Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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mutualtounilateralwithdrawal,fromresidualforcestocompletedeparture.But

Hanoineverbudged.Wecouldhaveneitherpeacenorourprisonersuntilwe

achievedwhatHanoiapparentlynolo ngertrusteditselftoaccomplish:the

overthrowofourally.



WewerenotpreparedtodofortheCommunistswhattheycouldnotdo

forthemselves.Thisseemedtousanactofdishonorthatwouldmortgage

America’sinternationalpositionforalongtimetocome.Ourrefusaltooverthrow

analliedgovernmentremainedthesingleandcrucialissuethatdeadlockedall

negotiationuntilOctober8,1972,whenHanoiwithdrewthedemand.



ThoughXuanThuyandIhadachievedlittleexcepttorestateestablished

positionsinalesscontentiousmanner,weagreedthateitherpartywouldbefree

tocontacttheotherandthatanothermeetingshouldtakeplace.XuanThuy

indicatedthatHanoididnotlikeintermediariesfromothercountriesandaskedus

todesignateanAmericantoreceiveordelivermessagesinthischannel.I

designatedGeneralWalters.AsummarywassenttoAmbassadorBunkerin

SaigontoinformPresidentThieu,whohadauthorizedsuchsecrettalksatthe

Midwaymeetingandwhowaskeptthoroughlybriefedonmysecretnegotiations

fromthebeginning.IntheabsenceofAmbassadorLodgeinParis,hisdeputy,

PhilipHabib,wasbriefedbyme.



Thenewlyestablishedchannelwasnotusedagainin1969.Twodayslater,

onAugust6,therewasaCommunistattackonCamRanhBay,whichonecould

barelyexplainonthegroundthatitmusthavebeenplannedwellbeforethe

meetingwithXuanThuy.OnAugust11,however,Communistforcesattacked

morethanonehundredcities,towns,andbasesacrossSouthVietnam,ending

theeight‐weeklullinthefighting.Themostgenerousinterpretationcouldnot

avoidtheconclusionthatHanoididnotbelieveingestures,negotiation,goodwill,

orreciprocity.



<<Contents>>

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****



AnotherReassessment



ixonreactedtothenewVietnamattacksbyannouncingonAugust23from

theSanClementeWhiteHousethathewasdeferringconsiderationofthe

nexttroopwithdrawaluntilhisreturntoWashington.Therewasanunusually 

delayedandseeminglyuncertainresponsefromtheNorthVietnameseinParis.

TheapparentdelayinourunilateralwithdrawalhadgivenHanoipause—ahintof

itsrespectforAmericanforcesandofwhatmighthave happenedhadour

domesticsituationpermittedgreaterfirmness.Butitdidnot.ThoughNixon’s

decisionwasexactlyinaccordancewithtwoofthethreecriteriafortroop

withdrawalhehadannouncedinMarchandfrequentlyrepea ted(enemyactivity,

progressinParis,andimprovementoftheSouthVietnameseforces),thedecision

wasgreetedwithoutragebytheCongressandthemedia.OnAugust25,HoChi

MinhrepliedtoPresidentNixon’sletterofJuly15.(Actually,thereplywas

receivedonAugust30,threedaysbeforeHo’sdeath.)Ho’sletter,not

reciprocatingNixon’ssalutationof“DearMr.President,”reiteratedNorth

Vietnam’spublicpos itioninaperemptoryfashion:



OurVietnamesepeoplearedeeplydevotedtopeace,arealpeacewithindependence

andrealfreedom.Theyaredeterminedtofighttotheend,withoutfearingthesacrificesand

difficultiesinordertodefendtheircountryandtheirsacrednationalrights.Theoverallsolution

in10pointsoftheNationalLiberationFrontofSouthVietnamandoftheProvisional

RevolutionaryGovernmentoftheRepublicofSouthVietnamisalogicalandreasonablebasis

forthesettlementoftheVietnameseproblem.Ithasearnedthesympathyandsupportofthe

peoplesoftheworld.



