Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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IcannotmaintainthatIcametothisviewimmediately.ButonceI

recognizedtheinevitable,Isoughttochannelitinaconstructivedirectionby

workingcloselywithBrandtandhiscolleagues.Resurgentnationalismwasa

dangerwhichevercoursetheFederalRepublicpursued;itcouldbebestavoided

byarelationshipofconfidencethatmadeaseparatecourseappeartoo

unrewardingandrisky.Weweredeterminedtosparenoefforttomutethelatent

incompatibilitybetweenGermany’snationalaimsanditsAtlanticandEuropean

ties.

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ForthedeepermotivationofSovietoverturesbothtowardtheFederal

Republicandtowardtheotherallieswastopracticeselectivedétente—toease

tensionswithsomeallieswhilemaintaininganintransigentpositiontowardus.It

wouldbeachievedbyelaboratingpresumedconflictsofinterestbetweenusand

ourallies;orbymaneuveringusintoappearingastheobstacletoaneasingof

tensions.Whateverthestrategy,itspurposewastodividetheAllianceandisolate

us.Butwewerenotwithoutrecourse.TheFederalRepublicdidnothavethe

bargainingtoolstoconductitsOstpolitikonapurelynationalbasis—andour

otheralliescouldnotdowithoutoursecurityumbrella.OnBerlinthenegotiating

strengthofthetwosideswastoounequal;withthecityisolatedandEast

Germanyoccupied,theFederalRepublicneededthesupportofitsallies.Linkag e

wasinherent.IfOstpolitikweretosucceed,ithadtoberelatedtootherissues

involvingtheAllianceasawhole;onlyinthismannerwouldtheSovietUnionhav e

incentivesforcompromise.

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ThiswasourattitudewhenBrandtaskedthatwereceivehispolitical

confidantEgonBahronOctober 13,evenbeforethenewgovernmentwas

formallyinstalled.IhadknownEgonBahrfromBrandt’sdaysasMayorofBerlin

whenBahrwaspressspokesman.Wehadrenewedouracquaintancewhenhe

headedthepolicyplanningstaffduringBrandt’stenureasForeignMinister.Bahr

wasamanofgreatintelligenceandextraordinaryconfidenceinhisabilityto

deviseformulastoovercomeadiplomaticimpasse.Hewasdedicatedto

improvingWestGermany’srelationswiththeEast;hebelievedthatgood

personalrelationswithSovietandEastGermanpersonalitieswouldassistthis

effort.Hisvanitycausedhimtoflauntthesecontactsanditwasnodoubt

occasionallyexploitedbyhiscounterparts.Hisenemies—andtheyweremany—

accusedhimofpro‐Sovietsympathies;manydistrustedwhattheyinterpretedas

hisdeviousness.ThoughBahrwasamanoftheleft,Iconsideredhimabovealla

GermannationalistwhowantedtoexploitGermany’scentralpositiontobargain

withbothsides.HewasofthetypethathadalwaysbelievedthatGermanycould

realizeitsnationaldestinyonlybyfriendshipwiththeEast,oratleastbyavoiding

itsenmity.Bahrwasobviouslynotasunquestioningly dedicatedtoWesternunity

asthepeoplewehadknowninthepreviousgovernment;hewasalsofreeofany

sentimentalattachmenttotheUnitedStates. Tohim,Americawasaweighttobe

addedtoWestGermany’sscaleintherightwayattherighttime,buthispriority

wastorestorerelationsbetwe enthetwoGermaniesaboveall.Asforhisalleged

deviousness,ItendedtoshareMetternich’sviewthatinanegotiationthe

perfectlystraightforwardpersonwasthemostdifficulttodealwith.Iatanyrate

didnotlacktheself‐confidencetoconfrontBahr’stactics.

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SoImetBahrwiththeattitudeofestablishingacooperativerelationship.

ThatIthoughtOstpolitikwasmorelikelytoleadtoapermanentdivisionof

Germanythantohealingitsbreachwasirrelevant.TheBrandtgovernmentwas

askingnotforouradvicebutforourcooperationinacoursetowhichitsprincipal

figureshadlongsincebeencommitted.Ithought weshouldreceiveBahrsoasto

reducethedistrustproducedbyNixon’sunfortunateelection‐nighttelephonecall

toKiesinger.ItseemedtomeimportanttoworkwithBrandtratherthanagainst

him;opposinghimwouldearnustheopprobriumofalltheGermansofboth

partieswhobelievedthatBrandtdeservedachance.Moreover,Brandt’scourse

wassupportedbyallallieswiththepossibleexceptionofFrance,whichwas,

however,unwillingtomakeitsoppositionexplicit.AndinthelongtermBrandt’s

aimofconciliationinCentralEuropewashistoricallycorrectevenifsometimeshe

pursueditwithanenthusiasmandsingle‐mindednessthatweakenedhis

bargainingposition.

