Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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wastetimeifonewasreluctanttoact.AnNSCReviewGroupmeetingwascalled

fortheafternoonfollowingtheshootdown,toprepareoptionsforanNSC

meetingthatwasscheduledforthefollowingday,April16,at10:00a.m.Nixon

gavenoindicationof whatactionheproposedtotake.Hewouldawaitthe

presentationoftheoptions.Itwasamistakenproc edure,infactindicatingthat

Nixonhadnostomachforretaliation. Itisallverywelltomakesureofalterna‐

tives.ButwhenanunarmedAmericanplaneisshotdownfarfromshore,a

leisurelyprocessofdecision‐makingcreatesapresumptioninfavorofeventual

inaction.Whatwasneededwassomeanalysisofthenatureofthechallengeand

whatitportendedforAmericanpolicy.Onlyinthesetermscouldtheoptions

makeanysense.Therewasafurthersourceofinhibition.Nixonhadscheduleda

pressconferenceforApril18longbeforethecrisisbroke.Itwasanexperience

thatusuallyfilledhimwithsuchacombinationofdreadandexhilarationasto

leavenoenergyforotherreflection.



IthoughtthatourreactiontoNorthKorea’sshootdownofanunarmed

planeoverinternationalwaterswithoutprovocationwouldbeinterpretedby

manyfriendlynations—especiallyinAsia—asatestofthenewAdministration’s

decisiveness.Ifavoredsomeretaliatoryact,butwaslessclearaboutwhatitmight

be.Mystaff’sadvicethatfirstdaywasamazinglyhawkish.EvenMorton

Halperin—latertogointovocaloppositiontotheallegedlybellicosetendenciesof

theAdministration—recommendedanimmediateairstrike.ButgiventheNSC

schedule,nomilitaryforcescouldbemovedforatleasttwenty‐fourhours,which

turnedouttobeanothererror.Animmediatemobilizationofmilitarystrength

wouldatleasthaveputNorthKoreaonnoticethatagraveoffensehadbeen

committed.Itmighthaveelicitedagesturetoindicatethatithadbackeddownor

admittedtheneedforsomereparation.Thisisindeedwhathappenedwhenthe

NorthKoreansbeattwoAmericanofficerstodeathalongtheDMZin1976.



Intheabsenceofaclear‐cutdirection,eachagencydevelopeditsown

optionsgearedtoitsownmoreorlessparochialconcerns.Mystaffdeveloped

alternativesrangingfromstiffdiplomaticprotest satPanmunjomtoseizureof

NorthKoreanshipsatsea,andvariouskindsofmilitarymoves,fromtheminingof

Wonsanharbortoshorebombardmentorattackingofanairfield.Whatallof

theseplanslackedwastheforcestoimplementthemoraspecificoperational

planoraparticularreparationwewoulddemandfromNorthKorea.Intheir

absencewewereengagedinacademicexercises.



TheStateDepartmentwaspreoccupiedwithameetingoftheArmistice

CommissioncalledbytheNorthKoreansforApril18.Theissuewaswhetherto

go,andifso,whattosay;orwhetherinsteadtoinsistonanalternativedate.The

StateDepartmentsentusamemorandumexpressingreservationsaboutmilitary

retaliation.Itdidnotaddressitsobjectiontoanyparticularformofmilitary

retaliationexcepttheideaofseizingaKoreanshipatsea,whichitfoundlegally

unjustified.



TheDefenseDepartmenttookthemostpuzzlingstepofall.Apparently

withoutconsultinganyotheragencyortheWhiteHouse,ithaltedall

reconnaissanceflightsneartheSovietUnion,China,intheMediterranean,and

overCuba.Wefound outaboutthisonlygraduallywhenNixongrandiloquently

orderedmilitaryescortsforourKoreanreconnaissanceflightsonApril17,onlyto

discoverthattherewerenoplanestoescort.Lairdwasundoubtedlyrightinhis

perceptionthattheseflightshadmultipliedovertheyearswithoutaperiodic

analysisoftheirrationale.Areviewwaslongoverdue.Myconcernwasthat

haltingallreconnaissanceinresponsetoashootdownwouldconveyan

impressionofinsecurity;ithardlysuggestedthattheAdministrationwas

determinedtodefenditsrightsagainstbrutalchallenge.



