Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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longerthanhadbeenplannedbyhispredecessor.NeitherthePresidentnorIhad

beenawareofthatplanoroftheannouncement.



IhadnofixedviewastotherightnumberofB‐52sorties,butIwantedto

husbandourrelativelyfewnegotiatingassets.Ifweweregoingtode‐escalate,it

shouldbeaspartofanegotiation;theworstwaytodoitwasunilaterallyin

responsetobudgetarypressures.IntheabsenceofaPresidentialwillingnessto

confronthisSecretaryofDefense,Inegotiatedaratherambiguouspress

statementwithLaird:“ItisthepolicyoftheUnitedStatesthatreductionsof

militaryoperationsmustbebroughtaboutbythephasedmutualwithdrawalof

externalforces.Budgetplanningfigureswillbebroughtinlinewiththispolicyon

thebasisofperiodicreview.”



Butthedamagewasdone.Ajour nalisttoldmethathetooktheB‐52

reductionasasignaltobothHanoiandSaigon,because“youdonotdoathing

likethisforbudgetaryreasons.”HesaiditcouldnotbereadbyHanoiasanything

exceptamovetowardthewithdrawalofourforces,orbySaigonasanything

otherthanawarningthattherewerefirmlimitstothecommitmentoftheUnited

States.Hewasrightinbothjudgments,thoughhegaveustoo muchcreditfor

thoughtfuldesign.Ultimately,wemadeavirtueofnecessity.AmbassadorLodge

wasinstructedtocitetheB‐52cutbackinhispublicpresentationattheParis

peacetalks.ThePresidentreferredtothereductioninsortiesinhisNovember3

speech.NeitherthennorlaterdidtheunsentimentalleadersinHanoi

acknowledgetheseconcessions.Theydidnotpayforgiftstheyhadalready

pocketed.



Ourpolicyconstantlyrantheriskoffallingbetweentwostools.WithHanoi

weriskedthrowingawayourpositioninaseriesofunreciprocatedconcessions.

Athome,themorewesoughttoplacatethecritics,themorewediscouraged

thosewhowerewillingto supportastrategyforvictorybutwhocouldnot

understandcontinuedsacrificeforsomethingsoelusiveashonorablewithdrawal.

Andwewerenotgainingtheapprovalofthosewhowantedtoturnthewarintoa

morallessonontheimperfectionsofAmerica,evenafterwehadgonebeyond

theprogramforwhichtheyhadbeendemonstratingonlyninemonthspreviously.

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<<Contents>>

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

TheVanceMission



orallthesereasonsIconcludedthattimewasworkingagainstusandthatwe

shouldfindsomemeansofbringingmatterstoahead.Isoughttoinvolvethe

USSRinacomplexmaneuverandrecommendedCyrusVanceastheidealmanfor

themission.

F



IhadmetCyVancewhenhewasDeputySecretaryofDefenseinthe

JohnsonAdministration.Deliberate,soft‐spoken,honorable,hestruckmeasthe

epitomeoftheNewYorkcorporationlawyer,meticulouslyexecutinghis

assignments,wiselyadvisinghisclients. Beneathhiscontrolledmanner,Ithought

Idetectedapassionatestreakinharmonywithprogressiveviewsnowwidelyheld

inthecirclesinwhichhemoved.OntheParisdelegationhehadcometoshare

theardentdedicationofhischief,Harriman,toanegotiatedsettlement.AfterI

wasappointedAssistantforNationalSecurityAffairs,Irecommende dVancefor

thepositionofUnderSecretaryofState,thenthesecondpositionintheState

Department.Rogersagreed,andthetwoofusmetwithVanceatRogers’shome

inBethesda,Maryland.Vancewasnoncommittalbutdidnotturndownthe

propositionoutofhand.IsawVanceatlengthonceagaintomakeclearhow

interestedthePresident‐electwasinhisservices,andhowimportantitwasfor

thenationtohavethebenefitofhisexperience.RobertMcNamara,hisformer

chief,addedhisownurgings.Vancethendeclined,explainingthatafternearly

eightyearsofuninterruptedgovernmentserviceheneededtoreturntoprivate

life.WhenVancelefthispositionasDeputyChiefoftheUSdelegationtotheParis

peacetalksonFebruary19,1969,Nixonsenthimawarmcableofthanks.I

admiredVance’sanalyticabilityandhisjudgment;Ilikedhimenormouslyasa

humanbeing.