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ThefirstresultofEgonBahr’sproposedvisitwasaproceduraldisputewith

theSecretaryofState.Rogersobjectedtothetriponthenotunreasonable

groundthatnegotiationsshouldbeconductedintheStateDepartment.Rogers

andI,dealingwitheachotherliketwosovereignentities,finallymadeacompact:

IwouldreceiveBahrbutnotnegotiatewithhim,andMartinHillenbrand,

AssistantSecretaryofStateforEuropeanAffairs,wouldsitinonthemeetings.

TherewasanotinsignificantdeviationfrommycompactwithRogersinthatBahr,

afterleavingtheWhiteHousebythefrontdoor,reentereditthroughthe

basementforaprivatetalkwithme,primarilytoestablishachannelbywhichwe

couldstayintouchoutsidetheformalprocedures.Aswithmychannelswith

DobrynintoMoscow,withPakistantoChina,andonoccasionwithIsraeland

evenEgypt,mycontactwithEgonBahrbecameaWhiteHousebackchannelby

whichNixoncouldmanagediplomacybypassingtheStateDepartment.

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BahrinformedusofthecourseBrandtintendedtofollow. Hestressedthat

hewantedtopursueitincooperationandfriendshipwiththeUnitedStates,but

leftlittledoubtthatthepolicyitselfwasnotsubjecttodiscussion.Themajor

resultwasthatBrandtwouldstayincloseconsultationwithusandthatwewould

cooperatewithhim.OnNovember11,WalterScheel,thenewForeignMinister,

announcedthatBonnwouldshortlyinitiatetalkswiththeSovietUniononan

agreementonthemutualrenunciationofforce.Aformalproposalwasmadeon

November16.[

ByapproachingtheUSSRfirst,Brandt’sgovernmenthopedtosmooththe

wayforsubsequentnegotiationswithEastGermanyandtheotherneighboringSovietsatellites.

TheGrandCoalitionhadattemptedapproachestoEastEuropeancountrieswithoutfirst

approachingtheSovietUnion;theSovietsthereforeblockedthem.]Meanwhile,the

WesternalliesdecidedtoreplytotheSovietproposalofSeptember24onBerlin

byofferingtheirowndetailedsetofproposals.Wewantedaguaranteefor

civiliansurfacetrafficto andfromWestBerlin,regularizedandsimplifiedcrossing

proceduresforWestBerlinerstotraveltoEastBerlin,andtheeasingofpostal,

telephone,andothercommunicationsbetweenthecity’stwohalves.Thisnote

wasdispatchedonDecember16.

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BythenaDecemberNATOmeetingofForeignMinistersatUSurginghad

setupaseriesoflinkagestoprevent“selectivedétente”andtostrengthen

Brandt’sbargainingposition.WemadeagreementtoaEuropeanSecurity

ConferenceconditionalonprogressintalksonBerlinandinSoviet‐German

negotiations.Ostpolitikwasbeingembeddedinamatrixofnegotiationsthat

enhancedthebargainingpositionoftheFederalRepublicbutthatalsosetlimits

beyondwhichitcouldnotgowithoutanalliedconsensus.Ofthesepotential

negotiationsperhapsthemostcomplicatedwastheEuropeanSecurity

Conference.

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<<Contents>>

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EuropeanSecurityConference

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heideaofaEuropeanSecurityConferenc ehadbeenastapleofEast‐West

discussionsforadecadeandahalf.Inthe1950stheSovietUnionhad

proposeditrepeatedly.Butitwasequallyrepeatedlyrejectedoutofhandasa

transparentattempttopreventGermanrearmamentandthedevelopmentof

NATO,andindeedtopreventanyAmericanroleinEurope,sincetheproposal

usuallyexcludedtheUnitedStatesasnot“European.”IntheFifties,also,several

thoughtfulobservers—themostnotablebeingGeorgeKennan—advocateda

disengagementofUSandSovietforcesfromCentralEurope.Intheprevailing

climatethistoowasnotseriouslyconsidered,ifonlybecausethedistancesto

whichtheUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnionwouldwithdrawweretoounequal.

T

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BythetimeNixonenteredoffice,politicalconditionshadchanged.InJuly

1966,theWarsawPactnationshadissueda“DeclarationonStrengtheningPeace

andSecurityinEurope,”urgingaEuropeanSecurityConference.InApril1967a

conferenceofEuropeanCommunistpartiesfollowe dsuit.ByDecember1967

Westerngovernmentswerefacingdomesticpressurestoeasetheirearlier

opposition.IntheHarmelReporttoNATOofDecember1967,namedafterthe

BelgianForeignMinister,therefore,theAllianceputthecollectivesearchfor

“progresstowardsamorestablerelationship”withEasternEuropehighonitslist

ofpriorities,secondonlytodeterrenceofaggression.InJune1968atthemeeting

ofitsForeignMinistersinReykjavik,NATOsignaleditsreadinesstodiscussmutual

andbalancedforcereduct ions(MBFR)—the newtechnicaltermfor

disengagement—wit htheWarsawPact.



Communistpolicyisoftendescribedasdiabolicallyclever,complicated,

followingwell‐thought‐outroutestowardworlddomination.Thiswasnotmy

impression.Onthecontrary,IfoundSovietdiplomacygenerallyrigid;noris

subtletythequalityforwhichSovietdiplomacywillgodowninhistory.TheSoviet

Unionhas,infact,hadspectacularlylittlesuccessinadvancingitscauseby

diplomacyormoralconsensus.Almostallofitsadvanceshavebeenduenotto

diplomaticskillbuttothethreatorrealityofdeployingmassivemilitary power.



ButSovietdiplomacyhasonegreatasset.Itisextraordinarilypersevering;it

substitutespersistenceforimagination.Ithasnodomesticpressuresimpellingit

constantlytoputforwardnewideastobreakdeadlocks.Itisnotaccusedof

rigidityifitadvancesvariat ionsofthesameproposalsyearafteryear.Thereare

norewardsinthePolitburofortheexplorationofever‐newschemes,whichturns

somuchofAmericandiplomacyintoanegotiationwithourselves.Likedropsof

wateronastone,Sovietrepetitivenesshasthetendencysoonerorlatertoerode

theresistanceoftherestlessdemocracies.PressuresdeveloptoaccepttheSoviet

proposal“inprinciple,”oratleasttotalkaboutit.Oncethesubjectisacceptedas

legitimate,thediscussionimmediatelyswitchestotheterms.Theyearningfor

relaxationoftensionscreatesapresumptioninfavoroftheSovietagenda.The

desireforagreementencouragesconstantpressurestofindatleastsomethingin

theSovietpositiontoaccept.



SoitwastosomeextentwiththeideaoftheEuropeanSecurity

Conference.DisparagedintheFifties,rejectedintheSixties,itfinallybeganto

gainacceptancewiththepassingyearsbydefault,asitwere.Sovietpersistence

wasreinforcedbydomesticyearningsforanendtotheColdWar,partlyunder

thedisillusionmentcausedbyVietnam.AsAmericanleade rs hipoftheAlliance

begantobequestioned,publicopinioninalliedcountrieslookedforalternatives

fortheirsecurity.AstheUnitedStatesseemedtobewithdrawingfromEurope,

theideaofmutualforcereductionstookonrespectability.Somesawmutual

forcereductionsasdesirableinthemselves;someadvancedtheideaasameans

eithertoheadoff,ortogainsomeSovietreciprocityfor,theAmericanunilateral

withdrawalsfromEuropethatourdomesticturmoilmadeappearinevitable.



TheSovietUnioncontinuedtopress,partlytoexploittheevidentWestern

interest,partlytodistractthoughtsfromCzechoslovakia.OnMarch17,1969,a

WarsawPactmeetinginBudapestformallyproposedanearlyconferenceon

Europeansecurity.Itcalledforstrengtheningofpolitical,economic,andcultural

contacts;recognitionoftheinviolabilityoffrontiers,includingtheOder‐Neisse

boundary(betweenEastGermanyandPoland)andthefrontierbetweenWest

andEastGermany;mutualrecognitionbyWestandEastGermanyofeachother

assovereignstates;renunciationbytheFederalRepublicofitsclaimsto

representtheentireGermanpeople;andrecognitionofWestBerlin’sseparation

fromtheFederalRepublic.Itwas,inshort,themaximumSovietprogramfor

Europe,putforwardinthenameofenhancingEuropeansecurity.



