Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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April10hadthePresidentannouncing:“IhaveinstructedourAmbassa dorin

MoscowtodaytoadvisetheSovietgovernmentthatweshallbepleasedtostart

thesetalksinGenevaonApril…”leavingittothePre sidenttofillinadatefor

somethinghehadexplicitlyrejectedfiveweeksearlier.Thestratagemwas

apparent:State,thinkingthePresidenthadbeenundulyinfluencedbyme,sought

tobypassmeviaaspeechwriter.



DayafterdaythatspringthebureaucracychippedawayatthePresident’s

declaredpolicy,feedingexpectationsofarmstalks.IntheNewYorkTimesofApril

18,“officials”werereportedcontendingthatarmsagreementswiththeSoviet

Union“areanoverridinggoaloftheNixonfore ignpolicy.”OnApril22theTimes

cited“Americandiplomats”speculatingaboutSALTtalksinJune.OnMay4,

LlewellynThompsontoldDobryninthatRogershopedtodiscussadateandplace

withDobryninbeforeRogersleftMay12onhistriptoAsia.OnMay8,Rogerstold

Dobryninthatheexpectedtobeabletodiscussadate,place,andmodalities

immediatelyafterhisreturnfromAsia,citingthetargetof“earlysummer.”The

sameday,ourAmbassadorinMoscow,JacobBeam,sawSovietDeputyForeign

MinisterVasilyV.Kuznetsovand,oninstructionsfromRogers,repeatedthetarget

datesofJuneorJuly:KuznetsovsaidtheSovietswereready.OnMay13Chalmers

RobertsintheWashingtonPost,citingAdministrationsources,saidRogerswould

meetDobryninonMay29andsetadate;theSovietshadreportedlyreiterated

theirreadiness.OnMay14,UPIreportedfromGenevathattheUnitedStateswas

readytostartSALTinearlyJuly.OnMay14,theBritishgovernmentapproached

theStateDepartmentforguidanceonhowtocommentpubliclyonSALT,which

theywereledtobelievewasimminent.OtherNATOallies,underthesame

impression,followedsuit.OnMay16inWashington,GerardSmithgaveWest

GermanAmbassadorRolfPaulsabriefingonSALT,speculatingthatnegotiations

wouldprobablyhavetoaddressbothMIRVandABMandcouldbegin“duringthe

summer.”



Thesepreemptivestatementsandcumulativepressureswerenottheresult

ofanarticulatedconceptualdifferencebetweentheSecretaryofStateandthe

President.Theywereaseriesoftacticalday‐to‐daydeviationsfromWhiteHouse

policy.Theywereintendedtocrystallizeadecision.Whattheydidwastoexpend,

wholesale,assetswewantedtohoardinaccordancewithacarefulstrategy.The

SovietswereeagerforSALT;weintendedtodrawouttheSovietsonotherissues

likeVietnam.Forabriefper iodinthespringofthatfirstyear,thevisible

discrepancybetweentheWhiteHouseandStateDepartmentgavetheSoviet

Unionanopportunitytomaneuverwithinourgovernment,toeggontheState

Department,media,andCongressasadeliberateformofpressureontheWhite

House.



Thecumulativeimpactofallthebureaucratic indiscipline,withmediaand

Congressionalpressuresadded,wasthatwehadtoabandonourattempttouse

theopeningofSALTtalksasaleverforothernegotiations.OnJune11we

authorizedRogerstoinformtheSovietsthatwewerereadytostartSA LT—onlyto

bemetbyfourmonthsofSovietstonewalling.



