Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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TheJapanesedonotlikeaconfrontation,whichproducesacatalogueof

identifiablewinnersandlosers;theyareuneasywithenterpriseswhoseoutcome

isunpredictable.Meetingswiththemareprecededbythevisitsofinnumerable

emissarieswhosubtlyprobetheimplicationsofone’sposition.Afterthis

exploratorystagethereisanintervalfortheessentialnat ionalconsensusto

coalescebeforetheformalstageofagreement.This iswhyatinternational

meetingsJapaneseministersrarelytalk;theyaretheretocollectrawmaterialfor

theirowndecision‐makingprocess.Attemptstobypassthisprocessandto

pressureaJapaneseinterlocutorintoagreementoccasionallyproducethe

appearanceofsuccessbecausethelegendaryJapanesepolitenessmayoverride

thejudgmentofwhatispossible.Buttheyalmostneverresultinaction.This

explainsthesuccessoftheOkinawanegotiationsandthefailureofthetextile

negotiationsin1969‐1970. 



<<Contents>>



****



TheOkinawaNegotiation

L



ongafterourpostwaroccupationofJapanhadendedin1952,Okinawa

andtheotherRyukyuIslandsremainedunderAmericanmilitary

administration.Therewasnoseriousdisputethattheultimatesovereigntyofthe

islandsbe longed toJapan.WeheldontotheoccupationstatusbecauseOkinawa

hadbecomeoneofourmostimportantmilitarybasesinAsia.Wecountedonits

airfieldsforthedefenseofKoreaandTaiwan;weuseditasastagingareafor

VietnamandasanemergencyfacilityforB‐52s.Westorednuclearweapons

there.ButimportantasOkinawawasstrategically,ourcontinuingoccupationofit

inthelateSixtiesmortgagedourlong‐rangerelationswithJapan.Inparticularit

castashadowontheUS‐JapaneseSecurityTreaty,aroundwhichourentireAsian

strategywasbuilt.Thetreatycameintobeingin1960amidwidespreadanti‐

AmericanriotsinJapanthatabortedPresidentEisenhower’splannedvisit.[

Nixon

hadhopesofcompletingEisenhower’smissionandbecomingthefirstAmericanPresidentto

visitJapan.Thejinxworkedagainsthim,too.InNovember1974,GeraldFordpaidthevisitto

TokyothatwasplannedforNixon.]Itwasdueforpossibleterminationaftertenyears,

upononeyear’snoticebyeitherparty,whichmeantthat1970wouldbeayearof

renewedagitationagainstthetreatybyanti‐AmericanelementsinJapan.We

weredoomedtothatunhappyprospectiftherepeatedJapaneserequestsfor

revisionofOkinawa’sstatuswentwithoutasympatheticAmericanresponse.

Japanesenationalistsandradicalswereunitedonthisissue,thelatteraspartof

anantinuclearcampaignofparticularpotencyinthelandofHiroshimaand

Nagasaki,andtheformertore coverlostterritoriesthathadhistoricallybeen

Japanese.



WhenPresidentJohnsonandPrimeMinisterEisakuSatohadmetin

November1967,theJapanesehadbeentoldthatbecauseofourelectionthe

issuewouldhavetowaituntil1969. TheissueofOkinawathuswasurgentwhen

Nixonassumedoffice.Ithadonlybecomehotterintheinterveningperiodsince

theSato‐Johnsonconversations.Therehadbeenpublicprotestsoverouruseof

thebasesforVietnamoperations.Thevisitofa nuclearcarriertoSaseboallegedly

lefttracesofradioactivityinthewater(whichtheUnitedStatesdeniedhad

anythingtodowiththeship’svisit).InFebruary1968theOkinawa legislature

adoptedaresolutionagainstbasingB‐52sontheisland,andtheSocialist

oppositionpartiesputforwardasimilarmotionintheJapaneseDiet(Parliament).

