Kissinger Henry. White House Years

Подождите немного. Документ загружается.

beingmaneuveredintothepositionofseeming“soft”indefenseofAmerican

interests.Congre ssionalfeelingsoonfoundexpressioninahighlydiscriminatory

tradebillaimedsquarelyatEuropeandJapan.Itwasbeingpushedbythethen

extremelypowerfulHouseWaysandMeansCommitteeChairman,WilburMills.

Thisbillwouldhaveraisedhighprotectionistbarriersagainstcertainimports,

especiallytextilesandshoes.Inthesummerandfallof1970atradewarwas

clearlythreatening;theCommonMarketcountrieswouldlikelyretaliateagainst

ouragriculturalexports.PaulMcCrackenwarnedthePresidentonJuly2ofthe

dangerandaskedhisinterventionwithMills.



IagreedsubstantiallywithMcCrackenandtheStateDepartment.Ihad

neversharedthenotionthataunifiedEurope wouldautomaticallyrushto

assumeourburdens.Inmyviewwehadmadetooone‐sidedastrategicchoicein

theFiftiesandSixties.BystressingEurope’seconomicunificationwehad

emphasizedthedimensioninwhichcompetitionwithuswasmostlikelyandour

interestsweremostlikelytodiverge.BydiscouragingaEuropeancommunityin

thedefensefield—atleastafterthefailureoftheinitialprojectin1954—we

downgradedtheareainwhichAtlanticinterestsweremostlikelytooverlap. ButI

preferredEuropeanunityinsomeformtoacacophonyofconflictingnationalities

whoseimpotencewouldsoonerorlatercausethemtoabdicateaseriousconcern

withforeignpolicyandthusbecomefunctional,ifnotactual,neutralists.Andwe

couldnotriskwrecking Europeanunitywithoutbreakingthepoliticalinfluenceof

theverygroupsinEuropewhohadsupportedastrongAtlanticAlliance.The

associationofmuchofAfrica,ofMediterraneancountriessuchasSpain,

Morocco,andTunisia,tosaynothingofIsrael,withWesternEurope,wasinthe

geopoliticalinterestoftheWest.Tothwarta relationshipofthesekeycountries

withEuropewouldbetheheightofpoliticalfolly.



OnJune30,inamemorandumtothePresident,Icamedownsquarelyon

thesideofourforeignpolicyobjectives.Penalizingoftextilesandshoeswouldhit

countrieswithdelicatedomesticsituations:Spain,whereitmightblowupour

basenegotiationsandriskourtieswithpost‐FrancoSpain;Italy,where

Communismwasgaining;andJapan.ButtoaffectaPresidentialdecisionitisnot

enoughtoopposearecommendation;onemustofferanalternative.

InternationallyIpro posedanegotiationtoplaceourconcernsbeforethe

EuropeanCommunity;domesticallyIputforwarda mechanismtoenablethe

economicagenciestoputtheirviewsbeforethePresident.TheNSCUnder

SecretariesCommitteewouldbeaugmentedbytheeconomicagenciesandbe

givenawatchingbriefontheeconomicimpactoftheEuropeanCommunity.This

schemewasinrealityadevicetolettheeconomicagencies“win”onthe

reinterpretationofthePresidentialreport,butatthesametimetotreatitasa

foreignpolicyratherthaneconomicissuethroughtheStateDepartment

chairmanshipofthecommitteedealingwiththesubject.Andtherequirement

thatdisputedissuesbereferredtothePresident—sodeartotheheartofthe

economicagenciesafraidofStateDepartmentdominance—guaranteedthatI

wouldhaveanopportunity toweighin(ifnothavethelastword)ifpurely

commercialconsiderationsthreatenedtooverwhelmforeignpolicyimperatives. 



TheUnitedStatesbegannegotiationswiththeEuropeanCommunityon

October10.TheEuropeandelegationwasledbyRalfDahrendorf,aWestGerman

liberal(whichinEuropeantermsmeantarepresentativeofa partyspanningthe

centerofthespectrumandstandingforfreeenterprise).Inameetingwithmeon

October15,Dahrendorfemphasizedhis“deepconcern” abouttrendsinAmerican

tradepolicy.HisanalysisoftheCommunity’sprospectswasnottooreassuring,

however.DahrendorfexpectedBritishentry,buthethoughtthattheCommunity

nolongerwasthinkingintermsofpoliticalunity;economicintegrationwouldbe

pursuedforitsownsake.ThisiswhatIhaddescribedtotheinteragencymeeting

onMay13astheworstoutcomeforus.Withoutcompensatingpoliticalprogress,

economicintegrationleadingtobrutalcompetitionandAmericanretaliationwas

boundtounderminesupportersoftheAllianceonbothsidesoftheAtlantic.



