Kissinger Henry. White House Years

Подождите немного. Документ загружается.

Noelectionbutanold‐fashionedpoliticaldealsettingupacoalitiongovernment

includingrepresentativesofallpoliticalfactions,Communistandnon‐Communist;

AlthoughtheirpropagandastillcallsforimmediatetotalwithdrawalofAmericantroops,

privatelytheyhaveindicatedthewithdrawalcouldbephasedovertwoorthreeyears;

PostponementofthereunificationofNorthandSouthVietnamforaperiodofbetween

fiveandtenyears;

InternationalguaranteesoftheterritorialintegrityofLaosandCambodia.

Hanoi,ofcourse,hadexplicitlyrejectedeachofthesepoints.]



Ingoingovertherecordwiththeperspectiveoftime,Iamastonishedby

myownextraordinarilysanguinereporting.Thiswaspartlyduetomydesireto

keepthechannelalive.AwareofNixon’sskepticism,Ifellintothetrapofmany

negotiatorsofbecominganadvocateofmyownnegotiation.Nodamagewas

done,becauseHanoinevergaveustheopportunitytomakeaconcretedecision. 

Anotherreasonforouroptimismwasthatwewerestillrelativeinnocentsabout

thetheologicalsubtletiesofHanoi’sunrelentingpsychologicalwarfare.For

example,IreportedtoNixonaftertheMarch16meetingthatHanoihadhintedat

awillingnesstodiscussmutualwithdrawal.Infact,asbecameevidentatthenext

meeting,LeDucThohadactuallyinsistedthatHanoiwoulddiscusstheroleofits

ownforcesonlyafterourwithdrawalandsolelywiththecoalitiongovernmentin

Saigonwhosecompositionitinsistedoncontrolling.



Therecordleavesnodoubtthatwewerelookingforexcuses tomakethe

negotiationssucceed,notto fail.Farfrombeingdeterminedonamilitarysolution

asourcriticsnevertiredofalleging,wewentoutofourwaytogivethebenefitof

everydoubttothepursuitofanegotiatedsettlement.Nixonsharedthispositive

attitudedespitehisgreaterpessimism.Andhewaswillingtorunrisks.In

preparationformyMarchmeetingIwrotetohimonFebruary27:



Thepositionswedevelopshouldbereasonableenoughtobeattractive,butstrong

enoughsowewouldnothavetobackawayfromtheminanothermoreconventional

negotiatingchannelifthisoneshouldbreakdown…Thelackofanagreedpositionwiththe

GVNwillrequireyoutomakedecisionsonourpositionwhichcould,iflaterrevealed,embroil

usindifficultieswithSaigon.Thisisrisky,butIseenootherwaytoproceedifweareto

maintainmomentumandsecrecy.



Nixonwroteintothemarginne xttothelastsentence:“OK—willdo.”



NorcanThieubefairlychargedwithbeinganobstacle—exceptinthe

specialsensethatHanoiobjectedtohisexistence. Icabledfullreportsafterevery

sessionbybackchanneltoAmbassadorEllsworthBunkerinSaigon,tobrief

PresidentThieu. Thieuinterposednoobjectionstoeitherprocedureorsubstance. 

Onlyslowlyandtowardtheveryendoftheprocessdidwecometounderstand

thatThieudidnotreallyagreewithourpositions.Inthebeginninghecalculated

thattheywouldneverbeacceptedandthatacquiescencewashiswayofkeeping

oursupportfortheconductofthewar.