ThemissionwhichIhadinmindwastailo r‐madeforhisqualities.Itwas

nothinglessthantoenlisttheSovietUnioninarapidsettlementoftheVietnam

war.



InallmyconversationswithDobryninIhadstressedthatafundamental

improvementinUS‐SovietrelationspresupposedSovietcooperationinsettling

thewar.DobryninhadalwaysevadedareplybyclaimingthatSovietinfluencein

Hanoiwasextremelylimited.Inresponse,weprocrastinatedonallthe

negotiationsinwhichtheSovietUnionwasinterested—thestrategicarms

limitationtalks,theMiddleEast,andexpandedeconomicrelations.Butwehad

nevermadeacomprehensiveproposaltotheSovietsonVietnam.



ImetwithVanceonMarch18toexplorehisgeneralwillingnessto

undertakeamissiontoMoscow.Theproposedmissioninvolvedlinkingthe

openingofSALTtalkswithanoverallsettlementinVietnam.Vancewouldbese nt

toMoscowtobeginSALTdiscussionsandonthesametripmeetsecretlywitha

seniorNorthVietnameserepresentative.Vancewouldbeempoweredtomake

rapidprogressinbothareas,whileseekingtokeepthemintandem.(WhatIdid

nottellVancewasthatIwouldrecommendtoNixonamilitaryshowdownwith

HanoiifVance’smissionfailed.)Thenextday,Vanceraisedanumberofsensible

questions:HowwouldthetwonegotiationsinMoscowberelatedtoeachother;

howcouldtherebetimetocarryoutbothassignmentsadequately;howwould

histalksonVietnambekeptsecretfromtheteamresponsibleforSALT?



OnApril3,IformallyproposedtheVancemissiontothePresident.I

pointedoutthedilemmasinherentinthenegotiationsastheywereproceedingin

Paris.WehadtoconvincetheAmericanpublicthat wewereeagertosettlethe

war,andHanoithatwewerenotsoanxiousthatitcouldaffordtooutwaitus.We

hadtocontinuemilitarypressuressufficienttodeterHanoifromturning

negotiationsintoanotherPanmunjom,butnotactsoprovocativelyastotempta

fighttothefinish.Ourgovernmenthadtobesufficientlydisciplinedtospeakwith

thesamevoice.RelationswithSaigonhadtobecloseenoughtodepriveHanoiof

theexpectationthatthenegotiationscouldbeusedtodemoralizetheSouth

Vietnamesegovernment.Idoubtedourabilitytofulfilltheseconditions. Ithought

thatbudgetarypressuresandimminentwithdrawalswouldreduceourmilitary

operationswithnohopeofreciprocity.TheParisdelegationlackeddiscipline;our

internaldivisionsmadeitunlikely thatwecouldpresentacoherentpolicyor

preventoscillationbetweenextremes.Thetemptationwouldgrowtotakeout

ourfrustrationsonSaigon.AnearlysettlementwasinourinterestbecauseI

suspectedthatallthetrendsIhadde scribed wouldbringaboutasituationin

whichourminimumprogramtodaywouldbemuchstrongerthanourmaximum

positionayearfromnow.ButHanoiwouldnotmovewithoutsomepressure.

ThereforeSovietparticipationcouldbecomecrucial.



Forallthesereasons,IrecommendedthatIapproachDobryninwiththe

warningthatUS‐Sovietrelationswereata crossroads.ThePresident,Iwouldsay,

waspreparedtomakeprogressinUS‐Sovietrelationsonabroadfront.Butthe

Vietnamwarwasamajorobstacle.Toresolvetheimpasse,Nixonwasprepared

tosendahigh‐leveldelegationtoMoscow,headedbyCyrusVance,toagree

immediatelyonprinciplesofstrategicarmslimitation.WhileinMoscow,Vance

wouldalsobeempoweredtomeetwithanegotiatorfromNorthVietnamandto

agreewithhimonamilitaryandpoliticalsettlementforIndochina.(SinceRogers

hadalreadygivenawaythetwo‐trackapproach,Ithoughtitbesttodevelopa

politicalprogramcompatiblewithSaigon’ssurvival.)Onthemilitaryside,we

wouldproposeacease‐fireandmutualwithdrawal.Onthepoliticalside,we

wouldofferguaranteesthattheNLF,ifitrenouncedviolence,couldparticipatein

thepoliticallifeofthecountrywithout fearofreprisal.Thiswouldbecoupled

withagreementonaseparateandindependentSouthVietnamforfiveyears,

afterwhichtherewouldbenegotiationsforunification.ThePresidentwouldgive

theeffortsixweekstosucceed.IftheoutcomeoftheVancemissionwaspositive,

thePresidentwouldalsoconsider“othermeetingsatevenhigherlevels”(thatis,

apossiblesummit). 



