Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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Executivewereconsumedbyarearguardactiontopreserveaminimalarsenal.

Pentagonplannerswereforcedtoconcentrateonpreservingtheexistingforce

structureratherthanadaptingittochangedcircumstances.



ThecutswouldprobablyhavebeenfarworsehadnotNixonattemptedto

respondtothenationalmoodbytrimmingthedefensebudgethimself,andhad

wenoteasedbudgetarypressuresbywithdrawingtroopsgraduallyfromAsia.We

shallneverknow.Ihavewonderedsincewhetheritwouldhavebeenwiserto

meettheissuehead‐on.Perhapsthereshouldhavebeenanall‐outnational

debateonourdefenseposturein1969.Accommodationfailedtoplacatethe

criticsandmayhavedemoralizedsupportersofastrongdefense;asinthe

VietnamcontroversyittendedtoisolatetheAdministrationbecauseitseemedto

grantthepreceptsofthecriticswithwhichtheAdministrationinfactdisagreed

andcausedthedebatetoturnontheimplementationofagreedassumptions.On

theotherhand,ringingPresidentialspeechesontheimportanceofdefense,such

asattheAirForceAcademyinJune1969,weremetwithderisionandindignation

inthemediaandtheCongress.TheonlyissueintheCongresswasnotwhether

defenseshouldbecutbutbyhowmuch.SupportersofdefenseinCongressand

thecountrydidnotrushtothebarricades.Intheantimilitaryorgyspawnedby

Vietnam,tohavechallengedtheoverwhelmingCongressionalsentimentfor

“domesticpriorities”wasalmostcertainlyanexerciseinf utility,pouringsalton

theopenwoundsoftheVie tnamdebate.



NixonandLairdintheendwereabletopreservetheessenceofourmilitary

structurethroughyearsofturmoil,cuts,andconflict.TheNixonAdministration

beganessentialnewprograms—theB‐1,theTrident,thecruisemissile—andlaid

afoundationonwhichitwaspossibletobuildwhentheCongressionalmood

changedafterthemid‐1970s.

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<<Contents>>



****



StrategicDoctrine



midstthisturmoil,mystaffandI—withthePresident’sstrongsupport—

undertookareexaminationofmilitarydoctrine.Thepurposewastoenable

usintimetoplananddefendourmilitaryprogramsaccordingtoreasoned

criteria,toadjustourstrategytonewrealities,andtotrytoleadthepublic

debateawayfromemotionalism.Thefirstproblemwastoredefinethestrategy

forgeneralnuclearwar.Accordingtothedoctrineof“assureddestruction,”which

hadguidedthepreviousAdministration,wedeterredSovietattackbymaintaining

offensiveforcescapableofachievingaparticularlevelofciviliandeathsand

industrialdamage.[

In1965,“assureddestruction”wasdefinedinthePentagonasthe

capacitytodestroyone‐fourthtoone‐thirdoftheSovietpopulationandtwo‐thirdsofSoviet

industry;by1968itwasloweredtoone‐fifthtoone‐fourthoftheSovietpopulationandone‐

halfofSovietindustry.]Thestrategydidnotaimatdestroyingtheotherside’smissile

orbomberforces;suchanapproachwouldhavetiedourforcestructuretothe

leveloftheotherside’s—whichispreciselywhattheadvocatesof“assured

destruction”soughttoavoid.Theypreferredtheapparentcertaintyofan

absolutestandardofdestructivenessdefinedineconomicterms(systemsanalysis

was,afterall,aneconomists’technique),whichfreedusfromtheneedtomatch

thegrowingSovietpower.Thenumberofnuclearweaponsneededtoachievea

hugelevelofdestructionwasfixedandnotlarge.



Remarkably,thedoctrineof“assureddestruction,”espousedbyliberal

advocatesofarmscontrolwhoweresupposedlymostmovedbyhumanitarian

concerns,impliedthemostinhumanstrategyforconductingawar.Thereasoning

wasthatthemorehorribletheconsequencesofwarthelesslikelywewereto

resorttoit;themorecontrollableitsconsequencesthegreatertheriskthatawar

wouldactuallyoccur.Therefore,fortheUnitedStatesandSovietUniontoaimat

eachother’spopulation,ratherthanateachother’smissilebases,wasdesirable;

ifmutualexterminationwastheonlycourse,neithersidewouldresorttonuclear

weapons.Whatwouldhappenincaseofmiscalculationwaslefttothefuture.

