Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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necessary.“AverellHarrimanmadethesamepointinaWhiteHousebriefingon

December4,1968.GeneralEarleWheeler,ChairmanoftheJointChiefs,wasonly

followinginheriteddoctrinewhenhetoldNixonattheNSCmeetingofJanuar y

25,1969,thateverythingpossiblewasbeingdoneinViet nam“exceptthe

bombingoftheNorth.”



NooneinthenewAdministration,however,couldanticipatearesumption

ofthebombingoftheNorthwithanythingbutdistaste.Weweresavoringthe

honeymoonthatfollows theInaugurationofanewPresident;Nixonhadnever

previouslyenjoyedtheapprovalofthemedia.Noneofushadthesto machforthe

domesticoutburstweknewrenewedbombingwouldprovoke—evenifitwere

thedirectresultofNorthVietnamesebetrayaloftheunderstandingsthathadled

tothebombinghalt.Aboveall,wehadnotyetgivenuphope,inthefirstmonth

ofthenewPresidency,ofunitingthenationonanhonorableprogramfor

settlementofthewar.



Unfortunately,alternativestobombingtheNorthwerehardtocomeby.

OnJanuary30,ImetinthePentagonwithLairdandWheelertoexplorehowwe

mightrespondshouldtherebeanenemyoffensiveinSouthVietnam.Wheeler

reiteratedthatAmericanforceswithinSouthVietnamwerealreadyfully

committed;theonlyeffectiveripostewouldbeoperationsintheDMZorrenewed

bombingoftheNorth.Lairddemurredatthelattersuggestion,emphasizingthat

thebombinghalthadencouragedpublicexpectations thatthewarwasbeing

wounddown.NordidIfavorit,becauseIwaseagertogivenegotiationsachance.

OnFebruary1,Nixonsentmeanote:“IdonotlikethesuggestionsthatIseein

virtuallyeverynewsreportthat‘weanticipateaCommunistinitiativeinSouth

Vietnam.’Ibelievethatifanyinitiativeoccursitshouldbeonourpartandnot

theirs.”ButmyrequesttotheJointChiefsforsuggestionselicitedthenow

familiarresponseoutliningvariouslevelsofairornavalattacksonNorth

VietnamesetargetsandMelLaird’s(andmy)equallystandardreluctanc e to

accepttherecommendation.



ThoughtthenturnedtobombingoftheNorthVietnamesesa nctuaryareas

inCambodia,forreasonsexactlytheoppositeofwhathasbeenassumed;itwas

notfromadesireto expandthewar,buttoavoidbombing NorthVietnamandyet

tobluntanunprovokedoffe nsivewhichwascosting400Americanlivesaweek.



RevisionistshavesometimesfocusedontheNixonAdministration’salleged

assaultonthe“neutral”statusofa“peaceful”country.Thesechargesoverlook

thattheissueconcernedterritorywhichwasnolongerCambodianinany

practicalsense.ForfouryearsasmanyasfourNorthVietnamese divisionshad

beenoperatingonCambodiansoilfromastringofbaseareasalongtheSouth

Vietnameseborder.In1978theCommunistvictorsinCambodiaputtheuninvited

NorthVietnamesepresenceinNorthEasternCambodiain1969‐1970at300,000,

whichfarexceededourestimates.

Cambodianofficialshadbeenexcludedfrom

theirsoil;theycontainednexttonoCambodianpopulation.[

TheCommunist

deserterwhohelpedpinpointthelocationoftheNorthVietnameseheadquartersreportedthat

noCambodianswerepermittedintheheadquartersarea.GeneralAbramsreportedthistothe

PresidentinFebruaryalongwithanassurancethatthetargetwasatleastakilometerdistant

fromanyknownCambodianhamlets.]TheywereentirelycontrolledbytheNorth

Vietnamese.FromtheseterritoriesNorthVietnameseforceswouldlaunchattacks

intoSouthVietnam,inflictcasualties,disruptgovernment,andthenwithdrawto

theprotectionofaformallyneutralcountry.Itrequirescalculatedadvocacy,not

judgment,toarguethattheUnitedStateswasviolatingtheneutralityofa

peacefulcountrywhenwithCambodianencouragementwe,inself‐defense,

sporadicallybombedterritoriesinwhichforyearsnoCambodianwrithadrun,

whichwereeitherminimallypopulatedortotallyunpopulatedbycivilians,and

whichwereoccupiedinviolationofCambodianneutralitybyanenemykilling

hundredsofAmericansandSouthVietnameseaweekfromthesesanctuaries.