Inyourletteryouhaveexpressedthedesiretoactforajustpeace.ForthistheUnited

StatesmustceasethewarofaggressionandwithdrawtheirtroopsfromSouthVietnam,

respecttherightofthepopulationoftheSouthandoftheVietnamesenationtodisposeof

themselveswithoutforeigninfluence.ThisisthecorrectmannerofsolvingtheVietnamese

problem…



Whateverthereason forHo’sreply—whetheritwasbasedonrealor

feignedoutrage—itonceagainmadeclearthatHanoiwouldbesatisfiedonlywith

victory.ItcountedonthenervousexhaustionoftheUnitedStates;itwould

toleratenoappearanceof“progress”innegotiationsthatmightenableustorally

publicopinion.Averynaturalresponsefromuswouldhavebeentostopbringing

soldiershome,butbynowwithdrawalhadgaineditsownmomentum.The

reductionswerealwaysannouncedforaspecificperiod;itwasinevitablethat

pressures,partlypublic,partlybureaucratic,wouldbuildupastheendofeach

periodapproached.TheAugust23ripostetoHanoi’sbelligerencewasthelast

timeNixontriedtohaltwithdrawals.



OnSeptember12,anotherNSCmeetingwasconvenedtodiscussthenext

troopreduction.Therewasnolongeranydebate.OnSeptember16,the

Presidentannouncedhisdecisiontolowerthetroopceilingbyanother40,500by

December15.Thetotalreductionintheauthorizedceilingnowamountedto

65,500.Thiswas15,000morethanhadbeenconsiderednecessarybyRogersat

thebeginningoftheyeartoconvincethepublicthatwewereseriousabout

endingthewar.AftertheannouncementonSeptember16ourwithdrawals

becameinexorable;thePresidentneveragainpermittedtheendofawithdrawal

periodtopasswithoutanno uncinganewincreme ntforthenext.Hanoiwason

thevergeofachievingthesecondofitsobjectiveswithoutreciprocity:The

bombinghaltwasnowleadingtounilateralwithdrawal.Wehadcomealongway:

Wehadacceptedtotalwithdrawal,wehadstartedoutofVietnamunilaterally,

andwehadde‐escalatedourmilitaryactivities—allwithouttheslightest

response.



Iwasbecominguneasyaboutthecourseofourpolicy.AttheNSCmeeting

onVietnamofSeptember12,Itooklittlepartinthediscussionbutexclaimed

towardtheend:“Weneedaplantoendthewar,notonlytowithdrawtroops.

Thisiswhatisonpeople’sminds.”TwodaysbeforethemeetingIhadsentthe

Presidentapersonalmemorandumexpressing mydeepconcernandquestioning

theassumptionsofVietnamization.Withdrawalswouldbecomelike“salted

peanuts”totheAmericanpublic;themoretroopswewithdrew,themorewould

beexpected,leadingeventuallytodemandsfortotalunilateralwithdrawal,

perhapswithinayear(thisinfacthappened).Iarguedthatourmilitarystrategy

couldnotworkrapidlyenoughagainsttheerosionofpublicopinionand

predicted,unhappilyrightly,thatHanoiwouldprobablywaituntilwehadlargely

withdrawnbeforelaunchinganall‐outattack.Inshort,Ididnotthinkourpolicy

wouldwork.MymemorandumofSeptember10isreprintedinfullinthenotesat

thebackofthisbook.



Ifollowedthismemorandumwithanotheradaylaterthatoutlinedthe

policyoptionsasIsawthemandwarnedonceagainthata strategyentirely

dependentonVietnamizationwouldnotwork.Aportionofthismemorandumis

alsointhenotesattheback.



Mypreferredcoursewastheonethathadbeenattheheartofthe

proposedVancemission:tomakethemostsweepingandgenerousproposalof

whichwewerecapable,shortofoverthrowinganalliedgovernmentbutensuring

afreepoliticalcontest.Ifitwererefused,wewouldhalttroopwithdrawalsand

quarantineNorthVietnambyminingitsportsandperhapsbombingitsraillinksto

China.Thegoalwouldbearapidnegotiatedcompromise.Wheretheplanningfor

theVancemissionhadproducedadetailedpeaceproposal,Iassembledatrusted

groupofmembersofmystaffintheWhiteHouseSituationRoominSeptember

andOctobertoexplorethemilitarysideofthecoin.Ourpresentstrategywas

tryingtowalkafineline,Itoldmystaff,betweenwithdrawingtoofastto

convinceHanoiofourdeterminationandwithdrawingtooslowlytosatisfythe

Americanpublic.AssumingthePresidentlostconfidenceinthispolicyandthathe

wasnotpreparedtocapitulate,howcouldheforcearapidconclusion? Iaskedfor

amilitaryplandesignedformaximumimpactontheenemy’smilitarycapability;I

requestedalsoanassessmentofthediplomaticconsequencesandascenariofor

thefinalnegotiation.



