Kissinger Henry. White House Years

Подождите немного. Документ загружается.

OnApril17NixonwenttoHawaiitogreetthereturningApollo13

astronauts.InordertokeepaneyeonCambodiaaswellasthemaneuveringover

withdrawalsIdidnotaccompanyhim.AdmiralJohnMcCain,ourcommanderin

thePacific,briefedNixonatlengthinHonolulu.Thisdoughty,crustyofficercould

havepassedindemeanor,appearance,pugnacity,andmannerofspeechfor

PopeyetheSailorMan.HissonhadbeenaprisonerofwarinHanoiforyears;this

tragedylefthimundaunted.Hefoughtforthevictorythathisinstinctand

upbringingdemandedandthatpoliticalrealityforbade.McCainbroughthometo

NixonthedangerinLaosandCambodia;hereinforcedNixon’sconvictionthatthe

withdrawalschedulehadtobeflexible.



NixonandIrejoinedforcesinSanClementeontheeveningofApril19.

SeparatedfromhisCabinetbythreethousandmiles,Nixonannouncedtothe

pressthathewouldmakeaspeechthenexteveningonredeploymentfrom

Vietnambutdeclinedtogiveanyindicationofitscontent.Wewerebesiegedwith

callsfromWashington,especiallyfromLaird.Nixonrefusedtotakethem.He

instructedmetotellLairdandRogersthenextmorningthathewasthinkingof

announcingonlya monthlyratebutnooverallnumber—itwastheexactopposite 

ofthetruth.Hispurposewastoavoidleakageofthetotalhehadalreadydecided

uponorofanyotherfigure.



LatethatafternoonofthetwentiethinSanClemente—toolat e forleaksto

theeveningnewscasts—IcalledLairdandRogerswiththePresident’sdecision:a

withdrawalof150,000bytheendofspringof1971,with60,000tobewithdrawn

in1970andtheremaining90,000in1971.Within1970thegreaterportionofthe

withdrawalswouldtakeplaceafterAugust1.Nixonmadehissurprise

announcementonApril20.Itwasoneofthetoursdeforcebywhichwe

sustainedoureffortinVietnam.Itmetthepoliticalneedforawithdrawal

scheduleandthemilitarynecessitytoretainthelargestpossiblenumberof

troopsduringthenextthreecriticalmonthswhileHanoi’sforceswereassaulting

CambodiaandpressingforwardinLaos.Whateverthebureaucraticmaneuversor 

themonthlyfluctuationsinthewithdrawalrate,thefactremainedthatwehad

withinoneyearprojectedatotalreductionof265,500belowthetroopceilingof

549,500wefoundwhenwecameintooffice.



RogerssupportedthePresident’sdecision,regrettingonlythatbyforgoing

morefrequentannouncements,thePresidentdeprivedhimselfofperiodic

respitesfrompublicpressures.Lairdwantedthewithdrawalsspacedmore

evenly;heinsistedonanappointmentwithNixon.Iarrangeditforthenextdayin

Washington.Nixonflewbackto Washingtonimmediatelyafterhis

announcement.WhentheymetonApril21,NixonexplainedtoLairdthat“we

mustplayatoughgame”forthenexttwoorthreemonthsandthereforehadto

postponewithdrawals.Lairddemurred:“Iwantyoutoknowyouhaveafiscal

problem.Youknow that,don’tyou?”(afavoriteLairdphrase,usedwhetheror

notonehadanywayofknowingwhathehadjustcommunicated—especially

whenonehadnot).ThePresidentassuredhimhedidknow.Lairdtoldthe

Presidentthathehadtotakeout60,000menbythetimeoftheNovember

Congressionalelectionor“youmightjust aswellforgetabouttheelection.”Nixon

repliedthathewouldbejudgednotbyhowmanymenleftVietnaminagiven

periodbutbyhowweleftVietnamintheend.Nixonsaidhewould“thinkabout”

Laird’swarning.