MuchofthedayofApril15was,therefore,spentininconclusiveplanning

exercises.ThereseemedtobeagrowingconsensustopickupaNorthKorean

shipatsea.Legalanalyseswererequested;theycametodifferingconclusionsbut

weremadeirrelevantwhenitwasrealizedthattherewerenoKoreanshipsatsea

norhadtherebeensincethecaptureofthePueblo.Thisdisposedofanother

brilliantsuggestion:thatweuseasubmarinetotorpedosomeNorthKoreanNavy

ship.TherewasarumortotheeffectthataKorean‐ownedshipunderDutch

registrywassomewhereintransit.Nixonwantedtoseizeit,keepingourlawyers

inaditherforthebetterpartoftheday.Asthingsturnedout,wecouldneverfind

theship.ForallIknowitneverexisted.



InthesecircumstancestheNSCmeetingonApril16wasbothunfocused

andinconclusive.Therewasnodiscussionofthefundamentalissue:whetherour

failuretorespondtotheshootdownofanunarmedreconnaissanceplaneover

internationalwatersmightnotcreateanimpressionofsuchirresolutionthatit

wouldencourageourenemiesinHanoiandemboldenopponentselsewhere.At

thesametimetherewastheusualreluctanceofanewAdministrationtoriskthe

honeymoon;atthattimewewerestillbaskinginpraiseformoderationand

restraintbycomparisonwithourpredecessors.Andtherewasanaturalfearof

beinginvolvedinwarintwotheaters.LairdpointedoutthatoureffortinVietnam

wascertaintosufferifwebecameinvolvedinatit‐for‐tatwithNorthKorea.Many

oftheseconsiderationswereimplicitratherthanformallystatedatthemeeting.

Militaryoptionswerereviewedinahaphazardwaywithouteverbeingbroughtto

thepointofseriousexamination.Theysufferedfromthedisabilitythatthosethat

seemedsafewereinadequatetotheprovocation,whilethosethatseemedequal

tothechallengeappearedtooriskyintermsofthefearofatwo‐frontwar.



Lateron,weweretolearnthatincrisesboldnessisthesafestcourse.

Hesitationencouragestheadversarytopersevere,maybeeventoraisetheante.

InretrospectitisclearthatwevastlyoverestimatedNorthKorea’sreadinessto

engageinatit‐for‐tat.ThisbeingstillearlyintheAdministration,Iconfinedmyself

thatfirstdaytopresentingtheoptions;Imadenorecommendatio n.Nixoncame

tonoconclusionattheNSCmeeting.Hespentmuchofthedayinquiringabout

theDutch/Koreanship,whichseemedtoofferadeusexmachinatonavigate

betweenriskymilitaryactionandthesortofpassivityNixonhadcriticizedso

vociferouslyinconnectionwiththePueblo.



Thenextday,April17,Nixonmadetwodecisions.Heacceptedthesecond

oftheseveraloptionsputbeforetheNSC:theresumpt ionofaerial

reconnaissanceaccompaniedbyarmedescorts.Andheorderedtwoaircraft

carriersintotheSeaofJapanforpossibleretaliatoryattacks.Thereasoning 

behindthemovementoftheaircraftcarrierswasthattousetacticalaircraft

basedinJapanwouldinvolveusincomplicatedconsultations withtheJapanese

governmentthatwerecertaintobeleakedandproducepublicprotest s,possibly

jeopardizingtheSecurityTreatytalkswithJapan.UsingB‐52SbasedinGuam

seemedtobeanoverreaction.Everyoneconvenientlyoverlookedtheaircraft

stationedinSouthKorea.Nodoubts ubconsciously,everyonedrewcomfortfrom

thefactthatitwouldtaketheaircraftcarriersthreedaystogettowherethey

couldlaunchplanes.Hawkscouldtellthemselvesthatweweredoingsomething;

