Kissinger Henry. White House Years

Подождите немного. Документ загружается.



Eban’seloquence—unfortunatelyforthosewhohadtonegotiatewith

him—wasalliedtoafirst‐classintelligenceandfullyprofessionalgraspof

diplomacy.Hewasalwayswellprepared;heknewwhathewanted.Hepracticed

tothefullhismaximthatanythinglessthanonehundredpercentagreementwith

Israel’spointofviewdemonstratedlackofobjectivity.Evenamostsympathetic

position—sayninetypercent— wasdeploredas“erosion.”“weakening,”or“loss

ofnerve.”IwasnotalwayssurewhetherEban’smorematter‐of‐factcolleaguesin

JerusalemappreciatedhiseloquenceasmuchasIdid;hisPrimeMinisterseemed

occasionallytobypasshiminfavorofmoreuNorthodoxchannels.ButIwas

hardlyinastrongmoralpositiontoobjecttochannelsthatbypassedaForeign

Minister.



EbantookvigorousexceptiontotheveryconceptofFour‐PowerandTwo‐

Powertalks,onthegroundthatthedeckwouldbestackedagainstIsraelineither

group.EbanstressedtheoneIsraelidemandthathecalculatedwasleastlikelyto

bemetbytheArabs:theinsistenceondirectnegotiationsandArabsignatureson

ajointpeacetreaty.Asignedpeacetreatywasessential,heexplained,becauseof

thespecialreverencethattheArabshadalwaysshownforwrittenpromises.Idid

notmovehimbysuggestingthatinmyadmittedlyinadequatereadingofArab

historyIhadfoundnogreaterorlesseradherencetosignedtreatiesthaninany

otherpartoftheworld.



Ebanwastooshrewdtowastetimedebatinghistorywithme,however.He

hadalongmeetingwithSecretaryRogersonMarch13inthecourseofwhichhe

wasshownthegeneralprinciplespaper ,rejectedit,andaskedthatitnotbe

submitted.Ebanobjectedstronglytoourformulationsregardingborders.It

seemedtoprejudgewhatIsraelinsistedcouldbenegotiatedonlybetweenthe

parties.Lestwegrowtooself‐confidentaboutanyotherportionofourprinciples

paper,Ebanrejectedthenotionofbig‐powerguaranteesaswell.By“globalizing”

everyeventintheMiddleEast,hesaid, wewouldturntheareaintoanother

Berlin.EgyptwasnotreadyforthekindofpeaceIsraelrequired;hewas

convincedtheSovietprese nceinEgyptmadeitincreasinglyunlikelythatNasser

wouldbeflexible.AnegotiationwithJordan,lessimmoderateandfreeofSoviet

influence,wasmorehopeful.



Inthefinalanalysis.Ebansawnothingintolerableinthestatusquo.Israel

muchpreferredthattheUnitedStatesavoidanactiveroleandletJarringpursue

hiscourse.Israelwasostensiblywillingtonegotiatebutprofoundlypessimistic

aboutprospectsforacomprehensivesettlement.Thismeantthattherewasno

wayofpursuingthecoursewehadsetforourselveswithoutamassiveclashwith

Israel.



ThenextvisitorswereArab.Theywerenomoretractable.



WhenformerPresidentEisenhowerdiedonMarch28,Nasserdesignated

MahmoudFawzi,hisforeignaffairsadviser,toattendthefuneralasEgypt’s

representative.Fawzi’spresencetohonoraleaderofacountrywithwhichEgypt

hadnodiplomaticrelationswasamarkofparticularrespectandcourtesy.Fawzi

wasafinegentleman,aprofessionalwiththeingratiatingmanneroftheeducated

Egyptianandthewearyairofonewhohadseenmuchofman’sfoibles.BecauseI

consideredEgyptasaSovietclientstate,I didnottakeadvantageofestablishing

thecloserhumancontactthattheopportunityafforded.Inthelightofmylater

experienceIhaveregrettedthis.