Theplanningwasgiventhename“DuckHook,”forreasonsthattotally

escapemetoday.Hal SonnenfeldtandJohnHoldridgewroteanalysesofthelikely

SovietandChineseresponsestoamajorre‐escalation.Legalanddiplomatic

assessmentswereprepared.RogerMorris,TonyLake,[

MorrisandLakelaterresigned,

allegedlyovertheCambodianoperationof1970;inthefallof1969,however,theyexpressed

nomoralscrupleoverthemuchtougheroptionwewereconsidering.]andPeterRodman

workedonadraftPresidentialspeech(partsofwhichwerelaterusedon

November3).TheJointChiefsofStaffdevisedaplanforminingNorth

Vietnameseportsandharborsanddestroyingtwenty‐ninetargetsofmilitaryand

economicimportanceinanairattacklastingfourdays.Theplanalsoanticipated

periodicattacksofforty‐eighttoseventy‐twohoursifHano icontinuedtoavoid

seriousnegotiation.ThetargetdatewastobeNovember1,1969,thefirst

anniversaryofthebombinghaltunderstandingthathadpromisedus“prompt

andproductive”negotiations.



Ourplanningproceededinadesultoryfashion.Asthescenariotookshape,

Iconcludedthatnoquickand“decisive”militaryactionseemedattaina ble,and

thattherewasnotenoughunanimityinourAdministrationtopursuesodaring

andriskyacourse.OnOctober17,Irecommendedto thePresidentthathedefer

considerationofthisoptionuntilhecouldassesstherateofNorthVietnamese

infiltrationfortheremainderoftheyear.[Thiswas,actually,anevasion.Thestrategy

impliedbytheDuckHookplanshouldhavehadnothingtodowiththerateofinfiltration—in

fact,onthebasisofmyownprognosisinfiltrationwouldnotpickupuntilwehadreducedour

forcesmuchfurther.Theplanshouldhavebeenlinkedprimarilytotheprogressof

negotiations.]MydoubtsaboutVietnamizationpersisted,reflectingtheinsoluble

dilemmasofcontestingbothNorthVietnam’sarmyanddomesticcritics,ofwhom

asignificantpercentageobjectedviolentlytotheveryconceptofacoherent

strategy.OnOctober30,IwroteanotherpersonalmemorandumtothePresident,

onceagainraisingmy doubtsabouttheassumptionsonwhichourpolicywas

based:



WehaveseensomanyVietnamprogramsfailafterbeingannouncedwithgreatfanfare,

thatIthoughtIshouldputbeforeyouinsummaryformmyquestionsabouttheassumptions

underlyingVietnamization.Tobelievethatthiscourseisviable,wemustmakefavorable

assumptionsaboutanumberoffactors,andmustbelievethatHanoiaswellwillcometo

acceptthem.



UScalculationsaboutthesuccessofVietnamization—andHanoi’scalculations,inturn,

aboutthesuccessoftheirstrategy—relyonourrespectivejudgmentsof:



—thepaceofpublicoppositionintheUStoourcontinuingthefightinanyform.(Past

experienceindicatesthatVietnamizationwillnotsignificantlyslowitdown.)



—theabilityoftheUSGovernmenttomaintainitsowndisciplineincarryingoutthis

policy.(Aspublicpressuresgrow,youmayfaceincreasinggovernmentaldisarraywitha

growingnumberofpressleaks,etc.)



—theactualabilityoftheSouthVietnameseGovernmentandarmedforcestoreplace

Americanwithdrawals—bothphysicallyandpsychologically.(Conclusiveevidenceislacking

here;thisfactinitself,andpastexperience,argueagainstoptimism.)



—thedegreetowhichHanoi’scurrentlossesaffectitsabilitytofightlater—i.e.,losses

ofmilitarycadre,politicalinfra‐structure,etc.(Again,theevidenceisnotdefinitive.Most

reportsofprogresshaveconcernedsecuritygainsbyUSforces—notalastingerosionofenemy

politicalstrength.)



—theabilityoftheGVNtogainsolidpoliticalbenefitfromitscurrentpacification

progress.(Again,reportsofprogresshavebeenlargelyaboutsecuritygainsbehindtheUS

shield.)



OurVietnamizationpolicythusrestsonaseriesoffavorableassumptionswhichmaynot

beaccurate—althoughnoonecanbecertainonthebasisofcurrentanalyses.