dovescouldconsolethemselvesthatwestillhadacushionoftime.Everypassing

daywouldaddtoinhibitionsagainstaretaliatoryattack,allthemoresoas,

erroneously,Inowbelieve,weweredemandingnothingoftheNorthKoreansthe

acceptanceofwhichcouldbeconsideredcompensationandtherefusalofwhich

wouldjustifyretaliation.OurprotestatPanm unjomhadbeenmild;Statehad

pressedforanonconfrontationaltone;Rogershadopposedmakinganydemands.

Ourpoliticalandmilitarymovesweresubstantiallyoutofphasewitheachother.

Inthiscontextthedecisiontomovethecarrierswasessentiallytime‐wasting;it

lookedtoughbutimpliedinaction.



OnApril17Iassembledaspecialcrisismanagementgroupcomposedof

middle‐levelrepresentativesofState,Defense,theCIA,andtheJointChiefsof

Staff,andmeasChairman.Itwasthenucleusofwhatlaterbecamethe

WashingtonSpecialActionsGroup(WSAG),whichhandledallfuturecrises.Inthe

absenceofclear‐cutdirectives,planningwasdesultoryinthisfirstcase.Therewas

norealdeterminationtouseforce:Alldiscussionsweretheoreticalandno

concreteoperationalplanwaseverputforward.



Nixon’spressconferenceonApril18announcingtheresumptionofarmed

reconnaissancewasgenerallytakenasourofficialresponsetotheshootdown,

evenwithinourgovernment.AlexJohnsonthoughttherewasnopointc o ntinuing

ourcontingencyplanningfora militaryresponse.Idisagreed.IknewthatNixon,

thepressconferencebehindhim,wouldnowturntoaseriousconsiderationof

theissues.



InthelatemorningofApril18—rightafterthepressconference—Nixon

andIreviewedthesituation.Itoldhimthatfailuretodemandsomeredressorto

engageinsomeretaliatoryactionwouldmakeitprobablethathewouldhaveto

actmoreboldlylateron.However,therewerethreeconditionsaboutwhich

Nixonhadto satisfyhimself:First,theactionhadtobesignificant;second,wehad

tobepreparedtosustainitifNorthKorearesponded(wecouldcertainlynot

sustainaprolongedgroundwar);andthird,hecouldnotuseforceunlesshehad

aunitedgovernmentbehindhim.MyjudgmentwasthatNorthKoreawouldnot

escalate,althoughthePresidentshouldactonthebasisthatitmight.Isuggested

thatIpollRogers,Laird,andHelmsindividuallyabouttheirviewstoavoidthe

dangerthatatanNSCmeetingtheywouldgoalongwithwhattheymightsense

ofthePresident’spreference.Nixonagreed,partlybecauseapressconference

usuallylefthimsodrainedthathesoughttoavoidstressfordaysafterward.



Rogers,Laird,andHelmswereunanimousintheiroppositiontoamilitary

retaliationagainstNorthKorea:Rogersbecauseofitsimpactonpublicopinion; 