ThefirstsuggestioncamefromGeneral Wheeler.WhenLairdonJanuary30

hadexpresseddoubtthatarenewedbombingoftheNorthwaspolitically

supportable,Wheelerproposed,asanalternative,attacksonthecomplexof

basesthattheNorthVietnamesehadestablishedillegallyacrosstheborderin

Cambodia.OnFebruary9,GeneralAbramscabledGeneralWheelerfromSaigon

thatrecentintelligencefromadeserter,aswellasphotoreconnaissance,showed

thattheCommunistheadquartersforallofSouthVietnamwaslocatedjustacross

theCambodianborder.(AsanoviceIwasmoreimpressedbysuchseemingly

definitiveevidencethanIwouldbelateron.Asitturnedout,theCommunist

leadersinPhnomPenheightyearslateralsoconfirmedthatthedeserter’s

informationhadbeenaccurateonthatscore.)Abramsrequestedauthorityto

attacktheheadquartersfromtheairwithB‐52s.Ambassado rBunkerendorsed

theideainaseparatecablethroughStateDepartmentchannels.



Theserecommendationsfellonfertileground.Inthetransitionperiodon

January8,1969,thePresident‐electhadsentmeanote:“Inmakingyourstudyof

VietnamIwantaprecisereportonwhattheenemyhasinCambodiaandwhat,if

anything,wearedoingtodestroythebuildupthere.Ithinkaverydefinitechange

ofpolicytowardCambodiaprobablyshouldbeoneofthefirstordersofbusiness

whenwegetin.”GeneralGoodpasterhaddraftedareplyformysignaturewith

detailedinformationabouttheNorthVietnamesebaseareasalongthe

Cambodianborder.Hereportedthat“ourfieldcommandinSouthVietnamis

convincedthatthevastbulkof suppliesenteringCambodiacomeinthrough

Sihanoukville…Whatwearedoingaboutthisisverylimited…Thecommandin

thefieldhasmadeseveralrequestsforauthoritytoenterCambodiatoconduct

pre‐emptiveoperationsandinpursuitofwithdrawingforcesthathaveattacked

us.Allsuchrequestshavebeendeniedorarestillpendingwithoutaction.”



TheimportanceofSihanoukvillewasoneofthecontestediss uesinthe

NSSM1study.TheUSmilitarycommandinSaigonwasconvincedthatbetween

October1967andSeptember1968sometenthousandtonsofarmshadcomein

throughSihanoukville.ButCIAandStatedisputedthis.Accordingtothemthe

flowofsuppliesdowntheHoChiMinhTrailthroughLaoswasmorethan

adequatetotakecareoftheexternalrequirementsofallCommunistforcesin

SouthVietnam.Atstakeinthisanalysts’debate,ofcourse,waswhetherthe

Cambodiansanctuariesweresocrucialatargetthattheyshouldbeattacked;as

happensalltoofrequently,intelligenceestimatesfollowed,ratherthaninspired,

agencypolicyviews.Thosewhofavoredattacksonthesanctuariesemphasized

theimportanceofSihanoukville;thosewhowereopposeddepreciatedit.(When

USandSouthVietnameseforcesmovedintothesesanctuariesinApril1970,

documentsinCommuniststoragedumpsindicatedthatshipmentsthrough

Cambodiafarexceededeventhemilitary’shighestestimates.)



Butwhateverthedisputeaboutwhetherthematerieltraveledthrough

SihanoukvilleordowntheHoChiMinhTrail,therewasnodisputeaboutthe

menaceoftheNorthVietnamesebasesinCambodiatoAmericanandSouth

Vietnameseforces.OnFebruary18,Ireceivedabriefingbyatwo‐manteamfrom

Saigon,togetherwithLaird,DeputySecretaryPackard,GeneralWheeler,and

Laird’smilitaryassistant,ColonelRobertE.Pursley.IreportedtothePresidentthe

convictionofGeneralAbramsthatnoCambodiancivilianslivedinthetargetarea.