Fawzi’svisitcameafternearlyadecadeandahalfoferodingrelations

betweenEgyptandtheUnitedStates.Duringthetransition,Nasserhadsenta

ramblinglettertothePresident‐electlistinghisgrievancesagainsttheUnited

Statesbuthintingthatintherightcircumstanceshewouldbepreparedtoresume

relations.ThishadalsobeenNasser’sthemewhenGovernorScrantonvisited

CairoinearlyDecember;Egyptwantedtoresumetiesbutwouldliketohavea

morefavorableAmericanMiddleEastpolicyfora pretext.Throughoutearly1969

NasserrepeatedtherequestforanAmericangesturetobreaktheice.Holdingup

thesaleofF‐4PhantomjetstoIsraelwasoneofhisideas;itwasunlikelyto

commenditselftoIsrael.ThoughitseemedtomethatNasseroverratedtheboon

hewouldconferonusbyresumingdiplomaticrelations,IwroteNixoninMarch

thatwehadalreadytakenseveralofthestepsNasserhadsuggested(iffor

differentreasons).Wehadconductedanactivediplomacy;wehadputforward

generalprinciples;Rogershadstatedaforthcomingpositiononfrontiersbefore

theSenateForeignRelationsCommittee.Thebasisforapossiblerapprochement

betweenWashingtonandCairoseemedtoexist.



AgainstthisbackdropIhadtwomeetingswithFawzipreparatorytohiscall

onNixononApril11.ButitsoontranspiredthatFawzihadnoauthoritytoresume

diplomaticrelations.HewouldreportourreactiontoCairo;relationscouldbe

resumedonlyiftherewassomeconcreteadvance;hedidnotspelloutwhathe

meantbythatphrase.Egyptwaseagertomakeprogresspartlybecausethe

Sovietswerepressingitinthedirectionofpeace,hesaid.Theyseemedto

understandthattheywouldnotbeabletohelptheirArabfriendsanyotherway;

inastalemateSovietstandingintheArabworldwasboundtodeteriorate.



Fawzi’slastpointwas,ofcourse,preciselythestrategicopportunityI

perceivedfortheUnitedStates.IftheSovietpositioninEgyptwasboundto

deterioratethelongerasettlementwasdelayed,wehadnoincentivewhatever

toacceptthefirstSovietorEgyptianoffer,especiallyaslongastheSovietUnion

maintainedlargeforcesinEgyptandEgyptiandiplomacytookitsleadfrom

Moscow.ThetermsofferedbyFawziwerenotlikelytoinspireoptimisminany

event.Egyptrefusedtosigna jointdocumentwithIsrael;itsobligationswould

runonlytotheSecurityCouncil(wheretheSovietUnionhadaveto);itwouldnot

establishdiplomaticrelationswithIsrael;UNpeacekeepingforcescouldbe

removeduponsixmonths’notice.Thesepositionswouldneversufficetobring

aboutthefullIsraeliwithdrawalEgyptdemanded.



FawziurbanelyassuredNixononApril11thatEgyptwaseagertoreduceits

militaryexpendituresanddevoteitsresourcestodomesticconstruction.Hedid

notasktheUnitedStatestopressIsraeltodothingsagainstitsinterests;hedid

requesteven‐handedtreatmentforEgypt.Asforresumingrelations,thetimewas

notyetripe,hesaid.



TothisdayIhavenotunderstoodNasser’smotives.Formonthshehad

conveyedurgentsignalspointinginthedirectionofresumpt ionofrelations.He

sentFawzi,knownasaconciliator,toWashington.Fawziconductedhimself

capably,butonthatcrucialissuehisinstructions,tohisobviousdiscomfiture,did

notpermithimto budge.ItwasneverclearhowNasserthoughtNixoncould

bravedomesticopposition,Israelirefusals,andSovietaloofnesstosupportthe

maximumgoalsofacountrythatrefuseddiplomaticrelationswithusandwhose

foreignpolicyremainedfundamentallyunfriendly.Nasser,ineffect,soughtto

dealwithusbyblackmailbuthadnothingtothreatenuswith.Whenlaterinthe

yeartheAdministrationputforwardpreciseplansonboththeEgyptianand

JordanianbordersalonglinespreviouslydeclaredacceptablebyNasser,he

refusedeithertoacceptthemortoresumerelations.Hegloriedinhisradicalism,

whichhethoughtessentialtohisPan‐Arabambitions,andforthishemusthave

feltcompelledto remaininperpetualco nfrontationwithusintheMiddleEast

andtheThirdWorld,evenatthecostofjeopardizingourwillingnessto movein

hisdirection.