Oneunhappyconsequenceofthesecrettalkswastosharpenthe

compartmentalizationofknowledge,whichwassuchabaneoftheNixon

Administration.Rogerswasnottoldofthemuntilwellinto1971.SinceDavid

BrucewasbriefedafterhebecameheadofourParisdelegat ion inJuly1970and

Bunkerwasalwayskeptuptodate,wehadthecuriousresultthatthese

ambassadorsknewmorethantheirnominalchief. Lairdwasneverformallytold,

thoughIamsurethathehadadequateinformationaboutwhowasusingthe

planesunderhiscontrolandthelikelyreason.Itwasapoorsystemandeven

thoughIoperateditIthinkitisone thatoughtneverto beemulated.Nixon’s

distrustofhisCabinetmembersexaggeratedtheiralreadystrongself‐will.Partly

throughignorance,partlybecausetheyfeltnocommitmenttopoliciestheyhad

notshaped,theyconsistentlycutacrossourinitiativesorchallengedour

strategiesthathadbeenclearlyarticulated.



ThefirstroundofnegotiationswithLeDucThocollapsedbecause

diplomacyalwaysreflectssomebalanceofforcesandLeDucTho’sassessment

wasnotsowrong.HissenseofpublicopinioninAmerica—andespeciallyofthe

leadershipgroupshehadidentified—wasquiteaccurate.Thedilemmasof

Vietnamizationwerereal.ThelackofdisciplineintheAmericanbureaucracy

meantthatthephilosophicaldisagreementswithintheExecutiveBranchwere

showingthrough.InthesecircumstancesLeDucThocouldseenoreasonto

modifyhisdemandsforunconditionalwithdrawalandtheoverthrowofthe

Saigongovernment.Hewouldseenoneuntiltwoandahalfyearslater,whenthe

militarysituationlefthimnootherchoice.



<<Contents>>



****



LaosInterlude



ntheNorthWestcornerofIndochina,wedgedbetweenmountainrangesand

theplainoftheMekongRiver,thetribesandpeoplesofLaos,ruledbya

Buddhistking,ledapeacefulexistenceforcenturies,essentiallyunaffectedbythe

warsandstrugglesoftheirmorebellicoseneighbors.Inthenineteenthcentury

LaoswasconqueredbytheFrenchwithoutrecordedresistanceandthen

governedbythemfromHanoialongwiththerestofIndochina.



Byoneofhistory’slittleironies,thosestrugglingforindependence

sometimesinherittheimperialpretensionsoftheirformercolonialrulers.Thus

theLeninistmastersofHanoisawthemselvesasthenaturalheirsofallthathad

beenruledbyFrancefromtheveryheadquarterstheywerenowoccupying.

TherehadbeenpreviouseffortsbyVietnamtodominateLaosandCambodiain

theeighteenthandearlynineteenthcenturies;

nowtherewasaddedaproclivity

toemulatethescaleofFrenchcolonialrule.Afterthe1954GenevaAgreement,

whichendedtheFrenchpresence,thepeace‐lovingpeoplesofLaoshadthe

misfortuneofbeingastrideconvenientroutesbywhichNorthVietnamcould

invadetheSouthwhilebypassingtheDemilitarizedZonesetupbythat

agreement.



FromthebeginningthePathet Lao(theLaotianCommunists,dominatedby

Hanoi)retainedcontrolovertwoNorthEastprovinceswherethewritofthe

governmentinVientianeneverran.By1961athree‐corneredcivilwarwasraging

betweenthePathetLaointheNorthEast,neutralistforcesinthecenterofthe

countryonthefabledPlainofJars,andarightistgroupalongtheMekongRiver

borderingThailand. (ThereisamapofLaosabove.)By1961,over6,000North

Vietnamesetroopswereinvolved.Theconflictbecamesufficientlygravefor

PresidentKennedytowarnatanewsconferenceonMarch23,1961:“Laosisfar

awayfromAmerica,buttheworldissmall…ThesecurityofallSouthEastAsiawill

beendangeredifLaoslosesitsneutralindependence.”InMay1961negotiations

overthefutureofLaosopenedinGeneva.LikeallnegotiationswithHanoi,they

provedprotracted;pursuingitsnormaltactic,Hanoimaintainedmilitarypressure

untilPresidentKennedysent5,000USMarinestoneighboringThailandinMay

1962.Withintwomonthsofthatshowofforce,anewGenevaAgreementwas

signedbyfourteennations,includingNorthVietnamandtheUSSR,providingfor

neutralizationofLaos.AcceptingtheSovietandNorthVietnameseproposal,the

UnitedStatesagreedtothewithdrawalofallforeignmilitarypersonnelandtoa

coalitiongovernment,headedbytheneutralistPrinceSouvannaPhouma,in

whichallthreefactionswouldberepresented.