LairdbecausehethoughtitwouldhurttheVietnameffortandtherewasno

Congressionalsupport;Helmsforacombinationofthesereasons.Ireportedthe

consensusofhisadviserstoNixonlateinthedayofApril18;Iaddedthe

recommendationthathecouldnotrunsuchrisksoveracloseissuesoearlyinhis

termwithadividedteam.NixonandImetintheTreatyRoomoftheResidence.I

neverhadhadtheimpressionthatNixonhadhisheartinaretaliatoryattack.He

hadprocrastinatedtoomuch;hehadnotreallypressedforitinpersonal

conversation;hehadnotengagedintherelentlessmaneuveringbywhichhe

bypassedoppositionwhenhismindwasmadeup. Nowthathehadineffectan

alibi,heragedagainsthisadvisers.HewouldgetridofRogersandLairdatthe

earliestopportunity;hewouldneverconsultthemagaininacrisis.Heordered

newraidsinourundisclosedMenuseriesagainstthesanctuariesinCambodiaso

thatHanoiwouldnotthinkusirresolute.Butthebottomlinewasthatwewould

makenomilitaryresponseagainstNorthKorea.IinformedtheInterdepartmental

GrouptothateffectonthemorningofApril19.



NixonneverthelessorderedthecarrierstoproceedintotheSeaofJapanas

ashowofstrength.Itwasathreatunrelatedtoacomprehensibledemandfor

actionbytheothersideandthereforelikelytobeinterpretedasemptyposturing.

InourinexperiencewehadnotevenaskedforcompensationfromNorthKorea;

therewasnoconditionforthemtosatisfy;hence,nomeansofresolution.The

carrierscontinuedtheirmajesticcourseforseveralmoredays,pursuedbya

flotillaofJapaneseboatsandblimpsrecordingtheeventfortelevision.What

wouldhavehappenedifmattershadbecomeseriouscanonlybeconjectured;in

allprobabilityseveralluminariesofJapanesetelevisionwouldhavebecome

casualties.However,oncewehadnotifiedourbureaucracy,wordleakedout

rapidlythattherewouldbenoretaliation.TaskForce71—asitwasbythen

called—cruisedpeacefullyintheSeaofJapanuntilApril26,elicitingamildand

privateSovietprotesttowhichwerespondedsharply.Bytheendofthemonth

thecrisishadsputteredanddied,leavingnoresultsintermsofaNorthKorean

penaltyfortheatrocityandlittleresidueexceptNixon’ssenseofnothavingquite

measureduptohisfirstfulltest.(Thatwassurelymyestimateofmyownrole.)



TheresidueofLaird’snearlyincomprehensible decisiontosuspendall

reconnaissancestillhadtobedealtwith.(ItwasnotuntilApril22thattheWhite

HousereceivedamemorandumfromthePentagondetailingtheextentofthe

standdown—notonlyaroundKorea,butalsooverChina,theSovietUnion,and

Cuba,andintheMediterranean.)ThePresident’sorderforarmedreconnaissance

wasusedtobringaboutanotherdelay,onthebasisthatsuitablefighterescort

neededfirsttobeassembled.Dailyrequestsledtoevasiveanswers.I was

becomingincreasinglyworried,notbecauseIconsideredeveryreconnaissance

missionessentialbutbecauseoftheprecedentthat ashootdownofasingleplane

couldputanendtoourglobalreconnaissancesystem.Thetemptationsthis

createdforotherincidentsseemedtomeoverwhelming.ItwasnotuntilMay8,

afterastanddownofnearlyfourweeks,thatnorm alreconnaissancewasordered

resumed.