IhavenodoubtthattheUnitedStateswouldhavepursuedthepeace

processmoreenergeticallyearlyintheNixonAdministrationhadNasserbeen

moreflexible.TheprincipalobstaclestoamoreactiveAmericanrolewere

Nasser’santi‐AmericanforeignpolicyandthepredominantroleoftheSoviet

UnioninCairo.Fawziwasnotinapositiontoreassureusthatthesedidnot

representfixedprinciplesofEgyptianpolicy.Instead,withallhischarm,Fawzion

Nasser’sinstructionscalmlyinsistedonhavingeverythingfornothing:USsupport

againstIsrael,SovietsupportagainsttheUnitedStates,andleadershipofthe

radicalmovementsthroughouttheThirdWorld.Foreignpolicydoesnotworkthat

way.Nassercouldnotmakethechoicebetweenhisrhetoricalambitionsandhis

intuitionofthelimitsofEgypt’sabilitytoachievethoseambitions.Hedied

withoutevermakingthechoice.Onlyhisgreatsuccessor,AnwarSadat,wouldput

thepiecestogether.



ThefailureoftheFawzimissionaffectedanotherArabvisitor,thedoughty

KingHusseinofJordan,whohadneverbargainedabouthisfriendshipwiththe

UnitedStates.Husseinwasoneofthemostattractivepoliticalleader sIhavemet.

ThelittleKing—ashewasaffectionatelycalledbyourofficials—stoutlydefended

theArabcauseevenwhenhisArabbrethrenfailedtoreciprocatehisloyalty.

OnceIknewhimreasonablywellIcouldmeasurehisirritationatwhathe

consideredinsensitivityorbureaucraticpedantrybytheheighteningofhis

legendarycourtesy;hisuseofthehonorific“sir”wouldmultiplywhileheassumed

aglacialdemeanor.(He,anhereditarymonarch,calledme“sir”evenwhenIwas

amerePresidentialAssistant.)



Hewasasgallantashewaspolite.OncehepilotedmywifeNancyandme

inhishelicopteronahair‐raisingrideattreetoplevel.Togethimtoflyhigher,

Nancysaidinnocentlythatshedidnotknowhelicopterscouldflysolow.TheKing

assuredherthattheycouldflylowerstill,makingtherestofthetripalmoston

thedeck.Hadheexploitedtheopportunityhecouldhaveobtainedmy

agreementtoanypoliticaldemandbypromisingtoflyhigher.



HusseinsoughtwithdignityandcouragetoreconciletherolesofArab

nationalistandAmerica’sfrie nd.Apro‐WesternmonarchinthevortexofArab

radicalism,hemaintainedhisindependenceaswellastherespectofrulersinthe

regionwhowerelessthanenchantedbythedynasticprinciple.Though

substantiallydependentonAmericanaidheputupwithourcumbersomeand

sometimeshumiliatingprocedures,neverlosinghiscomposureorpatiencebut

alsoneverdescendingto theroleofsupplicant.HewasthefirstArableader

preparedtotalkofmakingpeacewithIsrael,maintaininganintermittentif

fruitlesscontactwithJerusalem.ItwasamisfortunethatthestrengthofHussein’s

bargainingpositiondidnotmatchhismoderationandthathisavailableoptions

werenotequaltohisgoodwill.Hethushadthecapacityneitherforindependent

actionnorforblackmail,whicharethestuffofMiddleEasternpolitics.In1969,

thefedayeenofthePalestineLiberationOrganizationformedastatewithinhis

statebutdidnotdeflecthimfromhismoderatecourse;monthslater(asweshall

seeinChapterXV)hecourageouslyanddecisivelyconfrontedtheirchallengeto

hisauthority.



InhismeetingwithNixononApril8,Hussein,speakingalsoonbehalfof

Nasser,stressedthatbothleaderswerecommittedtoSecurityCouncilResolution

242andwerepreparedtosignanydocumentwithIsraelexc epta peacetreaty.

Husseinrecognizedtheneedforsomeminorborderrectifications.IfIsraelwould

cedeGazatoJordanianrule,therectificationsontheWestBankcouldbefairly

substantial.(Itseemsunfortunate,inretrospect,thattherewasnotmore

explorationofaseparateJordan‐IsraelarrangementinvolvingaswapofGazafor

WestBankterritories.)HusseinassertedthatbothNasserandhewerewillingto

considerdemilitarizedzonesandfreeaccessthroughtheSuezCanalaswellasthe

StraitofTiran.ThepressureofArabextremistswas“eager”toresumetieswith

theUnitedStates.Buttheconciliator yimpactoftheseremarkswaslargely

vitiatedbyFawzi’stalkswithmeandhisdisappointingmeetingwithNixonthree

dayslater,asalreadydescribed.