Butthebureaucracy’svictorywasPyrrhic.Afteryieldingontheopening

date,Nixon,buttressedbyme,movedtheconductofnegotiationsmoreand

moreintotheWhiteHouse. Whilehispreferenceforsecrecywouldhaveinclined

himinthisdirectionanyway,thebureaucracy’sindisciplineacceleratedit.The

SovietleaderssoonlearnedthatwhilethePresidentmightbereluctantto

confronthisSecretaryofStateandwhilehemightnowandthenwithdraw

tactically,Nixonhadnointentiontodefertoothersonthefundamental

determinationofourforeignpolicy.OncetheSovietsunderstoodthatthe

decisionsactuallycarriedoutwerethosemadebythePresident,directcontact

developedbetweenAmbassadorDobryninandtheWhiteHouse.Theresprang

intoexistencewhatcametobeknowninUS‐Sovietparlanceas“theChannel.”

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<<Contents>>

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

TheChannel



YencounterwiththeextraordinarySovietAmbassadorinhisapartmenton

February14wasthefirstofaseriesofintimateexchangesthatcontinued

overeightyears.Increasingly,themostsensitivebusinessinUS‐Sovietrelations

cametobehandledbetweenDobryninandme.Wemetalmostinvariablyinthe

MapRoomoftheWhiteHouse,apleasantroomofftheDiplomaticEntrance

whoseviewisobscuredbytherhododendronbushesplantedinthegarden.

FranklinRoosevelthaduseditashisplanningroomduringWorldWarII—hence

itsname.



DobryninandIbegantoconductpreliminarynegotiationsonalmostall

majorissues,heonbehalfofthePolitburo,IasconfidanttoNixon.Wewould,

informally,clarifythebasicpurposesofourgovernmentsandwhenourtalksgave

hopeofspecificagreements,thesubjectwasmovedtoconventionaldiplomatic 

channels.Ifformalnegotiationstherereachedadeadlock,theChannelwould

openupagain.Wedevelopedsomeprocedurestoavoidthesortofdeadlockthat

canonlyberesolvedasatestofstrength.WiththePresident’spermissionI would

sometimessketchourviewasmyownidea,statingIwas“thinkingoutloud.”

DobryninwouldthengivemetheKremlin’sreactio nonthesamenoncommittal

basis.Sometimestheprocedurewasreversed.Neithersidewasprecludedfrom

raisingtheissueformallybecauseofadversereactionfromtheother.Butatleast

inadvertentconfrontationswereprevented.Itwasawaytoexploretheterrain,

toavoidmajordeadlocks.



Dobryninwasadmirablysuitedtothisdelicaterole.Ambassadors

nowadayshavelittlefreedomasnegotiators.Thetelephoneandtelexfromhome

cangivethemadetailedbrief;theycanalsochangeitwithinthehour.Butifjet‐

ageambassadorshavebecomediplomaticpostmentheyarecrucialaspolitical

interpreters—andbeforethereisanemergency.Officialsathomespendsomuch

timemanagingcumbersomebureaucraciesthattheyhavelittlefeelforthe

complexitiesofothercapitalsandleaders—starklyless,certainly,thaninthedays

whentheworld’ssignificantdiplomatsallcamefromsimilarbackgroundsand

communicatedwithinthesameculturalframework.Thereisnosubstituteforthe

insightofamanonthespotwhomixesenoughtotakethepulseofpoliticallife

withoutbecomingsoabsorbedastoloseperspective.Hisroleiscrucialincrises

whenjudgmentsaffectingmattersoflifeanddeathdepe ndonasubtleandrapid

understandingofintangibles.



ThisisaparticularchallengetoSovietambassadors.Theyaretheproduct

ofabureaucracythatrewardsdisciplineanddiscouragesinitiative;ofasociety

historicallydistrustfulofforeigners;ofapeoplehidingitslatentinsecurityby

heavy‐handedself‐assertiveness.WithsomeSovietdiplomatsonehastheuneasy

feelingthattheyreportinawaytosuitthepreconceptionsoftheirfara waybut

ever‐watchfulsuperiors,forinthismannertheycanmosteasilyavoidthecharge

offlawedjudgment.MostSovietdiplomatscertainlyclingrigidlytoformal

positions,fortheycanneverbeaccusedinMoscowofunnecessarycompromiseif

theyshownoinitiative.Theyrepeatstandardargumentsbecausetheycannot

hazardachallengetoideologicalorthodoxy.Onlyrarelydotheyexplainthe

reasonsfortheirpositionsinanybutthemostformalterms,fortheydonotwant

toriskbeingblamedathomeforinadequateadvocacyorsuggestwithout

authorizationthatSovietpurposesaresubjecttonegotiation.



