Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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paritywithus,assomeexpected,theSovietscontinuedtobuild—untilstopped

bythe1972SALTaccords,andthentheyswitchedtoanenergeticqualitative

improvement.



TheAmericanresponsetotheSovietbuildupintheJohnsonAdministration

wastwofold.Therewasadecisiontobuildanantiballisticmissiledefensesystem

(ABM),butitwasforcedontheJohnsonAdministrationbyanarousedCongress

anditwaslefttoNixontoimplementit.Andontheoffensiveside,ratherthan

matchthenumbersofSovietmissiles,ourpredecessorsdecidedtodevelopMIRV

warheadstomultiplytheoffensivepowerofeachofourexistingmissiles.Thefirst

USflighttestsofMIRV’dmissilestookplacein1968.Ourpredecessorshadalso

decidedtobaseourstrategicforceonlightbuthighlyaccuratemissiles,the

MinutemanICBMandPoseidonSLBM.(TheSovietshadmadetheopposite

decision,emphasizingmissilesthatweremuchlargerthanoursandtherefore

capableofdeliveringafarheavierpayload.AsSoviettechnologyimproved,its

advantageinnumbersandpayloadwouldbeenhancedbyimprovedaccuracy.)

ThusdecisionsoftheJohnsonAdministrationdeterminedthesizeaswellasthe

numbersofourmissilesthroughoutourperiodinoffice.Thiswasbecausethe

leadtimeformostnewweaponsisatleastsixyearsbetweenconceptionand

productionandbecausetheCongressresistednewprogramsuntiltheendofthe

Vietnamwar.Hencenodecisionthatwemadecouldproducenewweapons

beforethemiddle1970s.AndCongressionaloppositionthreatenedtodelaythis

evenfurther.



Thus,inexorably,theoverwhelmingpreponderancethatwehadenjoyedin

theFortiesandFiftieswasbeingerodedfirstintoequality,eventuallyinto

vulnerability,ofourland‐based forces.TheSoviets’heavierpayloadandimminent

leadinnumberswouldbecounterbalancedforawhilebyourtechnologicallead.

WewerebelievedtobeatleastfiveyearsaheadinthedevelopmentofMIRVs;

theaccuracyofourmissileswasstillsuperior,acrucialingredientinany

calculationaboutahypotheticalnuclearexchange.Ourcapacityto maintaina

roughstrategicbalancewasnotyetendangered—providedourtechnological

superioritywasfullyexploited.WecoulddeployanABMtoprotectourcitiesor

ourmissilesites.Wecouldalsospeeduppreliminaryworkonamoreadvanced

bomber(laterknownastheB‐1),a newsubmarineandsubmarine‐launched

missile(theTrident),andanewICBM(theMX).After1978wewouldthusbeina

strongposition,providedalltheprogramsstartedintheearly1970swere

maintained.Wetookallthesesteps,buteachwasattackedbothintheCongress

andinthemedia.Ourstrategicdilemmawasthatwithoutthesefutureweapons

systemsourstrategicforceswouldgrowincreasinglyvulnerable;evenwiththem

ourlong‐termsecurityrequirementswerechanging.



Forevenwithequality,oraslightsuperiority,anynew Administration

wouldfaceanunprecedentedchallenge.Ourdefe nse strategiesformedinthe

periodofoursuperiorityhadtobereexaminedintheharshlightofthenew

realities.Beforetoolonganall‐outnuclearexchangecouldinflictcasualtieson

theUnitedStatesamountingtotensofmillions.Abalanceofdestructiveness

wouldthenexist;andevenifforawhileourcapacitytoinflictcasualtiesshould

exceedthatofouradversaries,ourreluctancetoresorttonuclearwarwas

certaintomountdramatically.ThecredibilityofAmericanpledgestorisk

Armageddonindefenseofallieswasboundtocomeintoquestion.Thisraised

criticalissues:Howcouldwemaintaintheindependenceandself‐confidenceof

alliedcountriesundertheshadowoftheSovietUnion’slandarmies(also

growing)aswellasitsexpandingnucleararsenal?Whatshouldbeourstrategyfor

theuseofournuclearforces?If all‐outthermonuclearwarbecametoo

dangerous,wouldlimitedapplicationsofnuclearforcesstillbefeasible?



