Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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“explore”acertaincourse“inprinciple,”withsolemnassurancesthatthis

decisioncreatesneitherprecedentnorobligationforanotherstepandthatthe

policymakerswillretainfullcontrolovertheprocess.Invariablythefirststep

impliesaseriesofothers;theexplorationofaserioussubjectcanonlyrevealits

difficultiesandspurpressurestoovercomethem.SoonthePresidentisaskedto

acttoremoveanimpassehisownpolicyhascreated.Thisisofcourseexactly

whattheadvocatesofanactivepolicydesire;theyareonlytooeagertoput

forwardschemestobreakthedeadlock.ManyMidEastexpertsinStatehadbeen

unhappywithPresidentJohnson’saloof posturetowardtheconflict,whichthey

attributedtodomesticpolitics. Theireagernesswasfurtherstimulatedbythecast

ofmindofsomeAmericandiplomatsthatacrisisissomehownotgenuineunless

weareapartytoit.Thiswastheoriginofthethoughtthatwemustneverbe

perceived(neverspecifyingbywhom)asindifferenttoemergingconfrontations.



Ihadseriousdoubtsaboutrushingintonegotiationswhoseobjectiveswe

hadnotdefinedandforwhoseoutcomewewouldbeheldresponsible.Ialso

questionedtheassumptionsunderlyingtherecommendation.Itseemedtome

unlikelythatwewouldfindcommongroundbetweentheparties.Ididnot

particularlylikethenegotiatingforumsofferedtous.GivenSovietandFrench

biasestowardtheArabviewpoint(andthepressuresthisputontheBritish),a

Four‐PowerforumasproposedbyFrancewaslikelytoproducea lineupagainst

theUnitedStates.Ontheotherhand,Two‐Powertalks—betweentheUnited

StatesandtheSovietUnion—might,iftheymadeanyprogress,givetheSoviet

Unionthecreditforhavingpre ssedaMiddleEastsettlementonus,andifthey

failed,saddleuswiththeblame.



Moreseriousthanthechoiceofforumwastheconstantand fundamental

premise—statedexplicitlybyoneoftheStateDepartmentrepresentativesatthe

February1NSCmeeting—thattheUnitedStateswouldhavetodeliverIsraeli

agreement.Itmeantthatwewerebeingaskedtopressureanallyonbehalfof

countrieswhich,withtheexceptionofJo rdan,hadbrokenrelationswithus,

pursuedpoliciesgenerallyhostiletous,andwereclientsofMoscow.Itherefore

doubtedtheadvisabilityofAmericanpressureforageneralsettlementuntilwe

couldseemoreclearlywhatconcessionstheArabswouldmakeanduntilthose

whowouldbenefitfromitwouldbeAmerica’sfriends,notSovietclients.Inthe

meantimeImuchpreferredanIsraeli‐Jordaniannegotiation,whichwouldinvolve

justsuchafriend,ratherthananIsraeli‐Egyptiannegotiation,inwhichwewould

beaskedtobailoutaSovietprotégé.Inshort,Ithoughttheprerequisiteof

effectiveMiddleEastdiplomacywastoreducetheSovietinfluencesothat

progresscouldnotbeascribedtoitspressuresandmoderategovernmentsgained

somemaneuveringroom.



IexpressedmyconcerntothePresidentthedayafterward.Hehadinvited

metoaccompanyhimtoWalterReedArmyHospitaltocallonformerPresident

Eisenhower,theninanadvancedstageoftheillnessthatkilledhimsevenweeks

later.Proppedupinaneasychair,Eisenhowerappearedevenmoreemaciated

thanthelasttimeIhadseenhim.HespentmuchofthetimewarningNixon

againstleaksofNSCproceedings.NixontoldhimaboutourMiddleEast

discussion.EisenhowerarguedagainstmajorAmericaninvolvementinthe

negotiations.ProbablyreflectingtheagonyhewentthroughoverSuezin1956,he

thoughtthebestcoursewastoletthepartiesworkitoutthemselves.Ifwe

becameactivewewouldbeforcedintheendtobecomeanarbiterandthenoffer

thepartiesourownguaranteeofwhateverfinalarrangementemerged.This

wouldkeepusembroiledinMiddleEastdifficultiesforever.