Dobryninavoidedtheseprofessionaldeformations.Hewasaclassic

productoftheCommunistsociety.Bornintoafamilyoftwelvechildren,andthe

firstmemberofhisfamilytogotoauniversity,hehadbenefitedfromthesystem

thatherepresentedsoably.Hewastrainedasanelectricalengineerand

secondedtotheForeignOfficeduringthewar.Whetherheowedhisflexibility to

histraininginasubjectrelativelyfreeofdeadeningideology,ortoanatural

disposition,hewasoneofthefewSovietdiplomatsofmyacquaintancewho

couldunderstandthepsycholo gyofothers.HewassuavenotjustbySoviet

standards—whichleaveampleroomforclumsiness—butbyanycriteria.Heknew 

howtotalktoAmericansinawaybrilliantlyattunedtotheirpreconceptions.He

toowasespeciallyskilledatevokingtheinexhaustibleAmericansenseofguilt,by

persistentlybutpleasantlyhammeringhometheimpressionthateverydeadlock

wasourfault.



IneverforgotthatDobryninwasamemberoftheCentralCommitteeof

theSovietCommunistParty;Ineverindulgedintheconceitthathiseasymanner

reflectedanypredispositiontowardmeortowardtheWest.Ihadnodoubtthatif

theinterestsofhiscountryrequiredithecouldbeasruthlessorduplicitousas

anyotherCommunistleader.Itookitforgrantedthathiseffectivenessdepended

ontheskillwithwhichhereflectedhisgovernment’spolicies,nothispersonal

preferences.ButIconsideredhisunquestioningsupportoftheSovietlinean

asset,notaliability;itenabledustomeasurethepoliciesofhismasterswith

precisionandbuttressedhisowninfluenceathome.Itwouldhavebeenenough

forourpurposesthatheshouldhaveanextraordinaryunderstandingofthe

Americanscene.OccasionallyhewouldgivemehispersonalanalysisofAmerican

politics;withoutexceptionitwasacuteandevenwise.Thisgaveussome

confidencethattheKremlinwouldhaveatitsdisposala sophisticatedassessment

ofconditionshere.AnaccurateunderstandingcouldnotguaranteethatMoscow

wouldchooseourpreferredresponse,butitreducedtheprospectsofgross

miscalculation.



Dobryninwasfreeofthetendencytowardpettychiselingbywhichtherun‐

of‐the‐millSovietdiplomatdemonstrateshisvigilancetohissuperiors;he

understoodthatareputationforreliabilityisanimportantassetinforeignpolicy.

Subtleanddisciplined,warminhisdemeanorwhilewaryinhisconduct,Dobrynin

movedthroughtheupperechelonsofWashingtonwithconsummateskill.His

personalrolewithinthemarginavailabletoambassadorswasalmostcertainly

beneficialtoUS‐Sovietrelations.Ifsomedaythereshouldcomeaboutthe

genuinerelaxationoftensionsanddangerswhichourperioddemands,Anatoly

Dobryninwillhavemadeacentralcontributiontoit.



InFebruary1969wewereattheverybeginning.Eachsidewasstilldyingto

getasenseoftheother.Dobrynin’srequestforanappointmentwiththe

PresidentconfrontedNixonwithaproceduralandasubstantiveproblem.

Procedurally,Nixonwishedtoestablishhisdominance overnegotiationswiththe

SovietUnion;inhismind,thisrequiredtheexclusionofRogers,whomightbetoo

anxiousandwhomightclaimcreditforwhateverprogressmightbemade. 

