Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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SovietproposalforanAsiancollectivesecurityscheme.Thiswasanindirect

reassurancetotheChinese,aswellasawarning thatwewouldresistthe

extensionofSovietinfluencetoSouthEastAsia.AshepointedouttotheThai

PrimeMinister:“Acondominiumisoutofthequestion.“



NixonspokemorefreelytoYahyaKhanofPakistanandNicolaeCeauşescu

ofRomania,becauseheknewthatbothofthemwerefriendlywiththeChinese.

OnAugust1,NixontoldPresidentYahyainLahorethatitwashispersonalview—

notcompletelysharedbytherestofhisgovernmentorbymanyAmericans—that

Asiacouldnot“moveforward”ifanationaslargeasChinaremainedisolated.

(Nixonseemedtothinkthatitenhancedhisstaturewithforeignleadersifhe

indicatedthatheactedcontrarytotheadviceofhissubordinates—indeed,thatif

theyknewwhathewasdoingtheywouldopposehim.Whattheseleaders,used

tomorehierarchicalarrangements,thoughtaboutsuchconfessionswillhaveto

awaittheirownmemoirs.)HestressedthattheUnitedStateswouldnotbea

partytoanyarrangementstoisolateChina.HeaskedYahyatoconveyhisfeeling

totheChineseatthehighestlevel.Yahyalaterthatdayarrangedabriefingforme

attheStateGuestHouseinLahorebyAirMarshalSherAliKhan,whohadrecently

visitedChina.TheMarshalbelievedthatChina’sdomesticupheavalwaswinding

down,andthatChinawouldsoonseektoenditsself‐imposeddiplomatic

isolation.HealsodescribedtheChineseleadersintermsquitecontrarytoour

thenwidespreadstereotypesofalmostirrationallyfanaticideologues.He

consideredthemdisciplined,pragmatic,andreliableoncetheygavetheirword.



Thenexttwodays,August2and3inBucharest,Nixonreturnedtohis

themewithPresidentCeauşescu.OnceagainheemphaticallyrejectedtheAsian

securitysystemonthegroundthatitwaswrongfortheSovietUniontoarrangea

cabalinAsiaagainstChina.Intwenty‐fiveyearsChinawouldhaveabillionpeople,

Nixonargued.Ifisolatedbyothers,itmightturnintoanexplosiveforce.Our

policywastohavegoodrelations withtheSovietUnionaswellaswithChina.He

hopedthatRomaniawouldagreetoactasachannelofcommunicationtothe

Chinese.Ceauşescuindicatedthathewaspreparedtoactasmessenger;he

promisedtoconveyourviewsandreportanyChineseresponse.



Contrarytoourexpectations,theRomanianchannelturnedouttobeone‐

way.WehadthoughtthattheChinesemightprefertodealwithusthrough

Communistintermediaries.Infact,theyprovedtoowaryforthat,perhapsfearful

ofSovietpenetrationofevenacountryasfiercelyindependentasRomania.



BackinWashington,IcalledinPakistan’sAmbassador,AghaHilaly,tokeep

thePakistanisinplayandtoestablishasecurechannel.Hilalywasanable

professional,fromanoldPakistanifamily,longactiveinpublicservice.Hisbrother

atthattimewasAmbassadortoChinaandlaterbecamepermanentheadof

Pakistan’sForeign Ministry;inthe1950s,Hilaly’ssister—anearlyadvocateof

women’srightsinaninhospitablesociety—hadbeenastudentofmineat

Harvard.Hilalywasmeticulousanddiscreet.IaskedhimtoreiteratetoPresident

YahyathatwethoughtNixon’smessageshouldbedeliveredtotheChineseonly

atthehighestlevel;inthemeantimePakistancouldpassonourbasicattitudeina

low‐keymannerwheneverana turaloccasionpresenteditself.ItoldHilalyof

Nixon’spreferencethattheHilalychannelwithmebethesingleconfidential

pointofcontactforanyfurtherdiscussionofthissubject.Hilalysuggestedthat

YahyawouldreserveNixon’sdetailedviewsforaconversationwithChouEn‐lai,

whowasexpectedtovisitPakistaninthenearfuture.



OnAugust8,SecretaryofStateRogersmadeamajorspeechinCanberra

declaringourdesiretoimproverelations withChina:



Werecognize,ofcoursethattheRepublicofChinaonTaiwanandCommunistChinaon

themainlandarefactsoflife.Weknow,too,thatmainlandChinawilleventuallyplayan

importantroleinAsianandPacificaffairs—butcertainlynotaslongasitsleaderscontinueto

havesuchanintrospectiveviewoftheworld…



Thisisonereasonwhywehavebeenseekingtoopenupchannelsofcommunication.