Thenextday,Ihadnotbeeninmyofficemanyminutesbeforeanirate

Eisenhowerwasonthephone.HehadjustreadaNewYorkTimesstoryreporting

thattheNSCmeetinghaddeterminedthattheUnitedStateswouldnowpursuea

moreactivepolicyintheMiddleEast.Withavigorthatbeliedmymemoryofhis

frailty—andagraphicvocabularyatvariancewithhissunnysmile—heberatedme

forlettingdownthePresidentbynotrestrictingthenumberofNSCparticipants.

Itwasmyduty,hesaid,topreventattemptsbythebureaucracytostampedethe

Presidentwithnewsleakslikethis.Whathadhappenedunderlinedhisstrictures

ofthenightbefore;weshouldkeephandsofftheMiddleEast.



ThesamedayIsentNixonmyfurtherreflectionsinamemorandum.Itook

itasgiventhathewasabouttodecideonsomeformofactivediplomacy,bothin

responsetoState’sproddingandbecauseofhiscampaignpledgesofanew

Americaninitiative.Isoughttoexplainthelikelycostsofsuchacourseandmy

doubtsaboutitschancesofsuccess.Itwastrue,Iargued,thatthepartieswould

neverbythemselvesbeabletoachieveasettlementamidthemountingviolence.

Butitdidnotfollowthatwewoulddobetter.IdoubtedwhetherNasserwouldbe

abletocommithims elftotheminimumconditionsofpeacethatIsraelwould

accept.Anall‐outeffortforageneralsettlementwouldprobablyfail;wewould

thereforebewastingourpoliticalcapital,exacerbatingthepressurestoward

conflictandcripplingourabilitytocontainaconflictifiterupted. Itseemedtome

thatwewouldbebetterofffocusingonapartialsettlement,suchasonewith

Jordan,[

ThisjudgmentturnedouttobewrongbecausetheWestBankandJerusalemwere

thetoughestissuesforIsraeltohandle.]whichhadalongandhonorablerecordof

friendshipwiththeUnitedStates.IurgedthePresident,ifheproceeded,to

obtainfromStatenotonlyitsproceduralproposalbuttheoutlineofthe

substanceofthepea cetermsitwouldbesupporting—thearticulationofwhich

was,afterall,thepointoftheexercise.



NixonandIhadaprivatetalk ontheafternoonofFebruary3. Hefelt

himself“boxedin.”HecouldnotrejecttheFrenchproposaloutrightsincethat

wouldmortgagehisefforttoimproverelationswithdeGaulle;also,hesawinthe

MiddleEastalevertopryloosesomeSovietcooperationonVietnam.Andhedid

notwanttooverruletheStateDepartmentonanissueonwhichitsviewswere

unanimousandsostronglyheld.Unfortunately,theseobjectiveswerenot

compatible.Inmyopinion,asItoldhim,weweremorelikelytoobtainSoviet

cooperationinVietnambymovingdeliberatelyintheMiddleEast,wherethe

Sovietclientsweretheweakerparty,thanbyrelievingitsembarrassmentthrough

talksthatwouldgivetheSovietsadazzlingopportunitytodemonstratetheir

utilitytotheirArabfriends.Norwouldweplacatethebureaucracybygoingalong

withitsopeninggambit;itwascertaintobebackwithrequestsformorespecific

instructionsthatwouldheadusdowntheslipperyslope.Ifwewerenotcareful,

wewouldbeaskedtobreakeverydeadlockbyputtingforwardourownplan—

whichwewouldthenbeaskedtoimposeonrecalcitrantparties.