ItoldthePresident,andproposedtohintto Dobrynin,thatthiscourseof

actionshouldnotbeapprovedunlessthePresidentwaspreparedtotake“tough

escalatorysteps”ifitfailed.



ThepeacetermsinmymemorandumtoNixonwentfarbeyondanything

discussedinourgovernmentorforthatmatterarguedbymostdoves.It

exceeded,forexample,thetermsofthedove platformdefeatedatthe

DemocraticConventioneightmonthsbefore.Itincludedacease‐fire‐atthatpoint

violentlyopposedbythePentagon.Itacceptedcompletewithdrawal(without

residualforces)anditagreedtoarolefortheNLFinthepoliticallifeofSaigon.

Weknewtoolittleof Hanoiatthatpointtounderstandthatitsleaderswere

interestedinvictory,notacease‐fire,andinpoliticalcontrol,nota roleinfree

elections.



OnthemorningofApril5whenIspokewiththePresidentatKeyBiscayne,

hewasdubiousthatthe“Vanceploy,”ashecalledit,wouldwork.Butheagreed

wehadtomakeadiplomaticmove.OnApril12,1969,tobringmatterstoahead,

IsentthePresidentamemorandumreiteratingthepointsIproposedtousewith

DobrynininameetingscheduledforApril14.Nixonapprovedthiswithafew

marginalnotesinhishandwriting,whichextendedthedeadlinetotwomonths

(ratherthansixweeks)andweremoree xplicitthanmydraftinholdingoutthe

prospectofeconomiccooperationtotheSoviets.



UsingatechniqueIwastoemployfrequentlylateron,IletDobryninre ad

thesetalkingpointstogetherwiththePresident’sinitialsandhandwritten

amendments.Thishadtheadvantageofavoidingmisunderstandingwhile

authenticatingthatIwasspeakingforthePresident.Dobrynintookcopiousnotes,

stoppingnowandagaintoaskforanexplanation.Whenhegotthrough,Dobrynin

askedwhetherweweremakingaVietnamsettlementaconditionforprogresson

theMiddleEast,economicrelations,andstrategicarms.Irepliedthatwewere

preparedtocontinuetalkingbutthattalkswouldmovemorerapidlyifVietnam

wereoutoftheway.Also,iftherewasnosettlementwemighttakemeasures

thatwouldcreate“acomplicatedsituation.”



DobryninwasvolubleinemphasizingMo scow’sdesiretostayin

negotiationswithuswhateverhappenedinVietnam.Hespe culatedthatChina

wasattemptingtoproducea clashbetweentheSovietUnionandtheUnited

States.AnescalationofthewarinVietnam,headded,couldonlyservethe

interestsofChina.Isaidthatifthiswereso,theSovietUnionhadajoint

obligationwithustoavoidcomplicatingmatters.Dobrynin’spartingwordswere

thatthiswasa“veryimportant”conversation.



YetnoreplywaseverreceivedfromMoscow—norejection,noinvitation,

notevenatemporizingacknowledgment.InJuneDobryninmentionedinpassing

thatourproposalhadbeentransmittedtoHanoibuthadnotfoundfavorthere.

ThenexttimeIheardfromDobryninabouttheVancemissionpro posalwaseight

monthslater,onDecember22,wheninthecourseofaglobalreviewhetoldme

thatMoscowhadtriedtobehelpfulwiththeVancemission.Hanoi,however,had

refusedtotalkunlesstheUnitedStatesagreedaheadoftimetoacoalition

government.Ratherthanreturnanegativereply,theKremlinhadpreferredto

saynothing.Iansweredcoollythatsomesortofacknowledgment,atlEast,might

havebeeninorder.