WhenNixontoldaCabinetme mberhewould“thinkabout”something,it

almostinvariablymeantthathewishedtoavoidaface‐to‐faceconfrontationand

thathewouldconfirmhisoriginaldecisioneitherthroughHaldemanorby

memorandum.Soitwas.Thenextday,April21,thePresidentinitialedashort

notetoLaird:



MemorandumfortheSecretaryofDefense:



Followingourdiscussionyesterdayafternoon,Iwanttoreiteratemydecisionthatno

morethan60,000troopsaretoberedeployedthisyear.Aplantothiseffectshouldbe

submittedtomebyMay1.



UntilIhavereviewedtheplan,nofurtherwithdrawalsshouldbescheduled.



Lairdacceptedthedecisionwithapparentgoodgrace.Butheknewhis

chiefwellenoughtoreturntothefrayatamorepropitiousmoment.InAugusthe

persuadedthePresidentthathecoulddramatizethesuccessoftheCambodian

operationbestbywithdrawing90,000bytheendof1970and60,000in1971—

theexactoppositeofthePresident’soriginalintention.Lairdgothisway.Nixon

acquiescedinpartbecausehehatedconstantcontroversy,inpartbecause

Congressionalelectionswereimminent.



Ihavediscussedthetroopwithdrawalatsuchlengthbecauseoftheinsight

itgivesontworelatedproblems:thedilemmasofextricatingourselvesfroma

warweinherited,whipsawedbetweenanimplacabledomesticoppositionandan

implacableHanoi;andtheNixonAdministration’sstyleofgovernment.



ThedilemmasofourVietnampolicywerereflectedinthegulfbetweenour

perceptionofrealityandthenatureofthepublicdebate.Ourrealityconsistedof

enemyoffensivesinLaosandCambodiathatthreatenedourmilitarypositionin

SouthVietnam.Yetastheobjectivethreatsgrew,wewererequiredtocontinuea

programofunilateralwithdrawal.Thepublicdebatefocusedonthedangerthat

wemightslideintoanew“commitment”intwootherfarawaycountries.Our

realitywasthatonlybypreventingacollapseofthesecountriescouldwe

strengthentheSouthVietnameseandenablethemtotakeuptheslackofour

withdrawalwithoutturningitintoarout.Thepublicdebatechallengedallmilitary

calculationsontheassumptionthatmilitaryeffortwasfutileandwaseither

unrelatedtoorinconsistentwithourdiplomaticprospects.(Thiswouldhavebeen

newstoGeneralGiap.)WehadseenenoughofLeDucThotoknowthatwithouta

plausiblemilitarystrategywecouldnothaveaneffectivediplomacy.



AsforNixon’sstyleofgovernment,hewaspreparedtomakedecisio ns

withoutillusion.Onceconvinced,hewentruthlesslyandcourageouslytothe

heartofthematter;buteachcontroversialdecisiondrovehimdeeperintohisall‐

envelopingsolitude.Hewasalmostphysicallyunabletoconfrontpeoplewho

disagreedwithhim;andheshunnedpersuadingorinspiringhissubordinates.He

woulddecidefrominsidehisself‐imposedcocoon,buthewasunwillingto

communicatewiththosewhodisagreed.ItwastheparadoxofaPresidentstrong

inhisdecisionsbutinconclusiveinhisleadership.Makingandenforcingdecisions

leftsomanyscarsonhimandothersthatitsacrificedadministrativecohesionon

thealtarofexecutivediscretion;itperverselycreatedthemaximumincentivefor

strong‐willedsubordinatestoevadehisdirectives.SinceNixondisdainedany

efforttoinstillateamspiritandusuallykepthisdesignstohimself,hisCabinet

wastemptedtoexaggerateitsautonomy.Thisinturnreinforcedhisconviction

thatthebureaucracydidnotsupporthim;itsurelyrarelywentoutofitswayto

carryoutthespiritofhisorders.Allthisbecameaviciouscircleinwhichthe

Presidentwithdrewevermoreintohisisolationandpulledthecentraldecisions

increasinglyintotheWhiteHouse,inturnheighteningtheresentmentsand

defiantmoodofhisappointees.