TheprecariousandincreasinglystrainedrelationshipbetweentheUnited

StatesandEuropewasreflectedina notescribbledbythePresident.Ona

memorandumofNovember13inwhichIbroughthimuptodateonnegotiations

withtheEuropeanCommunity,hewrote:“K—Itseemstomethatwe‘protest’

andcontinuetogettheshortendofthestickinourdealingswiththeCommunity.

Agricultureisaprimeexample.TheCongressissimplynotgoingtotoleratethis

toopassiveattitudeonthepartofourrepresentativesinsuchnegotiations.”

NixonwastoomuchofanAtla nticisttositoutthedestructivebattle.Heappealed

toWilburMills,tonoavail.Theprotectionisttrendwastoostrong;Millswasnot

persuaded,andtherestrictivetradelegislationremaine dpendingintheCongress

throughoutthesummerandfallof1970.Tosomeextentthesilentmajoritywas

takingoutitsfrustrationatAmerica’sbeing“kickedaround”intheworld.Our

tradenegotiationswithEuropedraggedoninconclusive lyfornearlyayear,until

NixoninAugust1971madethesubjectatleasttemporarilyirrelevantbyhis

dramaticdecisionofAugust15tolevya10percentsurchargeonallimports,to

endtheconvertibilityofthedollarintogold,andtoestablishwageandprice

controls.



Thefirstcontacts,then,hadshowntheWesternAllianceambivalentabout

thecommondefense,uncertainaboutrelationswiththeEast,andunitedonly

abouttheenlargementoftheEuropeanCommunity,whichinturntriggeredan

economiccontroversywiththeUnitedStates.Buttheprocessofconsultationled

toanincreasinglyexplicitarticulationofcommonpurposes.TheWesternleaders

werebeginningtocometogripswiththefundamentalissues. Therightquestions

werebeginningtobeaskedevenifitwouldtakesometimelongertoelaborate

commonlyacceptedanswers.Consensusamongdemocraciesisinherentlymore

complexthannegotiationwithauthoritarianstates.Theevolutionfromtutelage

topartnershipisneversimple.AnduponthatevolutiontheWesternAlliancewas

nowembarked,toprovethattheassociationoffreepeoplescouldflourishina

newgeneration.



<<Contents>>



****



PARTTHREE



19701971:

FromTurmoil

ToHope

XII



TheWarWidens



estilllivewithboththeconvulsionsandthemythsof1970in

Indochina.ThewarengulfedbothLaosandCambodia.Inearly1970

thestillnewAdministrationwantednothingsomuchastowinddown

thewar.Itwasmetwithade liberateescalationbytheNorthVietnamese,

ingeniouslyorchestratingmovementsofarmiesandAmericanpublicopinion

whilewewereengagedinsecretpeacetalks.InFebruarytherewasaNorth

VietnameseoffensiveacrossthePlainofJarsinLaos.InMarchtheNorth

VietnamesebegantobreakoutofthesanctuariesalongCambodia’sfrontierwith

SouthVietnam,whichtheyhadbeenoccupyingwithouta shredoflegalitysince

1965.TheystartedcuttingcommunicationsandharassingPhnomPenhwitha

viewtooverthrowingtheLonNolgovernment,whichhadreplacedSihanouk’s

withoutourknowledgeorparticipation.(LonNolwasrecognizedbyboththeUN

andtheSovietUnion.)



Yettheinflamedcondemnationforthetragediesthatensuedfellnoton

HanoibutontheUnitedStates.InmytalksinPariswithNorthVietnamese

emissaryLeDucTho,herejectedne utralityforbothCambodiaandLaos,and

emphasizedthatitwashispeople’sdestinynotmerelytotakeoverSouth

VietnambuttodominatethewholeofIndochina.Theboastsweremadeinsecret

butthemilitarymovesthatexpressedtheseambitionswereplaintosee.Froman

inexhaustiblenationalmasochismtheresprangthefolklorethatAmerican

decisionstriggeredtheCambodiannightmare,andthemythsurviveseventoday

whentheVietnamese,withouttheexcuseofAmericanprovocationbutwith

barelyawhimperofworldprotest,havefinallyfulfilledtheambitionof

conqueringthewholeofIndochina.InCambodiaarabbleofmurderous

ideologuesappear,itistrue,tohavebeensupplantedbyanorganized

Communiststate,butithasbeendonebythesameforceofalienarmsthatfirst

attemptedtodosoin1970.Hanoi’sinsatiablequestforhegemony—not

America’shesitantandambivalentresponse—istherootcauseofCambodia’s

ordeal.