TheEC‐121incidentwasnotprimarilysignificantforthedecisiontodo

nothing—itwasaclosecall,whichprobablyshouldhavegonetheotherway,but

oneonwhichreasonablemencoulddiffer.Butitdidshowmajorflawsinour

decision‐making.Wemadenostrategicassessment;instead,webandied

technicalexpedientsabout.TherewasnostrongWhiteHouseleadership.We

madenosignificantpoliticalmove;ourmilitarydeploymentstookplaceina

vacuum.Tomanagecriseseffectively,theagenciesanddepartmentsinvolved

havetoknowwhatthePresidentintends.Theymustbecloselymonitoredto

makecertainthatdiplomaticandmilitarymovesdovetail.Inthiscasewelacked

bothmachineryandconception.WemadenodemandsNorthKoreacouldeither

acceptorreject.Weassemblednoforcethatcouldposeacrediblethreatuntilso

longaftertheeventthatitbecamealmostirrelevant.Coordinationwaspoor;the

Presidentneverreallymadeuphismind.Still,theEC‐121incidentwasablessing

indisguise.Itmadeusdramaticallytightenourprocedures.Futurecriseswere

handledcrisplyandwithstrongcentraldirection.WeestablishedtheWashington

SpecialActionsGroupforthatprecisepurpose.Wemanagedtoprojectthereafter

amuchgreaterimpressionofpurpose.Nixon’sdispleasurewithRogersandLaird

wasunjustified.Theygavetheirbestjudgment,straightforwardly.Theresult

neverthelesswastoconfirmNixoninhisisolateddecision‐making.Infuturecrises

heknewwhathewantedandgotitevenifthemaneuverstoreachthatpoint

werefrequentlyconvoluted.



Overall,IjudgeourconductintheEC‐121crisisasweak,indecisive,and

disorganized—thoughitwasmuchpraisedthen.Ibelievewepaidforitinmany

intangibleways,indemoralizedfriendsandemboldenedadversaries.Luckily,it

happenedearlyandonarelativelyperipheralissue.Andthelessonswelearned

benefitedourhandlingoflatercrises.



<<Contents>>



****



TheUS‐JapaneseAlliance



apanandtheUnitedStateshavebeenalliesforovertwentyyears;the

keystoneofourPacificpolicyiswithoutdoubtourfriendship,partnership,and

interdependencewiththatextraordinarynation.Twopeople scouldhardlybe

moredifferentthanthepragmatic,matter‐of‐fact,legallyoriented,literal

Americans;andthecomplex,subtleJapanese,operatingbyallusionand

conveyingtheirmeaningthroughanindirect,almostaestheticsensitivityrather

thanwords.JapanandtheUnitedStateshaveknowneachotherforacenturyand

aquarter.Ourrelationshiphaspassedthroughanincrediblerange:fromcuriosity

tocompetition,conflict,occupation,reconciliation,toallianceandmutual

dependence.Americansareheterogeneousinourorigins,constantlystrivingto

redefinewhatwehaveincommon.Japan,ontheotherhand,isacountryof

unusualcohesivenessandhomogeneity.ForAmericans,contractsandlawsare

primeguarantorsofsocialpeace.TheJapanesedependlessonlegalandformal

rulestopreservesocialharmonythanonthequalityofhumanrelationshipsand

onunstatedpatternsofconsensusandobligation.



TheUnitedStatesisblessedwithvastlandandampleresourc es;

abundanceistakenforgranted.Japanisagreatindustrialpower,butits

prosperityismorerecentand—becauseofthedependenceofitsindustryon

importedfood,energy,rawmaterials,andexternalmarkets—morevulnerable.



Theclichéthatitisoddthattwosuchdifferentnations shouldhavecome

togetheris,likemostclichés,substantiallytrue.Butitwouldapplyaswellto

Japan’srelationswithanyothercountry.ForJapan’sachievements—and

occasionallyitssetbacks—havegrownoutofasocietywhosestructures,habits,

andformsofdecision‐makingaresouniqueastoinsulateJapanfromallother

cultures.ThefurtherparadoxisthattheJapanesehaveusedforeigners,acquiring

theirmethodsandtechnologythebettertomaintaintheirownvigorandidentity.