<<Contents>>



****



Diplomacy:Ever‐NewProposals



hedeadlockbetweentheMiddleEastpartiesinev itablyreflecteditselfinthe

Four‐andtheTwo‐Powertalks.Thesolutionthatseemedobvioustoour

interlocutorsinthosetalkswastothrowusintothefraytoimposeapeace.On

April14DobrynintoldmethattheTwo‐Powerexerciseneededmoreconcrete

propositions,particularlyonfrontiers.WhattheSovietsandArabswantedwasto

getustomakespecifictheimplicationofourvagueformulationsabout“minor

rectifications” andthe“weightofconquest,”thatis,anexplicitinsistencethat

Israeliwithdrawalbetotal.AssuringmeofSovieteagernesstohelppromotea

settlement,DobryninsuggestedwetryajointUS‐Sovietproposal;iftheUnited

Statescameupwithmorespecificpositionsoneachoftheprinciples,theSoviets

wouldthensellthemtotheArabs.SinceDobryninineffectwasaskingusto

accepttheArabprogram,itwasnotclearwhatheproposedto“sell”tothem.To

meitseemedthathewaslookingtoobtaincreditintheArabworldforwhat

wouldamounttoapeaceimposedbyusonIsrael.Wewerebeingpressedinthe

samedirectionintheFour‐Powerforumaswell.DeGaulle,whohadhonored

PresidentEisenhowerbyattendingthememorialserviceshimself,hadtoldNixon

onMarch31thattheFourshouldtrytoagreeoncommontermsforasettlement.

YetweknewfromourconsultationsinNewYorkthateachoftheparticipantshad

hisownideaofwhatthosetermsshouldbe—andthatnonewasacceptableto

Israel.Ineachforumwewerebeingaskedto imposeapeace,forwhichwe

needednoforum.ThiswaspreciselytheoutcomeIhadpredicted.

T



Athome,amajorityofbothHousesofCongressralliedtosupportIsrael’s

positioninapublicdeclaration:directnegotiations,acontractualpeace,andno

pressureonIsraeltowithdrawprematurely.AsinVietnam,wewouldwindup

negotiatingwithourselves.



Notsurprisingly,themoreinconclusivethenegotiationsinMarchandApril

1969,themoreintensewasthemilitaryconfrontationontheground.Asviolence

spiraled,UThantwarnedonApril22thata“virtualstateofactivewar”existed

alongtheSuezCanal;aCairospokesmandeclaredthe1967cease‐fireonthat

frontvoid.ClashesmountedasIsraelretaliatedagainstfedayeenattacksfrom

Jordan;Lebanondeclaredastateofemergencyinthefutileattempttohalt

fedayeenraidsintoIsraelfromitsterritory.Whatcametobecalled the“warof

attrition”wasproceedinginearnest.



Inotherwords,aftertwomonthsofanewUSinitiative,weweremoreor

lessbackatthestartingpoint.Wehadprovedagainwhatwealreadyknew:The

partieshadvastlydifferentviewsaboutthemeaningofsecureandrecognized

frontiers,thetimingandextentofwithdrawals,thenatureofrecognition,and

indeedtheprocessofnegotiation.



Anotherpolicyreviewwasclearlynecessary.



WhathadstartedinFebruaryasanexplorationtodeterminethefeasibility

ofnegotiationshadbyMayevolvedintotheproposition thattheUnitedStates

hadanobligationtosavethenegotiationsbyproducingnewandincreasingly

specificproposals.Buttherewasnogettingaroundthefactthateachside’s

propositionsweretotallyunacceptabletotheother.Thepartiescouldnotbe

maneuveredbyartfulproceduresintoabandoningpositionstheyhadheldand

foughtforinthreewarsovertwentyyears.Theyawninggulfbetweenthemcould

bebridgedonlybyformulationssoambiguousthattheywouldsimplyrepeatthe

evasionsofSecurityCouncilResolution242.



Inthesecircumstances,thevitalquestionforuswasnotwhatgeneral

proposalswewouldmakebutwhetherwewerepreparedtoinsist—bypressureif

necessary—thatourproposalsbecarriedout.Untilwehadansweredthis

question—whichmeant,astheproposalswereframed,pressureonIsrael—the

negotiationwasboundtostalemateonewayoranother.Ifwestucktoourvague

positions,theFour‐andTwo‐Powertalkswouldcollapse,withtheblamefalling

ontheUnitedStates.IfwewerespecificwewouldbeinamajorbrawlwithIsrael

withoutgainingthefriendshipoftheArabs.Onthecontrary,theSovietUnionand

itsclientswouldbethemajorbeneficiaries.Andifweshiedawayfrompressing

Israel,foreitherdomesticorforeignpolicyreasons,thenegotiationwouldagain

grindtoahalt.Tome,thiswastheinevitableconsequenceofattemptinga

comprehensivesettlementwhentheparties’positionsweresofarapart,the

SovietssupportedtheArabposition,andwehadnotyetmaneuveredtoa

mediator’srole.



