Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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•Asustaineddefensewithconventionalforces,adequatetodefendEurope

indefinitelywithoutrecoursetonuclearweaponsagainstthestanding

WarsawPactforces.



•Atotalconventionaldefensethatwouldallowustocounteranattackby

theWarsawPactunderfullmobilization.



Inanalyzingthesefourstrategies,ourconstraintsbecamedramatically

apparent.Thetrip‐wireconceptwasrejected.Itrancountertoourimperativeto

gaintimeforadeliberatedecisiononsofatefulanissueaswhethertoinitiate

nuclearwar,andthesubstantialtroopwithdrawals itimpliedwoulddemoralize

ourEuropeanallies.AsustainedconventionaldefenseofEuropewasalso

rejected.IpointedouttothePresidentbeforetheNSCmeetingofSeptember 10

thatallouragenciesexcepttheJointChiefsofStaffbelievedthatourNATOallies

wouldresistthisstrategybecauseitcontemplatedprolongedgroundconflictin

Europeandtherebywoulderodethecredibilityofourintentiontousenuclear

forcesinEurope’sdefense.Thiswasevenmoretrueofthefourthoption,total

defense.Ananalysisofthebudgetarycostsofthefourstrategiesfurtherlimited

ourchoices.Asustainedconventionaldefensewouldforceuseithertogiveupall

newdomesticprogramsorelsetoimposeasurtaxof 4percentifthePresident

limitedhimselfto thedomesticprogramstowhichhewasalreadycommitted

(welfarereform,revenuesharing,andurbanmasstransit).



Alliedsensitivitiesandbudgetaryconstraintsthusfo rcedustoreaffirmthe

existingstrategyofattemptinganinety‐dayconventionaldefense.Butanyclose

examinationexposeditsessentialhollowness.Ourstudiesshowedthateventhe

UnitedStates,withadeclaratorypolicyofresistingforninetydays,didnothave

sufficientstockpilesineverysignificantcategoryofsupplies.Andourabilityto

resistwouldbedeterminedbythesmallestcriticalstockpile,notsometheoretical

averagenumber.AnattempttoelicitfromthePentagonanestimateofwhich

criticalitemwasinshortsupplyproducedsuchanobfuscatingrun‐aroundthatit

wasclearthatwewouldexhaustsomeessentialitemswellbeforeninetydays.

Sinceweaponswerenotstandardized,itwasnotpossibletousethereservesof

oneallytoassistanother.Moreover,noonecouldjudgethesupplylevelsof

NATOasawholebecauseeachallycomputedtheconsumptionratesdifferently.

Bywhatevercriteriawereused,itwasclearthatNATOwasfarfrommeetingits

ownstatedgoals;thesituationwasamess.



Likeourpredecessorswesoughttodealwiththeproblembyencouraging

ouralliestoincreasetheirdefenseexpenditures.MelLaird,inpreparationfora

NATODefensePlanningCommitteemeetingonMay28,hadaskedforauthority

tourgeouralliestoincreasetheircontributiontoNATObyanaverageof4

percentannuallyfrom1971through1975.IhadsupportedLaird’s

recommendation,andthePresidenthadapproved.Theallies,however,would

agreetonofixedpercentage;theywouldgonofurtherthantocommit

themselvestoa“moderate”increase,definingnobasefromwhichthiscouldbe

calculated.Intheabsenceofarealisticstrategybackedupbytheabilityto

executeit,therewasnopracticalsolutiontotheproblem.Itremainswithout

resolutiontothisday.