Substantively,hewantedtobeginthelinkageapproachathisownpace.Nixon

soughttosolvetheRogersprobleminhiscustomaryfashionbylettingHaldeman

beartheonus(andnodoubtHaldemanlaiditoffonme).Haldemantoldthe

SecretaryofStatethatthebestguaranteefornotraisingexpectationswasfor

Rogerstobeabsentfromthemeeting.AttendancebyRogerswouldconveya

senseofurgencycontrarytoourstrategy;itmightleadtoanunduesenseof

optimism.Rogers,notusedtosuchsolicitudefromhisoldfriend,provedresistant

tothisthoughtfulness;agoodpartoftheweekendwasspentfightingoffRogers’s

pleas—basicallynotunjustified—thattheSecretaryofStateparticipateinthefirst

meetingbetweenthenewPresidentandtheSovietAmbassador.



ButthiswasthesortofissueonwhichNixonneveryieldedaslongashe

couldfindsomeoneelsetodothedirtywork.Rogersdidnotattendthemeeting.

Asasoptoinstitutionalprestige,MalcolmToon,thendirectorofSovietaffairsat

theStateDepartment(andlaterafirst‐classAmbassadortoMoscow),was

invited.Eventhatwasdeprivedofsignificance,however,becauseNixon

dismissedToonandmeattheendofthesessionandthentoldDobryninprivately

thatmattersofspecialsensitivityshouldbetakenupwithmefirst.



TheChannelwasthusformallyestablished.



BeforehismeetingwithDobrynin,Nixonaskedmetowriteamemo randum

outliningwhatDobryninwaslikelytoraise,hisobjectivesandthegeneralattitude

Iwouldrecommend.MyresponsepredictedthatDobrynin’slinewouldprobably

betoassureusofSovietreadinesstobeginnegotiations,especiallyonSALT;to

expressconcernthatwewerenotsufficientlyresponsivetotheconciliatory

stanceoftheSovietUnionsinceJanuary20;toleaveanimplicationthatwe

shouldnotpassupthefavorableopportunity;andtoestablishadirectchannel

betweenthePresidentandtheRussianleaders.IrecommendedthatifDobrynin

broughtamessagefromtheSovietleadership,thePresidentshouldbereceptive

toconcretepropositions,butnotlettheSovietsforcethepacebyvagueoffersto

talkwithoutindicationsofsubstance.Progress,we mustinsist,dependedon

specificsettlement,notpersonaldiplomacy.Anysummitmeetingshouldcomeat

theendofcarefulpreparation.Onspecific areasthemessagesshouldbethat

continuedharassmentofBerlinaccessroutesovertheissueofFederal

Presidentialelectionswouldendallhopesofnegotiations;thatintheMiddleEast,

eachsideshoulduseitsinfluenceforrestraintandaflexiblediplomacy;thatwe

weredeterminedtoendthewarinVietnamandouroverallrelationswiththe

Sovietsdependedontheirhelpinsettling thatconflict.Ialsoincludedan

ambiguousformulationtotheeffectthatifSovietsupportfailedtomaterialize

“wedonotexcludethatotherswhohaveaninterestwouldbeenlistedtobring

aboutprogress…”ThiswasacrypticreferencetotheChinese—thoughitwould

notbeopaquetotheastuteDobrynin.



Aswashishabit,Nixoncarefullyunderlinedthesentencesinmy

memorandumthatseemedsignificanttohim.Henotedthepassageemphasizing

ourcommitmenttotheintegrityandvitalityofBerlin.Heunderlinedalmostevery

sentenceinthesectionsontheMiddleEastandVietnam;henotedthereference

toChina.