Rogersarguedthatputtingforthadetailedplanwouldimproveour

positionevenifitwererejected;therewas,accordingtohim,simplynowayof

knowingwhetherasettlementwaspossiblewithouttestingEgyptian,Soviet,and

Israeliviews.Therefore,theStateDepartmentnowsubmittedforPresidential

approvalthedraftofadetailedpeacesettlementbetweenEgyptandIsrael,based

onthepre‐June5,1967,lines.AdraftofaJordan‐Israelpeace agreementwould

followshortly.



IexpressedstrongreservationstothePresident.Ipredictedthatthe

schemewouldprobablyleadtoablowupwithbothsides.Theborderswere

certaintobeunacceptabletoIsrael,andtheArabs,inNasser’scurrentframeof

mind,werenotreadytomakethenecessarycommitmenttopeace.Itwouldnot

improveourrelationswiththeArabs;itwouldstrengthenthepositionofthe

Soviets;theSovietsandtheirclientswouldfirstgetcreditforhavingpushedus

thisfarandthenaccuseusofnotgoingfarenoughandnot deliveringIsraelon

whatwehadpromised.



TheseissuesweredebatedbeforethePresidentatanNSCmeetingonthe

morningofApril25.ThePresident,tornbetweenthewarningsinmymemoranda

andthepressuresofhisbureaucracy,avoidedadecision.Instead,heaskedme

afterwardtoworkwithSiscoonmodifyingtheStateproposaltomitigatethe

dangersIhadforeseen.Thepaper,asre vised,wasapprovedbythePresidenton

May5.Thechangesweremostlycosmetic.ItwasknownthatthePresidentwas

notpreparedflatlytooverrulehisSecretaryofStateontheMiddleEast;hence,

myinfluencewasweak.InthenewversiontheUnitedStateswouldnotpresent

anoverallplanforanEgyptian‐Israelisettlementallatonce;rather,itsprovisions

wouldbeputfo rwardpiecemealinsuccessivetalksbetweenSiscoandDobrynin.

Second,theUnitedStateswouldnotcommititselfinitiallytopushforfullIsraeli

withdrawalfromtheSinai;rather,theformulationonboundarieswouldbeleft

ambiguous,withwithdrawaltotheprewarline“notnecessarilyexcluded.”These

changescouldonlydelay—theycouldnotarrest—theStateDepartment

steamroller;oncethePresidenthadauthorizedtheult imatepositionitwas

certaintobeputforwardonewayortheother.



ThiswasallthemoretruebecauseJoeSiscodidnotbelieveinleisurely

negotiations.AssoonasthePresidenthadapprovedtherevisedstrateg y,he

beganhissecondroundoftalkswithDobrynin.Hedidnotwastetime;hestarted

onMay6andfinishedbyJune9.Sisco brisklydoledouttheUnitedStates

positionsonthekeyissues.ItsoonbecameapparentthattheSovietswerenot

abouttoacceptthemandwouldinevitablyaskformore.Forexample,weinsisted

ondirectArab‐Israelinegotiationsatsomestage.Dobryninwantedtodownplay

this.Onborders,wemaintainedthat“theformerinternationalboundary

betweenEgyptandthemandatedterritoryofPalestineisnotnecessarily

excluded.”TheSovietUniondemandedtotalwithdrawaltotheprewarlines

withoutchange.WefavoreddemilitarizationoftheentireSinai;theSovietsdid

not.Weinsistedonfreenavigationthroughinternationalwaterwayssuchasthe

StraitofTiranandtheSuezCanalwhiletheSovietshedgedtheirpositionby

referencestotheConstantinopleConventionof1888whoseimportwas

ambiguouswhenappliedtocurrentcircumstances.Therewerealsodifferences

overtherefugeeissue.OnJune11,Dobrynincomplainedtomeaboutthenew

deadlock;helament edSisco’slackofprecision,particularlyhis“abstract”

formulationonborders,asDobrynincalledit(whichatleastdemonstratedtome

thatJoewasstayingwithininstructions).