InNovember1968,inthefirstdirectelectionthere,aSocialistwaselectedChief

ExecutiveoftheRyukyus.Asoneofhisfirstacts,heannouncedthathewouldset

upacommissiontostudythegradualclosingofthebasesandthereturnofthe

islandstoJapan.



ThedayafterNixon’sInaugurationIorderedaninteragencystudyofour

policytowardJapan,listingOkinawaamongthepriorityissuestobeexamined.

TheurgencywhichtheJapanesegovernmentattachedtothereversionof

OkinawawasdiscussedbrieflyatNixon’sfirstNSCmeetingthatsamedayandalso

inhisfirstformalmeetingwiththeJointChiefsofStaffonJanuary27.TheChiefs

consideredourOkinawabasestobeofinestimablevalue,not onlybecauseof

theirconvenienceforIndochinaoperationsbutalsoforourwholestrategic

positioninthePacific.TheChiefswerealreadycomingtoacceptthejudgmentof

theStateDepartment,supportedbyme,thatreversiontoJapanwaspolitically

imperative.Theywantedtomakecertain,however,thattheywouldhavethe

righttocontinuetousethebaseswithaminimumofinterference(theyhoped

noneatall).Alsotheywishedtohavetherighttocontinuetostorenuclear

weaponsontheisland.IfOkinawarevertedtoJapanandouruseweresubjectto

thesamerestrictionsasourbasesontheJapanesehome islands,thefacilities

couldnotbeusedforcombatoperationswithoutpriorconsultationwithJapan.

Nuclearweaponswouldbeexcludedaltogether,arestrictionwehadacceptedon

themainislandsbecauseofJapan’sspecialsensitivityastheonlynationtosuffer

nuclearattack;thiswouldpresentamajorproblemofrelocationforussinceno

convenientbaseswerecloseby.Iwasdetermined,however,inclosecooperation

withtheStateDepartment,tofindasolutionthatwouldmeettheneedsofeach

side.Whileourinteragencystudiesproceeded,PrimeMinisterSatotoldtheDiet

inFebruary1969ofhis“firmdetermination”toreuniteOkinawatoJapanandto

raisethematterwiththenewAmericanPresident.Asiftounderscorehispoint,

OkinawansstagedmassivedemonstrationsoutsideaUSairfield,protestingthe

presenceofB‐52susedforouroperationsinIndochina.



AwordisinorderhereaboutEisakuSato.LikeallJapaneseleaders,he

operatedanonymously;heneverpretendedthathehadapowerofdecision

beyondthenationalconsensus.Yethismoralforcewassogreatastoleavelittle

doubtthatithelpedtoshapethatconsensus.Hewas,itgoeswithoutsaying,

Japanesetothecore;hewasalsoasincerefriendoftheUnitedStates,seeingin

thepartnershipoftheerstwhilefoesthebestguaranteeforpeaceandprogres sin

EastAsiaandtheentirePacificregion.Hisfundamentalcommitmentwasto

Japan;hisforeignpolicycommitmentwastothealliancewithAmerica;his

passionwaspeace.Hehandleddifficultnegotiationswithextraordinarydelicacy

andwisdom.HedidnotdeservetheillfortunethattheNixonshocks—thesecret

triptoPekingandtheeconomicpackageofthesummerof1971—inflictedinhis

termofoffice.(Wethoughtwehadnochoice,asIshallexplaininlaterchapters.)

Hewasgenerousenoughnottoletitimpairourcloserelations.Iadmiredhis

charactersomuchthatItookaspecialtriptoJapaninJune1972,duringthelast

twoweeksofhisPrimeMinistership,toconsultwithhimostentatiouslyanddine

withhimasasymbolicdemonstrationofourrespectforthisgreatleade r.Even

afterheleftoffice,InevervisitedJapanwithoutrequestingtoseehim.Iamproud

thathebecameapersonalfriend.WhenhewontheNobelPeacePrizein1974,

heregardedthisasanadditionalbondbetweenus.Tomeheembodiedthe

sereneinnerstrength,wisdom,anddignitythatarethebestofJapan.Hediedtoo

soonforallwhobelieveinpeaceandfree dom.