Andsoontheseprocedureswouldbetestedbyanothercrisis,withthe

WhiteHouseonceagaininthevortex. Thedecisiononwhattodoabout

Cambodiahadbecomeinescapable.



<<Contents>>



****



TheAttackonNorthVietnameseSanctuaries



istoriansrarelydojusticetothepsychologicalstressonapolicymaker.What

theyhaveavailablearedocumentswrittenforavarietyofpurposes—under 

contemporaryrulesofdisclosure,increasinglytodressuptherecord—andnot

alwaysrelevanttothemomentofdecision.Whatnodocumentcanre vealisthe

accumulatedimpactofaccident,intangibles,fears,andhesitation.

H



MarchandAprilof1970weremonthsofgreattension.MytalkswithLe

DucThoweremaddeninglyambiguous. Wefacedwhatlookedlikeasignificant

offensiveinLaos;therewasthecoupinCambodiasoontobefollowedbyNorth

Vietnameseattacksalloverthecountry;Sovietcombatpersonnelappearedin

Egypt—thefirsttimethattheSovietUnionhadriskedcombatoutsidethesatellite

orbit.Amidalltheseevents,thePresidentwasgettingtesty.Nixonblamedhis

frustrationsonthebureaucracy’sslowanderraticresponsetohiswishes,which

heascribedtothelegacyofthirtyyearsofDemocraticrule.Haldemanjokedthat

thePresidentwasina“charmingmood”;inthecourseofcoveringonesubjecton

thetelephoneNixonhadhunguponhimseveraltimes.



OnApril13,justasCambodiawasapproachingthedecisiveturn,an

extraneouseventoccurredthattookaheavytollofNixon’snervousenergy:the

mishapofApollo13.SoonafteritslaunchonApril11itbecameapparentthat

therewasaseveremalfunctionandthattheastronautsmighthaveto

circumnavigatethemooninthecrampedandfragilevehicledesignedforthebrief

lunarlanding.Ilearnedofthea ccidentaround11:00p.m.Isoughttoinformthe

PresidentbutranintooneofthemindlessedictsbywhichHaldemanestablished

hisauthority:ThePresidentcouldnotbeawakenedwithouthisspecific

authorization.Thisherefusedtogiveforwhatheconsideredatechnicalproblem

involvingnoforeignpolicyconsiderations.IwarnedHaldemanthatkeepingthe

Presidentignorantwouldbehardtoexplain;heinsistedthatpublicrelationswas

hisprovince.ThenextmorningRonZieglerhadtogothroughverbalcontortions

toimply,withoutlyingoutright,thatthePresidenthadbeenincommandall

night.



TherescueoftheastronautsabsorbedagreatdealofNixon’sattentionfor

theweekthatthepressuresonCambodiaweremultiplying.Furthermore,Apollo 

13causedhimtotraveltoHawaiionApril17towelcomehometheastronauts,

whohadalmostmiraculouslysurvivedtheirbrushwiththeinfinite.Themilitary

briefingbyAdmiralMcCainilluminatedtheperilswefacedinCambodiaandits

dangerforVietnamization.ItmagnifiedNixon’srestlessnessandhelpedspeedup

hisdecisions.ButtherewereaboveallpressingobjectivereasonsforNixon’sstate

ofmindthatnoonewho tookPresidentialresponsibilitiesseriouslycouldignore.

Lateron,duringWatergate,SenatorHowardBakeraskedthefamousquestion:

“Whatdidheknowandwhendidheknowit?”Thequestionisaptinthiscaseas

well.



ThefirsttwoweeksofAprilhadseenawaveofCommunistattackson

Cambodiantownsandcommunications.Thesenowescalatedfurther.OnApril17,

severalCambodiangovernme ntpostsneartheprovincialcapitalofSenmonorom

werecapturedbytheNorthVietnamese.Onthesameday,aCambodianmilitary

spokesmanannouncedthattheenemyhadmorethandoubleditsareaofcontrol

intheprecedingtwoweeks.OnApril18,aCambodianarmybattalionwasbadly

mauledontheWestbankoftheMekongtwenty‐fivemilesSouthofPhnomPenh.

