Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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VI

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FirstStepstowardChina

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henwecompleteddraftingthecommuniquéannouncingmysecret

visittoChinainJuly1971,ChouEn‐lairemarkedthatthe

announcementwouldshaketheworld.Hewasright.Notonlywasita

sensationforthemedia;overnightittransformedthestructureofinternational

politics.Aftertwentybitteryearsofiso lationanAmericanemissaryhadstepped

ontothemysterioussoilofPeking;andhisPresidentwouldshortlyfollow.Itwas

abruptandastonishing,butbehindtheclimaxwerethirtymonthsofpatientand

deliberatepreparationaseachsidefeltitsway,gingerly,alwaystestingthe

groundsothatarebuffwouldnotappearhumiliating,graduatingitsstepssothat

exposurewouldnotdemoralizenervousalliesorgiveanewstrategicopportunity

tothosewhodidnotwishthemwell.

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Wetookevenourselvesbysurprise.Originallywehadnotthought 

reconciliationpossible.WewereconvincedthattheChinesewerefanaticand

hostile.Buteventhoughwecouldnotinitiallyseeawaytoachieveit,bothNixon

andIbelievedintheimportanc eofanopeningtothePeople’sRepublic ofChina.

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Eventscametoourassista nce,butIdoubtwhethertherapprochement

couldhaveoccurredwiththesamedecisivenessinanyotherPresidency.Nixon

hadanextraordinaryinstinctforthejugular.Hewaslessinterestedintacticsor

themeticulousaccumulationofnuance;toomuchdiscussionofdetailsof

implementation,indeed,madehimnervous.Oncehehadseta policydirection,

healmostinvariablyleftittometoimplementthestrategyandmanagethe

bureaucracy.ButthoughIhadindependentlycometothesamejudgmentas

Nixon,andthoughIdesignedmanyofthemoves,Ididnothavethepolitical

strengthorbureaucraticclouttopursuesuchafundamentalshiftofpolicyonmy

own.Nixonviscerallyunderstoodtheessenceoftheopportunityandpushedfor

itconsistently.Hehadthepoliticalbaseontheright,whichprotectedhimfrom

thechargeofbeing“softonCommunism.”Andhisadministrativestylelentitself

tothesecretive,solitarytacticsthepolicyrequired.IftheNSCsystemof

elaboratingoptionsinterestedhimforanything,itwasfortheintelligenceit

suppliedhimabouttheviewsofabureaucracyhedistrustedandforthe

opportunityitprovidedtocamouflagehisownaims. 

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Therewasamarginaldifferenceinourperspectives.Nixonsawinthe

openingtoChinaasomewhatgreateropportunitythanItosqueezetheSoviet

Unionintoshort‐termhelponVietnam;Iwasmoreconcernedwiththepolicy’s

impactonthestructureofinternationalrelations.Nixontendedtobelievethat

endingtheisolationof800millionChineseitselfremovedagreatthreattopeace.

TomeaChinaactiveinforeignpolicywouldcallforveryskillfuldiplomacyto

calibrateourpoliciesinthemorecomplicatedcontextthatwouldevolveandthat

wouldalterallinternationalrelationships.Butthesedifferencesrestedonthe

samefundamentaljudgment:thatifrelationscouldbedevelopedwithboththe

SovietUnionandChinathetriangularrelationshipwouldgiveusagreatstrategic

opportunityforpeace.Wehadbothcometothesameperceptionindependently.

InanimportantarticleinForeignAffairsinOctober1967Nixonhadwritten:

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Takingthelongview,wesimplycannotaffordtoleaveChinaforeveroutsidethefamily

ofnations,theretonurtureitsfantasies,cherishitshatesandthreatenitsneighbors.Thereis

noplaceonthissmallplanetforabillionofitspotentiallymostablepeopletoliveinangry

isolation.Butwecouldgodisastrouslywrongif,inpursuingthislong‐rangegoal,wefailedin

theshortrangetoreadthelessonsofhistory....

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Fortheshortrun,then,thismeansapolicyoffirmrestraint,ofnoreward,ofacreative

counterpressuredesignedtopersuadePekingthatitsinterestscanbeservedonlybyaccepting

thebasicrulesofinternationalcivility.Forthelongrun,itmeanspullingChinabackintothe

worldcommunity—butasagreatandprogressingnation,notastheepicenterofworld

revolution.