Astheinteragencyreviewmovedforward,IgaveNixonfrequent reports.

OnMarch8Isenthima paperbytheJointChiefsofStaff,forwardedbySecretary

Laird,reiteratingtheChiefs’concernforbothnuclearstorageandunrestricted

non‐nuclearmilitaryuseofthebases.TendayslaterIsentNixonamemo randum

outliningtheessentialelementsofthedecisionbeforehim.Thepoliticalreality

wasthatthepressuresinJapanforreversionwerenowunstoppable;agitation

againstourpresencenotonlyposedaphysicaldang ertoouruseofthebasesbut

alsocouldjeopardizethepoliticalpositionofSatoandthegove rning Liberal

DemocraticParty,whichhadinitiatedandmaintainedJapan’salignmentwiththe

UnitedStatesfortwodecades.Inshort,themilitaryandpoliticalrisksofseeking

tomaintainthestatusquooutweighedthemilitarycostofhavingsomewhatless

flexibilityinoperatingtheOkinawabasesunderJapanesesovereignty.Indeed,our

refusaltonegotiateanaccommodationcouldwellleadasapracticalmatterto

ourlosingthebasesaltogether.



Foronce,theUnitedStatesgovernmentwasunitedonanissue.ByAprilwe

wereabletoachieveaconsensusonthemajorprinciplesofouroverallpolicy

towardJapan.TherewasagreementthatJapanwasthecornerstoneofourAsian

policyandthatitmustbeourbasicobjectivetostrengthentherelationship.We

wouldseektocontinuetheSecurityTreatywithoutamendmentafter1970,

assumingJapanwasnottornbydomesticschismsoverit.Wewouldencourage

JapantoplayalargerpoliticalroleinAsiaandtomakemoderateincreasesinher

defensecapability,thoughwewouldnotexertpressureonhertodevelop

substantiallylargerforces.TheseprincipleswereagreeduponataReviewGroup

meetingonApril25andreceivedNixon’sblessingatanNSCmeetingonApril30.



Progresswasmadeevenonthetechnicalissuesofthereversionquestion.

TheChiefshadreconciledthemselvestoreducingthenumberofbaseson

Okinawa;theyagreedthatifwecouldnotobtainJapaneseagreementto

unrestricteduseofthebasesforcombatoperationsthroughoutAsiawecould

settleforunrestrictedrightsforthedefenseofKorea,Taiwan,andVietnam,

reinforcedbyaJapaneseendorsementofcommondefenseconcernsinAsia.

Actually,thiswasatheoreticalpointwithoutpracticaldifference.Itwasdifficult 

toimaginewhatareaswewouldwanttodefendfromOkinawaotherthanthose 

specified.ThemainpointofcontentionwasthattheJointChiefsofStaffinsisted

onacontinuingrighttouseourOkinawanfacilities fornuclearstorage.Atthe

NSCmeetingofApril30,AlexJohnson,theUnderSecretaryofStateforPolitical

AffairsandaformerAmbassadortoJapan,summedupthekeyissue:Ifproperly

handled,ourreversionofOkinawacouldserveasanincentiveforJapanto

assumegreaterresponsibilityforAsianstabilityanddefense.Butthenuclearissue

washighlysensitive;weneededtoshowsomeunderstandingforJapanese

sensibilities.



TheOkinawanegotiationsthatfollowedtheNSCmeetingdemonstratehow

muchnervousstraincouldhavebeenavoidedandhowmuchmoreeffectivelyour

governmentwouldhavefunctionediftheWhiteHouseandtheStateDepartment

hadmanagedtoachievethesamecompatibilityonothersubjects.Inthe

executionofNixon’sdecisionofApril30AlexJohnsonrantheday‐to‐day

interdepartmentalprocessinWashington;AmbassadorArminMeyerskillfully

conductedthenegotiationsinTokyo.Mycontributionwastoprovideageneral

climateofsupportandintervenewiththeJapaneseatkeymoments.Isawitas

myroletodemonstratethePresident’scommitmenttoasuccessfuloutcome.