Foreignpolicydecisionsrarelyemergefromabstractanalysis,however.For

reasonsalreadydescribedNixondidnotwishto overruletheStateDepartment,

antagonizedeGaulle,orrebufftheSovietUnion.Sensingthis,Isuggestedaway

tomovewithoutcommittingourselvesirrevocably.Ratherthanchoosebetween

theFour‐PowerandtheTwo‐Powerforums,wecouldmainta insomefreedomof

actionbyacceptingboth.WewouldmakeprogressintheFour‐Powerforum

dependonexploratorytalkswiththeSoviets.Inthismannerwecouldattemptto

tietheMiddleEastdiscussionstoourbroaderconcerns,includingSoviethelpon

Vietnam.AndintheFour‐Powerforum,ourEuropeanallieswouldbemore

hesitanttosidewiththeSovietsagainstusiftheyknewwehadourownbilateral

option.Topreventtheprocessfromgaininguncontrollablemomentum,wecould

insistthatthePresidentreviewtheresultsoftheexploratorytalksbefore

proceedingtoformaldiscussions.



ThePresidentagreed.OnFebruary3I letRogersandSiscoknowofthe

decision.OnFebruary5theStateDepartment,asinstructed,announcedthatthe

UnitedStatesregardedtheFrenchproposal“favorably”andthatwewouldbegin

consultationswiththeSovietUnion,Britain,andFrance,bilaterallytodevelop

“themeasureofunderstanding“thatwouldmakeanearlymeetingoftheFour

“fruitfulandconstructive.”



Myschemedidnotwork;itwastoocleverbyhalf.Icouldsparkplanning

exercisesandtrytodeflectbureaucraticenergiesbutIcouldnotcontrolthepace

ofthenegotiations.TheDepartmenttreatedtheWhiteHousetacticalgimmickry

asasoptodomesticpoliticsandrushedtocompletethe“exploratory”talksas

rapidlyaspossible.Withinlessthantwo weeks,IdiscoveredthattheState

Departmentwasalreadyplanningforthenextmove:developingsubstantive,

comprehensiveprinciplesforaMiddleEastpeacesettlement—exactlywhatIhad

hopedtostringoutovermanymonths.



Asthepaceofdiplo macyquickenedsodiddomesticexcitement.Withina

weekoftheannouncementofour“favorable”attitudetoFour‐Powertalks,

Israel’ssupportersreactedwiththevigorIwouldcometoknowsowellinthe

yearstocome.TheyreflectedIsrael’sownconcernthatoutsidersnotseekto

substitutefordirecttalkswiththeArabs.AdelegationofsixCongressmen,

headedbyEmanuelCellerofNewYorkandrepresentingtheHouseleadershipof

bothparties,calledfirstonmeandthenonthePresidentonFebruary13.They

viewedthestartofFour‐PowertalksasasignthattheUnitedStateswasheading

towardanimposedsettlement;theydeeplydistrustedtheforumandfearedit

wouldmoveusclosertoFrenchandSovietviews.



IftherewasalreadyconcernintheCongressoverthenegotiatingforum,I

couldimaginetheoutcryonceweturnedtosubstance.Thedramaticgulf

betweenthetwosides’positionswasdemonstratedagainbyinterviewsgranted

byPresidentNasserofEgyptandPrimeMinisterLeviEshkoltoanAmericannews

magazine.

TheEgyptiandemandedtotalIsraeliwithdrawalastheprecondition

forArabfulfillmentoftheotherprovisionsofResolution242. TheIsraelimade

clearthatIsraelwouldnotreturntoprewarlinesunderanyterms,andthathe

hadveryspecificideasabouttherequirementsfor“peace.”Thesituationwas

furthercomplicatedbythedeathofPrime MinisterEshkolattheendofFebruary,

whichmeantthatIsraelfacedtheprospectofcomplicatedelection ‐yearpolitics

untilGoldaMeir,namedEshkol’s successor,receivedafreshmandateinthe

electionsscheduledforOctober.



Thisonlyreinforcedmyconvictionthatthetimewasnotripeforanactive

negotiation.Andtheresultingstrategicdisagreementwasneverreallysettled.