Atfirstglance—indeed,atsecondglanceaswell—itwouldseemthatinthe

newstrategiccircumstancestherecouldbelittledebateovertheimportanceofa

continuedAmericantroopcommitmenttoEurope.Withnuclearparityonthe

way,thesignificanceofgroundforcesonthecontinent—Americanand

European—wasincreasing.Butallthepressureson uscamefromtheopposite

direction.OurtroopcommitmenttoEuropewasbuffete dbytheaftershocksof

theVietnamearthquake.SenatorsMansfieldandFulbrightandmanyothers

questioneditandsawitasanotherexampleofourglobaloverextensionthat

riskedwar.Theyweresoontointroduceformalre solutionsintheSenatetothat

effect.Theyreflectedalsoageneralresentmentthattwentyyearsaftertheend

ofWorldWarIItheEuropeans,withahistoryofmilitaryautonomy,stillwouldnot

raiseforcesadequatefortheirowndefense.Ourhighlyunfavorablebalanceof

payments,moreover,wasseentorequireareductionofforeignexchangecosts,

tobeachievedinpartbytroopcutsinEurope.Thissetupaviciouscircle:the

greaterthepressuresfortroopwithdrawalsintheUnitedStates,thegreaterthe

disinclinationofouralliestoaugmenttheirmilitaryestablishmentslestthey

justifyfurtherAmericanwithdrawals.



Infact,theUnitedStateshadstartedaprocessofthinlydisguised

withdrawalduringtheJohnsonAdministration.In1967‐1968partofoneArmy

divisionandsomeAirForceunitshadbeenreturnedtotheUnitedStates;

altogetheralmost60,000troopshadbeenbroughthome.Someoftheequipment

ofthesewithdrawnunitshadbeenleftbehindinstockpiles,andperiodic

exerciseswereheldtodemonstrateourairliftcapacitytoreturnrapidly.Butthese

stepsmissedtheessentialpoint:Europeansincreasinglyquestionednotthe

capabilitybutthewillingnessoftheUnitedStatestocarryoutthecommitmentto

theirdefense.Theyquestionednotourairliftcapabilitybutourpoliticalwill.



TheunilateralreductionprogramoftheJohnsonAdministration—withthe

acronymRedcoste(“ReductionofCostsinEurope”)—hadbeenjustifiedonthe

groundthatitwas“cuttingthefat”ofadministrativeoverhead;combat

effectivenesswouldnotbediminished.Thisfollowedhallowedconvention.The

cumulativeimpactofthesecutswouldtendtosuggestthatwepossessedatone

timethemostbloatedmilitaryestablishmentimaginable;orelsethatitscombat

effectivenesswassolowthatnoamountofreductionscouldaffectit.The

problemoftheNixonAdministrationwashowtodealwithlong‐planned

reductionswhichweretakingplaceattheverytimethatwewereurgingourallies

todomore.



AtthispointwewitnessedthedazzlingspectacleofMelvinLaird.Laird

unilaterallydecidedtomakehisowncutswithinNATO—barelythreemonths

afterurgingouralliestoincreasetheirexpendituresby4percentannually.In

earlySeptember1969,Lairdproposedreductionsofnavalforcescommittedto

NATObyoneattackcarrier,sixantisubmarinecarriers,andforty‐eightdestroyers

(nowmothballedonthePacificcoast).Healsorecommendedreducingthe

readinessofArmyStrategicReserveunitsassignedtoNATOand—moreimportant

fromthepoliticalpointofview—oftheelementsofthe24thInfantryDivisionthat

weresupposedtoreturntoNATOincaseofcrisis.Lairdincludedanother

pregnantsentence:“FurtherchangesinourNATOcommittedforcemaybe

requiredasaresultofreductionindefenseexpendituresalreadyannouncedand

underreview.”Basically,LairdwasastaunchsupporterofNATO.Whythendidhe

seektocutNATOforcessobrusquelyandsoprovocatively?



Theprincipalreason,strangelyenough,wasLaird’sconcerntomaintainthe

defensebudgetandwithitNA TO’sdefensecapability.Hewasunderpre ssure

fromtheBureauoftheBudget(representedbyitsAssistantDirectorJamesR.