Nevertheless,Iadvisedagainstanunprovokedbom bingofthesanctuaries.We

shouldgivenegotiationsachance,Iargued,andseektomaintainpublicsupport

forourpolicy.WecouldreviewthesituationagainattheendofMarch—the

classicbureaucraticstallingdevicetoeasethepainofthosebeingoverruled.

NixonapprovedthatrecommendationonFebruary22,thedaybeforehewasto

leaveonhistriptoEurope.



****



OntheverydayofNixon’sdecisiontodeferactionagainstthesanctuaries,

theNorthVietnamesetransformedvaguecontingencyplanningintoaneedto

dealwithacrisis.AfterweeksofpreparationantedatingthenewAdministration,

Hanoilaunchedacountrywideoffensive.Americanskilledinactionduringthe

firstweekoftheoffensivenumbered453,336inthesecondweek,and 351inthe

third;SouthVietnamesecasualtieswerefarheavier,averagingover500a week.It

wasanactofextraordinarycynicism.Nosubstantivenegotiatingsessionshad

beenheldinPariswithournewdelegation,headedbyHenryCabotLodge;the

newAdministrationcouldhardlyhaveformeditspolicy.Whetherbyaccidentor

design,theoffensivebeganthedaybeforeascheduledPresidentialtripoverseas,

thusbothparalyzingourresponseandhumiliatingthenewPresident.Itoccurred

despitethefactthatNixonhadcommunicatedwiththeNorthVietnameseinthe

transitionperiod(asweshallseebelow),emphasizinghiscommitmenttosettle

thewaronthebasisoftheself‐respectandhonorofallpartiesinvolved.Without

eventestingtheseprofessionsofintent,thefirstmajormoveofHanoiwastostep

upthekillingofAmericans.InotedinareporttothePresidentthattheNorth

Vietnamesehadbeen“abletoachievea relativelyhighcasualtyrateamongUS

andSouthVietnameseforceswhilenotexposingtheirownmainunits.”



Nixonreceivedamilitarybriefing ontheenemyoffensiveintheOvalOffice

surroundedbypilesofloose‐leafbriefingbookscompiledbymystaffandthe

StateDepartmentforeachcountryhewasabouttovisit.(Nixonlatercametouse

theOvalOfficemostlyforceremonialoccasions;heusuallypreferredtoworkin

hisinformalofficeintheExecutiveOfficeBuilding.)Nixonwasgoingthroughthe

books,committingthemtomemory,grumblingabouttheefforthehadtomake

todoso.Hewasalsoseething.Allhisinstinctsweretorespondviolentlyto

Hanoi’scynicalmaneuver.Foryearshehadchargedhispredecessorswith

weaknessinreactingtoCommunistmoves.Buthewaseageralsothathisfirst

foreigntripasPresidentbeasuccess. Americanretaliationmightsparkriotsin

Europe;passivitymightemboldenouradversary.Hedidnotresolvethisdilemma

immediately.TheonlyWhiteHousereactiononthedaytheoffensivestartedwas

aphonecallbymetoSovietAmbassadorDobrynin.ThePresidentwanted

Moscowtounderstand,Isaid,thatiftheNorthVietnameseoffensivecontinued

wewouldretaliate.



Butthenextday,onFebruary23,whileintheairenroutefrom

WashingtontoBrussels,Nixonmadeuphismind;hesuddenlyorderedthe

bombingoftheCambodiansanctuaries.Itseemedtomethatadecisionofthis

magnitudecouldnotbesimplycommunicatedtoWashingtonandtoSaigonby

cablefromAirForceOnewithoutconsultingrelevantofficialsorintheabsenceof

adetailedplanfordealingwiththeconsequences.Ithereforerecommendedto

Nixontopostponethefinal“execute”orderforforty‐eighthoursandsentaflash

messagetoColonelAlexanderHaig,thenmymilitaryassistantinWashington,to

meetmeinBrussels,togetherwithaPentagonexpert.Iwantedtogooverthe

militaryoperationsonceagainandtoworkoutadiplomaticplan.