NorthVietnamfloutedtheaccordsfromthedaytheyweresigned.All666

AmericanmilitarypersonnelinLaosdepartedthroughinternationalcheckpoints;

ofthe6,000NorthVietnameseinthecountryonlyforty(yes,forty)leftthrough

thecheckpoints;thethousandsremained.



InApril1963theprecariouscoalitionsplitapart.Fightingsoonresumed.

SouthernLaoswasineffectannexedbytheNorthVietnamesearmy,which

constructedthereanintricatesystemofinfiltrationroutesintoSouthVietnam—

theHoChiMinhTrail.By1970overhalfamillionNorthVietnamesetroopshad

movedSouthalongthesepaths.ThenumberofNorthVietnamesetroops

stationedinLaoshadrisento67,000—tentimesthenumberthatin1961‐1962

hadprecipitatedamajorcrisisunderPresidentKennedy.



Startinginthemid‐Sixties,theUnitedStatesfounditselfextending

increasingsupporttoPremierSouvannaPhouma,theneutralistleaderwhomwe

hadoriginallyopposedbutwhohadbeenrecognizedastheleaderbyallsidesin

the1962GenevaAccords.Our purposewastomaintainaneutralistgovernment

andalsotosecureSouvanna’sacquiescenceinoureffortstointerdicttheHoChi

MinhTrail.WegavefinancialassistancetotheRoyalLaotianArmy,tosome

irregularforcesofMeotribesmenledbyGeneralVangPao,andfromtimetotime

toThaivolunteersoperatinginLaos.Mostofthiswasoccasionallyreportedinthe

press;by1970allofitwasknowntotheSenateForeignRelationsCommittee

becauseofanumberofclassifiedhearingsconductedbySenatorStuart

Symington.ButtheUSgovernmentmadenoformalacknowledgment,soasto 

avoidgivingHanoiapretexttocompounditsmassiveviolationsoftheGeneva

AccordsbytakingoverallofLaos.



Thishistoryisofsomeimportancebecauseearlyin1970Laosbriefly

becamethefocalpointofourIndochinaconcernsanddomesticdebate.ANorth

VietnameseoffensivewasthreateningtooverrunNorthernLaos.Domesticcritics

usedtheoccasiontocryhavocaboutthedangerthatwemightslideintoanother

“open‐ended”commitmentinIndochinawithout noticingit.