InthatspiritIdiscussedJapan’sviewofitsfutureroleinAsiawithJapanese

AmbassadorTakesoShimodaonMay21.HeemphasizedthatiftheOkinawaissue

weresettledin1969,JapanwouldbewillingtoassumeAsianresponsibilitiestoa

fargreaterdegree.Irecognizedthatthiswasneitheranenforceablecommitment

noranexcessivelypreciseone,soIconfinedmyselftoanequallynebulous

assurancethatthePresidentwouldapproachtheforthcomingnegotiationsina

positivespirit.



Nixon’sdecisiononthetechnicalissueswasdisclosedtotheagenciesatthe

endofMay.ItfollowedtheconsensusoftheNSCmeeting :Ifweobtaineda

satisfactoryunderstandingfortheuseofthebasesforthedefenseofKorea,

Taiwan,andVietnam,NixonwouldreturnOkinawatoJapanesesovereigntyand

takeintoaccountJapanesesensitivitiesonthenuclearissue—inotherwords,he

impliedthathemightnotinsistontherighttostorenuclearweaponsinOkinawa.

WithinfourdaysofthisPresidentialdirective,itsessencewashelpfullyleakedto

theNewYorkTimes.Ourfallbackpositionwasthusinprintbeforeour

negotiationshadevenbegun.



FormalnegotiationsbetweenAmericanandJapanese officialsbeganin

earnestinJune1969indiplomaticchanne ls.Bythen,anotherissuehadarisenin

theUS‐Japanesedialogue,unconnectedwithOkinawabutdestinedtobe

intimatelylinkedtoit:textiles.WheretheOkinawanegotiationsexemplifiedhigh

policy,thetextileproblemprovedacaseoflowcomedy,frustration,andnear

fiasco.



ForvariousreasonsourbalanceoftradewithJapanwaschronicallyin

deficit.WhetherbecauseofextraordinaryJapaneseproductivity—astheJapanese

claimed—orbecauseofJapanesedumpingintheAmericanmarketandbarriersto

othercountries’penetrationof theirownmarket—assomeofourtradeexperts

insisted—JapaneseexportstoAmerica,particularlyinmanufa cturedproducts,far

exceededAmericanexportstoJapan.Japanhadeasyaccesstoourmarket;we

didnothaveanequalopportunityinJapan.TheresultwasthatJapanes e

competitionbecameafierceandsometimesoverwhelming challengeformany

Americanindustries,evokingfearsofune mploymentcausedbyanothernation’s

tradepractices.Americanbusinessmen,legislators,andeconomicofficialswere

vocalininsistingonsomeJapaneseflexibilityoneconomicmatterstosmooththe

wayforAmericanactiononOkinawa.Oureconomicagencies,eachrepresentinga

differentconstituency,werebombardingtheJapanesewithabarrageof

demands,includingmeasurestorestrictJapaneseexportsofwoolandsynthetic

textilesortoreducebarrierstoAmericancapitalinvestment.Theplethoraof

proposalswasactuallyself‐defeating;theJapanesewerechoosingtheleast

onerousones.TheJapanesehadacoherentpolicy;wehadonlyasetofseparate

demands.ThisenabledtheJapanesetoselectfromamongourmanyschemes

thoseleastburdensometothem,ofteninvolvingitemsoutofwhichJapanese

exportinghadalreadyshifted.Theydecided,forexample,toliberalizeconditions

forAmericaninvestmentinJapan,wellawarethatthereweremany

administrative,social,andculturalobstaclesbeyondformallegislation;theyeven

announcedajointventurewithChrysler.IreportedthistoNixonand

recommendedthatwegetourprioritiesstraight.Heagreed,writingonmy

memorandum:“Thiscapitalliberalizationisnotimportanttouspolitically.We

havetogetsomethingontextiles.”