Schlesinger)andtheCongresstocutourdefensebudgetbyatleast$5billionon

topofthereductionsNixonhadjudgedexpedienttomakeuponenteringoffice.

LairdcalculatedthatNATOenjoyedalargeconstituencyinsideandoutsidethe

government.Ifhecouldde monstrate thatoverallcutsinthedefensebudget

wouldimmediatelyaffectNATO,hemighteasethepressuresforreductions,orat

leastcontainthem.Hedecidedthatthebestwaytostillardorforbudgetarycuts

intheExecutiveorLegislativeBranchwastomakethemaspainfulaspossible.

Thisprovedtobeacorrectassessment.



Butforthisstrategytosucceedithadtobecarriedoutwithnerve,ofwhich

Lairdwasneverinshortsupply.AndthemoreplausibleLaird’smaneuver—which

wasessentialtoitssuccess—themoreitwasraisinghavocwithourpositionin

NATO.WhenIconveyedLaird’srecommendationstoNixonIwrotethefollowing

note:



Thesefacts,astheybecomeknown,aregoingtobereadinNATOagainstabackground

ofotherindicatorsthattheUSisactuallycuttingbackonitscommitmentsinEurope.The

personnelreductionsoverseasandSecretaryLaird’svariouscommentsallwillbetakenaspart

ofatrend…Thefactthatthesereductionsineffectivenessandreadinesshavealready

occurred,ofcourse,raisesthefurtherquestionofconsultation…



TogetsomecontroloverthesituationIsentadirectivetothedepartments

onSeptember17prohibitingfurtherdiscussionofreductionspubliclyorwithin

NATO,pendinga“memoforthePresidentdescribingwhathasalreadytaken

place,”andprovidingrecommendationsforNATOconsultation. 



ButLairdwastooquickforme.Tendaysafterhisfirstrecommendations,

hesentanothermemorandumtothePresidentremindingusofthecryptic

warninginhisearliercommunicationthatfurthercutswerepossible:“Thisnow

provestobethecase…ThereshouldbemorechangesrequiredinourNATO‐

committednavalforcesonceourdetailedanalysisiscompleted…Thereductions

arelikelytobeinterpretedasinconsistentwithyourstatementstotheEuropeans

thatwebelieveNATOforcesshouldbemaintainedatcurrentlevels.”Lairdwasin

effecttellingthePresidenteithertoincreasethedefensebudgetortobreakhis

wordtoEuropeanleaders.



Lairddidnotexplainwhatcouldpossiblyhavehappenedintendaysto

bringabouttheneedforanothercut,orwhyhehadnotinformedtheWhite

Houseofthescopeofhisintentionstobeginwith.Itwasclearthathewasusing

EuropeantroopreductionstoforcethePresident’shandonincreasingthe

defensebudget.Toaddabizarretouch,LairdadmittedthattheJointChiefsof

StaffbelievedthatthesecutswouldposeadditionalrisksfortheUnited States:“I

agreewiththeChiefsbutbelievethatthesecutsmustbemade,givenour

commitmentsinSEA[SouthEastAsia]andthecurrenttightfiscalsituation.”There

wasnodoubtthattheCommander‐in‐Chiefwasbeingblackmailedeitherto

increasehisdefensebudget(whichhewasreluctanttodobecauseof

Congressionalopposition)ortotakethemoneyfromSouthEastAsia,thereby

reducinghisnegotiatingflexibilityinVietnam.



OnceLairdhadawinningpos ition,itwouldonlymagnifyone’slossesto

continuethebattle.Lairdproceededtoimplementhisplan.ButIsought

somehowtoensurethatunilateralcutswouldnothappenagain.OnSeptember

19IwrotethePresidentsummarizingLaird’sdecisionsandtheChiefs’objections.