InmeetingswithforeignleadersNixonwasasuperbexpositorofcarefully

preparedpositions;healsounderstoodforeignpsychologiesbetterthanthoseof

mostAmericans—perhapsheconsideredthemlessofathreat.Butthegive‐and‐

takeofnegotiationsmadehimnervous;hehatedanypersonalencounterthat

wasnotasetpiece;hefounditpainfultoinsistonhispointofviewdirectly.He

wasimpatientwithsmallpointsandunwillingtoconfronttheprolonged

stalematesthatarethemechanismsbywhichsettlementsareusuallyachieved.

ThoughNixonexcelledatconceptualdiscussions,hewastoo proudtoadmitto

visitorsthatherequiredtheassista nceofevenamemorandum.Asnoted,he

conductedhisdiplomaticencountersbylearningbyheartthetalkingpoints

preparedforhim—which,infairness,weredrafte dtoreflecthisviewsiftheyhad

previouslybeendiscussedbetweenus.



Nixon’santipathytopersonalnegotiationwasnotaweaknessina

Presidentbutastrength.Someofthedebaclesofourdiplomatichistoryhave

beenperpetratedbyPresidentswhofanciedthemselvesnegotiators.Asageneral

ruletherequirement softheofficeprecludethefollow‐throughandattentionto

detailnegotiationrequires.Moreover,whenPresidentsbecomenegotiatorsno

escaperoutesareleftfordiplomacy.Concessionsareirrevocablewithout

dishonor.Astalematestakesthepersonalprestigeoftheoffice;a mistake

requiresanadmissionoferror.Andsinceheadsofgovernmentwouldnothave

chosenthiscareerwithoutahealthydoseofego,negotiationscanrapidly

deterioratefromintractabilitytoconfrontation.Negotiationsatlowerlevels—and

eventheSecretaryofStateisalowlevelinrelationtothePresident—permitthe

headofgovernmenttointerveneatcrucialmoments;adjustmentscanbemade

atfarlesscost.Bythetimeheadsofgovernmentappearonthescenethetextsof

agreementshouldalreadyhavebeensettled—soitwasmosttimeswiththe

PresidentsIserved—thoughapointortwomaybeleftopentojustifytheclaim

thattheinterventionoftheprincipalsclinchedtheissue.Presidents,ofcourse,

areresponsibleforshapingtheoverallstrategy.Theymustmakethekey

decisions;forthistheyareaccountable,andforittheydeservefullcreditno

matterhowmuchhelptheyreceivealong theway.Whentheyattemptthe

tacticalimplementationoftheirownstrategytheycourtdisaster.Nixonnever

madethatmistake.



ThefirstmeetingbetweenDobryninandNixontookplaceonFebruary17,

1969.Dobrynin,nowrecoveredfromtheflu,cameintotheOvalOffice,was

introducedtothePresident,andpresentedtheviewsofhisleadershipmuch

alongthelinesofhisconversationwithmeafewdaysearlier.Hehintedatthe

possibilityofa summitmeeting;hedidnotrejectlinkage.Onthecontrary,he

assertedaSovietwillingnessto negotiateonanumberofsubjectssimultaneously. 

HesaidthattheSovietUnionwaspreparedtouseitsinfluencetofindasolution

intheMiddleEast.Andheinquiredwhenwemightbereadytoengageintalkson

thelimitationofstrategicarms.



Nixon,intheformalmannerheadoptedwhenhewaskeyedup,replied

thatsummitsrequiredcarefulpreparations.Hestressedtheimportanceof

superpowerrestraintonaglobalbasis;heinsistedontheneedtodefusethe

MiddleEastandVietnam.Armstalks,too,hesaid,requiredcarefulpreparation,

andfreezingarmswouldnota ssurepeaceunlesstherewasalsopoliticalrestraint.

HeemphasizedtheimportanceweattachedtothestatusofBerlin,to which

DobryninrepliedthattheSovietUnionwoulddoitsutmosttocalmthesituation.