TextileswereasorepointwithNixon.Textilemanufacturersinthe

AmericanSouthwereamongtheindustrieshardesthitbyJapanesecompetition;

manymillshadtobeclosed;theyalsorepresenteda powerfulandeffective

lobby.Thishadcausedcandidate NixontomakeaflatpromisetoSouthern

delegatesandvotersinthepreviousyear,aspartoftheinscrutable American

tribalritualassociatedwithyearsdivisiblebyfour,thathewoulddosomething 

aboutthetextileproblem.



ThenewAdministrationwasdeterminedtocarryoutNixon’spromise. 

CommerceSecretaryMauriceStansandWhiteHouseaidesRobertEllsworthand

PeterFlaniganwantedtoconfronttheJapaneseimmediatelytoobtaina

voluntaryagreementtoreduceJapanesetextileexports.Apoliticalamateur,Idid

notthinkitappropri atetopickoutoneindustryforspecialconsiderationuntilour

overallpoliticalandeconomicstudieshadbeencompleted.Ithereforestalled,

hidingbehindtheNSCdecision‐makingprocess.Iwassooneducated:Nixontold

meinnouncertaintermsthathemeanttohaveatextileagreementandthatasa

PresidentialAssistantIwastocontributetotheobjective.Thiswaseasiersaid

thandonebecausemyignoranceofthesubjectwasencyclopedic.Ihad tolearn

anentirevocabularyofinternationaltrade,suchas“exportsubsidytechniques”

aswellasthearcanecomplexityof“triggerpoints”(atwhichrestraintswouldgo

intoeffect),and“categories”(whichwouldbesubjecttorestraint),allofwhichI 

haveagainmercifullysucceededinforgetting.Theonlyenduringelementinmy

memoryistheaweofoureconomicexpertsinthefaceofJapaneseingenuity,

causingthemtoinsistoncoveringeveryconceivablecategoryoftextileinthe

negotiations;theywereconvincedthatifanywereleftoutthewilyJapanese

wouldusetheloopholetoevadetheentireagreement.



SotomysorrowandlaterregretIwascatapultedintothesenegotiations.

MyrolewastolendPresidentialclouttopositionshandedtomebyMauryStans

andPeterFlanigan;Icouldonlytransmitthem,notnegotiatethem,foronceI

abandonedthepositionIwasgivenIhadnointellectualfootholdofanykind.As

inalaternegotiationwithPompidouonmonetaryissuesthismademe

unshakable:Withoutafallbackpositionorthetemptationtobeimaginativeon

myside,itwasuptotheothersidetoyieldifitwantedagreement.



MyinvolvementstartedwhenSatoingoodJapane sefashionsentoutasa

scoutapersonalfriendofhisandminewhohadnoofficialpositioninthe

Japanesegovernment.Theunofficialwasnownegotiatingwiththeuninformed.

BoththeemissaryandIcouldeasilybedisavowed;wesoonconstructedan

intricateKabukiplay.OnJuly18Sato’semissary’cameintoseeme;wethen

establishedthesecretchannelbypassingthebureaucraciesofbothcountries

(exceptthatinthiscase,becauseofmyignoranceofsubject,Ikeptthekey

playersonoursidemeticulouslyinformed).Satowantedtocometo an

understandingwithNixononthebasicissuesofprincipleonboththenuclear

issueandtextiles.Oncethebasicissuesweresettled,thebureaucraciesofboth

sideswouldbetoldtoworkoutthedetails.IcalledNixonandtoldhimofSato’s

approach;hewasenthusiastic:“Let’strytogetitdoneandnotfoolaroundwith

theStateDepartme nt.”