OnApril3DobryninsubmittedtheWarsawPactproposaltotheWhite

HousethroughtheChannel.Heevenaccompanieditwithaconcession.Hetold

meforthefirsttimethattheSovietUnionwouldnotobjecttoUnitedStates

participationinwhathadpreviouslybeendescribedasan“all‐European

conference.”HealsocalledtomyparticularattentionthefactthattheBudapest

Declarationhaddroppedtherequirementofpreviousdeclarationsthatalliance

systemsinEuropebedissolved;inotherwords,Moscowgenerouslyagreedtothe

continuationofNATO. 



Iwasnotpreparedtotreatthewithdrawaloftwoabsurdpreconditionsas

aconcession.WritingtothePresidentonApril4,Ipointedoutthat“anyonewho

isseriousaboutmakingprogressonEuropeanproblemsknowsthatwemustbea

party;weshouldnotmaketheSovietsthinkthattheyaredoingusafavorifthey

agreetosuchanobviousfactoflife.”



Nevertheless,theapparentconciliatorySoviettoneevokedenormous

eagernesswithintheAlliance.WhilevisitingWashingtonforEisenhower’sfuneral,

MarianoRumor,thenItalianPrimeMinister,toldNixonthatdespitethe

propagandisticintentoftheSovietproposalstheItalianpoliticalsituation

requiredaforthcomingresponse.Beingforthcomingvis‐à‐visa propagandistic

maneuverisnomeanfeat;tokeepitfromturningintoaslipperyslopeismore

difficultstill.BrandtfavoredaEuropeanSecurityConferenceforthestrange

reasonthatitwouldlegitimizetheAmericanpresenceinEurope.Pompidou

embraceditasameansofavoidingseparateGermanoverturestowardtheEast

andabsorbingtheminamultilateralframework.Britishleadersadvocateditasa

meanstotranscendtheColdWar.



Inthesecircumstances,IrecommendedtothePresidentthattoturndown

theSovietoverturecompletelywouldleaveusisolatedwithinNATO.Butwe

shouldmakeouragreementinprincipledependonprogressonconcrete

Europeanissues,especiallyBerlin.InamemorandumofApril8Inoted:



Withoutsuchprogress,aconferencewouldprobablyfindtheEastEuropeancountries

closelyalignedwitharigidSovietposition,whiletheWesternparticipantswouldbecompeting

witheachothertofindwaysto“breakthedeadlock.”Thenetresult…wouldtendtosetback

prospectsforaneventualresolutionofEuropeanissues.Consequently,ouremphasisshouldbe

ontheneedfortalksonconcreteissuesandforconsultationswithinNATOdesignedtodevelop

coherentWesternpositionsonsuchissues.



ThisbecametheUnitedStatesposition;itwassubstantiallyadoptedbythe

NATOministerialmeetinginAprilof1969.



Europeansecurityhadthusbeendeliberatelyputonaslowtrack.No

specificstepscouldbetakenuntilthenextNATOministerialconferencein

December;ithadbeenrelatedtoconcreteissues;theimperativeofAmerican

participationhadbeenmadeclear;ithadtobeprecededbyprogressonthe

Germanquestion.



Butoncelaunched,adiplomaticprocesscannot becontrolledsimplyby

formaldeclarations—especiallyfromtheofficeofthesecurityadviserinthe

WhiteHousebasement.Goodpolicydependsonthepatientaccumulationof

nuances;carehastobetakenthatindividualmovesareorchestratedintoa

coherentstrategy.Onlyrarelydopolicyissuesappearintermsofblackorwhite.

Moreusuallytheydependonshadesofinterpretation;significantpolicy

deviationsbeginasminordepartureswhose effectbecomesapparentonlyas

theyareprojectedintothefuture.Inevitably,therefore,theEuropeanSecurity

ConferenceraisedthesameissuesaboutlinkageandthephilosophyofEast‐West

relationsthathaddividedourgovernmentallalong.TheWhiteHouseapproach

wastomakeourparticipationinaEuropeanSecurityConferenceconditionalon

SovietconcessionsonBerlinandtheintra‐Germannegotiations.TheState

Departmentsawinasecurityconferenceadesirableforumthatshouldbemade

toyieldsomeresults,perhapsonbalancedforcereductions,perhapson

principlesofcoexistence.ItopposedlinkageandasusualchippedawayatWhite

Houseresistance.