<<Contents>>

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****



TheDefenseDebate



uchquestionswouldhavebeendifficulttoanswerinthebestof

circumstances.Unfortunately,thelate1960sandearly1970swerehardlya

timeforcalm,rationalanalysisofstrategic problems.Thepassionatecritiqueof

thewarinVietnamspreadtoanattackonthedefenseestablishmentasawhole;

indeed,somesawinanassaultonthedefensebudgetadeviceforforcinganend

tothewarinSouthEastAsia.“Reorderingnationalpriorities”fromdefenseto

domesticprogramswasthesloganoftheperiod;itwasaeuphemismforsevere

cutsinthedefensebudget.IntellectualswhomadefunofPresidentEisenhower’s

syntaxandleadershipwhenhewasinofficereadilyembracedasreceivedtruth

his1961warningagainstpermittingtheso‐calledmilitary‐industrialcomplexto

acquireadisproportionateinfluence onAmericanlife.Weapons—especially

ours—wereconsideredthecauseratherthanthesymptomsoftensionbecauseit

wasallegedthatourprogramstriggeredSovietresponsesratherthantheother

wayaround.TheUSgovernment’sassertionsthattheSovietbuildupfacedus

withagenuinedefenseproblemwereridiculed asstandardoutputofthe

“Pentagonpropagandamachine,”

regurgitatedeveryyeartoinfluencebudgetary

decisionsintheCongress.Thevalidperceptionthatthestrategicarmsracewas

differentfromanythatprecededitwasturnedintothepropositionthatanynew

expenditureforstrategicforceswasabsurdbecausetherealreadyexistedenough

weaponstodestroyhumanityseveraltimesover.Thetemperofthetimeswas

exemplifiedbyaconferenceinMarch1969inWashingtonconvenedbya

bipartisangroupoftenSenatorsandnearlyfortyRepresentativesonthesubject

of“theMilitaryBudgetandNationalPriorities.”Itwasattendedbydistinguished

scholars,scientists,formergovernmentofficials,andmembersofbothhousesof

Congress.Theirreport,laterpublishedunderthetitleAmericanMilitarism1970,

concludedthat“ourcountryisindangerofbecominganationalsecuritystate.”



Theeighty‐memberbipartisanMembersofCongressforPeaceThroughLaw

issuedareportinJulythatatta ckedsixmajorweaponsprograms,includingthe

ABM,inwhattheNewYorkTimesdescribedasaneffort“tocarrythemomentum

oftheanti‐ballisticmissiledebateintoamuchbroaderattackonmilitary

spending.”

Allthingsmilitarycameunderassault—programs,budgets,strategic

doctrines.Afull‐pageadvertisementopposingantiballisticmissiledefenseswas

entitledsarcastically:“FromthesamepeoplewhobroughtyouVietnam:theanti‐

ballisticmissilesyste m.”



Themostfrequentlycited“lesson”ofVietnamwasthattheUnitedStates

hadtoreduceitsoverseascommitments.Theimpre ssionwascreatedthatour

deploymentsabroad,ratherthandeterringaggression,actuallyencouragedit.By

withdrawingUSforcesfromoverseas,itwassaid,theincidenceofglobalconflict

wouldgodown,makinglowe rdefenseexpenditurespossible.Bythesametoken,

reducedmilitarybudgetswouldforcethegovernmenttocurtailitsforeign

involvement.Anadditionalbenefitwouldbethatfundswouldbefreedfor

domesticwelfareprograms.



Thenoveltheorythatreduceddefensebudgetsenhancedsecuritywas

expressedbytwoformerofficialsoftheKennedy‐Johnsonadministrationswriting

attheendof1968.TheywereCarlKaysen,formerDeputyAssistantforNational

SecurityAffairsunderJohnKennedyandthenheadoftheprestigiousInstitutefor

AdvancedStudyinPrinceton,andCharlesL.Schultze,DirectoroftheBureauof

theBudgetforJohnson.

Kaysenargued:



Thenewpoliticalandtechnicalrealitiespointtothefutilityofaquest forsecurity

primarilythroughincreasedmilitarystrengthandtotheincreasingimportanceofpolitical

factorsandarms‐controlarrangementsandagreements.Indeed,bygivingweighttothese

factorsinthenextfiveyears,wewillhaveabetterprospectofachievinghigherlevelsofreal

security—thatis,lowerrisksofharmtotheUnitedStatesanditsvitalinterests,witharmed

forcesandmilitarybudgetsasmuchasathirdlowerthantheyarenow—thanwewillhaveby

continuingtofollowthelineofourpastpolicyinaradicallyalteredsituation.Inplainwords,the

courseofarmslimitation,restrictionsindeployments,andarmscontrolisnotonlycheaper

thanthatofcontinuingcompetitioninarmsandmilitaryconfrontation;itissafer.