AstringofislandsoffthecoastofChina,withmist‐shroudedmountain

peaksgrowingoutofaturbulentsea,itsverdantvalleysyieldingbountifullytothe

disciplineofitstillersbutwithfewothernaturalresources,Japanflourishesasa

triumphofdiscipline,faith,anddedication.Onlythehardiestcouldwringaliving

outofsounpromisinganenvironment.InfluencedgreatlybyChineseculturebut

thenstrikingoutindependently,theJapanesedevelopedoverthecenturiesa

stylesomuchtheirownthatitbecameatonceajustificationfortheirexistence

andadefenseagainstoutsideencroachment;anationalmotivatingforceand

evenaweapon.Japanbecamemorelikeafamilythananation,governedlessby

itslaws(whichregulatedonlythesurfacephenomenaandthegrossestviolations)

thanbyanintricatesetofunderstandingswhichassignedeachJapaneseaspecific

role.Thefeudalvaluesandobligationsthatinothercountrieswereconfinedtoa

smallupperclasspermeatedtheentiresociety.Onthesecrowdedislandsmen

andwomencametounderstandthatsurvivaldependedondisciplineand

cooperationandthusontakingtheedgeoffallconfrontations.Theexquisite

Japaneseformofcommunicationdependsonneverputtingforwardaproposition

thatcanberefused;onconveyingthemostdelicateshadesofmeaningina

mannerthatpermitsretreatwithoutlossofface,andthatatthesametime

imposesconsiderationfortheotherpointofview.WordsintheirsubtleJapanese

shadingsareonlyasmallpartofthatdelicateprocess.Everygestureisinvested

withasymbolicsignificance—fromthebowasagreetingwhosefinegradations

indicateahierarchy,tothearrangementsofflowersonatable.



Ofcourse,therearedarkedgestotheintricateandclose‐knitJapanese

socialstructure.ItprovidestheindividualJapanesewithadefinedsenseofself

andthusbringsaboutrestraintandmutualsupportintheJapanesecontext;but

outsideJapanthesesamepeoplecanbecomedisoriented,evenferocious,when

thecriteriaforconductevaporateinconfrontat ionwithalien,seemingly

barbarian,behavior.



TheamazingthingisthattheJapaneserespectforthepastandsenseof

culturaluniquenesshavenotproducedstagnation.Othersocietieshavepaidfor

thecommitmenttotraditionbygrowingirrelevancetothecurrentsofmodernity.

Japanturneditsfeudalpastintoanassetbypermeatingitsentiresocietywith

suchasenseofsharedrespectthatitsinternaldifferencescouldnevermarthe

essentialunitywithwhichitfacedforeigners.Thisspiritofuniquenessproved

moreserviceablethan,forexample,China’sbeliefinitsculturalsuperiority.Japan

lostnofaceinadoptingthemethodsofothersocieties;itcouldaffordtoadopt 

almostanysystemandstillretainitsJapanesecharacter,whichdependedneither

onformsofgovernmentnoronmethodsofeconomicsbutonacomplicated,

imbued,sharedsetofsocialrelationships.Farfrombeinganobstacletoprogress,

traditioninJapanprovidedtheemotionalsecurityandindeedtheimpetustotry

thenovel.



AfterJapanwas“opened”byCommodorePerry—adelicateeuphemismfor

whateverywhereelseledtothebeginningofcolonization—theJapanesewith

irondeter minationadaptedtheirfeudalsocietytotheimperativesofmodernity.

TheinstitutionoftheEmperorensuredcontinuitywhiletheydevelopedan

industrialnationwhichwithinfiftyyearsgrewstrongenoughtodefeatamajor

Europeanpower—Russia—andwithinanothergenerationtoadoptitselfthe

formsofcolonialismthatithadresiste d, leadingitintoworldconflict.



DefeatintheSecondWorldWardidnotshakeJapan’sextraordinary

cohesionandresilience.ItseemedasifJapanhadafinelycalibratedradarthat

enabledittogaugetheglobalbalanceofpowerandtoadaptitsinstitutionstoits

necessities,confidentthatnoadaptationcoulddisturbtheessenceofJapanese 

society.Parliamentarydemocracyreplacedauthoritarianism,withtheEmperor

remainingasthesymbolofJapanesedistinctiveness.Japanchangedits

institutions,repairedthewartimedevastation,andemergedwithinlessthantwo

decadesmorepowerfulthanever.