HanoiwasfightingessentiallytwowarsinLaos,thoughbothforthesame

objectiveofhegemonyinIndochina.IntheSouth,theHoChiMinhTrailwas

Hanoi’slinktothebattlefieldof SouthVietnam.InNorthernLaos,Hanoi

supportedthePathetLaobutitwasrestrained,wethought,byfearofAmerican

orThairesponse.IthadsoughttomaintainjustenoughpressureontheLaotian

armytopreventitfromconsolidatingitselfasaninstrumentofauthority;itwould

bedealtwithaftervictoryinSouthVietnam.Wedidnot,forourpart,seekto

disturbthisuneasyequilibrium.NoAmericanadministrationcouldpossiblydesire

awarinacountrylikeLaos.Itwouldnotmakesenseto expandtheconflictinto

Laos,exceptfortheminimumrequiredforourownprotection,whenwewere

busywithdrawingtroopsfromSouthVietnam.ItwasthispositionthattheNorth

VietnamesedisturbedinlateJanuar y1970whentheysuddenlysent13,000

reinforcementsandagreatdealofextraequipmenttothePlainofJars,where

theneutralistswereholdingbackthePathetLao.ThatthreatenedSouvanna,and

ourrelationswithhim;ifheabandonedhisacquiescenceinthebombingofthe

HoChiMinhTrail,Hanoi’slogisticproblemwouldbegreatlyeased,exposingusin

SouthVietnamtogrowing peril.Worse,iftheNorthVietnamesetroopsreached

theMekong,thewarwouldloseitspointforThailand.Bangkokwouldthenbe

underpressurealongthehundredsofmilesoftheriverdividingaplainwithout

anyotherobstacles.WewouldalmostcertainlybedenieduseoftheThai

airbases,essentialforourB‐52andtacticalairoperationsinVietnam.



OnJanuary23,anenemyoffensiveimminent,ourAmbassadorinLaos,G.

McMurtrieGodley,requestedB‐52strikesagainstamajorNorthVietnamese

concentrationcontaining,itwasbelieved,4,000troops;itwouldhavebeenthe

firstuseofB‐52SinNorthernLaos.Thisinspiredastatelybureaucraticminuetin

Washingtonthattoldmuchaboutthestateofmindofourgovernment.Wewere

caughtbetweenofficialsseekingtoprotecttheAmericanforcesforwhichthey

feltaresponsibilityandamercilessCongressio nalonslaughtthatrattledthese

officialsintheirdeliberatio ns.



IscheduledameetingoftheWashingtonSpecialActionsGroup(WSAG)for

January26toconsiderGodley’srequest.TwohoursbeforethemeetingMelLaird

toldmethathefavoredusingB‐52sagainstthattarget;ontheotherhandhedid

notwantitdiscussedinaninteragencyforumforfearofleaks.Lairdurged

approvalinthesamechannelsasthesecretstrikesinCambodia.Thiswaswhy,he

toldme,hehadinstructedhisrepresentativesontheWSAGtorecommend

againsttheuseofB‐52sinNorthernLaoseventhoughhefavoredit.Therecord

ofthemeetingthuswouldshowPentagonoppositionwhateverLaird’spersonal

view;thePresidentwouldtaketheheatforthedecision.Onehourbeforethe

meetingBillRogerscalledtotellmethathewasagainstusingB ‐52sinNorthern

LaosandthathehadLairdonhisside.Imumbledsomedoubtsaboutthisclaim

butsuggestedameetingofthethreeofuswiththePresident.Unfortunately,the

PresidentchosethismomenttogointoseclusionatCampDavidtopreparehis

firstvetomessage,rejectingawelfareappropriationsbill.Aswashishabitonsuch

occasionshewouldnotaccepttelephonecalls,evenfromme.Bythetimehewas

againavailablealltheprincipalswereonrecordwithsomestatementprotecting

themselvesagainstallpossibledevelopments.



Ithereforestartedaroundthetrackagain—thistimewithGeneralEarle

Wheeler.IaskedhimwhetherthetargetofwhichLairdhadspokencouldbe

attackedwithtacticalaircraftratherthanB‐52s.(Forsomereason,tacticalair

strikesseemedtoprovokelessofanoutcrythanB‐52s.)Wheelerinformedme

thatitwasbeingattackedbytacticalaircraftbutthesecouldnotcomparein

effectivenesswithB‐52s.WhenIwentbacktoLairdhestressedthatthe

concentrationof4,000enemytroopswouldsoondisperse;itwasthebesttarget

forB‐52SsincehehadbecomeSecretaryofDefense.Ontheotherhand,hesaid,

hewouldnotbeoffendedifitwereturneddown.Iconcludedthatitwastoolate

toobtainaconsensusonthisparticulartargetbutpromisedtogetaclear‐cut

Presidentialdecision ontheprinciple.