Howwewoulddefendalliesinthesecircumstanceswasnotanalyzed.



Thedilemmaneverresolvedbythisdoctrinewaspsychological.Itwasall

verywelltothreatenmutualsuicideforpurposesofdeterrence,particularlyin

caseofadirectthreattonation alsurvival.ButnoPresidentcouldmakesucha

threatcredibleexceptbyconductingadiplomacythatsuggestedahigh

irrationality—andthatinturnwasprecludedbyourpoliticalsystem,which

requiresustoprojectanimageofcalculabilityandmoderation.Andifdeterrence

failedandthePresidentwasfinallyfacedwiththedecisiontoretaliate,who

wouldtakethemoralresponsibilityforrecommendingastrategybasedonthe

massexterminationofcivilians?HowcouldtheUnitedStatesholditsallies

togetherasthecredibilityofitsstrategyeroded?HowwouldwedealwithSoviet

conventionalforcesoncetheSovietsbelievedthatwemeantwhatwesaidabout

basingstrategyontheexterminationofcivilians?



Carriedastepfarther,thedoctrineof“assureddestruction”ledtothe

extraordinaryconclusionthatthevulnerabilityofourcivilianpopulationwasan

assetreassuringtheSovietUnionandguaranteeingitsrestraintinacrisis.Forthe

firsttimeamajorcountrysawanadvantageinenhancingitsownvulnerability.

“Assureddestruction”wasoneofthosetheoriesthatsoundimpressiveinan

academicseminarbutarehorriblyunworkableforadecision‐makerinthereal

worldandleadtocatastropheiftheyareeverimplemented.



IwasalsoconcernedthatasstrategicequivalencebetweentheUnited

StatesandtheSovietUnionapproached,strategicforcesmightbeusedinless

thananall‐outattack.IpointedouttothePresidentinJuneof1969thedilemma

hewouldfaceiftherewasalimitedSovietnuclearattackandurgedhimto

requestthePentagontodevise strategiestomeetcontingenciesotherthanall‐

outnuclearchallenge.ThePresidentagreed.Orderstothateffectwereissued.

Butourmilitaryestablishmentresistsintrusionintostrategicdoctrineevenwhen

itcomesfromaWhiteHouseseekingtobehelpful.WhenIenteredoffice,former

DefenseSecretaryRobertMcNamaratoldmethathehadtriedforsevenyearsto

givethePresidentmoreoptions.Hehadfinallygivenup,hesaid,inthefaceof

bureaucraticoppositionanddecidedtoimprovise.Iwasdeterminedtodobetter;

Isucceededonlypartially.Civiliandefenseplannerswerereluctantbecausemore

optionswouldrequiresomenewforces,complicatingbudge tarydecisions.The

servicechiefswerereluctantbecausetheyprefertonegotiatetheirforcelevelsby

bargainingwitheachother,ratherthansubmittingthemtothetendermerciesof

civiliananalystswho,experiencehastaught,aremorelikelytoemasculatethan

tostrengthenthem.Sinceourmilitaryoperationsareplannedbycombined

commandsnotsubordinatetothemilitaryservices,thevariouschiefsofstaffare

moreheadsofprocuremententerprisesthanoforganizationsresponsiblefor

implementingstrategy.Theyaredeeplysuspiciousofanydoctrinalformulation

thatlatermightinterferewiththeirprocurementdecisions.Soithappenedthata

specificPresidentialdirectiveof1969inquiringintotherationaleofnaval

programswasneveransweredsatisfactorilyintheeightyearsIservedin

Washington.Theresponsewasalwaysshortofbeinginsubordinatebutalsoshort

ofbeinguseful.Despitesemiannualremindersitwaslistedasincompleteonthe

bookswhenweleftoffice.Thesameattitudeexistedinotherservices.



Somewhatmoreprogresswasmadeindevelopingamorediscriminating

strategyforall‐outwar,partlyasaresultofconsiderableWhiteHousepressure.