Tothisday,IdonotknowwhetherMo scowpassedtheproposalonto

Hanoiand,receivinganegativereply,decidedthatitdidnotwanttoadmitits

impotenceorruntheriskofsomeAmericanretaliation.Itisalsopossiblethat

Moscownevertransmittedourproposalbecausethegainsweretooabstractand

therisksofSovietinvolvementincaseoffailuretoo great.Ileantowardthe

formerview.GivenHanoi’sfanaticalinsistenceonitsindependenceanditsskillat

navigatingbetweenMoscow andPeking,Moscowasasitefor adecisive

negotiationwastoorisky.Pekingmightobject;Moscowmightusetheoccasionto

goalongwithourmaneuverandmakeconcessionsinIndochinatostrengthen

superpowerrelations.AsforMoscow,itcouldnothavebeenoverlyeagertohost

anegotiationfortheresultsofwhichtherespectivesidesmightholdit

accountableandwhichitcouldnotinfluencedecisively.Wetriedthesame

approachagainin1971,thistimeofferingmeasthenegotiator.Itwasagain

rebuffed,probablyforthesamereasons.Intheabsenceofeitherdiplomaticor

militarypressurestheVietnamnegotiationsresumedtheirlaboredpace.



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

****



ReturntotheTreadmill



nMay8,atthesixteenthplenarymeetinginParis,theCommunistswith

greatflourishputforwardaten‐pointpeaceprogram.Couchedinthebynow

customarystyleofanultimatum,theTenPointslistedwhattheUnitedStates

“must”dotoendthewar.Theydemandedtotal,unconditional,andunilateralUS

withdrawal,abolitionoftheSouthVietnamesegovernment,andAmerican

reparationsforwardamage.TheyproposedthattheSouthVietnamese

governmentbereplacedbyacoalitiongovernmenttoincludeall“socialstrata

andpoliticaltendenciesinSouthVietnamthatstandforpeace,independenceand

neutrality.”

O



Theproposalforacoalitiongovernmentdidnotsoundunreasonable;many

unwaryAmericansreaditassimplyademandforCommunistparticipationinthe

Saigongovernment.Butoncewestartedexploring itsmeaningwefoundthatthe

Communistsreservedforthemselvestherighttodefinewhostoodfor“peace,

independenceandneutrality.”TheoperationalcontentoftheTenPointswasthat

afterwehaddecapitatedthegovernmentofSouthVietnamanddemoralizedthe

populationbytotalandunconditionalwithdrawal,wewouldthencolludewith

theCommuniststoforcetheremainingnon‐Communistelementsintoastructure

containingtheNLFandwhatevergroupstheCommunistsalonewoulddefineas

acceptable.Andthatnewcoalitiongovernmentwastobeonlyinter im;the

definitivepoliticalstructureofSouthVietnamwastobenegotiatedbetweenit

andtheNLF,backedbyHanoi’sarmy.SuchwastheCommunistdefinitionofa

“just”politicalsettlement.[

InJuly1971,withLeDucThoIwentoveralistofSaigon

politicians,includingallknownoppositionleaders,whomightproveacceptableasmeetingthe

testofstandingfor“peace,independenceandneutrality.”Notonepassedmuster.

]Needless

tosay,whentheCommuniststookoverSaigon,nocoalitiongovernmentwas

established;infact,eventheNLFwasexcludedfromanyshareinpower.Allkey

positionsintheSouthtodayareheldbyNorthVietnamese.



Theproposalwasone‐sidedincontentandinsolentintone.Butthemere

existenceofaCommunistpeaceplan,howeverextraordinaryinnature,

generatedCongressional,media,andpublicpressuresnot topassupthis

“opportunity.”Ifwewerenotgoingtobewhipsawedweclearlyneededto

elaborateaclear‐cutpositionofourown. InlateApril,Ihadproposedtothe

PresidentthathegiveaspeechpresentinganAmericanpeaceplan.OnApril25,I

calledthePresident’sattentiontoaremarkmadebyXuanThuy:“IftheNixon

Administrationhasagreatpeaceprogram,asitmakesbelieve,whydoesn’tit

makethatprogrampublic?”



ButthePresidenthesitated.Hewantedtowaitalittlewhilelongerfora

replyfromMoscowontheVancemission.Hewasalsoinhibitedbyhisuneasiness

abouttheattitudeofhisSecretaryofState.HewasconvincedthatiftheState

Departmentsawthedraftofaspeech,itwouldeitherleakitoradvancesomany

additionsincompatiblewithhisstrategythathewouldbemadetoappearasthe

hard‐linerifheturnedthemdown.Asusual,Nixonfoundasolutionaseffectiveas

itwasdevious.HewaiteduntilRogershaddepartedonatriptoSouthEastAsiaon

May12,andthenorderedmeonthesa medaytosupervisethepreparationofa

Presidentialspeechwithin thenextforty‐eighthours.