Facedbyburgeoningcompetitionfromtheothergrowingeconomiesin

freeAsia,whichbegantoenjoythebenefitsofskilled,cheaplaborthatwasonce

Japan’smonopolyadvantage,Japanesedecision‐makersbrilliantlymovedlabor

andresourcesfromindustrieshitbycompetitionintootherswheretheir

comparativeadvantageremained.Thesystemwhichgivesworkerslifetimejob

securitywasnotallowedtobecomeaprescriptionforimmobility.Ofcourse,to

somedegreeJapanbenefitedatfirstfrommassiveAmericanaidandthenfrom

lowspendingondefense,madepossiblebyitsrelianceontheSecurityTreaty

withtheUnitedStates.Butthesuccessisaboveallatributetothecohesionofits

institutionsandthetalentofitspeople.TheresilienceJapandemonstratedinthe

1973energycrisisunderlinesthepoint.Withintwoyearsanationdependent

uponimportsfor90percentofitsoilhaddug itselfoutofitsbalance‐of‐payments 

deficitandrestoreditssurplusbyanawesomefeatofnationalwill.Inmyview

Japanesedecisionshavebee nthemostfarsightedandintelligentofanymajor

nationofthepostwareraevenwhiletheJapaneseleadershaveactedwiththe

understated,anonymousstyle characteristicoftheirculture.



WhentheNixonAdministrationenteredofficewehadtwoconcernswith

Japan:Oureconomicagencieswereworriedbecauseoftheincreasingly

unfavorablebalanceofourtrade;ourpoliticaldepartmentswerepressingJapan

totakeongreaterresponsibilitiesforeconomicdevelopmentandpolitical

stabilityandevensecurityinAsia.Theseobjectiveswerestraightforwardenough,

butthetruthisthatneitherI normycolleaguespossessedaverysubtlegraspof

Japanesecultureandpsychology.Wethereforemademanymistakes;Iliketo

thinkthatwelearnedagreatdealandultimatelybuiltanextraordinarilyclose

relationshipafterfirstinflictingsomeunnecessaryshockstoJapanese

sensibilities.ThehardestthingforustograspwasthattheextraordinaryJapanese

decisionswereproducedbyleaderswhopridedthemselvesontheiranonymous

style.Tobesure,thereweregreatprimeministers.Buttheyworked

unobtrusively,conveyingintheirbearingthattheirpoliciesreflectedthe

consensusofasociety,nottheidiosyncrasyofanindividual.Theymightperform

theirdutieswithgreaterorlesserability.Inthefinalanalysis,however,theywere

theproductofacontinuoustradition,whichwoulddetermineitsnecessitiesnot

throughdominantpersonalitiesbutbyinfusingitspurposesthroughoutthe

society.



AllofusbroughtupinWestern‐styledecision‐making,inwhichthe

emphasisisontheactofdeciding,hadamaddeninglydifficulttimegraspingthis

point.Ourstyleofnegotiationisconversational;itistopersuadetheinterlocutor

topursueourpreferredcourse.ButaJapaneseleaderdoesnotmakea decision

byimposinghiswillonsubordinates;hisartconsistsofshapingtheirpreference

sothattheywillgointhedesireddirection.AJapaneseleaderdoesnotannounce

adecision;heevokesit.Westernersdecidequicklybutourdecisionsrequirea

longtimetoimplement,especiallywhentheyarecontroversial.Inour

bureaucracy,eachpowercenterhastobepersuadedorpressured;thus,the

spontaneityordisciplineofexecutionisdiluted.InJapanthisprocessprecedes

thesettingofpolicy.Decision‐makingisthereforeslow,butexecutionisrapidand

single‐minded;anditisgivenadditionalimpetusbecauseallthosechargedwith

carryingoutthepolicyhaveparticipatedinshapingit.

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