ItwascharacteristicofNixon’sinsecuritywithpersonalencountersthathe

calledmeintohisofficefourtimesthatdayforreassurancethathehaddone

well.Hethoughttherehadbeenatoughconfrontation. Myimpressionwasrather

theopposite—thatthemeetinghadbeenontheconciliatoryside.Oratleastthat

itwentasonewouldexpectoftheopeninginachessgamebetweenexperts.

Eachsidemademovestomaintainthemaximumnumberofoptions;eachside

soughttoprotectitselfagainstsomeunexpectedmovebytheopponent.Icould

tellNixoningoodconsciencethathehaddoneaswellaspossible.



Thenextmorning,February18,IsentNixonamemorandumwithmy

reflectionsonthatfirstmeeting.Myconclusionwas:



IbelievethecurrentSovietlineofconciliationandinterestinnegotiations,especiallyon

armscontrolbutalsoontheMiddleEast,stemsinlargemeasurefromtheiruncertaintyabout

theplansofthisAdministration.Theyareclearlyconcernedthatyoumayelecttoundertake

newweaponsprogramswhichwouldrequirenewandcostlydecisionsinMoscow;theyhope

thatearlynegotiationswouldatleastcounteractsuchtendenciesinWashington.(Idoubtthat

thereismuchdivisiononthispointintheKremlin,thoughtheremaywellbesubstantialones

overtheactualtermsofanagreementwithus.)Inanutshell,Ithinkthatatthismomentof

uncertaintyaboutourintentions(theSovietsseeitasamomentofcontentionbetween

“reasonable”and“adventurous”forceshere),Moscowwantstoengageus.Somewouldargue

thatregardlessofmotive,weshouldnotletthismomentofSovietinterestpass,lestMoscow

swingbacktototalhostility.MyownviewisthatweshouldseektoutilizethisSovietinterest,

stemmingasIthinkitdoesfromanxiety,toinducethemtocometogripswiththerealsources

oftension,notablyintheMiddleEast,butalsoinVietnam.Thisapproachalsowouldrequire

continuedfirmnessonourpartinBerlin.



ItwastoosoontogaugewhattheSovietswereupto.Dobryninhad

assentedtolinkageonlyinthesensethattheSovietleadersindicatedtheir

readinesstonegotiateonabroadfront;theydidnotagreetomakingtheresultof

onenegotiationconditionalonprogressinanother.Dobryninhadagreedblandly

thatprogresstowardpeaceinVietnamwouldhelpimprovetheoverall

relationship;butthisformulationwasalsoconsistentwithanattemptto

blackmailusby“reverselinkage.”TheSovietoffe rtobehelpfulontheMiddle

Eastinpracticecouldhavemeant—andinfactprovedtomean—nomorethan

thattheywerepreparedtosupporttheirArabfriends.



Asitturnedout,wewerenottobreakoutofourdeadlockwiththeSoviets

until1971.Inconclusiveexchangesin1969degeneratedintoa seriesof

confrontationsthatlastedthrough1970.Onabouttenoccasionsin1969inmy

monthlymeetingswithDobryninItriedto enlistSovietcooperationtohelpend

thewarinVietnam.Dobryninwasalwaysevasive.HedeniedthattheSoviet

Unionhadanyinterestincontinuingthewar;hewarned(extremelymildlyin

retrospect)againstescalation;henevercameupwithaconcreteproposaltoend

thewar.



ThePresidentfarednobetter.OnMarch26NixonwrotetoSovietPremier

AlexeiKosyginalongthelinesofhisconversationwithDobryninofFebruary17.

(LeonidBrezhnev,theGeneralSecretaryoftheCentralCommitteeofthe

CommunistParty,wastoplaynoobviouspublicroleinforeignpolicyuntilthe

middleof1971.)KosyginrepliedonMay27,addinglittletothestandardSoviet

position.Themajornewfeatureofhisletterwasthat,probablyemboldenedby

Americandomesticcriticismofourlinkageconcept,henowchallengedthe

conceptforcefullyandopenly.Kosyginarguedthat,“takingintoaccountthe

complexityofeachoftheseproblemsbyitself,itishardlyworthwhiletoattempt

somehowtolinkonewithanother.”Wedecidednottoarguethepoint;wewould

simplycontinueourapproachinpractice.