Allthistime,Israelmadeclearinitsinimitablewaythatitsunhappines s

withthenewAmericaninitiativewasmounting,evenasDobryninwasattacking

ourformulasfromtheArabside.OnMay13AmbassadorRabininquiredintothe

purposeofthisnewUS‐Sovietdialogueandexpressedspecialconcernthatwe

mightyieldontheborderissue.Hecritic izedotherprovisionsaswell.Israelstill

preferreddirectnegotiationswiththeArabs.PrimeMinisterGoldaMe irsentan

impassionedlettertoPresidentNixonreiteratingherconcernthattheUnited

Stateswasprejudicingthenegotiationsbyprede terminingtheoutcomeonthe

mainissues.Topreventthesituationfromgettingoutofhand,Rabinsuggested

thatMrs.Meirbeinvitedto Washingtonatanearlydate.Wewerenotreadyfor

animmediateencounter.IsecuredaninvitationfromthePresidentforMrs.Meir

tovisitinthefall.



Newfightingpunctuatedthediplomaticsparring.InMay,June,andJuly,

theMiddleEastexplodeddailywithfedayeenraidsfromJordanandaerial

combatovertheEgyptianandSyrianfronts;Mrs.MeirpromisedthatIsraeli

reprisalswouldbeswiftandsevere,repaying“sevenfold”theArabattackson

Israel.InMay,NassertoldTimemagazinethatasettlementwaspossibleifIsrael

agreedtototalwithdrawalandtogivingPalestiniansthechoiceofreturn—both

ofwhichIsraelhadalreadyrejected.Inthesameinterviewhealsosaidthathe

acceptedthe“reality”ofIsrael,buthedemonstratedhisambivalencebyordering

thatsentenceomittedfromtheCairomediaaccountofhisinterview.Then,ina

majorspeechonJuly23,Nasserseemedtoreversehimselfagain;henow

proclaimedthatEgyptwaspassingintothe“stageofliberation”initswarwith

Israel,andcondemnedtheUnitedStatesandBritainforsupportingIsrael.

Meanwhile,onJune13SovietForeignMinisterGromykoendedaCairovisitwith

acommuniquéthatpledgedfullSovietsupportforEgypt’sstruggleto“liquidate

theconsequencesofaggression.”



OnJune17,theSovietUnionfinallygaveusacounterpro posal.TheSoviet

replyhadsomepositiveelements:ittalkedofworkingforabindingagreement

andofrecognition ofIsrael.Butitshowedlittlef lexibilityonthemajorissuesthat

concernedusmost:Directnegotiationswerenotmentioned;finalbordersmust

rigidlyfollowthe1967lines:freedomofnavigationwasleftvague;thedefinition

offinalpeace omittedanyobligationtocontroltheguerrillas;anditrefusedto

embracethepropositionthatIsraelshouldhavesomecontroloverwhich

PalestiniansreturnedtoIsrael.



Rogers,nevertheless,decidedthattheSovietreplyshowedenough

“forwardmovement”towarrantanotherAmericanproposal.SinceDobryninhad

returnedhomeforconsultations,RogersproposedonJune30thatJoeSisco

traveltoMoscowtopresentsomenewideas.Specifically,RogerswantedSiscoto

beauthorizedinMoscow,athisowndiscretionasafallbackposition,toplayour

“trumpcard”—anexplicitcommitmenttotheprewarfrontiers—iftheSoviets

wereforthcomingontheissuesofpeace,security,anddirectnegotiations.



ThisIthoughtpremature,toputitkindly.Inmyview,theSovietreply

reflectednosignificantconcession.Basically,itsoughttoextractthetotalArab

programfromusbysubtlyevasiveandsubstantiallyunyieldingformulas.It

showednowillingnesstomatchourleverageonIsraelwithsimilarpressureon

theArabs.Itseemeddesignedfortheoverridingpurposeofdemonstratingthe

SovietUnion’sindispensabilitytoitsArabclients.Ifwewentalong,ablowupwith

Israelwasinevitable.Nevertheless,Iwasnotina positiontostopRogers’s

initiative.IrecommendedtothePresidentthathegoalongwiththeSiscotripso

longasweofferednonewconcessiononborders.IadvisedthePresident:“I

wouldnotatthissta gegivehimauthoritytocommitusinanywaytothefallback

language.ThatputsustoofaraheadofIsraelandgivesawayourpositionwithout