Nixonhadalways beenfarsightedaboutrelationswithJapan.Inhis1967

ForeignAffairsarticle,“AsiaAfterVietnam,”hehadwritten:



NottotrustJapantodaywithitsownarmedforcesandwithresponsibilityforitsown

defensewouldbetoplaceitspeopleanditsgovernmentunderadisabilitywhich,whateverits

rootsinpainfulrecenthistory,illaccordswiththeroleJapanmustplayinhelpingsecurethe

commonsafetyofnon‐communistAsia.



AndinthesamearticleNixon’sconceptionofJapan’simportantrolein

regionalsecurityrelatedaswelltohisviewoftheevolutionoftheUSrole:



Wearywithwar,disheartenedwithallies,disillusionedwithaid,dismayedatdomestic

crises,manyAmericansareheedingthecallofthenewisolationism.Andtheyarenotalone;

thereisatendencyinthewholeWesternworldtoturninward,tobecomeparochialand

isolationist—dangerouslyso.Buttherecanbeneitherpeacenorsecurityagenerationhence

unlesswerecognizenowthemassivenessoftheforcesatworkinAsia,wheremorethanhalf

theworld’speopleliveandwherethegreatestexplosivepotentialislodged.



Ispentafewdaysgoingovertheissueswiththeemissarybeforemy

departurewiththePresidentonthetriptotheApollo11splashdownandaround

theworld.TheemissaryandIagreedonthegeneraloutlinesofatextile

settlementthatwouldbenegotiatedthroughdiplomaticchannels.Thenuclear

issuewasleftforlaterconsideration.



Theharmoniousatmospherewasmarredbyoneofthosemix‐upsthatno

onecanforeseeandthatonceithappensneversee mstoend.SomeUSarmy

nervegashadbeenstoredincanistersonOkinawa.Amajorwhoseaesthetic

senseexceededhisjudgmentdecidedtohavethecanisterspaintedwhite.

Blastingthesurfacesmoothinpreparationaccidentallydrilledholesinsomeof

thecanisters,andgasescaped.MediaandCongressionalpressuresmounted

rapidly.JapaneseattentionfocusedonOkinawaasneverbefore.Foracoupleof

weeksagreatdealofthetimeofseriouspeoplewasdevotedtofindingaplaceto

whichthegascouldbemovedintheUnitedStateswhennostatewantedtohave

itpassthroughonthewaytoitsfinaldestination.Itwasfinallymovedto

JohnstonIslandinthemiddleofthePacificandtheredestroyed.



SecretaryofStateRogersvisitedTokyoinlateJuly(splittingofffromthe

PresidentialswingthroughSouthEastAsia)tocontinuetheformaltalkswiththe

JapaneseoverOkinawa.HewasaccompaniedbyMauryStansandAgriculture

SecretaryCliffordHardin,whojoinedhiminCabinet‐leveltalksontradeandother

economicsubjects.Thecommuniquéaftertheirmeetingsdisclosedonlythat

RogersandForeignMinisterKiichiAichihad“discussedtheproblemofreversion

toJapanofadministrativerightsoverOkinawa.”ButtheJapanesequicklyleaked

tothepress,andRogersconfirmedinanewsconferenceonAugust3,thatthe

UnitedStateshadagreedtothereversionofOkinawainprinciple.Thisreinforced

Nixon’sandSato’spreviousdeterminationtoconfinethemostsensitive

discussionstothelessporousprivatechannel.



NegotiationsproceededsmoothlyenoughforSatotobeinvitedto

WashingtoninNove mberforcrucialmeetingsthatwerefinallytosettlethe

Okinawaissue.Ineffecttwoissueswereleftfortheleaders:thenuclearstorage

inOkinawa,whichwasexplicit;andtextiles,whereconcessionswouldnotbe

revealedlesttheyundermineSato’sdomesticbase.ThatthePresidentinsistedon

atextilesettlementwashammeredhometomebythepoliticalsideoftheWhite

House.Iwasfarfromenthusiasticaboutlinkinganissueoffundamentalstrategic

importancewithatransientdomesticpoliticalproblem,andineffectblackmailing

theJapaneseonamatterofthiskind.ButIwasnotinastrongenoughpositionin

1969toblockthecollectivejudgement.