IrecommendedwesetupaDefenseProgramReviewCommittee(DPRC)inthe

NSCsystemtoenabletheWhiteHouseandtheotheragenciestohavesome

voiceinLaird’sdecisions.Nixonapproved.TheCommitteewasinfactestablished

anddidsomeusefulwork.Nevertheless,theWhiteHouseneverachievedthe

controloverdefensepolicythatitdidoverforeignpolicy.Lairdwastoonimble;

theJointChiefsweretoosuspiciousofoutsidedeterminationoftheirpriorities;

andwehadourhandsfullwiththedesignandconductofoverallgeopolitical

strategy.ButiftheDPRCcouldnotshapedefensepolicyacrosstheboard,itcould

actasabrakeonunilateralsteps.Thisbe cameapparentwhenLairdreturnedto

thechargeinOctober.Heproposedcutsinreserveunitsandsuggestedthata

passingreferenceto thisprospectbemadeto ourNATOallies.Iurgedthe

Presidenttoputanendtothispiecemealapproachlestwecreatetheimpression

ofanendlessprocessofwithdrawal.Nixonagreed.Fromthenon,wedidmanage

topreventunilateralcutsinourNATOforces.



Ourallies,notusedtothesubtletiesofourpoliticalprocess,didnot

immediatelyunderstandthatallthiswasessentiallyfortheirowngood.Atthe

firstmeetingofthenewDPRConOctober21,GeneralWheeler,Chairmanofthe

JointChiefs,predictedthatwewouldhaveaveryhardtimewithourallies—

correctly,heblamedthebudget‐cutters,notLaird.Hisguesswasborneout.

NATOSecretary‐GeneralManlioBrosiovisitedWashingtononNovember14and

spokepessimisticallyabouttheprospectsforincreasingEuropeanforcelevels

whileAmericawasreducingitstroops.Healsoreportedagrowinginterestinthe

AllianceinnegotiationswiththeSovietsonmutualtroopreductions.Sincethe

UnitedStateswouldbewithdrawinganyhow,heargued,NATOmightaswell

tradeinourprogrammedreductionsforsomeSovietconcessions.



InfairnessitmustbestatedthatLairdhadachievedhisprincipalaim.He

hadsoscaredvariousconstituenciesthathisbudgetwascutbytheabsolute

minimum.InthelongrunthiswasofgreatbenefittoNATOandthedefense

postureoftheUnitedStates.Butin1969itcertainlycomplicatedtheprospects

foracoherentnewNATOstrategyandgaveusananxioustimewithourallies.



Basically,Lairdhadcalledattentiontoafundamentalissue.Therewaslittle

doubtthatthebudgetconstraintswerethreateningtoundermineourforeign

policy.Forthefollowingyearthesamedilemmassurfacedagain. ByJune1970,

budgetaryplanningforFiscalYear1972wasgettingintogear.TheBureauofthe

Budget(nowrenamedtheOfficeofManagementandBudget,orOMB)foresawa

defensebudgetof$76billion.MelLaird,withmysupport,begantowieldhis

formidablepowersofmaneuver.Heconsidered$79billionastheirreducible

minimum;ifhehadtocut$3billion,hewrotethePresident,theresultswouldbe

ominous.Laird’sgeniusforpaintingthemostdireconsequencesifhisbudget

requestswerenotmethadnotbeenimpaired;ifanythingithadbeensharpened 

byhissuccessesduringthepastyear.Hesubmittedastaggeringinventoryof

reductions,whichincludedthelossoffouraircraftcarriers,deactivationoftwo

Armydivisions,retirementof130to140ofouroldestB ‐52S,andcancellationof

othermajorprocurementprograms.(Ifa$3billioncutwouldhave suchanimpact

itwasamazingthatthefullbudgetboughtsofewnewweapons.)



