Department(whichhadbeengivenasummaryofthePresidentialconversation
withMrs.Meir).
Aseriousbureaucraticbattlewaslooming.OnSeptember27Dobrynin
calledonmewiththeperennialSovietsuggestionofajointUS‐Sovietposition,
thistimetoprovideguidelinesforJarring,theUNSpecialRepresentative.I
rejectedtheoverturewiththeargumentthataslongastheSovietswereso
unhelpfulonVietnam,jointactionelsewherewouldbe“difficult.”Ihadno
intentiontoactjointlywiththeSovietUnionwhentheSovietsclearlyexpectedto
getafreerideonourexertions.ButmyrebuffmerelysentDobryninbackinto
otherchannels.Hecontinued intensivetalkswithSiscoinSeptemberand
October.PickingupthreadsoftheMoscowvisit,SiscoandDobryninmulledover
thevariousprovisionsofapossibleEgyptian‐Israelisettlement.ByOctober14,
Siscowasreportingthattherewasenoughprogressonprocedures(suchas
holdingindirecttalks,asRalphBunchehadconductedtwentyyearsearlieronthe
isleofRhodes)towarrantmovingaheadtotheissueofboundariesthefollowing
week.
Ihadmydoubtsaboutthis“progress.”IthoughttheSovietswereusingthe
MiddleEast,likeSALT,tomakeNixonthinktwiceabouthisthreatenedNovember
1“deadline”overVietnam(seeChapterVIII).Myconcernswerenoteasedbythe
meetingbetweenDobryninandthePresidentonOctober20.Dobryninreadfrom
anaide‐mémoire,puttingalltheblamefortheMiddleEastimpassesquarelyon
Washington.Nixonrepliedsharply,pointingoutthattheSovietshadbeentotally
inflexibleonIsraeliwithdrawalwithoutindicatinganysacrificetheywouldask
fromEgypt;theSovietclienthadlostthewar,hadlosttheterritory,andwasinno
positiontobemakingdemands.
WhileNixonwasfacingdownDobrynin,Siscowasanglingforauthorityto
tellDobryninaboutourfallbackpositionacceptingthe1967frontierlinkedto
securityguarantees.Hewantedtomoveaheadatameetingscheduledfor
October28.IdiscussedthiswiththePresident,whoagreedthereshouldbeno
AmericaninitiativesofanykindbeforetheNovember1Vietnamdeadline.Nixon
had,infact,givenaflatorderthattherebenofurthercontactsatallwiththe
SovietsuntilhehadgivenhismajorNovember3speechonVietnam.Sisco
protested,becauseRogershadalreadypromisedGromykothatSiscoand
DobryninwouldmeetonOctober28. (Thiswashardlyaconclusiveargument,