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InamagazineinterviewonAugust9,1968,immediatelyafterhis

nominationforPresident,Nixonreiteratedthat“WemustnotforgetChina.We

mustalwaysseekopportunitiestotalkwithher,aswiththeUSSR…Wemustnot

onlywatchforchanges.Wemustseektomakechanges.”

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Chinahadnotfiguredextensivelyinmyownwritings.In1961,Ihadwritten

aboutthepossibilityofaSino‐Sovietrift.Suchaprospect,Iargued,“mustnotbe

overlooked”andifitoccurred“weshouldtakeadvantageofit.”Butwecouldnot

promotethisriftbyourowneffortsandwecouldnotbuildourpolicyonthe

expectationofit.

(Infact,weknownowthattherifthadalreadyoccurred.)Inmy

articleontheVietnamnegotiationspublishedintheJanuary1969issueofForeign

Affairsbutwrittenthreemonthsearlier,Ihadarguedthat“theSovietdoctrine

accordingtowhichMoscow hasarighttointervenetoprotectsocialistdomestic

structuresmadeaSino‐Sovietwaratleastconceivable.ForMoscow’saccusations

againstPekinghavebeen,ifanything,evensharperthanthoseagainstPrague.”I

sawthisasapotentiallyseriousproblemforHanoiandasafactortopressHanoi

towardasettlement.Morefundamental, inJuly1968,beforetheSovietinvasion

ofCzechoslovakia,IhadworkedwithNelsonRockefelleronaspeechhegaveon

US‐Sovietrelationsthatcontainedapassageforeshadowinglaterpolicy:“Wewill

havetolearntodealimaginativelywithseveralcompetingcentersofCommunist

power…IwouldbeginadialoguewithCommunistChina.Inasubtletriangleof

relationsbetweenWashington,Peking,andMoscow,weimprovethepossibilities

ofaccommodationswitheachasweincreaseouroptionstowardboth.”

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Myperceptionowedsomethingtomygeneralapproachtotheconductof

foreignpolicy.Ourrelationstopossibleoppo nentsshouldbesuch,Iconsidered,

thatouroptionstowardbothofthemwerealwaysgreaterthantheiroptions

towardeachother.Ifwecouldfreeourdiplomacyfromthedeadweightoftwo

decades,eachCommunistsuperpowerwouldhavegreaterinducementtodeal

withusconstructively.

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ThoughmanyscholarsurgedarapprochementwithChina,suchan

approachtothequestionwasnotwidelyshared.Anumberofsinologists urged

animprovementofrelationsasanendinitself,forwhichAmericansshouldmake

concessions.AgroupofdistinguishedprofessorsfromHarvardandthe

MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology,forinstance,sentamemorandumon

ChinapolicytoNixonduringthetransitionperiod.Theyurgedthatwemove

towardChinabysuchinitiative sasrelinquishingourtiestoTaiwanandinviting

thePeople’sRepublicintotheUnitedNations.Theirmemorandumdidnot

mention—nordoIrecallanyotherChinaexpertswhodidsoatthetime—the

geopoliticalopportunitiesforuswithrespecttotheSovietUnionorthepossibility

thattheChinesemighthaveanincentivetomovetowarduswithoutAmerican

concessionsbecauseoftheirneedforanAmericancounterweighttotheSoviet

Union.

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Butallideasaboutrapprochement,whatevertheirrationale,ithastobe

said,werelittlemorethannebuloustheorieswhenthenewAdministrationcame

intooffice.Fortwentyyears,therehadbeenvirtualisolationandideological

hostility,punctuatedbythewarinKoreainwhichAmericanandChinesesoldiers

foughtferociouslyagainsteachother.Bilateraltalkshadbeenbegunbetween

consularofficialsoftheUnitedStatesandthePeople’sRepublicofChinain1954

inGeneva;thesewereraisedtotheambassadoriallevelin1955andlatermoved

toWarsaw.OnSeptember10,1955,anagreementwasreachedonrepatriationof

somenationals.And thatwasall.Inthe134meetingsheldfrom1954through

1968therepatriationaccordremainedtheonlyconcreteachievement.