TobringthechoicesandtheirconsequencesintofocusIconveneda

meetingoftheDefenseProgramReviewCommittee.PaulMcCracken,Chairman

oftheCouncilofEconomicAdvisers,wasworriedthattheprojectedfederal

budgetof$237billionwould“scarehelloutofthefinancialcommunity”and

demoralizetheFederalReserveBoardtothepointwhereitmightputadamper

oneconomicrecovery.Wewouldthenwindupwiththeworstpossible

outcome—asluggisheconomyandrekindledfearsofinflation.McCracken

wanteda$6billioncut,twicethatrecommendedbyOMB.Ontheothersideof

theledger,DeputyDefenseSecretaryDavidPackardarguedthatanycutin

defensewouldbedisastrousforoursecurity.



Decisionswerecomplicatedbytheinabilityofthemilitaryservicesto

presentanagreedrationalefortheirrequests.Intheyearsofrelativelyample

defensebudgetseachservicehadsimplypusheditsownpetprojects,whichwere

usuallybasedonwhatwastechnicallyfeasible.The“agreed”JointChiefsofStaff

submissionswereusuallynonaggressiontreatiesamongthevariousservices

unrelatedtoacoherentstrategy.Isaidtomycolleagues:“Iwantapaperthatwill

tellthePresident:‘Ifyoudothis,thesearetheconsequences.’“Ifwecouldno

longerdestroySovietmilitarypower,whatwastherightlevelforourstrategic

forces?Whatwouldbetheimpactofthatnewsituationonthedefenseof

countriesaroundtheSovietperiphery,includingEurope?Couldonebasethe

defenseofperipheralareasindefinitelyonastrategyofexterminatingcivilian

populations?AtatimethattheAmericanthreattolaunchgeneralnuclearwar

waslosingcredibilitywewereundersimultaneouspressuretocutallother

forces.“Wearecuttingourgeneralpurposeforcesandgettingoutofplaceslike

Korea.[

ThisreferredtoaplantopulladivisionoutofKorea,tocompensateforwhichwe

wouldbeefupSouthKoreanforces.]Howarewegoingtodefendtheseareas?This

questionhasto beputtothePresident.Hemustknowwhatweareheading

into.”



ItprovedverydifficulttogettheissuesubmittedtothePresidentinan

agreedmanner.NoonehadaninterestinscrutinizingNATOdoctrineandforces

tooclosely.Suchaninvestigationmightwellhighlighttheincongruityofa

deploymentthatwasacompromisebetweentheEuropeandesiretoguarantee

anAmericannuclearresponseandourattempttoensurethatwewouldinvokeit

onlyasalastresort.AseriousexaminationofNATOconventionalstrategywas

furtherinhibitedbythefearthatsuchastudywoulddiscovershortfallsin

essentialsuppliesthatcouldnotberemediedintheexistingmoodofparliame nts

andmediaandthusmightpro duceapretextforunilatera lreductions.



Ikeptraisingatmeetingaftermeetingthegrowingincongruitybetween

ourstrategyandourforceposture.Noonedeniedthisreality,yetnoonewas

willingtodoanythingaboutit.AtonesessionIfounditimpossibletoobtaina

definitionoftheterm“marginallyeffective,”whichhadbeenusedtodescribea

categoryofweaponsinourplanningpapers.TobringmatterstoaheadI

arrangedameetingoftheJointChiefsofStaffwithNixonforAugust18,1970.It

followedthetime‐honoredpatternofsuchsessions.Eachchiefexplainedwhyhis 

shareoftherecommendedbudgetwastheminimumrequiredtocarryouthis

“mission.”Eachtreatedtheprecisenatureofthatmissionasself‐evidentand

chosenottoexplainit.Baffledbythesenurturedambiguities,overwhelmedwith

technicaldetail,thePresidentfounditimpossibletotellwhetherthearguments

wereself‐servingorjustified.Theywereusuallyboth.