SchultzeconcludedthattheendoftheVietnamwarwouldpermita

reductionofthedefensebudgetby$20to$22billionperyear.Buthewas

worriedthatthis“peacedividend”wasindangerofbeingeatenupbythe

procurement,alreadyinprocess,ofmajornewweapons.Hethereforeurgedthe

greatestvigilanceinapprovingnewprograms.Kaysenargued,andSchultze

agreed,thatanadditional$15‐16billionsavingsperyearcouldberealized

beyondthisso‐calledpeacedividendifprogressweremadeinSALTandifour

conventionalforceswerereducedtoamoremodestsize,reflectingascaling‐

downinAmerica’sforeigncommitments.



Thuscriticsdrewfromtheapproachingnuclearparitytheamazing

conclusionthatweshouldcutourconventionalforcesinwhichwewerealready

vastlyinferior.TheysawintheendoftheVietnamwarnotanopportunityto

makeupforlong‐neglectedprocurementbutanoccasionforcuttingourdefense

budget.Thesecutscouldofcoursebejustifiedonlyiftherewaslessenedforeign

dangerorifexistingforceswereredundant.Thesepreciseargumentswere

advancedbythreeHarvardprofessorsinJanuary1970:



Itisnotclearthat[conventional]forcescontributetodeterringmajornon‐nuclear

conflictsorthatsuchconflictsaresufficientlylikelytojustifytheirstandingbyinreadiness.Only

militaryplanners,professionallycommittedtobeliefintheworstcontingencies,todayassign

significantprobabilitytoasuddenSovietmarchacrosstheNorthGermanplain,asurprise

attackbytheRedArmyontheMediterraneanflankofNATO,orevenanunheraldeddescentby

CommunistChinaonBurmaorThailand.Equally,itisunclearwhatroleAmericannon‐nuclear

forcescanplayinthekindsofminorwarsthatdoseemprobable.



ThearticledidnotaddressthequestionwhethertheprobabilityofaSoviet

conventionalattackmightbeaffectedtosomeextentbythesizeoftheopposing

forces;itsimplyassumedthatsincetherehadbeennoaggressioninthepast

therewouldbenoneinthefutureandthereforeweweremaintaining

unnecessaryforces.



Itis,ofcourse,inherentindeterrencethatonecanneverprovewhathas

preventedaggression.Isitourdefenseposture?Orisitthatouradversarynever

intendedtoattackinthefirstplace?Paradoxically,themoreagivenmilitary

posturedetersaggression,themoreargumentsitsuppliestothosewishingto

dismantleit.Thethreeprofessorsmaintainedthatasmallerconventionalforce

wouldpermitbudgetreductionsamountingto$30billion,a defensebudget$17

billionbelowtheminimumpost‐VietnampostureadvocatedbythePentagonand

$10billionlessthantheforceprojectedbyPresidentNixon’sfirstbudget.



Thesameargumentsweretakenup,moresignificantly,intheCongress.

SenatorMikeMansfield,theMajorityLeader,declaredinApril1969thathe

wouldleadafighttocutatleast$5billionfromthe$77.6billiondefense

appropriationrequestintheNixonAdministration’sfirstbudget(whichwas

alreadysomewhatscaleddownfromthebudgetsubmittedbytheoutgoing

Administration).Mansfieldtookaimatfifteendiffe rentdefenseprograms.For

example,hecriticizedaNavyproposalfo rafleetoffastlogistic deploymentships

as“typicalofthosefoot‐in‐the‐doorthingsaboutwhichwehavetobecareful.”



InMay,theNewYorkTimesreportedthat“agrowingsegmentofCongress,

propelledbytheantimilitaryclimategeneratedbythewarinVietnam,is

searchingforsomeeffectivewaytoslashsteadilyrisingmilitaryexpenditures.”

Thiseffortto “leashmilitaryspending”wasbipartisanandincludedsuch

RepublicansasSenatorsMarkHatfieldofOregonandJohnShermanCooperof

Kentucky.TheTimesquotedfreshmanRepublicanSenatorWilliamA.Saxbefrom

Ohio:“WecometotheSenatewiththeattitudethatNixonwaselectedbecause

ofthewar—thatthewarwreckedJohnsonandthatitwillwreckNixonunlesshe

responds.Thoseofuswhocomeinwiththisgroupbelieveourelectionwas

largelyresponsivetothisnationalattitude.Iamreallyhopefulthatwewillbeat

theABMandwillgoaheadwiththatfootholdtoattackthewholecomplex.”