OnMay14DobryninwasgivenanadvancecopyofthePresident’sVietnam

speech.Byprearrangement,NixontelephonedmewhileIwasmeetingwith

Dobryninandinvitedbothofusto theLincolnSittingRoomtoemphasizeto

Dobryninhisdeterminationtoendthewar.TherewasnoSovietresponse.This

wasalsotheSovietreactiontoourproposalofaVietnampeacemissionbyCyrus

Vance.[

TheseUS‐SovietdiscussionsonVietnamaredescribedinChapterVIII.]Itwasin

partbecauseofSovietstonewallingthatNixonscheduledhistriptoRomania in

August.HispurposewastoremindMo scowthatwehadoptionstowardEastern

EuropeandalsotowardthePeople’sRepublicofChina,ofwhichRomaniawasa

sometimesupporter.AndintheautumnwerefusedtoinviteAndreiGromykoto

Washingtonforthebynowalmosttraditionaltourd’horizonwiththePresident

ontheoccasionofGromyko’sannualvisittoNewYorkfortheUNGeneral

Assembly.WeindicatedthatthePresidentwouldreceivetheSovietForeign

Ministershouldanappointmentberequested;this,inturn,theSovietsrefusedto

do.



TherewasasamenesstoSovietconductin1969thatleftlittledoubtof

theirbasicpreferenceforformoversubstance.ByApril,asIrecountedearlier,a

seriesoflower‐levelpublicstatementsandleaksnotauthorizedintheWhite

HousehadprecipitatedacommitmenttostartSALTtalksby“latespringorearly

summer.”WhentheWhiteHouseonJune11authorizedinformingtheSoviets

thatwewerereadytobegintalks,ourbureaucracyconfidentlyexpectedareply

inamatterofweeksorless.Infact,theSovietsdidnotreplyforoverfour

months.Thereasonalmostcertainlywasthattheywantedtoawaittheendofthe

Senate’sABMdebateandnotspoiltheargument ofourcriticsthatourABM

programwasincompatiblewitharmscontrolnegotiations.



Whateverthereason,itwasnotuntilOctober20thatDobrynincalledon

thePresidenttoinformhimofSovietwillingnesstosetadatefortheopeningof

SALTtalks.Dobrynintooktheoccasiontocomplainabouttheslowprogressof

US‐Sovietrelationsingeneral.NixonrepliedthattheSovietUnionhadeveryright

tomakeitsowndecisionsbutgeneralprogresswoulddependontheSoviet

attitudeonVietnam.Todrivethepointhome,IgaveDobryninthenextdayasan

aide‐mémoiretheVietnamportionofthetranscriptofhisconversationwiththe

President;IhaddeliberatelysharpenedsomepointsforMoscow’sconsumption.

Dobrynin,aswashispractice,hadtakennonotesduringthemeetingwithNixon,

buthespottedthediscrepanciesandaskedwhichversionheshouldtransmitto

Moscowastheofficialrecord.Itoldhimtousethewrittenversion.



WemadenoprogressonEuropeansecurity,especiallyBerlin,either.The

EastGermansstartedamini‐crisisbyharassingaccessroutesinprotestofthe

FederalPresidentialelectioninWestBerlin,thoughthreepreviouselectionshad

passedwithoutincident.OnFebruary22,ontheeveofhisfirstvisittoEurope,

Nixonorderedastep‐upofUSmilitarytraffictoWestBerlin.Hedidsooverthe

anguisheddisagreementoftheStateDepartment.Theincidentpassedbecause

DobryninhadpromisedNixononFebruary17thattheSovietUnionwouldkeep

thesituationcalm.OnMarch5theFederalelectiontookplaceintheReichstag