Thebureaucracywantedtoembarkonsubstantivetalksasrapidlyaspossible

becauseitfearedthatadeterioratingsituationwouldincreaseSovietinfluence.I 

thoughtdelaywasonthewholeinourinterestbecauseitenabledusto

demonstrateeventoradicalArabsthatwewereindispensabletoanyprogress

andthatitcouldnotbeextortedfromusbySovietpressure.TheState

Departmentwantedtofueltheprocessofnegotiationsbyacceptingatleastsome

oftheSovietideas,tofacilitatecompromise.Iwantedtofrustratetheradicals—

whowereinanyeventhostiletous—bydemonstratingthatintheMiddleEast

friendshipwiththeUnitedStateswasthepreconditiontodiplomaticprogress.

WhenItoldSiscoinmid‐Februarythatwedidnotwanta quicksuccessinthe

Four‐PowerconsultationsattheUnitedNationsinNewYork,Iwasspeakinga

languagethatrancountertoalltheconvictionsofhisDepartment.



TheSoviets,meanwhile,hadquicklynibbledatourbait.Atmyveryfirst

meetingwithDobryninonFebruary14,hetoldmethattheSovietleadershipwas

preparedtotalkbilaterallywithusontheMiddleEast,preferablyoutsidetheUN

framework.HerepeatedthesamepointduringhisfirstmeetingwithNixonon

February17.NixonevadedtheofferofconfidentialbilateraltalksontheMiddle

EastattheWhiteHouselevel;hemaintainedhisviewthattheChannelwouldbe

availableonlyinreturnforcooperationonVietnam.



ThePresident’stalksinEuropeonhistripinlate FebruaryandearlyMarch

1969addedtothepressuresontheUnitedStatesto becomeactivelyinvolved.

TheBritishandFrenchnaturallywantedthemaintalkstotakeplaceintheFour‐

Powerforum;theydidnotflatlyobjecttoparallelUS‐Sovietdiscussionsbuttheir

enthusiasmforthisprocedurewaswellcontained.DeGaulleobservedwith

OlympiandetachmentthattheUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnioncouldtalk

aboutanythingtheychosesolongastheyavoidedtheimpressionofa

condominium.Beyondtheseprocedura lconcerns—anddeGaulle’sgeneral

supportfortotalIsraeliwithdrawalcoupledwithFour‐Powerguarantees—no

Europeanleaderhadaconcreteideaofhowtomovethepartiestoa

comprehensiveagreement.Theygenerouslyleftsuchdetailstous.



BythebeginningofMarch,then,foreignandbureaucraticpressures

combinedtogenerateirresistiblemomentumbehindanactiveAmericanrole.

EveninadvanceofthePresidentialdecision,JoeSiscowasalreadydiscussingwith

DobryninthevirtuesofTwo‐Powertalks.Sisco’senthusiasmwasnotalittle

influencedbythefactthathewouldconducttheTwo‐Powertalks,whilethe

Four‐PowertalkswereundertheaegisofCharlesYost,ourAmbassadortothe

UnitedNations.



Dobrynin,somewhatconfused,overlunchwithmeonMarch3pressedfor

clarificationabouttherelationbetweentheTwo‐Powertalks,whichhewaseager

tostart,andtheFour‐Powerforum.Hetriedtotantalizemebyrevealingthatthe

SovietUnionwaspreparedtodiscussapackagedeal,thatistosay,ascheme

requiringthesimultaneousexecutionofallitsprovisions,incontrasttotheprior

Arab‐SovietdemandthattheprocessbeginwithIsraeliwithdrawal.Hewantedto

knowinwhatforumtosurfacehisplan;heindicatedapreferencetodiscusssome

ofthemoredelicatesubjects,suchasfrontiers,intheWhiteHouseChannel.