OnJune3,theCongressmovedontwofronts.TheJointEconomic

CommitteeheadedbySenatorWilliamProxmirebeganeightdaysofhearingson

howtoreducethedefensebudget.CharlesSchultze,undeterredbythefactthat

thepreviousbudgetshadbeenpreparedduringhisincumbencyasbudget

director,openedthehearingsbysuggestingthattheCongresscreateanew

committeetoreviewtheDefenseDepartmentposturestatementandbringabout

substantialreductions.OneflooraboveintheNewSenateOfficeBuilding,the

SenateArmedServicesCommitteelaunchedaninquiryintothe$1.5billioncost

overrunontheC‐5Asupertransportaircraft(theplanethatwaslaterofvital

importanceinthe1973MidEastwar).



Thesepressuresfoundtheirinevitableexpressioninthebureaucracy.On

June17IreportedtothePresidentthatasubstantialbodyofopinionintheState

Department,theArmsControlandDisarmamentAgency,andevenintheCIA

believedstronglythat



strategicinitiativesorassertionsofU.S.determinationtoremainstrategicallypowerful

wouldonbalancedisappointandworryourAlliesbecauseoftheirfearofanacceleratingarms

raceandwouldleadtoadeteriorationofEast‐WestrelationsbecauseofhardeningSoviet

attitudes.Also,itseemstobewidelybelievedthatSovietstrategicdecisionsarehighlysensitive

toourowndecisionsandthateveryU.S.actionwillprovokeanoffsettingSovietreaction.



IncommentingontheseviewsIwrotetoNixon:



Idonotbelievetheevidencejustifieseitherthestrengthwithwhichtheseviewsare

heldorthelackofstrongdissentingviews.Itisequallyplausibleinmyjudgmentthaton

balanceEuropeanswouldberelievedatcleardemonstrationsofU.S.strategicresolveandthat

theSovietleadership,facedwithveryrealeconomicproblems,wouldbemoreratherthanless

interestedinseekingsomeformofslowdowninthecompetition.



Fromthebeginning,Nixonwasdeterminedtoresistthesetrends,believing

thatAmericanpowerwasnotonlymorallydefensiblebutcrucialforthesurvival

offreecountries.Butintheexistingclimate,strengtheningourdefensesproved

nosimpletask.Notonlytheconductofawarbutthesinewsofnationalsecurity

wereunderassault.



Formethedebatebroughtmuchstresswitholdfriendsandformer

associateswithwhomIhadservedonarmscontrolpanelsandstudygroupsfor

overadecade.Iagreedwiththemthatnuclearweaponsaddedaunique

dimensiontothearmsrace.Tobesure,myreadingofhistorydidnotsupport

theirviewthatallarmsracescausedtensions;armsbuildups,historically,were

moreoftenareflectionratherthanacauseofpoliticalconflictsanddistrust.ButI

substantiallyagreedthatwhatmarkedourtimeasaperiodofrevolutionary

changewasthehighstateofreadinessofstrategicweaponsandtheir

destructiveness.Strategicforces,atoncehighlyvulnerableandextremely

powerful,couldinacrisistemptonesidetostrikefirst,especiallyifitfearedthat 

itmightloseitsmeansofretaliationtoafirstblow.



Likemanyintheacademiccommunity,Ifavoredaconsciouspolicyof

stabilizingthearmsrace.Ibelievedalsothatnationalleadershadadutyto

disenthrallthemselvesofthesimplisticnotionsthatmilitarypoweralonebrought

security,datingfromatimewhenthepenaltiesformisjudgmentinvolvedless

catastrophicconsequences.Inmyviewitwasintheinterestofbothsidesto

reducethevulnerabilityoftheirretaliatoryforces:byagreementonmutual

restraintifpossible,byunilateralactionsifnecessary.Evenmoreimportant,Iwas

convincedthatademocraticsocietywouldneverbeableto bravethehazardsof

thenuclearageunlessitspeoplewereconvincedthatitsleadersresponded

rationallyandsoberlytotheunprecedentedexistenceofweaponsofmass

destruction.GiventhedynamicsoftheSovietsystem,Ithoughtthatmilitary

challengeswerepossible,perhapsevenprobable.IwantedtheUnitedStatesand

itsalliestobeabletofacethembackedbyaunitedpublic.OnelessonofVietnam

wasthatfirmcounteractions,necessarilyinvolvingsacrifice,couldalwaysbe

underminedbydomesticdivisionsifourpeoplebelievedtheirgovernments

needlesslysoughtorprovokedconfrontations.