TheJointChiefscooperatedbecausetheyunderstoodthatthedoctrineof

“assureddestruction”wouldinevitablyleadtopoliticaldecisionshaltingor

neglectingtheimprovementof ourstrategicforcesandintimereducingthem.

Wethereforedevelopedin1969newcriteriaof“strategicsufficiency”that

relatedourstrategicplanningtothedestructionnotonlyofciviliansbutof

militarytargetsaswell.Thesecriteriaof“strategicsufficiency”thatrelatedour

strategicplanningtothedestructionnotonlyofciviliansbutofmilitarytargetsas

well.Thesebackswitharationale,ratherthanbyreflex;theygaveusatleastthe

theoreticalcapabilitytouseforcesforobjectivesotherthanthemass

exterminationofpopulations.



Translatingthesedoctrinalinnovationsintooperationalplansprove dfar

moredifficult.Planningstartedimmediately,butitwasnotcompleteduntilthe

incumbencyofJamesR.SchlesingerasSecretaryofDefense(1973‐1975).Some

newtargetingoptionswerethenproduced.Unfortunately,bythetimetheywere

developedtheyhadbeenovertakenbyadvancesintechnology.Expected

casualtiesinanuclearwarhaddoubledevenforminimumnuclearoptions.

DefenseSecretaryHaroldBrownhaspursuedthiseffortintheCarter

Administration.Achievingamorediscriminatingnuclearstrategy,preservingat

leastsomehopeofcivilizedlife,remainstothisdayoneofthemostdifficulttasks

toimplement,requiringasubstantialrecastingofourmilitaryestablishment.If

unsolved,theproblemwillsoonerorlaterparalyzeourstrategyandourforeign

policy.



<<Contents>>

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****



TacticalNuclearWeapons



similarproblemexistedwithrespecttotacticalnuclearweapons.Onemight

havethoughtthatifourstrategicforcestendedtowardparitywiththeUSSR

andifatthesametimewewereinferiorinconventionalmilitarystrength,greater

emphasiswouldbeplacedontacticalnuclearforces.ThisindeedwasNATO’s

proclaimedstrategyof“flexiblerespo nse.” Buttherewaslittleenthusiasmforthis

conceptwithinourgovernment.Civilianofficials intheStateDepartmentandthe

Pentagon,especiallysystemsanalysisexperts,wereeagertocreateaclear

“firebreak”betweenconventionalandnuclearweaponsandtodelaythedecision

toresorttoanynuclearweaponsaslongaspossible.Theywerereluctant,

therefore,torelyontacticalnuclearweapons,whichtheythoughtwouldtendto

erodealldistinctionsbetweennuclearandconventionalstrategy.



ApassagefromastudyonNATO’smilitaryoptionsreflectedthisstateof

mind.Thisparticularstudywasunabletofindanyusefornuclearweaponsin

NATOeventhoughourstockpiletherenumberedinthethousands:Theprimary

roleofournuclearforcesinEurope,thestudyargued,istoraisetheSoviet

estimateoftheexpectedcostsofaggressionandaddgreatuncertaintytotheir

calculations.Nuclearforcesdonotnecessarilyhaveadecisiveimpacton the

likelihoodorformofaggression,thestudyconcluded.Thiswasanastonishing

statementfromacountrythathadpreservedthepeaceinEuropeforovertwenty

yearsbyrelyingonitsnuclearpreponderance.Norwasitclearhowforces

thoughtnottohaveadecisiveimpactcouldaffectthecalculationsofapotential

aggressor.Itwasacounselofdefeattoabjurebothstrategicandtacticalnuclear

forces,fornoNATOcountry—includingours—waspreparedtoundertakethe

massivebuildupinconventionalforcesthatwasthesolealternative.



Toconfusemattersfurther,whileAmericanciviliananalystsdeprecatedthe

useofnuclearweaponsasineffectiveandinvolvingadangerousriskofescalation,

ouralliespressedacoursecontradictingtheprevailingtheoryinWashington.

Theyurgedbothaguaranteedearlyresorttotacticalnuclearweaponsand

immunityoftheirterritoriesfromtheiruse.Inevitably,discussions thathadbeen

goingonsince1968intheNATONuclearPlanning Groupbegantoproduce

seriousdifferencesofopinion.