FartherSouthontheMekong,aCambodianarmyheadquarters atHungLoiwas

besiegedforaweekbyalargeenemyforce.OnApril20,enemyforces

unsuccessfullyattac kedSnuolinKratieprovince.InKandalprovince,Communist

forcestemporarilycapturedthetownofSaang,sometwentymilesSouthof

PhnomPenh.OnTuesday,April21,thedayafterthePresident’stroopwithdrawal

announcement,CommunistforcesstruckthetownofTakeoandcuttheroad

betweenitandPhnomPenh.



ThepatternofCommunistmilitaryactionswasbecomingclear(seethe

maponpage471).GeneralWilliamWestmoreland,ActingChairmanoftheJoint

ChiefsinGeneralWheeler’sabsence,reportedthattheCambodianarmedforces

wereonly“marginallyeffective”againstthesuperio rNorthVietnameseandViet

Cong.Hewrote:“TheenemyobjectivemaywellbetoisolatethecityofPhnom

Penh,bringmilitarypressuretobearonitfromallsides,andperhaps,ultimately,

tobringSihanoukbacktoregainpoliticalcontrolattheappropriatetime.”



TheCommunistswereescalatingtheirpoliticalpressuresaswell.OnApril

21Sihanouk’s“NationalUnitedFrontofCambodia”broadcastanappealto

overthrowLonNolovertheVietCong’sclandes tine radio.Thesameday,

SihanoukbroadcastamessagefromPekinginwhich,accordingtoRadioHanoi,he

urgedCambodians:“Youshould atonceabandonandisolatethecliqueoftheLon

Nol‐SirikMatakreactionaries,youshouldpointyourguns atthesetraitors.”



Revisionisthistoryhaspaintedapictureofapeaceful,neutralCambodia 

wantonlyassaultedbyAmericanforcesandplungedintoacivilwarthatcould

havebeenavoidedbutfortheAmericanobsession withmilitarysolutions.The

factsaredifferent.Sihanoukdeclaredwar onthenewCambodiangovernmentas

earlyasMarch20,twodaysafterhisoverthrow,throwinginhislotwiththe

CommunistshehadheldatbayandlocatinghimselfinPeking,thenstill

consideredthemostrevolutionarycapitalintheworldandwithwhich,moreover,

wehadnomeansofcommunicationwhatever.AprilsawawaveofCommunist

attackstooverthrowtheexistinggovernmentalstructureinCambodia.LeDuc

ThoonMarch16hadrejectedallsuggestionsofde‐escalationofmilitaryactivities

andonApril4hadrejectedallsuggestionsofneutralization.Hehadassertedthat

theCambodian,Laotian, andVietnamesepeopleswereoneandwouldfight

shouldertoshouldertowinthewholeofIndochina.BythesecondhalfofApril,

theNorthVietnameseweresystematicallyexpandingtheirsanctuariesand

mergingthemintoa“liberatedzone.”TheyweresurroundingPhnomPenhand

cuttingitofffromallaccess—usingtheverytacticsthatfiveyearslaterledtoits

collapse.



Ifthesestepswereunopposed,theCommunistsanctuaries,hitherto

limitedtonarrowunpopulatedareasclosetotheVietnameseborder,wouldbe

organizedintoasinglelargebasearea ofadepthandwithalogisticssystem

whichwouldenablerapidtransferofunitsandsupplies.Wewouldhave

preferredtheoldSihanouk government,ItoldagroupofRepublicanSenatorson

April21.ButSihanouk’spronouncementsleftlittledoubtthatthisoptionwasno

longeropentous.IfLonNolfell,theSihanoukwhoreturnedwouldnolonger

balancecontendingforcesinneutralitybutleadaCommunistgovernment.His

necessities(aswellashisoutragedvanity)wouldforcehimtopurgethe

moderategroupsonwhichhisfreedomofmaneuverbetweencontending

factionshadpreviouslydepended;hewouldbereducedtoafigurehead.