InthemeantimeDobryninweighedinwithapropo saloftheWarsawPact

nationsthataEuropeanSecurityCo nferencebeassembledinthefirsthalfof

1970,withatwo‐pointagenda: renunciationoftheuseorthreatofforcein

relationsbetweenEuropeanstates,andthewideningofcommercial,economic,

technical,andscientificrelatio nsbetweenEuropeanstates.Iopposedboththe

scheduleandtheagenda.Wecouldnotagreeonadateuntiltherehadbeen

progressinothernegotiations,especiallyonBerlin;norcouldwelettheSoviets

focusonrecognitionofthestatusquoinEuropeuntiltheresultsofBonn’s

Ostpolitikwereclearer;Bonn,notwe,shouldassumetheresponsibilityfor

acceptingthedivisionofGermany.Anditmadenosenseexpandingcommercial

andtechnicaltiesiftensionspersisted.ThePresidentissuedinstructionsalong

thisline.



RogerscouldreporttothePresidentwithsomesatisfactionofthe

DecemberNATOministerialmeeting :



OntheEuropeanSecurityConferenceandEast‐Westrelations,weachievedarealistic

andcautiousNATOstandwhichstressedtheneedforfurtherexplorationsandbetterprospects

forsignificantresultsbeforeweagreedtogotoaConference.WealsoobtainedAlliance

agreementonNATOinitiativesvis‐à‐visEasternEuropeincludingpreparationofanegotiating

positionformutualandbalancedforcereductions,supportforinitiativesonGermanyand

Berlin…Euphoriaforaconferenceforaconference’ssakewascontained…



Wehad,infact,bluntedtheSovietstrategyofselectivedétentebylinking

keyissuestoeachother.TheSovietswantedaEuropeanSecurityConferencebut

theycouldnotgetoneexceptbymakingprogressinBerlin,wherewehadaveto

asanoccupyingpower.Brandt’sOstpolitiktendedtoconfirmtheEuropeanstatus

quonomatterwhatwedid,butBrandtwouldnotbeabletogethisagreement

withtheSovietUnionorEastGermanyratifiedbyhisParliamentintheabsenceof

anagreementthatimprovedaccesstoBerlin.Ifwekeptourhead,therefore,we

wereinapositiontoencouragedétenteandtocontrolitspace,torespondtoour

allies’pleasforaneasingoftensions,andconductanegotiationbothpreciseand

compatiblewithoursecurity.



<<Contents>>



****



EuropeanLeadersVisitWashington:1970



herewasthusmuchtotalkaboutwhentheWestEuropeanleaders,

reciprocatingNixon’svisitoftheyearbefore,descendedonWashingtonat

monthlyintervalsstartinglateinJanuary1970.Thefirstvisitor wasHaroldWilson;

hewasfollowedbyGeorgesPompidouinlateFebruaryandbyWillyBrandtin

earlyApril.

T



Wilson,asalwayswithNixon,affectedhismostavuncularmanner,likea

small‐townbankerwhohaddecidedthatthebestwaytodealwithhismost

improvidentcustomerwastogivehimareputationforparsimonytouphold.He

urgedonNixonthebenefitsofBrandt’spolicyasifnootherapproachwere

conceivable.Nixon,whosesuspicionofBrandthadnotabated,wentnofurther

thantoindicatethatwewoulddonothingtoopposehim.Atthesametime,

WilsonwasnotaboveusingOstpolitiktofurtherhisgoalofBritain’sentryintothe

EuropeanCommunity,arguingthatBritain’smembershipmightserveto restrain

Germannationalistambitions.MuchofthediscussionwasaboutBiafra,a

provinceofNigeria,populatedbytheIbotribe,thathadsoughttosecedefrom

thecentralgovernment.ThebordersofAfrica’snationswerecruellydrawnbyim‐

perialpowersonthebasisofadministrativeconvenience,cuttingacrosstribalor

linguisticties.Nationalunitywithinexistingfrontierswasbothconstantlyatrisk

andpassionatelydefended.Secession— especiallyonatribalbasis—threatenedto

disruptallestablished order;oncetheprecedentwasestablishednostatewould

besafe.TheOrganizationofAfricanUnitystronglysupportedtheNigerianfederal

government’swartopreservetheunityofthecountry.SodidBritain,convinced

alsothatitscolonialtraditionconferredaspecialknowledgeofAfricanproblems.



