demonstratedthatourmilitaryeffortcouldneverbringpeace.
15
Therecurringcall
forAmericanconcessionsregardlessofHanoi’sreactionsledtheTimesintoa
seriesofconstantlyescalatingproposals.In1968theTimesadvocatedmutual
withdrawalbyboththeUSandNorthVietnam,butthissoonevolvedintoa
recommendationthattheUnitedStatesinitiatetheprocesswithatoken
withdrawal,thenintoademandforwithdrawalsregardlessofHanoi’sresponse,
andthenintopressuresforafixedandunconditionaltimeta ble forthecomplete
evacuationofUSforces.
16
AsforthescaleofAmericanwithdrawals,theTimes
firstcalledfortheUnitedStatessimplyto“initiate”or“begin”troopreductions;
aneditorialinMayreferredtoanticipatedUScutbacksoffiftytoonehundred
thousandmenas“substantial.”WhenNixonbeganthewithdrawalprogramat
MidwayinJune,thiswasfirstwelcomedas“asteptowarddisengagement”;by
September,howeve r,therewasgrumblingthatthewithdrawalof60,000was
“timid”and“token,”andnot“significant”or“adequate.”
17
Thesameescalationofproposalsoccurredinthepoliticaldimension.In
May1969,theTimescalledfora“coalitionelectoralcommission” tosupervise
freeelectionsinSouthVietnam.Butlessthanfourweekslater—amonthbefore
Saigonofferedtoestablishjustsuchajointcommission—thepositio nhad
evolvedtothenegotiationof“anagreement…onthefuturegovernmentofSouth
Vietnam,”thatis,an“interimcoalition.”
18
Asformilitarytactics,theTimesbegan
callingforacutbackofsearch‐and‐destroymissions inApril1969.Itsownnews
columnsonJuly25reportedthatsuchareductionwasabouttotakeplace.
Withintwoweeks,theTimeswascallingforastandstillcease‐fire.
19
Eventhis
provedinsufficient.NixonoffereditonOctober7,1970;Hanoipromptlyrejected
it.TheTimescontinueditscr iticism.
Eachoftheseescalatingconcessionswasadvancedasthekeytopeaceand
astheonlywaytogetnegotiationsstarted.
20
Oncemade,theconcessionwas
brieflyapplauded,andindeedHanoiwascalledontorespond.
21
ButwhenHanoi
ignoredtheproposals,theresult wasnotacallforAmericansteadfastnessbutfor
furtherUSconcessions
22
onthegroundthatthelackofprogresswasthefaultof
theUnitedStates
23
orofSaigon.
24
Theimportanceoftheearlierconcessionwas
nowdisparaged,
25
orelseitwasarguedthatHanoihadinfactreciprocated
26
or
thattheUnitedStateshadbeenhardeningitsposition.
27
Thesecallsforever
furtherAmericanconcessionswereregularlyexplainedbytheargumentthatthe
UnitedStateshadaspecialobligationtoproveitsgoodfaithtotheothersideand