JustafewdaysagoweliberalizedourpoliciestowardpurchaseoftheirgoodsbyAmerican

travelersandtowardvalidatingpassportsfortraveltoChina.Ourpurposewastoremove

irritantsinourrelationsandtohelpremindpeopleonmainlandChinaofourhistoricfriendship

forthem…



ThusbytheendofAugustwehadcommunicatedwiththeChineseby

unilateralsteps,intermediaries,andpublicdeclarations.Allthishadoccurred

throughaseriesofadhocdecisions.Therehadbeennoformalconsiderationof

ChinapolicyattheCabinetlevel.TheNationalSecurityCouncil didnotmeeton

thistopicuntilAugust.BeforeitmetIgavethePresidentmyanalysisofthe

differentviewswithinthegovernmentofhowweshouldplayourrelationswith

ChinainlightofourrelationswiththeSovietUnion.Oneview(whichwemight

callthe“Slavophile”position)arguedthattheSovietsweresosuspiciousofUS‐

Chinesecollusionthatanyefforttoimproverelat ionswithChinawouldmake

Soviet‐Americancooperationimpossible.Thosewhoheldthis viewbelievedthat

weshouldgivetopprioritytoimprovingrelationswiththeSovietUnionand,for

thisreason,shouldavoideffortstoincreasecontactwithPeking.Anopposing

view(akindof“Real‐politik”approach)arguedthattheSovietsweremorelikely

tobeconciliatoryiftheyfearedthatwewouldotherwiseseekarapprochement

withPeking.Thisschoolofthought urgedthatweexpandourcontactswithChina

asameansofleverageagainsttheSovietUnion.Athird“Sinophile”groupargued

thatourrelationswiththeSovietUnionshouldnotbeamajorfactorinshaping

ourChinapolicy.Marginalactionsto increaseSovietnervousnessmightbeuseful

butfundamentalchangesintheUS‐Chinarelationshipshouldbeguidedbyother

considerations.



Notsurprisingly,IwasonthesideoftheRealpolitikers.



WhentheNSCmeetingdiscussedtheseissuesonAugust14,1969,little

wasdecided,butthePresidentstartledhisCabinetcolleaguesbyhis

revolutionarythesis(whichIstronglyshared)thattheSovietUnionwasthemore

aggressivepartyandthatitwasagainstourintereststoletChinabe“smashed”in

aSino‐Sovietwar.Itwasa majoreventinAmericanforeignpolicywhena

Presidentdeclaredthatwehadastrategicinterestinthesurvivalofamajor

Communistcountry,longanenemy,andwithwhichwehadnocontact.The

reasonaSino‐Sovietwarwasonhismindwasthatanewincreaseoftensions

alongthebordercausedusgraveconcern.Italsoreinforcedourconvictionthat

theneedforcontactwasbecomingurgent.



<<Contents>>



****



RumorsofWar

O



NAugust8,thesamedayasRogers’sCanberraspeech,theUSSRandthe

People’sRepublicendedthetalksthathadproceededsinceJunein

Khabarovskandsignedaprotocolontheimprovementofnavigationonboundary

rivers.Farfromeasingtensions,thisseemedtospurthem.Afewdayslater,new

andbloodyfightingbrokeoutalongthefrontierbetweenSinkiangand

Kazakhstan.PravdaonAugust14reportedoncivildefensepreparationsin

Kazakhstan;theNewChinaNewsAgencyonAugust15accusedtheUSSRof

preparingforwarandexhortedtheChinesepeopletodothesame.



Signalsoftensionmultiplied.OnAugust18amiddle‐levelState

DepartmentspecialistinSovietaffairs,WilliamStearman,washavinglunchwitha

SovietEmbassyofficialwhen,outoftheblue,theRussianaskedwhattheUS

reactionwouldbetoaSovietattackonChinesenuclearfacilities.Itookthis

sufficientlyseriouslytoconveneameetinginSanClementeonAugust25ofthe

WashingtonSpecialActionsGroup(WSAG),theNSCsubcommitteefor

contingencyplanningandcrisismanagement.Iaskedthemtoprepare

contingencyplansforAmericanpolicyincaseofaSino‐Sovietwar.Whenthe

WSAGpapersprovedinadequate,Ihadagroupfrommystaffattemptabetter

analysis.AswillbediscussedinChapterXVIII,anexcellentpaperwasdonein

early1970,cold‐bloodedlyanalyzingourpotentialforeitherpreventingawaror

influencingitsoutcome.ThePresident’sconvictionexpressedattheAugust14

NSCmeetingthatwecouldnotallowChinatobe“smashed”wasnolongera

hypotheticalissue.Ifthecataclysmoccurred,NixonandIwouldhavetoconfront

itwithlittlesupportintherestofthegovernment—andperhapsthecountry—for

whatwesawasthestrategicnecessityofsupportingChina.