ApplyingourstrategyofusingtheMiddleEastasleverageonVietnam—and

consciousofNixon’sreluctanceto seemeinvolved—Ievadedtheproposal;I

encouragedDobrynintopursuehisbilateraltalkswithSisco.



Thenextday,March4,itwastheturnoftheIsraeliAmbassadorto inquire

intoourpurposes.YitzhakRabinhadbeenaheroofIsrael’swarofindependence

andasChiefofStaffofIsrael’sdefenseforceshewasanarchitectofthevictoryof

theSixDayWar.Exceptforhisintelligenceandtenacity,hewasanunlikely

ambassador.Taciturn,shy,reflective,almostresentfulofsmalltalk,Rabin

possessedfewoftheattributescommonlyassociatedwithdiplomacy.Repetitious

peopleboredhimandthecommonplaceoffendedhim;unfortunatelyforRabin

boththesequalitiesarenotexactlyinshortsupplyinWashington.Hehated

ambiguity,whichisthestuffofdiplomacy.Igrewextremelyfondofhimthough

hedidlittletoencourageaffection.Hisintegrityandhisanalyticalbrilliancein

cuttingtothecoreofaproblemwereawesome.Ivaluedhisjudgment,often

evenonmattersunconnectedwiththeMiddleEast,andtrustedhismotiveseven

whenhiscountry’spositions werenotalwaysidenticalwithourown.Webecame

goodfriendsandremainedsothroughallthevicissitudesandsquabblesthatour

dutiesoccasionallyimposedonus.



InthatfirstconversationIcouldnotanswerhisquestionaboutourpolicy;

wehadnotyetsettledonitourselves.ButIwasreasonablycertainthatthe

PresidentwouldproceedwithboththeFour‐andTwo‐Powerforums.Myprivate

advicewasthatIsraelshouldprepareaconcreteprogramarticulatingadefinition

of“peace”thatitcouldlivewith;onlythiscouldgiveuscriteriabywhichtojudge

progress.



AsIfeared,themomentumofnegotiationsratherthanconsideredstrategy

drovethedecisions.ByearlyMarchSiscoreportedthesuccessIthoughtitwiser

topostpone;hehadnowalreadyfulfilledhisfirstinstruct ionsandwasaskingfor

furtherguidance—whichtheDepartmenthadbeenworkingfortwoweeksto

prepare,lestthePresidentloseanytime.Inotherwords,lessthanamonthafter

startinga“deliberate.”“exploratory”process,Siscoandhiscolleagueswere

abouttoproposetoNixonthatweputforwardsubstantivecomprehensive

principles.



TheargumentoftheStateDepartmentnowwasexactlytheoppositeof

thatbywhichtheexplorationshadbeensoldtothePresident.Whereasamonth

earlierithadbeenarguedthatthedecisiontoopenFour‐Powertalksimpliedno

commitmentastosubstance,nowitwasclaimedthattheinformalexplorations

couldnotbesustainedexceptwithsomespecificschemesuchasasetof

principles.Unlessweputforthourideas,itwasclaimed,wewouldbestuckwith

lessbalancedpositionspresentedbytheotherthreepowers.Andwehadtodoso

quickly.TheStateDepartme nturgedthatthescheduledmid‐MarchvisitbyIsraeli

ForeignMinisterAbbaEbanshouldbethedeadlineforPresidentialdecision.Eban

wastobetoldthatweplannedtosurfacethedocumentintheFour‐Powerforum

andwiththeSoviets.TheprocedureIhaddevisedinordertoslowthingsdown

hadbeennowfullyexhaustedinlessthanfourweeks.



Myviewshadnotbeenchangedbytheeventsofthepreviousmonth.On

March5IwrotetothePresident,summingupmyconcerns:



EveryonepointsoutthatwewillbeexpectedtodeliverIsraelinanynegotiation.The

Arabsassume—wronglybutirrevocably—thatwecanmakeIsraeldowhatwewish.TheFrench

andBritishassumewecoulddomorethanwehave.PerhapsonlytheSoviets—whoknowthe

limitsoftheirowninfluenceinCairoandDamascus—realisticallyunderstandthelimitsofour

influenceinJerusalem,buttheyfindtoomuchpropagandaadvantageinoursupportforIsrael

toadmitthetruthpublicly.