Onthefollowingday—August19—therewasanNSCmeetingtoreviewthe

defensebudget.Thediscussionrambledoninconclusively.Nixonmade

statementsthatweretoughphilosophicallybutthatdidnotchangehisbudgetary

ceiling;ourcapabilitieswouldultimatelybedeterminedbytheceiling,notbyhis

exhortations.Nixonthoughtitimperativetopresenta“lean”budgetinorderto

forestallevenmoreseverecutsbytheCongress.Allthatthediscussionachieved

wastoreducetheproposedcutfrom$6billionto$4.5billion;theCongressthen

slashedanother$3billion.IexpressedmypremonitionstoNixonina

memorandum:



Weareindangerofslidingintoaperiodofrelyingonmassiveretaliationeventhough

thisisabsurd.Ourgeneralpurposeforcesmustbelookedat.Wehavetohaveforcesinwhich

wecanbelieve.Wemustbeabletoprojectacrediblepowerabroadinasituationwhere

generalnuclearwarisnolongeralikelyorreasonablealternative.Thegeneralpurposeforces

arethewayweareseenbyallies—theyarethecontactandthereality.



MelLairdinamemoranduminNovemberstressedthathetoowas

concernedaboutthedangerousdeclineinconventionalcapabilities.



Laird,Packard,andIconsoledeachotherwiththedeterminationthatwe

woulddoourutmosttomakeupinadequaciesinthe“out”years—theyearsnot

coveredbythecurrentbudget.Unfortunately,forthemomentallpressureswere

intheoppositedirection.Thedecisiontomovetowardavolunteerarmyfurther

reducedweaponsprocurement.Itforcedanincreaseinpayscalessothat

eventuallynearly60percentofourmilitarybudgetwenttopayandallowances

(asagainstalittleover30percentintheSovietUnion),leavingamuchsmaller

amountfornewweapons.Anddespitethoseincentivesitproducedamanpower

shortage.ByNovember1970,USforcesinEuropewereabout17,000below

authorizedstrength;almosttwo‐thirdsofthatreductionhadtakenplacesince

July.



Andmaintainingeventheexistingforceswouldfaceincreasingpolitical

obstacles.SenatorMikeMansfield,MajorityLeaderoftheSenate,nowused

Brandt’sOstpolitiktojustifyasubstantialreductionofourtroopsinEurope.



Everyeasingoftensionsledtopressuresforcutsintheforceswhichhadmade

thateasingpossible.SomefavoredareductionoftheAmericanmilitaryprese nce

inEuropebecausetheythoughtitwasnolongernecessary;othersconsideredour

overseasdeploymenteconomicallyunbearable.SenatorStuartSymingtonmade

thispointtoAssistant SecretaryofStateMartinHillenbrand:



ThepeopleoftheUnitedStateswanttoseeareductioninthecoststhatwehavein

Europe,andtheythinkandalltheeconomistsIhaveevertalkedtobeforeexceptyouthinkthis

wouldsignificantlyandfavorablyaffecttheUSeconomy.



IntheCongress,supportersofNATOarguedinthenameofburden‐sharing

thatifEuropedidnotdomore,weshoulddoless(becauseofourintractable

balanceofpaymentsdifficulties).“Burden‐sharing”had,infact,thesame

objectiveconsequenceasbudgetarypressures:Itwasawaystationinthe

directionofreducingourforcesinEuropeandourcontributiontoEuropean

security.



OurEuropeanallies,consciousoftheirmilitaryvulnerability,uneasyalike

abouttheirfearsofAmericanabdicationandtheirpoliticalrisksathomein

expandingtheirowndefenses,watchedourdebatewithforeboding.They

simultaneouslyfearedourwithdrawalsanddreadedourpressuresonthemto

builduptheirdefenses.Theywerelookingforwaysoutoftheirdilemmaandthey

foundtwo—atleastintermediate—expedients.