TheSino‐Sovietpropaganda warintensifiedmarkedlyattheendofAugust.

OnAugust28,PravdawarnedChinaagainstfurtherarmedprovocationsand

appealedtotherestoftheworldtorecognizethedangerofChinabeforeitwas

toolate.Pravdaaddedominouslythat“nocontinentwouldbeleftoutifawar

flaresupunderthepresentconditions,withtheexistingpresent‐daytechnology, 

withtheavailabilityoflethalweaponsandtheup‐to‐datemeansoftheir

delivery.”Thesameday,theChineseCommunistPartyCentralCommitteeissued

apublicorderexhortingthepopulationagaintowarpreparations,including

acceleratedconstructionofundergroundsheltersinthecities.InlateAugustwe

detectedastanddownoftheSovietairforceintheFarEast.Suchamove,which

permitsallaircrafttobebroughtto ahighstateofreadinesssimultaneously,is

oftenasignofapossibleattack;ataminimumitisabrutalwarninginan

intensifiedwarofnerves.ThestanddowncontinuedthroughSeptember.



OnthethirtiethanniversaryofthebeginningofWorldWarIItwo

prominentSovietgeneralsrattledsabersatPeking.WritinginIzvestia,theSoviet

governmentnewspa per,onSeptember1,SovietChiefofStaffandFirstDeputy

DefenseMinisterMarshalMatveyZakharovpointedlyrecalledtheSoviet

onslaughtthatdestroyedtheseven‐million‐manJapanesearmyintwenty‐five

days.GeneralS.P.Ivanov,commandantoftheGeneralStaff’sHigherMilitary

Academy,soundedthesamethemeinanarticleinthenewspaperRedStaron

September2.



Wethereforeraisedourprofilesomewhattomakeclearthatwewerenot

indifferentto theseSovietthreats.OnAugust27,CIADirectorRichardHelmshad

spokenatabackgroundluncheonforagroupofdiplomaticcorrespondentsand

disclosedthattheSovietUnionseemedtobesoundingoutitsEuropean

CommunistbrethrenonthepossibilityofaSovietpreemptiveattackonChinese

nuclearinstallations.

OnSeptember5,UnderSecretaryElliotRichardsontolda

NewYorkconventionoftheAmericanPoliticalScienceAssociation:



InthecaseofCommunistChina,longrunimprovementinourrelationsisinourown

nationalinterest.Wedonotseektoexploitforourownadvantagethehostilitybetweenthe

SovietUnionandthePeople’sRepublic.IdeologicaldifferencesbetweenthetwoCommunist

giantsarenotouraffair.Wecouldnotfailtobedeeplyconcerned,however,withanescalation

ofthisquarrelintoamassivebreachofinternationalpeaceandsecurity.



ItwasanotherrevolutionarystepfortheUnitedStatestotakesuchpublic

noteofathreatagainstacountrywithwhichithadbeeninapostureofhostility

fortwentyyearsandwithwhichithadhadnokindofexchangesincetheadvent

ofthenewAdministration.



Therewasnoimmediateimpact.OnSeptember10amemberoftheSoviet

missionattheUnitedNationsremarkednonchalantlytoaUSdelegatethatthe

SovietsweremilitarilyoverwhelminglysuperiortotheChineseandthatifcurrent

Chinesehostilitycontinued,a militaryengagementmightbecomeunavoidable.

Onthesameday,theSovietnewsagencyTASSchargedtheChinesewith488

premeditatedviolationsoftheSovietborderandwithprovokingarmedclashes

involving2,500ChineseintheperiodfromJunetomid‐August1969.