ThisGrouphadbeensetupbySecretaryMcNamaraasadevicebywhich

ouralliescouldparticipateinnucleardecisionswithoutacquiringnuclear

weaponsthemselves.[

TheNPGwascomposedoffourpermanentmembersandthree

membersrotatedateighteen‐monthintervals.ThepermanentmembersweretheUnited

States,Britain,WestGermany,andItaly.(France,tomaintainitsindependenceinnuclear

matters,refusedtoparticipate.)]DenisHealey,thenBritishMinisterofDefense,had

explainedhisgovernment’sviewwhenNixonvisitedLondoninFebruary1969.In

Healey’sjudgmentNATO’sconventionalforceswouldbeabletoresistforonlya

matterofdays;henceearlyuseofnuclearweaponswasessential.Healey

stressedthecrucialimportanceofmakingtheSovietsunderstandthattheWest

wouldprefertoescalatetoastrategicexchangeratherthansurrender.Onthe

otherhand,NATOshouldseektoreducedevastationtoaminimum.TheNuclear

PlanningGroupwasworkingonsolvingthisriddle;its“solution”wastheuseofa

verysmallnumberoftacticalweaponsasawarningthatmattersweregettingout

ofhand.



WhatBritain,supportedbyWestGermany,wasurgingcametobecalled

the“demonstrativeuse” ofnuclearweapons.Thismeantsettingoffanuclear

weaponinsomeremotelocation,whichdidnotinvolvemanycasualties—inthe

airovertheMediterranean,forexample—asasignalofmoredrasticuseifthe

warningfailed.Ineverhadmuchuseforthisconcept.I believedthattheSoviet

UnionwouldnotattackWesternEuropewithoutanticipatinganuclearresponse.

Areactionthatwasdesignedtobeofnomilitaryrelevancewouldshowmore

hesitationthandetermination;itwouldthusbemorelikelytospurtheattack

thandeterit.Ifnuclearweaponswereto beused,weneededaconceptbywhich

theycouldstopanattackontheground.Ahesitantorineffectivere sponseran

theriskofleavinguswithnochoicesotherthansurrenderorholocaust.



Butwhatwasan“effective”response?Giventhepoliticalimpossibilityof

raisingadequateconventionalforces,theEuropeanssawnuclearweaponsasthe

mosteffectivedeterrent.Buttheyfearedtheuseofthemontheirterritories;

whatseemed“limited”touscouldbecatastrophicforthem.Therealgoalofour

allies—underliningthedilemmaoftacticalnuclearweapons—hasbeentocommit

theUnitedStatestotheearlyuseofstrategicnuclearweapons,whichmeanta

US‐Sovietnuclearwarfoughtovertheirheads.Thiswaspreciselywhatwas

unacceptabletoAmericanplanners.Ourstrategy—thenandnow—mustenvisage

theultimateuseofstrategicnuclearweaponsifEuropecanbedefendedinno

otherway.Butitmustalsoseektodevelopotheroptions,bothtoincreasethe

credibilityofthedeterrentandto permitaflexibleapplicationofourpower

shoulddeterrencefail.



In1969,atemporarycompromiseemergedthatineffectpaperedoverthe

dispute.TheNuclearPlanningGroupkeptopenthepossibilityofboth

“demonstrative”and“operational”usesoftacticalnuclearweapons.Inother

words,adecisionwasavoided.Lairdwascorrectwhenhereportedtothe

President:“Thelongertermproblemofdivergencebetween Americanand

Europeanviewsonstrategyremains.”



<<Contents>>



****



OneandaHalfWars



hilethenuclearissuewasnotresolved—andperhapscouldnotbe—one

majoradaptationofourstrategicdoctrinedidtakeplacein1969.Itwas

destinedtohavepro foundconsequencesforourforeignpolicy.Whatstartedout

asahighlyesotericdiscussionofmilitarystrategyturnedintooneofourmost

importantsignalstothePeople’sRepublicofChinathatwemeanttoimproveour

relationswithit.