OnMay14,Nixonwentonnationaltelevisionandelaboratedforthefirst

timethepremisesofhisVietnampolicy,thestepsthathadbeentaken,anda

concretenewnegotiatingproposal.Hereviewedtheactionsofhisfirstfour

monthsinoffice:thebluntingoftheenemyoffensive,theimprovementofour

relationswiththeSaigongovernment,thestrengtheningoftheSouthVietnamese

forces,and,aboveall,thedevelopmentofacoherentnegotiatingposition.



Heproposedaneight‐pointprogramthatrepresentedaquantumadvance

intheAmericannegotiatingpositionoverthatoftheJohnsonAdministration.

Specifically,heabandonedtheManilaformula(Hanoi’swithdrawalsixmonths

beforeours)andadvocatedsimultaneouswithdrawal.YettheNorthVietnamese

withdrawalcouldbedefacto(by“informalunderstanding”)ratherthanexplicitly

admittedbyHanoi.[

IexplainedinaWhiteHousebackgroundbriefingbeforethespeech,

“Wedonotcarewhethertheyacknowledgethattheyhaveforcesthere,aslongastheymake

suretheforcesleavethereandwewillsettleforsupervisoryarrangementswhichassureus

thattherearenolongeranyNorthVietnameseforcesinSouthVietnam.”opportunityto

explorethepossibilitiesofafairpoliticalcontest.Theonlyconditionsitdidnotmeetturnedout

tobetheCommunistsinequanon:unconditionalwithdrawalofUnitedStatesforcesand

collusiveinstallationofaCommunist‐controlledgovernment.]TheUnitedStatesagreedto

theparticipationoftheNLFinthepoliticallifeofSouthVietnam;itcommitted

itselftofreeelectionsunderinternationalsupervisionandtoaccepttheir

outcome.ThePresidentofferedtosetaprecisetimetableforwithdrawal,andhe

offeredcease‐firesunderinternationalsupervision.Inshort,theMay14speech

providedeveryNorthVietnamesenegotiatorXuanThuyinitiallyraisedhopesbya

relativelymildreaction,delicatelynotingthattherewere“pointsofagreement”

betweentheTenPointsoftheNLFandtheEightPointsofthePresident’sMay14

speech.Butintheformalnegotiationsheadamantlyrefusedtodiscussthem;

soonthenegotiatingsessionsrevertedtothesterilereiterationofstandardNorth

Vietnamesepositions.Thestalematecontinued.



Andsodidoureffortstobreakit.



<<Contents>>



****



TheBeginningofTroopWithdrawals



ftertheMay14speechoutliningourcompromisetermsfornegotiation,we

turnedtotheunilateralwithdrawalofAmericantroops.Wehadinherited,in

oneofthelessfelicitousphrasesofforeignpolicyinthiscentury,a general

commitmentto“de‐Americanize”thewar.TheJohnsonAdministrationhad

beguntheefforttostrengthentheSouthVietnamesearmy,buttherewereno

plansforAmericanwithdrawals.AsSecretaryofDefenseClarkCliffordhadsaidon

September29,1968,“thelevelofcombatissuchthatwearebuildingupour

troops,notcuttingthemdown.”InanewsconferenceofDecember10,1968,

Cliffordreiteratedthattherewerenoplansforanyreduction.Inourinnocence

wethoughtthatwithdrawalsofAmericantroopsmighthelpuswinpublicsupport

sothatthetroopswhichremainedandourenhancedstayingpowermightgive

Hanoianincentivetonegotiateseriously.Atthesametime,ifwestrengthened

theSouthVietnamesesufficiently,ourwithdrawalsmightgraduallyevenendour

involvementwithoutagreementwithHanoi.



Nixonfavoredwithdrawalforboththesereasons.Inanewsconferenceof

March14,hehadlaiddownthreecriteriaforourwithdrawals:theabilityofthe

SouthVietnamesetodefendthemselveswithoutAmericantroops;negotiating

progressintheParistalks;andthelevelofenemyactivity.Nixon’sstrategyinthe

earlymonths,infact,wastotrytoweakentheenemytothemaximumpossible

extent,speedupthemodernizationofSaigon’sforces,andthenbegin

withdrawals.Hethoughtthatwouldbeapublicrelationscoup. 