OnFebruary12thelong‐fearedNorthVietnameseoffensivefinallybroke

onthePlainofJars.Thenextday,PremierSouvannaPhoumamadeaformal

requestforB‐52strikes—thefirstofseveral.ByFebruary16theNorth

VietnameseandPathetLaohaddrivengovernmentforcesfrommostofthehigh

groundthatdominatestheapproachestothePlain.ThePresidentcalleda

meetingfortheafternoonofFebruary16withLaird,ActingSecretaryofState

Richardson,Helms,AdmiralMoorer(ActingChairmanoftheJointChiefs),andme.

IrecommendedthatthePresidentauthorizeB‐52strikesiftheenemyadvanced

beyondMuongSoui,thefarthestpointofCommunistpenetrationbeforethe

governmentoffensiveoftheprevioussummer.ThePresidentagreed.The

CommunistswerebeyondMuongSouiwithintwenty‐fourhours.Anattackwith

threeB‐52swaslaunchedontheeveningofFebruary18.Ithadtakenamonthof

discussion,amajorNorthVietnameseoffensive,andthenearcollapseofthe

LaotianfronttoinduceexactlyoneB‐52strike.Idonotknowtothisdaywhether

Lairdfavoredoropposedtheaction;hisstandwascompatiblewithboth

positions.Wheelerwasconsistentlyinfavor.Rogersmovedfromoppositionto

indifference.



ButoneB‐52strikewasenoughtotriggerthedomesticoutcry.Thevery

nextday,February19,theNewYorkTimesreportedthatB‐52shadbeendiverted

fromSouthVietnamtoattackNorthVietnameseandPathetLaoforcesin

NorthernLaos.SenatorsEugeneMcCarthyandFrankChurchwastednotimein

deploringtheinvolvementofAmericanplanesandpilotsinLaos;theymadeno

referencetotheNorthVietnameseoffensive.SenatorMikeMansfield,also

withoutmentioningthecontinuing NorthVietnameseonslaught,scoredAmerican

“escalation”onFebruary21.Reportsappearedof“armedAmericansincivilian

clothes”supportingtheLaotiancommand.

OnFebruary25,SenatorsMathias,

Mansfield,Gore,Symington,Cooper,andPercyattackedAdministration“secrecy”

overwhattheytermeda“deepeningU.S.involvement.”SenatorsGoreand

MansfieldonFebruary25demandedpublicationofsecrettestimonytakenby

theirsubcommitteeinOctoberonUSinvolvement.SenatorSymingtonsenta

lettertoSecretaryRogersurgingthatAmbassadorGodleybebroughtbackfrom

Laostotestify.OnFebruary27theWallStreetJournalhalfheartedlysupported

theuseofB‐52sbutwarnedagainstfurtherescalation.TheWashingtonPoston

March2weighedinwithastingingeditorialentitled“Laos:TheSameOldShell

Game.”



Thiswastheculminationofacampaignextendingovermanymonthsinthe

Senateandinthemediatogetatthe“truth”inLaos.Theissuewasnottoobtain

thefacts—theywerewidelyknown—buttoinducethegovernmenttoconfirm

thempublicly,whichwasquiteadifferentmatter.TheSenateForeignRelations

Committeehadsubstantiallyfullknowledgefromitsstaffinvestigationsaswellas

fromitsclassifiedhearings.Similarly,themediahadgiventhepublicareasonably

accuratepicture.Theissueforuswastowhatextentanofficialacknowledgme nt

ofouroperationsinLaoswouldwreckwhatwasleftofthe1962Accords,give

HanoiapretextforfurthersteppingupitsaggressioninNorthernLaos,andfuel

evenmorepassionatecontroversyathome.



OurroleinLaoshadbeen“secret” inthreeadministrationsoftwoparties

preciselybecauseeachPresidentwantedtokeepitlimited.Tospelloutthelimits

publiclywasasdangeroustothisstrategyastospellouttheextentofour

involvement.Wewerebeingpressedtodoboth.Fromthecritics’pointofview

theissuewasusefulforachallengetothewholeVietnamenterprise.Somewould

evenhaveconsidereditabonusifacollapseinLaoshadledtoacollapsein

Vietnam.Theywantednotfactsbutammunition.