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OnMay28,1968,PekingpostponedtheWarsawtalks,suggestingtwo

datesinNovember,aftertheAmericanPresidentialelection.PekingRadio

assertedthat“thereisnothingtodiscuss atpresent.”Thefirstfaintglimmerof

changefollowedtheeventsofAugust21,1968,theSovietinvasionof

Czechoslovakia.Whereasintheupheavalsof1956inPolandandHungarythe

Chinesehadattemptedtoactasconciliators,thistimetheirresponsewasabusive

condemnationoftheSovietUnion.TheChineseCommunistPartynewspaper

People’sDailyonMarch17,1969,forexa mple,calledtheCzechinvasion“armed

aggressionandmilitaryoccupation”bythe“Sovietrevisionistrenegadeclique.”It

denouncedtheBrezhnevDoctrineoflimitedsovereigntyasan“out‐and‐out

fascisttheory.”Forinitsliteralmeaning,theBrezhnevDoctrineappliedasmuch

toChinaastoanyEastEuropeancountry;indeed,givenChina’sunconcealed

hostilitytotheSovietleadership,perhapsevenmoreso.



Thus,onNovember26,1968,threemonthsaftertheCzechinvasionand

justaftertheUSelection,PekingproposedanotherWarsawmeetingwiththe

UnitedStatestotakeplaceonFebruary20,1969.TruetotheancientChinese

traditionofneverrevealinganyneedforthecooperationofforeigners,Peking

adoptedachallengingtone,callingontheUnitedStatestojoin“anagreementon

theFivePrinciplesofPeacefulCoexistence”and“towithdrawallitsarmedforces

fromChina’sTaiwanProvinceandtheTaiwanStraitsanddismantleallitsmilitary

installationsinTaiwanProvince.”



TherewasnoquestionthattheSovietUnionwasemergingastheprincipal

Chineseforeignpolicyconcern.Sino‐Soviethostilityhadmanyroots.Whatstarted

asaclosealliancesoonshowedincreasingstrains,whichwereatfirstpapered

over.TherewasanideologicaldisagreementoverChina’sclaimstohaveachieved

Communismwithoutpassingthroughthestageofsocialism—adoctrineofMao

Tse‐tung’sthatimpliedthatPekingwasideologicallymorepurethanMoscow.

Therewasalsoanationalrivalrybetweentwopowerfulstates,andagrowing

mistrust.Inthelate1950sKhrushchevrefusednuclearcooperation;theChinese

retaliatedbysteppingupideologicalattacks. In1959theSovietUnionpulledout

itstechnicaladvisersandendedalleconomicaid.Personalantipathydeveloped

betweenthetwogroupsofCommunistleaders,violatingallMarxist‐Leninist

injunctionsagainst“subjectivism.”TheChineseresurrectedancientgrievances,

demandingthereturnofvaststretchesofSiberianterritoryallegedlyseizedby

thetsarsincenturiesofRussianexpansion.



By1969,thepoliticalconflictwasbeginning totakeanominousmilitary

form.Untilabout1965‐66,aroughmilitarybalancehadexistedalongtheSino‐

Sovietborder.Forcelevelsonbothsideswerelow.OppositeSinkiang,Soviet

forcesweremorenumerous;theChinesehadnumericalsuperioritynear

Manchuria.Sovietforceswere,ofcourse,consistentlysupe rior inqualityandin

logisticalsupport.Borderincidentsbeganaround1959,andincreasedin

frequencythereafter.Nevertheless,forseveralyearstherewasnolarge‐scale

buildupbyeitherside.Theninearly1966theSovietsbegantransferringhig hly

trainedandwell‐equippedcombatunitsfromEasternEuropeto theFarEast.

Nuclear‐tippedsurface‐to‐surfacerocketsmadetheirappearance.Moreworrying

forPeking,inJanuary1966theSovietUnionsignedatwenty‐year“Treatyof

Friendship,Cooperation,andMutualAid”withMongoliathatallowedittostation

troopsandtomaintainbasesthere.ThenumberofSovietdivisionsalongthe

Chineseborderincreasedfromabouttwelveunderstrengthdivisionsin1964to 

overfortymodernizeddivisionsby1970.