SihanoukvillewouldreopentoCommunistsupplies.Securitythroughoutthe

SouthernhalfofSouthVietnamwoulddeterioratedrastically.



ByApril21thebasicissuehadbeenlaidbarebyHanoi’saggressiveness;it

waswhetherVietnamizationwastobemerelyanalibiforanAmericancollapseor

aseriousstrategydesignedtoachieveanhonorablepeace.Iftheformer,neither

therateofwithdrawalnoreventsinneighboringcountrieswereimportant;in

fact,anythingthathastenedthecollapseofSouthVietnamwasablessingin

disguise.Someoftheopposition,likeSenatorGeorgeMcGovern,tookthis

position.ThoughIconsidereditagainstthenationalinterest,itwasrationaland

honest.Myintellectualdifficultiesarosewiththosewhopretendedthatthere

wasamiddlecourseofactionthatwouldavoidcollapseinVietnamandyetignore

theimpendingCommunisttakeoverinCambodia.



TherewasnoseriousdoubtthatHanoi’sunopposedconquestofCambodia

wouldhavebeenthelaststrawforSouthVietnam.Inthemidstofawar,itschief

allywaswithdrawingforcesatanacceleratingrateandreducingitsairsupport.

SaigonwasbeingaskedtotakethestrainattheverymomentHanoiwas

increasingreinforce mentsgreatlyovertheleveloftheprecedingyear.If

Cambodiaweretobecomeasinglearmedcampatthispoint,catastrophewas

inevitable.Saigonneededtimetoconsolidateandimproveitsforces;theUnited

Stateshadtoposeacrediblethreatforaslongaspossible;andHanoi’soffensive

potentialhadtobeweakenedbyslowingdownitsinfiltrationanddestroyingits

supplies.ItwasaracebetweenVietnamization,Americanwithdrawal,and

Hanoi’soffensives.



Strategically,Cambodiacouldnotbeconsideredacountryseparatefrom

Vietnam.TheindigenousCambodianCommunistforces—themurderousKhmer

Rouge—weresmallin1970andentirelydependentonHanoiforsupplies.The

forcesthreateningtheSouthVietnameseandAmericansfromCambodiawereall

NorthVietnamese;thebaseareaswerepartofthewarinVietnam.North

Vietnameseforcesthatwerebusycuttingcommunic ationshadalreadyseizeda

quarterofthecountry. Thedangerofbeing“boggeddowninanewwarin

Cambodia”wasamirage;theenemyinCambodiaandVietnamwasthesame

one.WhateverforceswefoughtinCambodiawewouldnothavetofightin

Vietnamandviceversa.Thewarbythenwasasinglewar,asLeDucThohad

proclaimed;therewasturmoilinCambodiapreciselybecauseHanoiwas

determinedtouseitasabaseforitsinvasionofSouthVietnamandtoestablish

itshegemonyoverIndochina.



ByApril21wehadastarkchoice.WecouldpermitNorthVietnamto

overrunthewholeofCambodiasothatitwasanindisputablepartofthe

battlefieldandthenattackitbyairandsea—evenRogerstoldmeonApril21that

iftheCommuniststookoverCambodia,hebelievedallbombingrestrictions

shouldbeended.OrwecouldresistCambodia’sabsorption,supportingthe

independenceofagovernmentrecognizedbytheUnitedNationsandmostother

nations,includingtheSovietUnion.[

Curiouslyenough,oneofthemostimplacablecritics

ofourpolicyinCambodiapresentsthesameanalysisofwhatourchoiceswere:

BackinMarchandApriltheadministrationhadhadfreedomofchoice

inreactingtoeventsinCambodia.Ifithaddecidednottoencourage,letalone

toarmLonNol,itcould havecompelledeitherthereturnofSihanouk or,at

lEast,anattempt,byLonNol,topreservethecountry’sflawedneutrality.This

wouldnothavebeenanidealsolutionforWashington,itwouldprobablyhave

meantagovernmentdominatedbyHanoiandattheveryleastitwouldhave

allowed the Communists continued use of Sihanoukville (which Lon Nol

renamedKompongSom)andthesanctuaries.ButasthesuppressedNational

Intelligence Estimate had pointed out, short of permanent occupation the

sanctuaries would always pose a military problem for a South Vietnamese

government;thatwasafactofbothgeographyandrevolutionarywarfare.