ForsomereasonBiafrahadbecomeanissueintheAmericanPresidential

campaignof1968.NixonhadclaimedthattheUnitedStateswasnotdoing

enoughtoeaseciviliansufferinginthebesiegedprovince.OurStateDepartment

sharedtheBritishviewthattochallengeNigeriansovereigntywouldearnusthe

hostilityofAfrica’smostpopulousnationandthesuspicionsofallothers.Iam

inclinedtobelievethatNixontookthecontraryviewinpartbecausehetookno

littlepleasureinshowingsomeofthosewhowerewonttoattackhimforhis

allegedmoraldefectsthattheytoowerecapableofexpediencyontheissueof

humanrights.



DuringWilson’svisitinJanuary1970theNigeriancivilwarwasdrawingtoa

bloodyconclusion.Thecentralgovernment wasabouttooverrunthes eceding

province.Independentstudieshadindicatedthatunlessmassivereliefsupplies

reachedBiafraimmediately,amillionandahalfwouldstarvetodeath.The

Nigeriangovernmentinsistedthatallsuppliesbedeliveredthroughit.TheWhite

House—withRogerMorrisofmystaffplayinganenergeticandpassionaterole—

wasseekingtorushsuppliesdirectly.IsupportedMorris.SodidNixon,happyfor

oncetobeonthehumanesideofanissue.BritishobfuscationandState

Departmentprocrastinationsoonmadetheissuemoot.Weneversucceededin

establishinganindependentreliefprogram.Federaltroopstookcontrolofthe

provinceandsnuffedoutBiafran“independence.”Acurtainofsilencedescended.

Intheend,theNigerianfederalgovernmentsuccessfullycarriedoutapolicyof

reconciliationwiththedefeatedIbos.WilsoninfluencedNixon’spolicytoa

degreeandcurbedourinterventionistimpulses.Fromthepointofviewofour

long‐terminterestsheandtheStateDepartmentwereundoubtedlyright.



AnothernoteworthyeventofWilson’svisitwashisattendanceataregular

NSCmeeting.ItwasNixon’swayofreciprocatingforhisequallyhistoric

attendanceatasessionoftheBritishCabinet whenhevisitedLondoninFebruary

1969.Botheventswerepartcharade,sinceobviouslynose riousdebatewould

occurinthepresenceofforeignleaders—allthelesssoasNixonwasgenerally

uncomfortablewithanydiscussionwhoseoutcomehecouldnotforese e.The

subjectchosen,appropriatelyenough,wasAmericanpolicytowardEurope.The

bureaucraticmaneuveringprecedingthemeetingturnedouttobefarmore

interestingthanthemeetingitself.Forayearmyofficehadsoughttoextractan

optionspaperonthesubjectfromtheEuropeanBureauoftheStateDepartment.

Ithadresistedbitterly.TheStateDepartmenthadconsideredEuropeanpolicyits

specialpreserveanddidnotwanttoadmitwhatwasunfortunatelyinherentin

thepresentationofoptions:thepossibilityofapolicychange.



Aftermonthsofprocrastinationoversubsidiaryissuesthereemergedat

lastagovernmentaloptionspaper.ThechoicesbeinglaidbeforethePresident

hardlyopenedscintillatingnewvistas.Theywere:(1)maintainingthe“present

course”;(2)supportingan“enhancedEurope”(meaningBritishentryandcloser

integration);or(3)Americandisengagement.Herewasthest andardbureaucratic

deviceofleavingthedecision‐makerwithonlyonerealoption,whichforeasy

identificationisplacedinthemiddle.Theclassiccase,Ijoked,wouldbeto

confrontthepolicymakerwiththechoicesofnuclearwar,presentpolicy,or

surrender.Inthiscase,thebureaucracytooknochances.Options1and2were

thesame;ourpresentcoursewasan“enhancedEurope.”“American

disengagement”hadpejorativeconnotationsandnosupportinourgovernment

orinanyalliedgovernment.Thusthepreordainedconsensusquicklyembraced

thepolicyofencouragingan“enhancedEurope.”Nixonlaiddownthegospel:



IhaveneverbeenonewhobelievestheUSshouldhavecontroloftheactionsofEurope.

ItisintheinterestsoftheUnitedStatestohaveastrongeconomic,politicalandmilitary

Europeancommunity,withtheUnitedKingdominthatcommunity.Ihavepreferredthat

Europemoveindependently,goingparallelwiththeUnitedStates.Astrong,healthyand