OnNovember29,1968,theJohnsonAdministration,withPresident‐elect

Nixon’sblessing,acceptedtheChineseoffertoresumetheWarsawtalks.(Ihad

notyetbeenappointedasNixon’sAssistant.)



<<Contents>>



****



FirstSignals



nretrospectallsuccessfulpoliciesseempreordained.Leadersliketo claim

prescienceforwhathasworked,ascribingtoplanning whatusuallystartsasa

seriesofimprovisations.ItwasnodifferentwiththenewChinapolicy.Thenew

Administrationhadthegeneralintentionofmakingafreshstart.Butinallcandor 

ithadnopreciseideahowtodothisandithadtotakeaccountofdomestic

realities,nottheleas tofwhichwasNixon’straditionalsupportamongthe

conservative“Chinalobby”thathadneverforgivenTrumanandAchesonfor

allegedlybetrayingChiangKai‐shek.



TheleadersinPekingprobablyhadthesameproblem.ItislikelythatMao

Tse‐tungdecidedtomovetowardtheUnitedStatesshortlyaftertheCzech

invasion.ButhegovernedacountryjustemergingfromtheCulturalRevolution.

Maohadsoughtbythisextraordinaryconvulsiontoheadoffthefataltendencyof

Communiststatestowardbureaucratizationandstagnationbyimposingfromthe

topapermanentrevolutionaryupheaval—surelyoneofthefewtimesinhistory

theheadofacountrydeliberatelyoverthrewhisowninstitutionsasan

educationaldevice.Theimpactoftheupheavalonforeignpolicyisrevealedby

thefactthatin1969Chinahadonlyoneambassadorservingabroad(hewas

HuangHua,stationedinCairo,laterAmbassadortotheUnitedNationsandstill

laterForeignMinister).



OneofthefirstandmostimportantstepstakenbytheNixon

Administrationwassomethingwedidnotdo.TheJohnsonAdministrationhad

usedthespecterofAsianCommunismledbyPekingasaprincipaljustificationfor

theVietnamwar.PresidentJohnsoninhisspeechatJohnsHopkinsUniversityon

April7.1965,hadarguedthat“therulersinHanoiareurgedonbyPeiping”;

[

PeipingwastheNationalistChinesenameforPeking;thisusagewasanadditionalinsult.]the

contestinVietnamwas“partofawiderpatternofaggressivepurposes.”Inthe

sameveinSecretaryofStateDeanRuskbeforetheSenateForeignRelations

CommitteeonFebruary18,1966,sawPekingastheinstigatorofaggressionand

PekingandHanoiasincollusion.Bycontrast,theNixonAdministration,fromthe

beginning,nevercited,orevenhintedat,ananti‐ChinesemotiveforourVietnam

involvement;wedidnotagreewiththeanalysis;weneedednoadditional

enemies.



Thefirstfewmonthswerefullofcontradictorytendencies.InhisInaugural

addressNixonmadeaveiledreferencetothenewAdministration’swillingnessto

talktoChina:“Letallnationsknowthatduringthis administrationourlinesof

communicationwillbeopen.Weseekanopenworld—opentoideas,opentothe

exchangeofgoodsandpeople—aworldinwhichnopeople,greatorsmall,will

liveinangryisolation.”Thephrase“angryisolation”harkedbacktohisForeign

Affairsarticleof1967.Buttherewasnoresponse.TheChinesewerenottobe

impressedbyasingleconciliatoryallusion.



ThedayafterInaugurationtheNewChinaNewsAgencydenouncedNixon

asthenew“puppet ”chosenbythe“monopolybourgeoisclique”toimplement

“theviciousambitionsofUSimperialismto continuetocarryoutaggressionand

expansionintheworld.”Nixon’slow‐keyrhetoricandthedemonstrationsagainst

himattheInauguralinWashingtonrevealed,accordingtoNCNA,thatUS

imperialismwas“besetwithcrises”andfacinga“deathbedstruggle.”The

People’sDailyofJanuary27gloatedthatUSimperialismwas“onitslastlegs.”The

articlemocked:“Althoughattheendofhisrope,Nixonhadthecheektospeak

aboutthefuture…Amanwithonefootinthegravetriestoconsolehimselfby

dreamingofparadise.Thisisthedelusionandwrithingofadyingclass.” 



