstructionstoBunkerbasedontheirownstudiesandpreferences,using

figuressubstantiallyatvariancewiththosebeingdiscussed inbackchannels.

BunkerandAbramsdidanadmirablejobofkeepingtheirtwosetsofinstructions

straight.Thieuconcurredwiththesameprovisosabouttimingandairsorties

previouslyreporte dbyAbramsandBunker.