Themilitaryresponseswemadeweremuchagonizedover,andinourview

minimalifweweretoconductaretreatthatdidnotbecomearout.Therewere

certainlyerrors,butthepersiste nceoftheimageofAmericanofficialsplottingthe

overthrowofneutralistPrinceSihanoukinCambodiaandplunging deeperinto

warinLaosaswellasCambodiaillustratestheprevalenceofemotionoverreality.

TheRichardNixonwhoonApril30announcedourassaultontheCambodian

sanctuarieswasthesamePresidentwhohadannouncedonApril20the

withdrawalof150,000troops.TheAdministrationwhichfinallyactedtopreventa

completeCommunisttakeoverofCambodiawasthesamegovernmentthathad

offeredtheneutralizationofCambodiaonApril4—andbeencontemptuously

rebuffed.TheparadoxesofIndochina aremanyandpainful.ItwasHanoithatwas

implacablebutitwasAmericathatreapedthewhirlwind,nearlyshatteringthe

nerveoftheExecutive.Eachoftheseinterlockedmajoreventsrequiresa

separatenarrativeinthischapter,butithastobeginwiththerealityof

governmentatthetime,whichwasthatattheendof1969andthebeginningof

1970weengagedinamajorattempttounderstandwhatwashappeningonthe

groundinVietnam—andtotalk peacesecretlyonceagainwithHanoi.The

researchworkhadbeguninthefallof1969whenElliotRichardsonandIsetupan

interagencycommittee,theVietnamSpecialStudiesGroup,whosepurposewas

summedupinamemorandumbymetothePresidentdatedSeptember5,1969:



Lookingbackinourexperienceoverthelastfewyears,itisremarkablehowfrequently

officialshavelettheirpreconceptionsaboutVietnamleadthemastrayeventhoughacareful

andobjectiveanalysisofreadilyavailablefactswouldhavetoldthemdifferently.



ThegroupmetforthefirsttimeonOctober20.ElliotRichardson,Dave

Packard,RichardHelms,andrepresentativesoftheJointChiefsofStaffandthe

DefenseIntelligenceAgencywereinattendance.AWorkingGroup,ledbyLarry

LynnandBobSansomofmystaff,conductedanintensivestudyoftwelveofthe

forty‐fourprov incesinSouthVietnamtosolvetheperennialproblemofobtaining

anaccurateassessmentofthesituation inthecountryside,thatis,thecontest

overcontroloftheruralpopulation.



Ireadoverthe100‐pagepaper,coveringitwithhandwrittenquestions.

Whywasit,forinstance,thatin1965,1966,and1967Iwasbriefedthatthe

SouthVietnameseweremakingprogress?Whathadchanged?DidUSadvisers

knowwhattheywerelookingat?“Ihavefound,”Iwrote,“thatthemost

incompetentonesarethosemosteasilysatisfied…Ifyouhavealowerlevelof

incidents,doesthismeanyouaredoingwell,orisittheenemy’sdeliberate

intention?Ifit’sthelatter,isitasignal?Howdoweknow whattheinfrastructure

isthatwe’vedestroyed?…Everyonesayslandreformisimportant.Ithasn’t

happened,yetwemakeprogressinpacification.Howcanthisbe?”Afteranew

draftincorporatedanswerstothesequestionsIsummarizedthepaper’s

conclusionsforthePresidentonJanuary22.Thirty‐eightpercentofthe

populationofSouthVietnamlivedinthecities,fairlysecurelyundertheauthority

andprotectionofthegovernment(especiallyafterthefailureoftheTetoffensive

of1968decimatedtheVietCongcadre).Butaprimaryobjectiveoftheenemy’s

strategywastogaincontrolofthe62percentofthepeoplethatlivedinthe

countryside,therebytosurroundthecitiessothattheywould“falllikeripe fruit.”

TheconclusionofthestudywasthatsinceSeptember1968theSaigon

government’scontrolofthecountrysidehadrisenfrom20to55percent;thatof

theCommunistshadfallenfrom35to7percent.SomefourmillionruralSouth

Vietnameselivedincontestedareas,duringthedaycontrolledbySaigon,atnight

bytheVietCong.Wecouldnotbesurethatthesepercentagescouldbe

maintained,however,aswecontinuedourtroopwithdrawals.