Nixon’sInauguraladdressmayhavebeenmorestatesmanlikebutthe

Chinesehadmorepungentwriters.



Nixonwasindeedsomewhatschizophrenicintheearlydays.Fivedaysafter

theInauguration,NixonsentmeandRogersamessagecomplainingthatour

AmbassadorinaEuropeancountryhadfailedtopreventthatcountryfrom

announcingitsrecognitionofPeking.TheAmbassador,hesaid,wasa“disaster”;

weweretoldto“getridofhim”immediately.Athisfirstnewsconference,on

January27,Nixonwasaskedwhetherhewasplanningtoimproverelationswith

CommunistChina.HegavealongaccountofChinesehostility,concludingthatat

theforthcomingWarsawmeetingChinawouldhaveanopportunitytoprove

whetherithadaltereditsattitude.“Untilsomechangesoccurontheirside,

however,Iseenoimmediateprospectofanychangeinourpolicy.”



Theconverse,ofcourse,wasthatifChinachangeditsattitudeinsome

unspecifiedmanner,wewouldbereceptive.Formallythisdidnotdiffer

substantiallyfromthepronouncementsofpreviousadministrations.Anditwasin

sharpcontrastalsowithmoreconciliator yreferencestotheSovietUnion,SALT,

andtheNon‐ProliferationTreatyinthesamenewsconference.Tothesuspicious

Chineseallthismusthavelookedlikethefearedcondominium.Andtheywere

alreadyfrettingoveranotherincident.Threedaysbeforethisnewsconference

theChinesechargéd’affairesintheNetherlandshaddefectedandsoughtasylum

intheUnitedStates.OnFebruary6theChineseprotested.OnFebruary18they

canceledtheWarsawmeetingscheduledforFebruary20,onthegroundthatthe

UnitedStateshad“incited”thecharge“tobetrayhiscountryandhewascarried

offbytheCIA.”Nottobeoutdone,Nixon,inhispressconferenceofMarch4,

pouredmorecoldwaterontheprospectsofaSino‐Americanrapprochement:

“Lookingfurtherdowntheroad,wecouldthinkintermsofabetter

understandingwithRedChina. Butbeingveryrealistic,inviewofRedChina’s

breakingofftheratherlimitedWarsawtalksthatwereplanned,Idonotthink

thatweshouldholdoutanygreatoptimismforanybreakthroughsinthat

directionatthistime.”



YetonFebruary1,inresponsetoareportindicatingsomeEastEuropean

concernaboutpossibleChinese‐Americancontacts,Nixonhadwrittenmea

memorandum:



InotedinyourJanuary31reporttheinterestingcommentsfrom[theEastEuropean]

source.IthinkweshouldgiveeveryencouragementtotheattitudethatthisAdministrationis

“exploringpossibilitiesofraprochement[sic]withtheChinese.”This,ofcourse,shouldbedone

privatelyandshouldundernocircumstancesgetintothepublicprintsfromthisdirection.

However,incontactswithyourfriends,andparticularlyinanywaysyoumighthavetogetto

this…source,Iwouldcontinuetoplantthatidea.



Tobesure,thememorandumdidnotaskmetodoanythingtowardthe

Chinese;itsimplyurgedmetocreatetheimpressionthatwewereexploring a

movetowardChina.Iwastoplanttheidea,moreover,notwithfriendsofthe

ChinesebutwithEastEuropeans.Themaneuverwasintendedtodisquietthe

Soviets,andalmostcertainly—givenNixon’spreoccupations—toprovidean

incentiveforthemtohelpusendthewarinVietnam.



IusedtheNixonmemorandumtoinitiateapolicyreview,andonFe bruary

5IcalledforaninteragencystudyofChinapolicy.Thedepartmentsandagencies

wereaskedtoexamine:



1. ThecurrentstatusofU.S.relationswithCommunistChinaandtheRepublicofChina;



2. ThenatureoftheChineseCommunistthreatandintentionsinAsia;



3. TheinteractionbetweenU.S.policyandthepoliciesofothermajorinterested

countriestowardChina;