WhentheNixonAdministrationcameintooffice,theprevalentdoctrinefor

conventionalforceswasthe“two‐and‐one‐half‐war”strategy;accordingtoitthe

UnitedStatesneededforcessufficientto:(1)mountaninitial(ninety‐day)

defenseofWesternEuropeagainstaSovietattack;(2)makeasustaineddefense

againstanall‐outChineseattackoneitherSouthEastAsiaorKorea;and(3)still

meetacontingencyelsewhere,forexample,theMiddleEast.Ourstrategic

planningassumedwhatwasbeliedbythepoliticalfacts:thatweconfronteda

Communistmonolith,thatageneralwarwouldalmostsurelyinvolvea

simultaneousattackonourvitalinterestsbyboththeSovietUnionand

CommunistChina.Tobesure,weneverchosetobuildtheconventionalforces

envisagedbythisambitiousstrategy.Inmilitarytermsthetwo‐and‐one‐half‐war

strategywasapaperexercise,inwhichcertaindivisionswereearmarkedfor

EuropeandothersforAsia.Itsmajorresult,however,waspsychological.It

connectedtheSovietandChine sethreatsinourthinkingsoinextricablythatany

analysisofpossibleuseofnuclearweaponstendedtopresupposethattheSoviet

UnionandChinawereasingletargetarea.Politically,itinhibitedour

understandingoftheemergingsplitbetweentheCommunistgiantsandthe

opportunitythisrepresentedfortheUnitedStates.



InoneofmyearlyinitiativesassecurityadviserIlaunchedareexamination

oftheassumptionsofthetwo‐and‐one‐half‐warconcept.AnInterdepartmental

Grouprespondedwithfiveoptions,whichmystaffandIboileddowntothree.

Eachalternativestrategywasanalyzedintermsofthecontingenciesitwould

enableustomeetanditsbudgetaryimplications.StrategiesforNATOwere

matchedinvariouscombinationswithstrategiesforAsia.Thesecombinations

werethenrelatedtoprojecteddomesticexpenditures,sothatthePresident

coulddecidewhatlevelofriskhewasrunningifheweretogiveupanyparticular

strategicoptionforaspecificdomesticprogram.Thethreeoptionswereas

follows:



•Strategy1wouldmaintainconventionalforcesforaninitial(ninety‐day)

defenseofWesternEuropeagainstamajorSovietattack,andforsimultaneous 

assistance(bylogisticalsupportandlimitedUScombatforces) toanAsianally

againstthreatsshortofafull‐scaleChineseinvasion.



•Strategy2wouldmaintainforcescapableofeitheraNATOinitialdefense

oradefenseagainstafull‐scaleChineseattackinKoreaorSouthEastAsia.Thatis,

wewouldnotmaintainforcestofightonalargescaleinEuropeandAsia

simultaneously.



•Strategy3(essentiallyourstrategybeforetheVietnamwar)would

maintainUSforcesforaNATOinitialdefenseandadefenseofKoreaorSouthEast

Asiaagainstafull‐scaleChineseattack.Theforceswouldbecapableofmeeting

themajorWarsawPactandChinesethreatssimultaneously.



OnOctober2,1969,IwrotetothePresidentsumminguptheoptionsand

theirmilitaryandbudgetaryimplications.Theagencieshadvaryingviews,whichI

reportedfairly,butincaseofasplitviewthePresidentasalwayswantedmy

recommendation.IurgedthatheapproveStrategy2:“Ibelievethata

simultaneousWarsawPactattackinEuropeandChineseconventionalattackin

Asiaisunlikely.Inanyevent,Idonotbelievesuchasimultaneousattackcouldor

shouldbemetwithgroundforces.”



Nixonacceptedmyrecommendation.Itwasoneofthemoreimportant

decisionsofhisPresidency.Firstofall,itharmonizeddoctrineandcapability.We

hadnevergeneratedtheforcesourtwo‐and‐one‐half‐wardoctrinerequired;the

gapbetweenourdeclaratoryandouractualpolicywasboundtocreateconfusion

inthemindsofpotentialaggressorsandtoraisegraverisksifweattemptedto

applyit.Therewasnorealistic prospectthattheChineseandtheSovietswould

moveagainstusatthesametime.ButiftherewereajointassaultbyChinaand

theSovietUnion,wewouldbefacedwithathreattotheglobalequilibrium;to

pretendthatinthesecircumstanceswewouldconfineourresponsetoa

conventionalwarintwowidelyseparatedareaswouldmultiplyourdangers.