Therewasabriefinterludewhileadramaticmeetingtookplaceon

September11betwe enthetwoPrimeMinisters,KosyginandChouEn‐lai.Both

KosyginandChouhadvisitedHanoiseparatelytopaytheirrespectsonthedeath

ofHoChiMinh.Thestrainbetweentheircountr ieswasreflectedinthefactthat

KosyginflewtoHanoiviaIndiainsteadofthemuchshorterroutethroughChina,

andthatheleftHanoibeforeChou’sarrival.TASSreportedthathehaddeparted

forMoscow.HegotasfarasDushanbeinSovietCentralAsiawhenhisplane 

suddenlyalteredcourseandheadedforPekingbywhatmustsurelybethe

longestroutefromHanoi.HisbriefencounterwithChouatPekingairportwasthe

firstsummit‐levelmeetingbetweenthetwocountriesinfourandahalfyears.



Itisacommonmyththathighofficialsareinformedim mediatelyabout

significantevents.Unfortunately,officialinformationmust almostinvariablyrun

theobstacleofbureaucraticreviewortheneedforacovermemorandumtoput

theeventintosomebody’sperspective.Ithappensnotinfrequently—muchtoo

frequentlyforthesecurityadviser’semotionalstability—thateventhePresident

learnsofasignificantoccurrencefromthenewspapers.Soitwaswiththe

Kosygin‐Choumeeting.TomyembarrassmentthePresidentreadaboutitinthe

WashingtonStarbeforeIcouldsendhimananalysis.Hecalledmeandaskedfor

myreaction.Itoldhimthatatfirstblushthejointannouncementofthemeeting

seemedrathercool.Theabsenceofthestandardadjective“fraternal”in

describingtheconversationimpliedaseriousrift.TheChinesemayhaveinvited

Kosygintostopby,Ispeculated,becausetheythoughtitintheChineseinterestto

“coolthisoff.”ThePresidentwonderedifthismeanta“détente”betweenthem.I

thoughtnot;itsee medtomeaneffortbybothsidestopositionthemselvesfor

thenextroundoftheirconflict.



Theoriginofthemeetingwascapableofvariedinterpretations.The

diversionofKosygin’sflightcouldsuggestthatthevisitwasalast‐minuteChinese

invitation.Ontheotherhand,theminimalrespectaccordedtoKosygin,whowas

notpermittedtoleav etheairport,andthefactthattheSovietsannouncedthe

meetingfirst,couldimplyaSovietmove.WhetheritwasaChineseapproach

towardaccommodationoralastSovietwarningtoPeking,itwasclearthatSino‐

Sovietrelationswereapproachingacrisispoint.



OnSeptember16,anominousarticleappearedintheLondonEvening 

News,bearingoutmyanalysis.VictorLouis,aSoviet“freelance journalist”whom

webelievedtobeaspokesmanfortheSovietgovernment,oftenfloatedtrial

balloons.Henowwrotethat“Marxisttheoreticians”werediscussingthe

possibilityofa Sino‐Sovietwarandsuggestingthat,ifittookplace,“theworld

wouldonlylearnaboutitafterwards.”LouismentionedthepossibilityofaSoviet

airstrikeagainsttheChinesenucleartestingsiteatLopNorinSinkiang.He

claimedthataclandestineanti‐MaoradiostationwasoperatinginChina,which

revealedtheexistenceofanti‐Maoforceswho,itwas“quitepossible,”might

producealeaderwhowouldaskothersocialistcountriesfor“fraterna lhelp.”

“Eventsinthepastyear,”Louisnoted,“haveconfirmedthattheSovietUnionis

adheringtothedoctrinethatsocialistcountrieshavetherighttointerfereineac h

other’saffairsintheirowninterestorthoseofotherswhoarethreatened.”



ASovietattackonChinacouldnotbeignoredbyus.Itwouldupsetthe

globalbalanceofpower;itwouldcreatearoundtheworldanimpressionof

approachingSovietdominance.ButadirectAmericanchallengewouldnotbe

supportedbyourpublicopinionandmightevenacceleratewhatwesoughtto

prevent.



OnSeptember29,IbroughtthePresidentuptodateontheSoviet

maneuveringoverthepreviousmonthandurgedthatwedostillmore to

respond:



Iamconcernedaboutourresponsetotheseprobes.TheSovietsmaybequiteuncertain

overtheirChinapolicy,andourreactionscouldfigureintheircalculations.Second,theSoviets

maybeusingustogenerateanimpressioninChinaandtheworldthatwearebeingconsulted

insecretandwouldlookwithequanimityontheirmilitaryactions…Ibelieveweshouldmake

clearthatwearenotplayingalongwiththesetactics…



BeforethePresidentcouldactonthisrecommendation,onOctober7the

NewChinaNewsAgencysuddenlyannouncedthatChinahadagreedtoreopen

thebordernegotiationswiththeUSSRattheDeputyForeignMinisterlevel.Ina

conciliatorystatementChinaaffirmeditsdesireforapeaceful settlement;it

deniedthatitwasdemandingthereturnofterritoriesseizedbytsaristRussiain

thenineteenthcentury.Thenextday,Chinapublishedafive‐pointproposal

callingforamutualtrooppullbackfromdisputedareas.OnOctober20,bor der

negotiationsresumedinPeking,conductedbyDeputyForeignMinistersVasilyV.