Haig,Haldeman(representingNixon,whocouldnotattendwithout

attractingattention),thePentagonplanningofficer,andImetonboardAirForce

OneattheBrusselsairportonthemorningofFebruary24.justbeforethe

PresidentspokeatNATOheadquarters.TheplanethatNixonusedhadbeenbuilt

toJohnson’sspecifications.DirectlybehindastateroomforthePresidentwasa

conferenceareawithanoversizedchairfittingintoakidney‐shapedtable;both

thechairandthetablewereequippedwithbuttonsthatenabledthemtodevelop

alifeoftheirown.Thechaircouldassumevariouspositio ns;thetablecouldmove

hydraulicallyupanddown.Ifonepressedthewrongbuttonthetablewould

slowlysink,pinningonehelplesslyinthechair;thesituationcouldturncriticalif

thechairwasrisingatthesametime.Inthisawesomesettingweworkedout

guidelinesforthebombingoftheenemy’ssanctuaries:Thebombingwouldbe

limitedtowithinfivemilesofthefrontier;wewouldnotannouncetheattacks

butacknowledgethemifCambodiaprotested,andoffertopaycompensationfor

anydamagetocivilians.Intheshorttimeavailable,wedevelopedbothamilitary

andadiplomaticscheduleaswellasguidanceforbriefingthepress.Haigandthe

PentagonexpertleftimmediatelyforWashingtontobriefLaird.Nixonlaterin

LondongaveRogersacrypticaccountofhisthinkingbutnodetails.



Beforethedaywasout,LairdcabledhisreservationsfromWashington.He

thoughtthatitwouldbeimpossibletokeepthebombingsecre t,thepresswould

bedifficulttohandle,andpublicsupportcouldnotbeguaranteed.Heurgeddelay

toamomentwhentheprovocationwouldbeclearer.Itwassymptomaticofthe

prevalentmoodofhesitation,thefeartowakethedormantbEastofpublic

protest.Inretrospect,itisastonishingtowhatextentallofusfocusedonthelegal

questionofwhethertheunderstandinghadbeenviolated,andnotonthefour

hundredAmericandeathsaweekbywhichHanoisoughttobreakourwillbefore

wecoulddevelopanycourseofaction.Evenmoreastonishingnowisthatduring

thisentireperiodnoseriousconsiderationwasgiventoresumingthebombingof

NorthVietnam;thebombinghalt,enteredtospeedasettlement,wasturning

intoanendinitself.



IagreedwithLaird’sconclusionsabouttheCambo dianbom bing,ifnotwith

hisreasoning.IthoughtthatafailuretoreacttosocynicalamovebyHanoicould

doomourhopesfornegotiations;itcouldonlybereadbyHanoiasasignof

Nixon’shelplessnessinthefaceofdomesticpress ures;itwaslikelytoencourage

furthermilitarychallenges,asNorthVietnamundertooktowhipsawNixonasit

hadsucceededwithJohnson.Butthetimingbotheredme.Ididnotthinkitwise

tolaunchanewmilitaryoperationwhilethePresidentwastravelinginEurope,

subjecttopossiblehostiledemonstrationsandunabletomeetwithandrallyhis

owngovernment.IalsodidnotrelishtheprospectofhavingVietnamthesubject

ofallourEuropeanpressbriefingsorofprivatelytryingtoofferexplanationsto

alliedgovernmentsnotalwayseagertoreconciletheirprivatesupportofour

Vietnameffortswiththeirpublicstanceofdissociation.Isaidasmuchtothe

President.Thefollowingday,whilewewereinBonn,Nixoncanceledtheplan.



Theso‐calledmini‐Tetexposedtheprecariousnessofourdomestic

position.Theenemyoffensivesurelymusthavebeenplannedovermanymonths.

Itoccurredwhenwewerebarelyfourw eeksinofficeandbeforetheenemycould

possiblyknowwhatweintended—sincewedidnotknowourselves.YettheNew

YorkTimesonMarch9blamedthenewAdministrationforhavingprovokedHanoi

bypresumingtospendamonthinstudyingtheoptionsinawarinvolvingan

expeditionaryforceofover500,000men:“ThesadfactisthattheParistalkshave

beenleftondeadcenterwhileAmbassadorLodgeawaitsaWhiteHousego‐

aheadformakingnewpeaceproposalsorforengaginginpr ivatetalksoutof

whichtheonlyrealprogressislikelytocome.Everythinghasbeenstalledwhile

theNixonAdministrationcompletesitsmilitaryanddiplomaticreview.”This

themesoonwasrepeatedintheCongress.