Bynowmymemorandaweregrowing quixotic.Theonlyrealalternativesto

Vietnamizationwereimmediatewithdrawalorelsetheescalationthatwaspartof

theVancegambitandDuckHookplanning.Noteventhestrongestcriticsinthe

mainstreamofAmericanliferecommendedim mediate withdrawalin1969.It

wouldhavebeenablatantbetrayal,precipitatingthecollapseofourally,giving

himnochancetosurviveonhisown. Itwouldhaveshakenconfidenceinthe

UnitedStatesinAsia,particularlyJapan;duringtheentireperiodnotone

Europeanleaderurgedonustheunconditionalabandonmentofthewarwehad

inherited.IdoubtthatouropeningtoChinawouldhaveprosperedaftersucha

humiliation.Chinawasinchingtowardus,afterall,tofindacounterweighttothe

growingSovietthreatonitsborders.Itwasnotevenlogisticallypossibleto

withdraw500,000meninstantaneously;thePenta gonestimatedthataminimum

oftwelvetoeighteenmonthswouldberequiredtoremovethenumbersthathad

gonetoVietnamoveraperiodoffouryears.Theywouldhavetobeextricated

amidstthedisintegrationandpanicourcollapsewascertaintoproduce;the

SouthVietnamesearmyofcloseto amillionmightwellturnontheallythathad

sobetrayedit.Therewas,moreover,nexttonopublicsupportforsuchacourse;

everypollshowedthatunilateralwithdrawalwasrejectedbycrushingmajorities.

Thepublicwasasambivalentasthegovernmentplanners;Itwantedustogetout

ofVietnamandyetitdidnotwantdefeat.Aboveall,Hanoihadmadeclear

repeatedlythatthewarcouldnotbeended—orourprisonersreleased—evenby

ourunilateralwithdrawal.Weweretoldthroughoutthatasweexitedwealsohad

toremoveouralliesfrompowerandinstallaCommunist‐dominatedcoalition

government.



Startingin1970,thoughnotatfirst,ourcriticspressedustoannouncea

finaldeadlineforourwithdrawal.Butthatwaseitheravariationof

Vietnamizationortheequivalentofcapitulation.Ifthedeadlinewasarbitrary—

thatis,tooshort—everythingwoulddisintegrateand itwasaformulafor

collapse.Ifthedeadlinewasfeasibleintermsofourownplanningfor

Vietnamization,theonlydifferencewasthatitwaspubliclyannounced.Theissue

wasthetacticaljudgmentwhetheranannouncementwouldhelporhinderour

extricationfromthewar.Forbetterorworseourjudgmentwasthatapublic

announcementwoulddestroythelastincentivesforHanoitonegotiate;itwould

thensimplyoutwaitus.AndhowwouldweexplaintoAmericanfamilieswhytheir

sons’livesshouldbeatriskwhenafixedschedulefortotalwithdrawalexisted? It

isimportanttorememberthatmostresponsiblecritics,includingClarkClifford,at

firstonlyaskedforthewithdrawalofcombattroopsbytheendof1970,leavinga

largeresidualforcebehind.Ourownscheduledifferedfromthisbyexactlyfour

months.



Anotherargumentfrequentlypressedonuswasthatweshouldstopgiving

Saigona“veto”overournegotiatingposition;moregenerallyitwasanattackon

theallegedrepressivenessoftheSouthVietnamesegovernment.Itwouldbe

absurdtodenythatthegovernmentonwhoseterritoryourforceswerelocated

hadsomeinfluenceoverourpolicies.Itsself‐confidence,legit imacy,and

survivabilitywereafteralloneofthekeyissuesofthewar;ifwecollapseditby

pressuresbeyonditscapacitytobear,wewouldineffecthavesettledonHanoi’s

terms.ButourinfluenceonSaigonwasmuchgreaterthanthereverse.Thereis

noquestionthatinresponsetoourpressuretheSaigongovernmentmade

extraordinaryeffortstobroadenitsbaseandtoagreetoapoliticalcontestwith

theCommunists.Asignificantlandreformprogramwasinstituted;anelectoral

commissiononwhichtheCommunistswouldberepresentedwasputforward. 

Saigon’spoliticsweremorepluralisticandturbulentthanitsAmericancritics

caredtoadmit—andvastlybet terinhumantermsthantheicytotalitarianismof

NorthVietnam,whichwasinfactthealternativeatstake.