KuznetsovandCh’iaoKuan‐hua.



ItseemedtomethatinthewarofnervesChinahadbackeddown.Iwrote

thePresidentthatinmyviewtheshiftintheChinesepositionwasduetotwo

factors:agrowingconcernoveraSovietattackandthepossiblereassertionof

controloverforeignpolicybythemorepragmaticfactionrepresentedbyChou

En‐lai.ButI didnotbelievethatanyfundamentalchangehadoccurred;the

underlyingtensionscouldnotbereversedbyproceduralagreements.Withhis

approvalIproposedexploring somenewadministrativemovestowardChinawith

ElliotRichardson.Nixonagreed.



Atthispoint—notsurprisingly—thePakistanichannelsuddenlybeganto

showsignsoflife.OnOctober10,AirMarshalSherAliKhan,whohadbriefedme

inLahore,visitedme inmyofficeintheWhiteHouse.HereportedthatYahyahad

passedageneralmessagetotheChineseaboutourwillingnesstoimprove

relationsbutnowfeltheneededsomethingmorespecifictoconveywhenChou

En‐laicametoPakistan.ItoldSherAliofastepthatElliotRichardsonandIhad

workedoutafewdaysearlier.SincetheoutbreakoftheKoreanWarin1950,two

AmericandestroyershadbeenassignedtopatroltheStraitofTaiwanto

symbolizeourcommitmenttothedefenseoftheRepublicofChina.The

destroyerswerenot,infact,partofthedefenseoftheisland;theirrolewas

primarilysymbolic.RichardsonandIobtainedthePresident’sassenttowithdraw

apermanentpatrol;wewouldshowourcontinuingcommitmenttothedefense

ofTaiwanbyfifteentransitspermonthofotherAmericanwarships.President

YahyawasfreetocommunicatethisdecisionconfidentiallytotheCommunist

ChineseAmbassador.Heshouldensure,however,thatPekingdidnot

misunderstand;ourbasiccommitmenttoTaiwan’sdefenseremainedunchanged;

thiswassimplyagesturetoremoveanirritant.ItoldSherAlithatIwouldbein

touchwithAmbassadorHilalywhenthePresidenthaddecideduponsomething

moreprecisetosaytotheChinese.IreportedallthistoNixon,whowroteatthe

endofmyreport:“K—alsoopentradepossibilities.”SinceSherAlihadalready

leftWashington,andsinceIwantedtoavoidtheimpressionofovereagerness,I

decidedtoholdthisprospectforthenextround. 



OnOctober20,AmbassadorDobrynin,intheconversationwithNixonin

whichheconveyedtheSovietreadinesstoopenSALTtalks,alsoformallywarned

againstanyattempttoprofitfromSino‐Soviettensions.Nixontoldhimthatour

ChinapolicywasnotdirectedagainsttheSovietUnion.Atthesametime,the

UnitedStatesdidnotintendtobeapermanentenemyofthePeople’sRepublicof

ChinaanymorethanoftheSovietUnion.Weexpectedtoacceleratetrade,the

exchangeofpersons,andeventuallydiplomacy.AfterthisconversationIwrote

Nixonmyassessment:



TheSovietsagaingiveventtotheirunderlyingsuspicionthatwearetryingtoflirtwith

Chinainordertobringpressureonthem.Theywarnus“inadvance“thatanysuchideacan

leadtogravemiscalculationsandwouldinterferewiththeimprovementofUS‐Sovietrelations.

YouhavealreadyansweredthispointandIbelievethereisnoadvantageingivingtheSoviets

excessivereassurance.InanycaseweshouldnotbedivertedfromourChinapolicy.



Norwerewe.Tobecertainthatourmeaninghadbeenunde rstood,on

November26Iauthorizedanadditionalsignal,proposedbytheState

Department,bywhichthedecisiontoendthedestroyerpatrolwouldbeleaked

toChineseofficialsinHongKong.