Thispassageisinteresting,firstofall,becauseitcombinesallthemisconceptionsabout

eventsinCambodiain1970.MynarrativecanleavenodoubtthatwedidnotencourageLon

NolnorevenbegintoarmhimforweeksafterNorthVietnamesetroopswereravaginga

neutralcountry.TheoptionofLonNol’srestoringCambodia’sneutralitydidnotexist;ithad

beenexplicitlyrejectedbyLeDucTho.AndbythenSihanoukwasnolongerinapositiontobe

neutralist.HecouldreturnonlybydestroyingtheLonNolfaction,whichhadpreviously

constitutedhisowngovernmentandwhosenucleushewouldneedtobalanceoffagainsthis

newfoundKhmerRouge“friends.”Therealprospectbeforeus,therefore,wasexactlywhatthe

quotedparagraphdescribesasthemostlikelyoutcome:thereopeningofSihanoukville,a

governmentinPhnomPenhdominatedbyHanoi,andreopenedsanctuariesnownolongeran

isolatedstripbutcomprisingallofEasternCambodia.WhereIdiffersharplyfromtheparagraph

isinitsassertionthatwehad“freedomofchoice.”Thisispreciselywhatwedidnothave,for

theprospectitdescribeswouldhavemeantamassiveshiftinthemilitarybalanceinIndochina:

anoverwhelming,insurmountable,anddecisivemenacetothesurvivalofSouthVietnam.

Asfortheallegedly“suppressed”NationalIntelligenceEstimate,thisisanotherfiction.

Nointelligenceestimatewasever“suppressed”orinhibitedbytheNSCoffice.Theywere

routinelydistributedtoalltheprincipalagencies.TheCIAinputwasanimportantelementof

everypolicydeliberation,includingthatbeforetheCambodiandecision.Nixonreceivedfull

briefingsfromDirectorHelmsatatleastthreeNSCmeetingsorCabinet‐leveldiscussionsin

April,andindeedNixonsawHelmsprivatelyonthreeadditionaloccasions.

]



TherehadbeennoconsiderationofattackingthesanctuariesbeforeApril

21.ThefinaldecisionwastakenonApril28.Itisimportantthereforetoreview

thedecision‐makingprocessinsomedetailtoknowwhoknewwhatandwhen.



NodoubtAdmiralMcCain’sbriefingofNixononApril18gavefocustohis

inchoateanxietiesaboutCambodia.Hewassufficientlyconce rnedtoaskMcCain

tocometoSanClementeandgivemethesamebriefingonApril20.

Unquestionably,theaccumulatednervousstrainofthepreviousweekscaused

Nixontobecomesomewhatoverwrought;itdoesnotalterthefactthathis

analysiswasessentiallyright.OnthetriptoSanClementetorendezvouswithhim

Ihadcometothesameconclusion. Ididnotseehowwecouldstandbyand

watchCambodiacollapsewithouttherebyproducingatthesametimethe

collapseofallweweredoinginVietnam.IwouldhaveraisedtheissuewithNixon

hadnotMcCaininasensepreemptedme.Nixon’sfirststeponreturningto

WashingtonwastoscheduleameetingwithHelmsandmefor7:00a.m.onApril

21tobringhimselfuptodate.Helms’sbriefingshowedthattheNorth

VietnamesewereattackingalloverthecountryandthatPhnomPenhcouldnot

longwithstandthisassault.Indiscussingthestatusofour(negligible)response,

Nixondiscoveredthatthe$5millionfo rarmsforCambodiaapprovedbythe

WSAGonApril15anddoubledbyhimshortlythereafterwasstillbeingheldupby

bureaucraticfoot‐dr agging.NorhadthecommunicationsequipmentfortheCIA,

whichhehadorderedonApril1andinsistedupononApril16,beendelivered.