WhereIpartedcompanywithmyfriendsandformercolleagueswasinmy

analysisofSovietmotivations.Ididnotacceptthepropositionthatunilateral

restraintinweaponsprocurementonourpar twouldevokeacomparable

responsefromtheKremlin.Asbelieversinthepredominanceof“objective

factors,”theSovietleaderswerelikelytointerpretsuchstepslessasgesturesof

conciliationthanasweakness,causedbydomesticoreconomicpressures.The

SovietUnionaftertheCubanmissilecrisiswasgoingalloutinitsweapons

procurementineverymajorcategoryofarms.Americanabdicationwouldtempt

Soviettendenciestowardfillingeveryvacuum;theUSSRwouldaccepta 

stabilizationofthearmsraceonlyifconvincedthatitwouldnotbeallowedto

achievesuperiority.ItwasinourinteresttodemonstratetotheSovietUnionthat

giventheinequalityofresourcesitcouldnotpossiblywinanarmsrace,thatwe

wouldnotstandbywhilethebalanceshiftedagainstus,andthatifsufficiently

provokedwewouldsimplyoutproducethem.



NordidIagreewiththemilitaryanalysissooftenadvancedbycriticsofour

defenseprograms.Itwastruethatnotionsofmilitarysuperiorityhadadifferent

significanceinthenuclearage;itdidnotfollowthatwecouldriskstandingstill

whileouradversariesbuiltfeverishly.Overthedecadesagrowingimbalance

againstuswasboundtodepriveourpledgestodefendouralliesofany

credibility;inextremecircumstancesitmighttemptanattackontheUnited

States.



EveniftheriskstotheSovietUnionofanattempttoattacktheUnited

Stateswouldalwaysseemexorbitant,anerodingstrategicequilibriumwasbound

tohavegeopoliticalconsequences.Itwouldaccentuateourknowninferiorityin

forcescapableofregionaldefense.ThecountriesaroundtheSovietperiphery

wouldbemoreandmoretemptedtoseeksecurityinaccommodation.Norwere

ourdangersexhaustedbydeliberateactsofSovietmilitarypressure.Ina

revolutionaryperiodmanycriseswereconceivablethatwerenotsoughtbyeither

side;Sovietwillingnesstorunriskswasboundtogrowasthestrategicbalance

shiftedagainstus.Thiscouldnotfailtodemoralizecountrieslookingtousfor

protection,whethertheywerealliedortechnicallynonaligned.



Ithereforefavorednewstrategicprogramsandastrengthened

conventionaldefense,evenwhileurgingamajoreffortinnegotiationstocontrol

arms.Intimemyviewsweretoprovokethewrathofbothco nservativesand

liberals,theformerbecausetheyopposedanyarmscontrol,thelatterbecause

theyopposedanyarmsbuildup. Bythesametoken,the1969debateonthe

militarybalancecametoaffectnatio naldecisionsonbothweaponsprocurement

andSALTnegotiationsforalltheyearsoftheNixonAdministration.



Thedebatefocusedontwonewweaponssystems:theABMprogramand

thedeploymentofMIRVsonourmissiles.ThenewAdministrationinheritedboth

oftheseprogramsfromitspredecessor.ButNixon’svictoryhadalteredthe

politicalequation;itliberatedDemocraticcriticsofdefenseprogramswho had

mutedtheirviewswhiletheirownpartywasinoffice.Theyweresoonreinforced

bysomeoftheveryJohnsonAdministrationofficialswhohadoriginatedthese

programsandwereeagertorejointhemainstreamoftheirparty.ThoughNixon

hadcutthedefensebudgetsubmittedbyJohnsonby$1.1billion,hewas

neverthelessabusedalmostimmediate lybyaninsistentchorusofDemocratic

critics.SomeRepublicans,believingtheantimilitarysentimenttobethedominant

publicmood,joinedthem.