Despitethesehazardswecametotheconclusionthatsomeformal

statementofourpolicyandintentionsinLaoswasrequired.Thereasoningthat

ledtothisconclusionwassomewhatByzantine.Lairdwantedapublicstatement

toheadoffStateDepartmentleaksmakinghimthefallguy;forthisobjectiveto

berealized,theexplanationhadtocomefromanywherebuttheDefense

Department.RogersopposedaStateDepartmentbriefingforthesamereason;

hehadnodesiretomountthebarricadesoverLaos.Hesuggesteddeclassifying

thesecretStateDepartmenttestimonythathadalreadybeengivenbeforethe

Symingtonsubcommittee.Symingtonhadbehavedhonorably. Inthosefar‐off

years,secretsconveyedwerestillsacrosanctinmanyCongressionalcommittees;

Symingtonwouldnotreleaseclassifiedinformationwithouttheconsentofthe

Administration.ButiftheAdministrationhadgivenitsconsentitwouldhave

undercutthepracticeandprincipleofcla ssifiedhearings.Inthefuture,allthat

wouldbeneededtoforcesecrettestimonyintothepublicdomainwouldbethe

generationofapubliccontroversy;itwouldbeaperpetualtemptationtoan

unfriendlycommitteetostructurethesecretpresentationssoastogenerate

maximumadversepublicityandthencompeldisclosure.



Iexplainedtheissue inamemorandumforthePresident:



TherealissueinLaosisentirelyrelatedtoVietnam:



‐ThereisnoquestionbutthattheNorthVietnamesecanoverrunLaosatanypointin

timethattheycareto,providingtheyarewillingtopaythepoliticalandpsychologicalcostsof

upsettingthe1962Accords.



‐ShouldNorthVietnamoverrunLaos,ourwholebargainingwithrespecttotheVietnam

conflictwouldbeundermined.Infact,ifNorthVietnamesemilitaryoperationsinLaossucceed

tothepointthatSouvannabelieveshemustsuccumbtotheirinfluenceinordertosurvive,we

couldthenanticipatethathewouldrefusetopermitustocontinueourinterdictionoftheHo

ChiMinhTrailandthusourmilitaryoperationsinSouthVietnamwouldbecatastrophically

damaged.



‐Thesearethefundamentalconsiderationswithalltherestamountingtobalderdash….



‐StateregardsthereleaseoftheSymingtonSubcommitteetestimonyasbeingthe

simplestwaytodothis.Wemightkilltwobirdswithonestone:placateSymington,Fulbright,et

al,andshowthepublicwhatwearereallydoing.



‐Ontheotherhand,itisdoubtfulwhetherthereleaseofthesensitivepartsofthe

testimonywillplacatetheSenators.TheyknowwhatisgoingoninLaos,andwhy.The

executivesessionshavegiventhemallthis…



‐ReleasingthetestimonywouldhelpNorthVietnamtodocumentitscasethatweare

violatingtheGenevaAccords,withoutadmittingthatitisviolatingthem,andthusseriously

underminetherealbasisforouraction.



ItwouldalsomakeitmoredifficultfortheSovietstopreservetheirpresentrelatively

friendlyposturetowardstheRLG[RoyalLaotianGovernment]…



‐Furthermore,bygivinginonLaos,theAdministration’sstandonnotreleasingsensitive

partsoftheproceedingswouldbeerodedwithrespecttoothercountries.Wemightbe

openingarealPandora’sboxofproblemsforourselves,notonlydomestically,butinour

relationswithothercountries.Ourgoodfaithinpreservingthesanctityofinternational

agreementscouldnolongerbetrusted,andtheusefulnessofthediplomatswhonegotiated

themwouldbecompromised.IamparticularlyconcernedoverthereactionoftheThai,who

alreadyquestionourcommitmenttothem.