Yeteveryonealsosaysthatasettlementthisyearisunlikely,preciselybecauseIsraeli

post‐Eshkolandelection‐yearpoliticswillstrictlylimitIsrael’sabilitytocompromise.



Theargumentscommonlymadefortryingtheunlikelyarethat(1)tryinginitselfwould

beastabilizingfactorintheMid‐Eastand(2)arrangingasettlementthisyearistheonlywayto

undercutthemilitantPalestinians.Butasituationcanbeposedinwhich(1)tryingtoohard

couldmakemattersworsethannotmakinganall‐outeffortnowand(2)asettlementcould

actuallystrengthenthePalestiniansandweakentheArabgovernmentsthatacceptedit.



OurdilemmawasthatifwepressuredIsraelwewouldgiveencouragement

toArabradicalsandSovietclients,whowouldseeitasavindicationoftheir

intransigenceandoftheirSovietconnection;forthesamereasonsuchpressure

couldalsodriveIsraeltoextremeactions,oratleasttodiginandconcede

nothing.IfontheotherhandwefailedtopressIsrael,theblameforthedeadlock

wouldfallonus.IntheeventthatIsraelagreedtocompromiseterms,the

Palestinianswouldthenprobablyblockasettlement,withSyrianandIraqi

support;amoderateArabgovernmentthatagreedtothesettlementwouldcome

underassaultfromtheradicals.HusseinandevenNassercouldbecome

vulnerable.Theresultwouldbenotmerelyafailednegotiationbutincreasing

chaosandanewdangerofwar. Inotherwords,giventheinfluenceand

intransigenceoftheSoviets,themilitanceofNasser,andthepowerofthe

fedayeen,Iargued,theMiddleEastwasnotreadyforacomprehensiveAmerican

initiative.



TheStateDepartmentcameupwithapaperof“generalprinciples”which

ledpreciselyinthatdirection.Itassertedthattheobjectofnegotiationswasa

bindingcontractualagreement,thoughnotnecessarilyapeacetreaty.Face‐to‐

facetalkswere“notessential”intheearlyphasebutwouldprobablyhaveto

occur“atsomepoint.”Theprinciplesallowedminimalchangesfrompreexisting

borders,butsuchchanges“shouldnotreflecttheweightofconquest.”(The

languageabout“theweightofconquest”wasaStateDepartmenteuphemismfor

insistingonnear‐totalIsraeliwithdrawal;ithadappearedearlierinaspeechby

PresidentJohnsononSeptember10,1968.)Theclearassumptionbehindthe

principleswasthat,whiletheUN’sGunnarJarringwastotakethelead,withthe

Four‐PowerandTwo‐Powertalks“backstopping”him,inthelastanalysisthe

effortcouldworkonlyiftheUnitedStatesexerciseditsfullleverageoverIsrael.

AnearlierversionofState’sgeneralprinciplespaperinsistedonIsraeliwithdrawal

totheprewarlinewithEgyptandJordan,exceptfor minorborderrectifications

onlyinthecaseofJordan.Onthisprovision,IdidmanagetosoftenState’s

principlesinasessionwithSisco,thoughanIsraeliexplosionwascertainanyway.