ThusbegananintricateminuetbetweenusandtheChinesesodelicately

arrangedthatbothsidescouldalwaysmaintainthattheywerenotincontact,so 

stylizedthatneithersideneededtobear theonusofaninitiative,soellipticalthat

existingrelationshipsonbothsideswerenotjeopardized.BetweenNovembe r

1969andJune1970therewereatleastteninstancesinwhichUnitedStates

officialsabroadexchangedwordswithChineseofficialsatdiplomaticfunctions.

ThiswasinsharpcontrasttoearlierpracticeinwhichtheChinesewould

invariablybreakoffcontactassoonastheyrealizedtheywereencountering

Americans.OnatleastfouroccasionsChineseofficialsinitiatedthecontact.Then

contactsstartedtogobeyondsocialbant er.InDecember1969ourDeputyConsul

GeneralinHongKongheardthrougha reliableintermediarythe“private”viewof

aChineseCommunistofficialthatwhileallthedifferencesbetweentheUnited

StatesandthePeople’sRepublicwouldtakeyearstoresolve,someformof

relationshipcouldbeestablishedbefore1973.



Wetriedaninitiativeofourown.OnSeptember9,attheheightofthewar

scare,ourAmbassadortoPoland,WalterStoessel,calledonthePresidentfora

routinecourtesycall.IhadknownStoesselsince1959whenhewasassignedasa

postgraduatefellowtotheCenterforInternationalAffairsatHarvard.I 

consideredhimoneoftheverybestForeignServiceOfficers—expert,thoughtful,

disciplined.While wewerewaitingtoseeNixonIurgedStoesseltowalk uptothe

AmbassadorofthePeople’sRepublic atthenextsocialfunctiontheyboth

attendedandtellhimthatwewerepreparedforserioustalks.[

Asitturnedout,the

CulturalRevolutionhadclaimedthisAmbassador;thehighest‐rankingofficialinWarsawwas

thechargéd’affaires.]



Nothinghappenedforthreemonths.ThenonDecember3,Stoessel

spottedLeiYang,theChinesechargéd’affaires,ataYugoslavfashionshowheldat

theWarsawPalaceofCulture.WhenStoesselapproached,LeiYangretreated

downaflightofstairs.Stoesselpursuedhimanddeliveredhismessagethrough

Lei’sPolish‐speakinginterpreter.ToconveytotheChinesethatStoessel’s

approachhadnotbeenapersonalidiosyncrasy,wehadtheStateDepartment

spokesmanannounceatthenextregularnoonbriefingthatStoesselandLeihad

exchangedafewwords.ChouEn‐laitoldmemanyyearslater thatwehadnearly

causedhisworthychargeaheartattack,andthatLeiYang,totallywithout

instructionsforsuchacontingency,hadfledfromStoesselbecausehedidnot

knowhowtorespond.



ButChouEn‐laiknew.OnDecember6thePeople’sRepublicreleasedtwo

otherAmericanswhohadbeenheldsinceFebruary16whentheiryachthad

strayedintoChinesewatersoffKwangtungprovince.[

Thiswasaseparateincident

fromtheJulyepisodedescribedearlier.]



OnDecember11,1969,toouramazement,AmbassadorStoesselwas

invitedtotheChineseEmbassy—thefirstsuchinvitationinanySino‐American

contactsincetheCommunistshadtakenpowerinChina.Stoesselrespondedthat

hewouldbehappytoarrivediscreetlyatthereardoor;hewastoldthatsuch

delicacywasunnecessary;themainentrancewaseminentlysuitable(presumably

toavoidanychancethatSovietintelligencemightmisstheoccasion).Stoessel

indeedwentthroughthefrontdoorandmethisChinesecounterpartina

“cordial”atmosphere,asStateDepartme ntspokesmanRobertMcCloske y

announcedthenextday.StoesselproposedtheresumptionoftheWarsawtalks;

noothersubjectswerecovered.Itwasagreedthatanothermeetingwouldtake

placewithinthemonth.



ThiscontactbyStoesselwasthefirstoperationalinvolvementofthe

regularStateDepartmentmachineryinChinadiplomacy.UnderSecretaryElliot

Richardson,AssistantSecretaryMarshallGreen,theirstaffs,andhigh‐level

analystshadmadeavitalcontributiontothevariousstudiesdoneintheNSC

system;theyhadablyworkedoutthevariousschemestoeasetraderestrictions.

ButtheStateDepartmentasaninstitutionhadnotbeeninvolvedintheoverall