Nixonwasbesidehimself.Heorderedanimmediatetransferofthemoney.He

calledanNSCmeetingforthenextdaytodeterm ineoverallstrategy.



Inpreparation,IaskedGeneralWestmorelandaboutthefeasibilityof

militaryoperationsbySouthVietnameseforcesintothesanctuaries.

Westmorelandthoughttheycouldbeeffective,butnotdecisivewithout

Americansupport.Ialsosentabackchannelmessa getoEllsworthBunker,asking

forhisandAbrams’s“candidjudgment”ofthemilitary,political,and

psychologicalconsequencesofSihanouk’sreturnorofaCommunistvictoryin

Cambodia.Ialso requestedtheirsuggestionsofpossiblecountermeasures.



SinceFebruary,theSouthVietnamesehadconsideredoccasionalshallow

cross‐borderoperations—toadistanceofaboutthreemiles—intothesanctuaries

withourlogisticalsupport.Acompanyorlessinsize,theseweredesignedto

discovercachesofweapons.GeneralHaighadreportedafterhisJanuarytourof

SouthVietnamthattherewereenemysupplycachesafewmilesoverthe

CambodianborderthatcouldnotbesafelytargetedbyB‐52sbecausetheywere

toonearpopulatedareas.LairdhadauthorizedGeneralAbramstogivelogistical

supporttoSouthVietnameseforcesforshallowpenetrationswhenhevisited

VietnaminFebruary.Across‐borderoperationbySouthVietnameseforceshad

takenplaceonMarch27.Itwasreportedbythepress.Asecondoperationtook

placethenextdayandwasalsoreported.WhiteHousePressSecretaryRon

ZieglerhaddeclaredonMarch28thatAmericanfieldcommanderswerenow

authorizedtocrosstheCambodianborderinresponsetothreatstoAmerican

forces.



Uponlearningofthefirstcross‐borderoperation,Irequestedatemporary

halttothemuntilwecouldreachaconsideredandcoordinatedjudgmentinlight

ofthenewsituationandtoavoidgivingHanoiapretextforexpandingthewar.I

didnotwantpolicydeterminedbythetacticaldecisionsoffieldcommanders.

AfterissuingtheseinstructionsIwentona(long‐scheduled)vacationforaweek.

HaigthereforesenttheimplementingcabletoBunkeronMarch27:



IftheseoperationscontinuewewillbesubjecttoaccusationthatSouthVietnamese

GovernmentisdrawingUSintoexpandedwar.



Whilerecognizingthatyouarenotafreeagentinthisrespect,Mr.Kissingerhopesthat

youcanencourageThieutorefrainfromtheseoperationsexceptinsituationswherecurrentUS

rulesofengagementwouldapply.Mr.KissingerwantsyoutobeawarethatwhilePresidentis

understandingofSouthVietnamesemotives,heisconcernedthatshorttermmilitarybenefits

ofcross‐borderoperationsmightbeoutweighedbytherisksposedtooureffortstomaintain

ourcurrentlevelsofdomesticsupportforouroverallVietnampolicy.



OnMarch30,asinstructed,BunkermetwithThieuandexplainedwhy

cross‐borderoperationsshouldbeheldinabeyance.Ourobjectivewastoprevent

theexpansionofthewar,Bunkertoldhim.Thieuacceptedourrecommendation.

OnMarch31,theNewYorkTimeswarnedthattheCambodiangovernment’s

willingnesstopermitalliedcross‐borderraidsagainstCommunistsanctuaries

mightdrawtheUnitedStatesdeeperintothewar.TheCambodiangovernment

thereupon,onMarch31.“faithfultoitspolicyofstrictneutrality,”formally