OnMarch10,NixonapprovedtheStateDepart mentrecommendationthat

thegeneralprinciplespaperbepresentedtoEbanduringhisvisit;thenthepaper

wouldbediscussedpointbypointbetweenSiscoandDobryninandsubmittedto

theFour‐Powerforumasthebasisforconsultationsthere.Nixonindicatedtome

thathesharedmyskepticismaboutwhatcouldcomeofit,buthesaiditwould

giveStatesomethingtodo,whilewehandledVietnam,SALT,Europe,andChina

intheWhiteHouse.(ItisnottobeexcludedthathegaveRogersanopposite

explanation.) Rogersproudlyunveiledthenewapproachinpublictestimonyto

theSenateForeignRelationsCommitteeonMarch27,tellingtheSenatorsthatit

was“adirectinterestoftheUnitedStatestoexercisewhateverinfluenceithas,in

whateverwaywouldbeusefulandeffective…”Callingfor“secureandrecognized

boundaries”anda“contractuallybinding,”stateofpeace,Rogersaddedthe

crucialformula:“Inourviewrectificationsfromthepreexistinglinesshouldbe

confinedtothoserequiredformutualsecurityandshouldnotreflecttheweight

ofconquest.”



Sisco’stalkswithDobryninstretchedoverninesessionsbetweenMarch18

andApril22andfollowedpredictablelines.Theonlytopicdiscussedwasthe

Americangeneralprinciplespaper,withDobryninpressingSiscotobemore

specific.Beingmorespecificinthiscontextmeantspellingoutafirmerposition

onissuessuchasfinalborders,whichcouldonlyprovokeanuproarinIsraelby

makingitobviousthatwehadmovedclosertotheSoviet‐Egyptianinsistenceon

totalwithdrawal.WepresentedthegeneralprinciplestotheFourPowerson

March24withthesameresult.OnceagaintheAmericanpositionwasthefocus

ofdebate,withouralliesseekingtonudgeusintoagreatereffort.“Greater

effort”hadthesameoperationalmeaningasbeing“morespecific.”Wewere

beingjockeyedfrompositiontoposition,endlesslyaskedtomodifyourpositions

inordertorescueanegotiationthatweourselveshadstartedpres umablyin

ordertoeasepressuresonus.



AttheendofMarch,IsentaninterimreportabouttheTwo‐Powertalksto

thePresident:



Whilewehavesofaravoidedtheworstdangersofanunpreparedposition,thewhole

burdenofthetalkscouldstillfallonus—forproducingallthesubstantiveproposalsandfor

bringingtheIsraelisaround…Agooddefinitionofanequitablesettlementisonethatwillmake

bothsidesunhappy.Ifso,wemusthaveSoviethelp,andtheSovietsmustsharetheblamefor

pushinganunpalatablesolution.



WehadalreadyseparatedourselvesfromIsrael’sposition;theSovietshad

notreciprocatedbydifferentiatingtheirpositioninanywayfromtheArabs’.

Beforewetooknewsteps,Ireiterated,weneededtodevelopanagreedUnited

Statespositiononthetermsofafinalsettlement,onthetacticsofproducingit,

onhowtorelatetheTwo‐andFour‐Powertalks,andonhowtocoordinateboth

ofthemwithJarring.Otherwise,theentireexercisewouldendinconfusion.



Alltheseproceduralmaneuveringswouldnotspareusfromthenecessity

toheartheviewofthepartiesthemselves—aproce ssboundtobringusstarkly

intocontactwithrealityonceagain.



<<Contents>>

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****



MiddleEastVisitors



T

hefirsttobeheardfromwastheeloquentAbbaEban,whoarrivedin

WashingtoninthemiddleofMarchfortalksattheWhiteHouseandSta te

Department.IhadmetEbansociallyinIsraelwhenhewasMinisterofEducation;

thiswasmyfirstprofessionalcontactwithhim.Ihaveneverencounteredanyone

whomatchedhiscommandoftheEnglishlanguage.Sentencespouredforthin

mellifluousconstructionscomplicatedenoughtotestthelistener’sintelligence

andsimultaneouslyleavehimtransfixedbythespeaker’svirtuosity.Theprose

flowedevenly,withouthighpoints,rustlingalonginexorablylikeaclearmountain

stream.Tointerruptseemedalmostunthinkable,foroneknewthatonewould

havetodosoinanidiomthatseemedbarbaricbycomparison.NoAmericanor

BritishpersonalityeverremindedmesoacutelythatEnglishwasforme,afterall,

anacquiredlanguage.