ThePresidentadoptedarestrainedpostureinpublicwhilechampingatthe

bitinprivate.AtanewsconferenceonMarch4hedeclared:



Wehavenotmovedinaprecipitatefashion,butthefactthatwehaveshownpatience

andforbearanceshouldnotbeconsideredasasignofweakness.Wewillnottoleratea

continuationofaviolationofanunderstanding.Butmorethanthat,wewillnottolerateattacks

whichresultinheaviercasualtiestoourmenatatimethatwearehonestlytryingtoseek

peaceattheconferencetableinParis.Anappropriateresponsetotheseattackswillbemadeif

theycontinue.



OnMarch4IpassedontothePresidentwithoutcommentaLairdmemo

recommendingagainstproposalsbytheJointChiefstoattackNorthVietnam.

Lairdwasfarfroma“dove”;innormalcircumstanceshisinstinctswereratheron

thebellicoseside.Hewouldhavepreferredtoaimforvictory.Buthewasalsoa

carefulstudentofthepublicandCongressionalmood.Hewasafinelytuned

politicianandassuchhehadlearnedthatthosewhomountthebarricadesmay

wellforgoafutureinpolitics;hewasnotaboutto makethissacrifice.He

thereforenavigatedwithgreatcarebetweenhisconvictions,whichcounseled

somemilitaryreaction,andhispoliticalinstinct,whichcalledforrestraint.He

opposedbombingNorthVietnam;hebecameastrongsupporteroftheattackon

theCambodiansanctuaries.(Hisonlydisagreementhadtodowithpublic

relationspolicy;hedidnotthinkitpossibletokeepthebombingsecret,on

practical,notonmoral,grounds.)ThePresident,followingasimilarlogic,ordered

astrikeagainsttheCambodiansanctuariesforMarch9.OnMarch7Rogers

objectedbecauseofprospectsforprivatetalksinParis.



Nixonretractedhisorderasecondtime.Witheachtimehemarchedupthe

hillanddownagain,Nixon’sresentmentsandimpatienceincreased. LikeLairdhe

keptsayingthathedidnotwanttohittheNorth,buthewantedtodo

“something.”OnMarch14,Nixonwasaskedatanewsconferencewhetherhis

patiencewaswearingthin.Hereplied:



ItooknocomfortoutofthestoriesthatIsawinthepapersthismorningtotheeffect

thatourcasualtiesfortheimmediatepastweekwentfrom400downto300.Thatisstillmuch

toohigh.Whatourresponseshouldbemustbemeasuredintermsoftheeffectonthe

negotiationsinParis.IwillonlyrespondasIdidearlier…Wehaveissuedawarning.Iwillnot

warnagain.Andifweconcludethatthelevelofcasualtiesishigherthanweshouldtolerate,

actionwilltakeplace.



NextdaytheNorthVietnamesefiredfiverocketsintoSaigon—afurther

escalationandviolationoftheunderstanding.Therewerethirty‐twoenemy

attacksagainstmajorSouthVietnamesecitiesinthefirsttwoweeksofMarch.At

3:35p.m.thedaytherocketshitSaigonI receivedaphonecallfromthe

President.HewasorderinganimmediateB‐52attackontheCambodian

sanctuaries.Cappingamonthoffrustration,thePresidentwasemphatic:“Stateis

tobenotifiedonlyafterthepointofnoreturn…The orderisnotappealable:”

(“Notappealable”wasafavoriteNixonphrase,whichtothosewhoknewhim

grewtomeanconsiderableuncertainty;thisofcoursetendedtoacceleraterather

thanslowdownappeals.)