Thepoliticalimplicationswereevenmoredecisive.Wehadtogiveupthe

obsessionwithaCommunistmonolith.BylinkingSovietandChinesepurposeswe

createdpresumptionsthatcircumscribedtheflexibilityofourdiplomacyandran

countertothedemonstrableantagonismbetweenthetwomajorCommunist

powers.ThereorientationofourstrategysignaledtothePeople’sRepublicof

ChinathatwesawitspurposesasseparablefromtheSovietUnion’s,thatour

militarypolicydidnotseeChinaasaprincipalthreat.Althoughourchangeof

doctrinewasneveracknowledgedbyPeking,itisinconceivablethatitwas

ignoredbythosecarefulstudentsofgeopoliticswhosometiculouslymonitored

allAmericanpublicstatements.Fornotonlydidwebegintoreflectthenew

strategicdesigninourmilitaryplanningforbothnuclearandconventionalwar;to

leavenodoubtaboutourintentions,wetooktheextraordinarystepofspelling

outourrationaleinthePresident’sfirstForeignPolicyReporttotheCongresson

February18,1970,alongthelinesoftheanalysisIhavejustdescribed.Thekey

sentencesread:



Intheefforttoharmonizedoctrineandcapability,wechosewhatisbestdescribedas

the“11/2‐war”strategy.Underitwewillmaintaininpeacetimegeneralpurposeforces

adequateforsimultaneouslymeetingamajorCommunistattackineitherEuropeorAsia,

assistingalliesagainstnon‐ChinesethreatsinAsia,andcontendingwithacontingency

elsewhere[emphasisadded].



Thechoiceofthisstrategywasbasedonthefollowingconsiderations:



—thenuclearcapabilityofourstrategicandtheaternuclearforcesservesasadeterrent

tofull‐scaleSovietattackonNATOEuropeorChineseattackonourAsianallies;



—theprospectsforacoordinatedtwo‐frontattackonouralliesbyRussiaandChinaare

lowbothbecauseoftherisksofnuclearwarandtheimprobabilityofSino‐Sovietcooperation…



AndWesternEurope—notAsia—wassingledoutasthetheaterinwhich

thethreatwasmostlikely.Wewere,inshort,concernedmorewiththedangerof

SovietthanofChineseaggression.



WehadsentanimportantsignaltoChina.Wewouldnolongertreata 

conflictwiththeUSSRasautomaticallyinvolvingthePeople’sRepublic.Wewould

treatourtwoadversariesonthebasisoftheiractionstowardus,nottheir

ideology;wepubliclyacknowledgedtheirdifferencesandtheunlikelihoodoftheir

cooperation.TheChinesehadanoptiontomovetowardus.



<<Contents>>

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****



TheNixonDoctrine



henewstrategydefinedtheforceswewouldgenerate.Contrarytothe1960s,

thestatedgoalsforourforcelevelswereinfactmet.Butthereremainedthe

needtorelateourintentionstotheconcernsofalliesandfriends,particularlyin

Asia.Incontrasttosomeofourdomesticcritics,thesethreatenedcountriessaw

ourwithdrawalfromVietnamasirreversible.Theyfearedthatintheprocessthe

UnitedStatesmightshedallitsrespo nsibilitiesandturnitsbackonallitsinterests

intheregion.Countriesnotalliedwithuswonderedwhetherwewouldbeginto

defineoursecurityconcernsinthePacifi cinstrictlylegalterms,confinedtothose

countrieswithwhichwehadwrittencommitments.Wherewouldthisleave

countriesofgreatstrategicimportance, suchasIndiaorIndonesia?Andthose

thathadwrittencommitmentswonderedabouthowwewouldinterpretthem.

T



ConsideringthedomesticattacksonAmericanoverinvolvementand

attemptstoreduceevenourcommitmentstoNATO,thesewerenotnaiveor

trivialquestions.ButiftheUnitedStateswasperceivedtobeabdicatingitsrolein

Asia,dramaticchangesintheforeignpoliciesandperhapseventhedomestic

evolutionofkeycountrieswouldbeprobable.Ontheotherhandtherewasno

senseinindicatingadoctrineforcommondefensethatcouldnotenlista

domesticconsensus.