TheSouthVietnamesegovernment’sinternalsecurityproblemwasnota

flimsyexcuseforautocracybuttherealityoforganizedterrorisminthecitiesand

almostdailyassassinationsandkidnappingsinthecountryside.[

Theassassinations

andkidnappingswereusuallyaimedatthebest,nottheworst,ofSaigon’sofficials,including

schoolteachers,becausetheyembodiedSaigon’sbestclaimtopublicsupport.

]The

independenceandpoliticalweightofSouthVietnam’smilitarycommandersand

theirtendencytowarlordismwereachallengeeventoThieu’sperson alauthority,

nottospeakofconstitutionalgovernment.ButtheUnitedStatessharedsome 

blamehere,foritwastheoverthrowofNgoDinhDiemin1963,withitsresulting

massivepurgeoftheciviladministration,thatmadesuccessorregimesso

dependentonthemilitary.Obviously,thepoliticalpracticesofaprosperous

countrywithalonglibertariantraditioncouldnotbefullyappliedinan

underdevelopedcountrywrackedbycivilwar;theywerenotappliedbyPresident

LincolnduringourownCivilWar.AttackingThieutoooftenwasnotanadvocacy

ofconcretereformbutanalibiforourabdication.



Thefactwasthatthealternativestosimplygettingoutordismantling

SaigonwereescalationorVietnamization.Wefinallyrejected themilitaryoption

becausewedidnotthinkwecouldsustainpublicsupportforthelengthof time

requiredtoprevail;becauseitsoutcomewasproblematical;andbecausehadwe

succeededSaigonmightstillnothavebeenreadytotakeover.IntruthInever

examineditmorethanhalfheartedly,largelybecauseIandallmembersofthe

Administrationnotonlywantedtoendthewarbutyearnedtodosointheleast

convulsiveway.WhatseparatedtheAdministrationfromitsmoderatecriticswas

notaphilosophybutanuance.Ourcourseaimedatwithdrawal;ourdesireto

retainflexibilityandthereforeourrejectionofapublicdeadlinewasdueto our

lingeringhopethatHanoimightatsomepointnegotiate,payingsomepr ice to

accelerateourtotalwithdrawal.



<<Contents>>



****



TheUnpacifiableDoves



hepublicatmospherewashardlyhospitabletonuance.Forthewarhadsetin

motionforcestranscendingtheissuesandemotionsthatwentbeyondthe

substanceofthedebate. 

T



AweekbeforeInauguration,onJanuary12,1969,thedistinguished

diplomaticcorrespondentoftheWashingtonPost,ChalmersRoberts,had

perceptivelyoutlinedNixon’sdilemma:



Ataguess,thecountryandCongresswillgivethenewPresidentsixmonthstofindthe

routetodisengagementwithhonorfromtheVietnamwar.Butveryprobablysixmonths,or

anylimitedextensionthatpublicattitudesmaygrant,willnotbeenough…



PresidentNixonisbound,notsomuchbyhisownwordsasthenationalmood,to

continueontheJohnsoncourse…



TheelectioncampaignmadeitveryevidentthatthebigmajorityofAmericanswantto

getoutofVietnam,butinawaythatdoesnotmakeamockeryofthelossthusfarofmorethan

31,000Americanlives.



ThiscombinationofattitudesrestrictsMr.Nixonbothastotimeandsubstance…



Soitwas.Asthemo nthswentbyin1969,wewereconfrontedbypublic

protestsanddemonstrationsandquickeningdemandsinthemediaandthe

Congressforunilatera lconcessionsinthenegotiations.Theyhadonecommon

theme:TheobstacletopeacewasnotHanoibuttheirowngovernment’s

inadequatededicationtopeace.