WhereasforNixontheavoidanceofconfrontationwasapersonal

idiosyncrasy,forSatoitwasaculturalimperative.Theneedsofthetwoleadersto

haveawell‐rehearsedoutcometotallycoincided.Therefore,tendaysinadvance,

Sato’semissaryarrivedtoworkoutwithmethemainunderstandingstobe

reachedandthelanguagetobeadoptedinthepublishedcommuniqué.Alex

JohnsonandAssistantSecretaryMarshallGreen,whowereawareofmy

confidentialtalkswithSato’semissary,recommendedholdingthePresident’s

decisionnottoinsistonnuclearstorageinreserveuntilthelastminutesoasto

obtainthemaximumconcessionsontextiles.Icoollytoldtheemissarythatthe

finaldecisiononthenuclearissueshouldbeleftforSato’sarrival,sothatitwould

be“hisachievementwhenhecomeshere.”



Thestrategyworkedintheshortterm;butitwentbeyondSato’scapacity

todeliver.Satowasatadisadvantage.Oncehehadcome,hecouldnotletthe

negotiationsfailonthenuclearissue,sincethatwouldhavejeopardizedthe

entiresecurityrelationshipwiththeUnitedStates,thepillarofJapaneseforeign

policy.TheemissarythereforetoldmethatSatowouldagreetoacomprehensive

arrangementbywhichtheJapanesewouldlimittheirtextileexportsto theUnited

Statestospecificlevels.MauryStansgavemeaformulafortheselimitationsthat

Ihandedoverinpristineform;asfarasIwasconcerneditmightaswellhave

beenwritteninJapanese.TheemissaryflewbacktoJapantobriefSato;aftera

fewdaysheconfirmedthattheproposedlimitationswouldbeacceptable.The

stageseemedsetforasuccessfulmeetingbetween NixonandSato.



Then,twodaysbeforeSato’sarrival,Ireceive da franticphonecallfrom

Tokyo.ItwasSato’semissary.Todisguise hisidentityandfoolfortwominutes

anyintelligenceserviceslisteningin,hehadadoptedthenomdeguerreof“Mr.

Yoshida”;hespokeellipticallyof“myfriend”(Sato)and“yourfriend”(Nixon) in

outliningtheproblemontheopenline.(The“myfriend”/”yourfriend”

conversationsweretobecomeafeatureofmylifeforanextendedperiodand

ultimatelywereto testmysanity.)InthisconversationheinformedmethatSato

(“myfriend”)wouldnotbeabletosettletextilesina secretnegotiation;hewould

simplynotbeabletodeliveronhispromises.Fordomesticreasonshepreferred

tohavetheagreedpositionemergefromongoingformaltradetalksinGeneva.

“Yoshida”confirmedthattheoutcomewouldbethespecificfiguresagreedto;

butthesomewhatmoreprotractedprocesswouldpermitthearticulationofa

Japaneseconsensus.Iconsultedallinterestedpartiesinourgovernment;all

agreedtothisprocedure.Weshouldhaverealizedwhatwasgoing tohappen.If

SatowasnotstrongenoughtodeliveronhisagreementwhenOkinawahungin

thebalance,hewouldsurelybeunabletodosoinapurelycommercial

negotiationwhereintheconcessionswouldhavetobemadelargelybythe

Japanesesideandnoobviouspressureswereavailableforus.



SatoarrivedattheWhiteHouseonNovember19,1969.Herepresenteda

countrythathadresteditsentiresecurityandforeignpolicyupontheUnited

States.HisJapancountedonAmericanstrengthandresolveandleadership.

Indeed,inhisdinnertoastthatevening,SatolavishedpraiseontheAmerican

achievementintheApollo12moonlanding,whichhadjusttakenplace;toSato

thiswas“notonlythevictoryofthesuperbpoweroforganizationoftheUnited