ItoldthePresidentthatsuchadecisionshouldnotbetakenwithoutgiving

hissenioradvisersanopportunitytoexpresstheirviews—ifonlytoprotect

himselfifitledtoapublicuproar.Notimewouldbelost.Adetailedscenario

wouldhavetobeworkedoutinanyevent,andtoprepareinstructionswould

requireatleasttwenty‐fourhours.Ameetingwasthereforescheduledforthe

followingdayintheOvalOffice.IconsultedLaird,whostronglysupportedthe

President’sdecision.Toprepareforthemeeting,Iwroteamemoforthe

Presidentlistingtheprosandcons.Therisksrangedfroma proformaCambodian

protesttoastrongSovietreaction;fromseriousCambodianopposit iontoexplicit

NorthVietnameseretaliation—thoughitwashardtoimaginewhatescalation

Hanoicouldundertakebeyondwhatitwasalreadydoing.Finally,therewasthe

riskofanupsurgeof domesticcriticismandnewantiwardemonstrations.I

recommendedthatourParisdelegationaskforaprivatemeetingonthedayof

thebombingsoasto emphasizeourpreferenceforanegotiatedsolution.Iurged

thePresidenttostresstohisassociatesthattheproposedbombingwasnottobe

aprecedent.Whatmychecklistdidnotforesee(whatnoneofourdeliberations

foresaw)iswhatinfacthappened:noreactionofanykind—fromHanoi,Phnom

Penh,Moscow,orPeking.



ThemeetingonSundayafternoon,March16,intheOvalOfficewas

attendedbyRogers,Laird,Wheeler,andmyself.ItwasthefirsttimethatNixon

confrontedaconcretedecisioninaninternational crisissincebecoming

President;itwasalsothefirsttimethathewouldfa ceoppositionfromassociates

toacourseofactiontowhichhewasalreadycommitted.Heapproacheditwith

tacticsthatweretobecomevintageNixon.Ontheonehand,hehadmadehis

decisionandwasnotabouttochangeit;indeed,hehadinstructedmetoadvise

theDefenseDepartmenttothateffecttwenty‐fourhoursbeforethemeeting.On

theotherhand,hefeltitnecessarytopretendthatthedecisionwasstillopen.

Thisledtohoursoftheverydiscussionthathefoundsodistastefulandthat

reinforcedhistendencytoexcludetherecalcitrantsfromfurtherdeliberations.



TheOvalOfficemeetingfollowedpredictablelines.LairdandWheeler

stronglyadvocatedtheattacks.Rogersobjectednotonforeignpolicybuton

domesticgrounds.HedidnotraisetheneutralstatusofCambodia;itwastaken

forgranted(correctly)thatwehadtherighttocounterNorthVietnam’sblatant

violationofCambodia’sneutrality,sinceCambodiawasunwillingorunableto

defenditsneutralstatus.

Rogersfearedthatwewouldrunintoabuzzsawin

Congressjustwhenthingswerecalmingdown.Therewereseveralhoursof

discussionduringwhichNixonpermittedhimselftobepersuadedbyLairdand

Wheelertodowhathehadalreadyordered.Havingpreviouslysubmittedmy

thoughtsinamemorandum,Ididnotspeak.RogersfinallyagreedtoaB‐52strike

onthebaseareacontainingthepresume dCommunistheadquarters.These

deliberationsareinstructive:AmonthofanunprovokedNorthVietnamese

offensive,overathousandAmericandead,elicitedafterweeksofanguished

discussionexactlyoneAmericanretaliatoryraidwithinthreemilesofthe

CambodianborderinanareaoccupiedbytheNorthVietnameseforoverfour

years.Andthiswouldenterthefolkloreasanexampleofwanton“illegality.” 



Afterthemeeting,theJointChiefssoughttoincludeadditionalattackson

NorthVietnamesetroopconcentrationsviolatingtheDemilitarizedZone.Laird

andIagreedthatitwasmoreimportanttokeepRogerswithusandtheproposal

wasnotapproved.



TheB‐52attacktookplaceonMarch18againstNorthVietnameseBase

Area353,withinthreemilesoftheCambodianborder(seethemapbelow).For

thisstrikethePentagondugintoitsbottomlessbagofcodenamesandcameup

with“Breakfast”—asmeaninglessasitwastasteless.Whenanairattackhitsan

ammunitionorfueldepot,therearealwayssecondaryexplosionsthatprovide

nearlyconclusiveevidenceofasuccessfulraid.Theinitialassessmentbythecrew

oftheMarch18Breakfaststrikereported“atotalof73secondaryexplosionsin

thetargetarearanginguptofivetimesthenormalintensityofatypical

secondary.”