GeneralWheelerattheJanuary25,1969,NSCmeetinghadsaidhethought

PresidentThieuwouldprobablyagreetoasmallreductionofUSforcesbecauseit

wouldhelpNixondomesticallyandconveytheimageofaself‐confidentSouth

Vietnam.Rogersthoughtwecouldbuyanindefiniteamountoftimeathomewith

awithdrawalof50,000troops.LairdandNixonkepttheircounsel.Thieu

expressedconfidencepubliclyonFebruary6thatasizable numberofAmerican

forcescouldleaveVietnamin1969.GeneralGoodpaster,thenservingasdeputy

toGeneralAbrams,attendedanNSCmeetingonMarch28andreportedthatthe

SouthVietnameseimprovementhadalreadybeensubstantial;wewereinfact

closeto“de‐Americanizing”thewar,hesaid,butwerenotatthe“decisionpoint”

yet.Lairdspokeup:“Iagree,butnotwithyourterm‘de‐Americanizing.’Whatwe

needisatermlike‘V ietnamizing’toputtheemphasisontherightissues.”The

Presidentwasimpressed.“That’sagoodpoint,Mel,”hesaid.Thus

“Vietnamization”wasborn.



OnApril10,Iissuedadirectiverequestingthedepartmentsandagenciesto

workoutascheduleforVietnamizingthewar.Nixondecidedthetimewasripe

soonafterhisMay14speech.WhereashehadwantedtodeliverhisMay14

statementwithoutinterferencefromRogers,hesoughttoproceedontroop

withdrawalsbypreemptingLaird.



AmeetingwasarrangedforJune8withSouthVietnamesePresidentThieu

towinhissupport.ThesitewastobeMidwayIslandinthePacific,chosen

becauseofthefearthatavisitbyThieutotheUnitedStateswouldprovokeriots.

HawaiiwasrejectedbecauseLyndonJohnsonhadheldameetingtherewith

Vietnameseleaders.ItwasasymptomofthemorassintowhichtheVietnamwar

hadplungedoursocietythatameetingbetweenthePresidentandtheleaderfor

whosecountryoverthirtythousandAmericanshaddiedhadtotakeplaceonan

uninhabitedislandinthemiddleofthePacific.



OnthewaytoMidway,NixonconvenedameetinginHonoluluonthe

afternoonofJune7withRogers,Laird,GeneralWheeler,AmbassadorLodge,and

myself,intheconferenceroomoftheKahalaHiltonHoteloverlookingthePacific.

AmbassadorBunker,GeneralAbrams,andAdmiralMcCainwerealsothere.The

meetingwastotakethefinaldecisiononwithdrawalstrategy.Itwasclearthat

themilitaryapproachedthesubjectwithaheavyheart.Deepdowntheyknew

thatitwasareversalofwhattheyhadfoughtfor.Howeverpresented,it would

makevictoryimpossibleandevenanhonorableoutcomeproblematical.The

processofwithdrawalwaslikelytobecomeirreversible.Henceforth,wewouldbe

inaracebetweenthedeclineinourcombatcapabilityandtheimprovementof

SouthVietnameseforces—aracewhoseoutcomewasatbestuncertain.



Contrarytomythology,themilitaryrarelyopposetheirCommander‐in‐

Chief,evenprivately.Iftheycanconjureupahalfwayplausiblejustification,they

willovercometheirmisgivingsandsupportaPresidentialdecision.Itwaspainful

toseeGeneralAbrams,epitomeofthecombatcommander,obviouslyunhappy,

yetneverthelessagreeingtoawithdrawalof25,000combattroops.Heknew

thenthathewasdoomedtoarearguardaction,thatthepurposeofhiscommand

wouldincreasinglybecomelogisticredeploymentandnotsuccessinbattle.He

couldnotpossibly achievethevictorythathadeludedusatfullstrengthwhileour

forceswereconstantlydwindling.ItremainedtosellthispropositiontoPresident

Thieu.



TheMidwaymeetingcouldnothavehadamoresurrealisticsetting.Forthe

spaceofsevenhoursthisatollofnomorethantwosquaremileswasinvaded by

thePresidentialentourageofoverfivehundredofficials,securitymen,

communicators,journalists,andsupernumerarieswhoconsideredthemselves