Futuregenerationsmayfinditdifficulttovisualizethedomesticconvulsion

thattheVietnamwarinduced.OnJuly2,1969,antiwarwomendestroye ddraft

recordsinNewYork.OnJuly6,membersofWomenStrikeforPeaceflewtothe

UniversityofTorontotomeetthreewomenrepresentingtheVietCong.The

mayorsoftwotownspetitionedthePresidenttostopsendingtheirso nsto

Vietnam.DemonstratorslaunchedamockinvasionofFortLewisonJuly15.There

wereweeklydemonstrationsatthePentagon,includingsuchcharminggestures

aspouringbloodonitssteps.OnAugust14twelveyoungsoldiersfromabasein

Honolulusoughtrefugeinachurchasan“actofdeepinvolvementagainstallthe

injusticeinherentintheAmericanmilitarysystem.”AgroupcalledBusiness 

ExecutivesforVietnamPeacecalledontheWhiteHouseonAugust28toinform

theAdministrationthat“thehoneymoonisover.”WhileNixonwasontheWest

CoastinAugusthewasexposedtorepeateddemonstrationsathisresidencein

SanClemente.OnSeptember3,agroupofovertwohundredtwenty‐five

psychologistsdemonstratedoutsidetheWhiteHouse,protestingtheVie tnam

waras“theinsanityofourtimes.”Protestersrea dlistsofwardeadatpublic

ralliesandhadtheminsertedintotheCongressionalRecord.(Thisturnedintoa

favoriteactivityofsomeformermembersoftheJohnsonandKennedy

administrationswhomighthaveowedtheirsuccessorssomethingbetterthanto

implythattheywereindifferenttosacrificesanddeaths.)DuringAugustleaders

oftheprotestmovementannouncedaseriesofmonthlydemonstrationsstarting

October15tobringpressureonthegovernment—theso‐calledMoratorium.All

ofthiswasconspicuouslyandgenerallyapprovinglycoveredbythemedia.Very

few,ifany,oftheprotesterseverappealedtoHanoiforevenalittleflexibilityor

werereadytograntthatjustconceivablytheirowngovernmentmightbesincere.



Asthesummerdrewtoacloseandstudentsreturnedtouniversitiesand

theCongressendeditsrecess,thepaceofprotestquickened.ThedeathofHoChi

MinhonSeptember3wasallegedtopresentanewopportunityforendingthe

stalemateinParis,thoughwhateverevidencewasathandindicatedtheopposite.

Therewasclamorthatweproposeacease‐fireindeferencetotheleaderwho

hadcausedussomuchdiscomfiture,andhopethatsuchacease‐firewouldthen

becomepermanentasifHanoimightbemadetoslidewithoutnoticingitintoan

arrangementithadconsis tentlyrejected.Infactweobservedacease‐fireonthe

dayofHo’sfuneralandofcourseitwasnotextendedbyouradversaries.Asthe

summerdrewtoaclose,ChalmersRobertsofferedathoughtfulanalysisinthe

WashingtonPostofSeptember5.Hepredictedthatantiwarpassionswerejust

beginningtoheatup:



[BystayinginSanClemente]Mr.Nixonhasbeenabletoescapeexplainingwhatheis

tryingtodoaboutthewar.WithCongressawayandthecollegegenerationatthebeaches…

therehasbeennofocusonthewar’sopponents.



Butallthissurelyisabouttochange.Mr.NixonwillbebackintheWhiteHousenext

Tuesdayandbytheneventhelastcongressionallaggardwillbeintown.Inafewdays…the

studentswillbebackoncampus…



Ho’sdeathiscreatingcallsfornewNixoninitiatives.AndHo’smaninParis,XuanThuy,

onTuesdayseemedtohintthatmassiveAmericanwithdrawalsjustmightmovetheParistalks

offdeadcenter.



BotheventsarelikelytobegristforAmericandoves…Thelongsummerisoverandnew

forcesarecomingintomotionintheareaofAmericanpublicopinion.ThePresidentwillsoon

havetosaymoreandprobablydomoreifhewantspublicsupport.…



Roberts’spredictionprovedonlytooaccurate.OnSeptember3,Senator

EdmundMuskieofMainecomplainedthatPresidentNixon’splanforendingthe

warwas“veryambiguous”;healsoquestionedwhetherNixonwasinfactseeking

anegotiatedsettlementratherthanamilitaryvictory.(“Victory”wasturninginto

anepithet.)OnSeptember5,SenatorsJohnShermanCooperandGaylordNelson

suggestedthatthePresidentusethe“opportunity”createdbyHoChiMinh’s

deathtoproposenewinitiativestoendthewar;theydidnottellushoworwhat

theopportunityconsistedof.OnSeptember6,SenateMajorityLeaderMike

Mansfieldmadethesamesuggestion.OnSeptember18,twodaysafterthe

President’sannouncementofwithdrawalof40,500moretroops,SenatorEdward

KennedyattackedthePresident’sVietnampolicyandbrandedtheSaig onregime

astheprimaryobstacletoa settlement.InaninterviewonSeptember21,Cyrus

Vancecalledfora“standstillcease‐fire,”suggestinga“leopard‐spotfederalor

confederalsolution”

(thoughwehadproposedacease‐firetoDobryninaspart

oftheVancegambitandHanoihadshownnointerestinit).OnSeptember25,