Thestatisticsweremoderatelyencouraging,butwealsoknewthatNorth

Vietnam’sconfidencewasunbroken.BetweenDecembe r14and20,1969,Hanoi

publishedaseriesofsevenarticlesbyitsDefenseMinister,GeneralVoNguyen

Giap,whosemainthrustwasthataprotractedstrugglecoulddefeatAmerica’s

superiortechnology.IpredictedtothePresident,inasummaryofthesearticlesI

senthimonJanuary7,1970,thatHanoiwouldplayfortimeuntilenough

AmericanforceshadlefttoallowittochallengeSaigon’sarmedforcesonamore

equalbasis.Isummedupmydoubtsaboutoptimisticreportsinmid‐Januaryas

follows:



(1)TheNorthVietnamesecannothavefoughtfor25yearsonlytocallitquitswithout

anothermajoreffort.Thiseffortcouldcomeinmanyways—throughattacksonAmerican

forces,ARVN[ARVN,theArmyoftheRepublicofVietnam,thatis,SouthVietnameseforces.]

forcesorlocalforces.Butiftheyhaddecidednottomaketheeffort,theywouldpresumably

havebeenmoreforthcomingwithregardtonegotiations.[HerethePresidentscribbled:

“makessense.”]



(2)WehavenotseenproofthatARVNhasreallyimproved.Itmaybethattheenemy

forceshavebeenhurtratherthanthatARVNissignificantlybetterthanitwasinthepast.It

couldbethatwhentheenemydrewbackitsmainforcesandcutdownitsactivityinAugustand

September,perhapsbecauseofourthreatinParisatthebeginningofAugust,theyunder‐

estimatedtheeffectthiswouldhaveontheirguerrillaforces.



(3)Therecouldbetoomuchpressurefromthetopforoptimisticreporting...



ForthesereasonsIrecommendedthatthePresidentsendmymilitary

assistantAlexanderHaigandateamofanalyststotourSouthVietnam.Between

January19and29,1970,theysurveyedninekeyprovincesandconfirmedthe

resultsofourWashingtonstudies.Theyalsowarned,however,thattherateof

improvementhaddefinitelyslowedinthelastmonthsof1969:“Thereisnosign

thattheenemyhasgivenup…ThepressuresontheGVN[

GVN,orGovernmentof

Vietnam,thatis,theSouthVietnamesegovernment.]resultingfromU.S.troop

withdrawalsmayleadto…adeteriorationofterritorialsecurityforceperformance

andalossofpopular supportfortheGVN.”Similarconclusionswerereachedby

anindependentCIAstudythatrevealedagrowingpessimismamongSouth

VietnameseleadersderivingfromfearofanoverlyhastyAmericanwithdrawal.

WhenIsentthisCIAreporttoNixon,hewroteonit:“K—thepsychologyis

enormouslyimportant.Theymusttakeresponsibilityiftheyareevertogain

confidence.Wehavetotakerisksonthatscore.”



Tobesure,therewerecontraryviews.SirRobertThompson,theBritish

expertonguerrillawarfarecreditedwithdevisingthestrategythatdefeatedthe

CommunistguerrillasinMalaya,reportedafteravisittoVietnaminNovember

1969thatSaigonhelda“winningposition”andwouldbeabletomaintainit

unlesstheUnitedStateswithdrewtoorapidlyandreduceditsaid.Thisreportwas

senttoalldepartments,and—somewhat incontradictiontotheirviewsexpressed

intheVietnamSpecialStudiesGroup—theyendorsedit.



Butnoamountofstudy,howeverobjectivelyorprayerfullyconducted,

couldsolveourbasicdilemma.Anenemydeterminedonprotractedstruggle

couldonlybebroughttocompromisebybeingconfronted byinsuperable

obstaclesontheground.WecouldattemptthisonlybybuildinguptheSouth

VietnameseandbluntingeveryeffortHanoimade tointerruptthisbuildup.Our

strategywascertaintobebitterlycontestedbyadedicated,vocal,andgrowing

minorityofourpeople.TheNovember3speechboughtsometimefor

Vietnamization.Buttimeisfickle;wehadtousethebreathingspelltostrengthen

ourselvesontheground.Simultaneously,Iwasdeterminedtoprobethe

prospectsfornegotiations —theprocessbywhichthetwosidestestedtheir

respectiveassessmentsofeachotherandwesoughttoshapeasettlementfroma

seeminglyintractablestalemate.



<<Contents>>



****



ReturntoSecretNegotiations



havealwaysbelievedthattheoptimummomentfornegotiationsiswhen

thingsappeartobegoingwell.Toyieldtopressuresisto invitethem;toacquire

thereputationforshortstayingpoweristogivetheothersideapowerful

incentiveforprotractingnegotiations.Whenaconcessionismadevoluntarilyit

providesthegreatestincentiveforreciprocity.Italsoprovidesthebestguarantee

forstayingpower.InthenegotiationsthatIconductedIalwaystriedtodetermine

themostreasonableoutcomeandthengetthererapidlyinoneortwomoves.