<<Contents>>



****



AntiballisticMissiles(ABM)



heABMhadbecomecontroversialin1964whenitbecameapparentthatthe

SovietUnionwasdeployingamissiledefensesystemaroundMoscowinthe

apparenthopeofprotectingtheSovietcapitalagainstanattack.Underconstant 

Congressionalprodding,SecretaryofDefenseRobertMcNamara,with

considerablehesitationandreluctance,finallyputforwardthe“Sentinel”ABM

programin1967.McNamarawastornbetweenthedoctrine sofarmscontroland

domesticpressures,betweentheimperativesofdefenseandthecounselsof

restraint.Heoptedfora compromise.HerejectedtheconceptoffullABM

defenseoftheUnitedStatesagainstanall‐outSovietattack.Suchasystemwould

beprohibitivelyexpensive;buttherewasalsoatheorythatitmightbeperceived

bytheSovietsasasteptowardafirst‐strikecapability.(AcountrywithafullABM

defensemightimagineitcouldstrikefirstandthenuseitsABMstointerceptthe

weakenedretaliatoryblow.)TheJohnsonAdministrationwent evenfartherand

activelydiscouragedthenotionthatthe“Sentinel”ABMhadanyutilitytolimit

damagefromaSovietattackontheUnitedStates.Theprincipaljustificationput

forwardforthe“Sentinel”programin1967wasnottheSovietthreatbutthe

lesserdangerfromthesmallforceofICBMsthatChinamightdevelopinthemid‐

1970s.InhislastreporttotheCongressasSecretaryofDefense,inJanuary1968,

ClarkCliffordstressedthepointofviewthatinthestrategicbalancedefensewas

secondary:“Weremainconvinced…weshouldcontinuetogiveprimarypriorityin

theallocationofavailableresourcesto theprimaryobjectiveofourstrategic

forces,namely‘assureddestruction.’“

T



BythetimeofNixon’sInaugurationthedomesticmoodhadchanged

significantlyfromtheperiodofthemid‐1960swhenCongressvirtuallyforced

ABMappropriationsonMcNamara.OppositiontoABMwasgrowinginthe

Congressaswellasintheacademic andscientificcommunity.AllofNixon’s

instinctswereagainstunilaterallygivingupaweaponsprogram—especiallyone

approvedbyhispredecessor.Isharedhisview;Iconsideredithighlydangerousto

stopprogramsintheareaofourtraditionalsuperiority—advancedtechnology—

withoutanySovietreciprocity.



Butinordertopulltheteethofpubliccriticism,NixononFebruary6asked

hisDeputySecretaryofDefense,DavidPackard,tochairaninteragencyreviewof

theABMprogram.Hispurpose,ashetoldme,wastomakeusappearthoughtful.

Itprovedawrongcalculat ion.AsinthecaseofVietnam,meetingcriticshalfway

didnotallayopposition;itwhettedappetites.Itencouragedthebeliefthatthe

samepoliticalpressureswhichhadproducedthereviewcouldcausethe

AdministrationtoabandontheABMaltogether.TheNewYorkTimes,for

example,gavethePresidentnocreditfororderingthereviewbutascribedit

instead—notallthatincorrectly—toCongressionalpressure.TheTimesargued

thatthenextstepshouldbetoquestionawholerangeofmilitaryprojects:“The

CongressionalpressurethatspurredtheNixonAdministrationtohaltdeployment

oftheSentinelantiballisticmissilesystemsignalsahealthynewdispositionon

CapitolHilltochallengethemilitary‐industrialcomplex,againstwhichPresident

Eisenhowerwarnedeightyearsago.”And:“Nowthattheexerciseofthatright

haspromptedanAdministrationreassessmentoftheABMsystem,thereare

encouragingsignsthatmoresuchquestionswillbeaskedonCapitolHill.”



OnFebruary16theinfluentialChairmanoftheCongressionalJoint

CommitteeonAtomicEnergy,RepresentativeChetHolifield,saidthathewould

opposeanymissiledefenseagainstChinaoranyantimissilesitebuiltclosetohis

ownhomeinCalifornia.ThisofcourseleftnorationalewhateverfortheABM

program.OnFebruary19SenatorEdwardKennedytookupthechargethatthe

PentagonreviewoftheABMhadasitsprimarypurposetomollifycritics.On

February26,inaspe echattheUniversityofMinnesota,HubertHumphreysaid

thatweshouldhaltdeploymentoftheABMsystemand“beginasexpeditiouslyas

possiblenegotiationwiththeSovietUniononthereductionofoffensiveand

defensivestrategicsystems.”OnMarch6,SenatorAlbertGore’sdisarmament

subcommitteeopenedhearingsonthestrategicandforeignpolicyimplicationsof

anABMsystem.AlmostwithoutexceptionthewitnesseswerehostiletoABM

defense.