BothweresuggestedinonesentenceofthePresident’sForeignPolicy

ReportofFebruary18,1970:



Theforgingofacommonunderstandingonbasicsecurityissueswillmateriallyimprove

ourabilitytodealsensiblyandrealisticallywiththeopportunitiesandpressuresforchangethat

weface,includingsuggestionsinthiscountryforsubstantialreductionsofUStrooplevelsin

EuropeandthepossibilitythatbalancedforcereductionscouldbecomeasubjectofEast‐West

discussions.



Theenergetic,able,andnotalittlewilyNATOSecretary‐GeneralManlio

Brosiointerpreteda phrasedraftedbystaffassistantsasaPresidentialsignalfor

action.HeproposedthatNATOconductadefensereviewasameansofslowing

downAmericanwithdrawals.AndhewasadrivingforcebehindNATO’s growing

interestinnegotiationswiththeEastforthemutualreductionofforcesinCentral

Europe—whateventuallycametobeknownasmutualandbalancedforce

reductions,orMBFR.Bothweredesigned—asBrosiofranklyadmittedtoNixon

whentheymetprivatelyinNaplesinSeptember1970—asdevicestoputabrake

onunilateralAmericandecisions.ThepresumptionwasthattheUSCongress

woulddonothingirrevocableuntilthetwoinitiativeshadbeenexploredand

completed.Therevivaloftheideaofmutualreductionswasnotapassionate 

commitmenttothisambiguousgoalbutanattempt—notatalldiscouragedby

theAdministration—toforestallunilateralAmericancuts.



ThedefensereviewproposedbyBrosiooccupie dmuchof1970.Aspartof

it,the“Eurogroup”(theEuropeancaucusformedatHealey’sinitiativetheyear

before)wastodeviseaprogramofnewmeasurestobeefupdefense;thiswasto

neutralizecriticismintheUSCongressthatEuropeanswerenotdoingenough.

Nixongavetheprojectanadditionalimpetuswhen,inameetingwithNATO

commandersinNaplesonhisMediterraneantripinSeptember1970,hestressed

thatourapproachtoburden‐sharingpreferredadditionalEuropeanexpenditures

tobemadefortheirowndefense,ratherthanfinancialgimmickstorepaythe

UnitedStatesforthestationingofAmericantroops.Hisstatementthatwedidnot

wantAmericanstoactasmercenariesforEuropeanswasnobleandtheoretically

correct;butitdidnothelpMelLaird’sdesperateattempttogetsomebudgetary

reliefinanyform(suchastheWestGermanagreementtopayforourbarracks

andtobuyAmericanweapons,tooffsetsomeofourbudgetarycosts).MelLaird

wasperformingmiraclesinmaintainingourNATOforcessubstantiallyatexisting

levelsandlayingthebasisformodernizationofourstrategicarsenal.But

modernizationofNATOwasoutofthequestionwhenallourexertionswere

neededtokeeptheCongressfromlegislatingareductionofforces.The

WashingtonPostcorrespondentinBonninalengthyarticleonOctober5

indicatedthatthestrongstatementsmadebythePresidenthadnotallayed

Europe’sfearsonthisscore:“Afteralongperiodofbrushingtheproblemasidein

hopesthatitsomehowwouldgoaway,theEuropeanmembersofNATOare

beginningtorealizethattheyhavelittletimelefttocounterpressuresintheUS

CongressforawholesalereductionoftheAmericancommitmenttoNATO.”



Theprojectedmilitarybudgetcouldleavenodoubtaboutthedirectionin

whichCongressionalandpublicpressureswereinex orablypushing us.Thoughthe

dollaramountofthebudgetwasslightlyhigherthantheprecedingone,inflation

andthecostsofthevolunteerarmyproducedasignificantreductionintermsof

constantdollars.Ourallieswereunwillingtostepintothebreach;theychoseto

implementthe1970 defensereviewbymeasuresthatavoidedseriousfinancial

commitments.TheNATOdefensereviewwascompletedbyDecember1970and

submittedtotheNorthAtlanticCouncil.Itamounte dtoacollectivecontribution