Thiswasderidedasastrategyof“preemptiveconcession”bythosewholiketo

maketheirmovesindribletsandatthelastmoment.ButIconsiderthatstrategy

usefulprimarilyforplacatingbureaucraciesandsalvingconsciences.Itimpresses

novicesasademonstrationoftoughness.Usuallyitprovestobeself‐defeating;

shavingthesalamiencouragestheothersidetoholdontoseewhatthenext

concessionislikelytobe,neversurethatonehasreallyreachedtherock‐bottom

position.Thus,inthemanynegotiationsIundertook—withtheVietnameseand

others—Ifavoredbigstepstakenwhentheywereleastexpected,whentherewas

aminimumofpressure,andcreatingthepresumptionthatwewouldsticktothat

position.Ialmostalwaysopposedmodificationsofournegotiatingpositionunder

duress.



InNovember1969ourpositionseemedthestrongestsincethebeginning

oftheNixonAdministration.WehadwithstoodamilitaryoffensivebyHanoi,as

wellastheMoratorium;thePresidenthadtakenhiscasetothepeopleand

receivedsubstantialsupport.HenryCabotLodgehadresignedasAmbassadorto

theParistalksinNovemberforpersonalreasons.Nixon,toshowhisdispleasure

withtheslowprogressofnegotiations,refusedtoreplacehim.Hanoiconstrued

thisasasignalthatwemightendthebombinghaltwhichhadbeentiedtothe

openingofnegotiations.HavingstonewalledtheParistalksforayear,itnow

clamoredinsistentlyfortheappointmentofanewseniornegotiator.Isuggested

toNixonthatwemightusethisperiodtomakeanotherattemptatsecrettalks.

TheNorthVietnamesecouldnotusethesecretParischannelforpropaganda;if

theyrefusedtotalkitcouldbeusedagainstthemifwemadeitpublic;andif

Hanoiwasreadytosettle—whichIdoubted—wewouldlearnofitonlyinsecret

talks.Inanyevent,ifwewereseriouswecouldbuildarecordbywhichwewould

beabletodemonstratethatHanoiwastheobstacletonegotiations.



Nixonwasskepticalofnegotia tionsforavarietyofcomplexreasons.On

onelevelhedidnotbelievethatHanoiwouldbepreparedtosettleforanyterms

wecouldlivewithwithouthavingsufferedmajormilitarysetbacks;inthishe

provedtoberight.Hewasingeneraluneasyaboutanyprocessofnegotiation;he

hatedtoputhimselfintoa positionwherehemightberebuffed.Andforthat

precisereasonhealwayscarefullyconstructedanexcuseforfailure.Ineverwent

intoanegotiationwithoutawrittenororalinjunctiontohangtoughandsome

expressionthatNixondidnotreallyexpectsuccess.ButbecauseNixon,forallhis

bravado,genuinelywantedpeace,heinevitablyfellinwithmyargumentthatwe

owedittoourpeop letoexplorethepossibilityofanhonorablesettlement,

howeverunlikelythechances,andtoestablishourrecordofhavingdoneso.



Accordingly,towardtheendofNovember1969weaskedGeneralVernon

Walters,ourdefenseattachéinParis,torequesta privateappointmentwithXuan

Thuy;itwasquicklygranted.It wasthefirsttimeintheNixonAdministrationthat

weapproachedtheNorthVietnamesedirectlywithoutaforeignintermediary.

Waltersproposedanothersecretmeetingwithme.ButtheNorthVietnamese

werenotreadythen.Meticulousplanners,theyhadnotyetmadeuptheirminds

aboutthefullimplicationsofNixon’sNovember3speech.OrperhapssinceXuan

Thuywasnotapolicymaker,theysawnopointinanothermeetingathislevel.

Hanoifelttheyhadfirsttoreestablishthepsychologicalequilibriumbyashowof

nonconcern.



Whateverthereason,onDecember12GeneralWalterswascalledtothe

NorthVietnamesecompound.MaiVanBo,NorthVietnameseDelegate‐Generalin

Paris,proclaime dHanoi’sunhappinesswiththe“warlike”spee chofNovember3

andthePresident’srefusaltonameaseniorreplacementforHenryCabotLodge.

HecalledattentiontoHanoi’sproposalattheAugustmeeting,whichhe

describedas“bothlogicalandreasonable.”Sincewehadalreadyrejectedthat