Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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buildingwithoutacrisisandharassmentstopped.WhenImetChinesePremier

ChouEn‐laionmysecrettripinJuly1971,heofferedhisowninterpretationof

theseevents.HearguedthattheSovietUnionhaddeliberatelystagedtheMarch

1969borderclasheswithChinatoprovideadiversionwhileWestGerman

parliamentarianstraveledunimpededtoBerlin.InChou’sviewtheborderclashes

weremanufacturedtopermittheSoviets“toescapetheirresponsibilitiesover

Berlin.”[

TheMarch1969militaryflare‐upalongtheSino‐SovietborderisdescribedinChapter

VI.]



Inanycase,PresidentNixonmadeapublicproposalofaBerlinnegotiation

inhisspeechattheSiemensfactoryinWestBerlinonhisEuropeantripon

February27.Afterreaffirmingourresolvetodefendthecity,heexpressedthe

hopethatBerlincouldbecomeanobjectof“negotiation…andreconciliation”

insteadofthreatsandcoercion.AnoffertodiscussBerlinwasalsoincludedinthe

President’slettertoKosyginonMarch26.AttheNATOmeetinginWashingtonin

April,thethreeWesternalliesresponsibleforBerlin—France,Britain,andthe

UnitedStates—wereurgedbytheFederalRepublictoapproachtheSovietsabout

Berlin.Alliedconsultationstothisendproceededoverthesummer.OnJuly10

GromykopubliclydeclaredSovietwillingness“toexchangeviewsastohow

complicationsconcerningWestBerlincanbepreventednowandinthefuture.”

WestGermanChancellorKurtKiesinger,notunawareofthebenefitsofaneasing

oftensionsfortheGermanelectionsscheduledforSeptember,urgedspeedy

acceptance.OnAugust7theWesternalliesindicatedawillingnesstoopentalks.

TheSovietswaiteduntilwellintoSeptember—orjustbeforetheGerman

elections—beforegivinganevasivereply;itdidlittlebutrepeatGromyko’s

generalphrasesandstressthesovereigntyoftheEastGermanregime(notyet

recognizedbyanyoftheWesternpowers).TheSovietsevadedanycommitment

totalkaboutimprovingaccessandproposedinsteadanegotiationoncurbing

WestGermanactivitiesinBerlin.



ThisSovietreplyseemedtome“virtuallynosubstantiveadvance,”asI

describeditinamemorandumtothePresident.OnceagaintheSovietswere

seekingalltheatmosphericadvantagessurroundingtheopeningofnegotiations

onanothermajorissuewithoutanyindicationthattheywerepreparedfor

substantiveprogress.Iconcluded:“Theyareobviouslyinnohurry,andIseeno

reasonsforustobe,especiallysincepushingthene gotiationrunssomedangerof

forcingtheSovietssimplytorepeattheirrigidsupportforEastGerman

‘sovereignty.’“



WhattheSovietleadersdidtrytoarrangeoverBerlinwerebilateraltalks

withtheUnitedStates.KosygininhisletterofMay27hadpickedupthe

President’soffertodiscussthesubjectandDobrynin,inhisconversationwith

NixononOctober20,madetheformalproposal.GiventheSoviets’unwillingness

todiscusstheimprovementsinaccesstoBerlinthatwedesired,Irecommende d

thatwediscouragethenotionofbilateraltalks.TheSovietswouldonlyusethem

tostirupsuspicionsamongourallies. Wewoulddobesttokeepthisissueinthe

regularFour‐Powerforumforthemoment,Isuggested.



TheSovietsadoptedasimilartacticontheMiddleEast.Onceagainthey

openedwithurgentrequestsfortalks.Whenthesebegan,asChapterXwill

describe,theSovietsembracedthestandardradicalArabposition,whichthey

musthaveknownwasnotnegotiable.FormonthsweweretoldthattheSoviet

UnioncouldnotaskitsclientsforconcessionsuntiltheUnitedStateshadclarified

itspositionsonfrontiers;wefinallydidsoonOctober28,substantiallyaccepting

the1967borders.NoSovietreplywasreceivedfortwomonths;whenitcameit

offerednothing.AsfarastheSovietswereconcerned,1969wasaflightfrom

concreteness.



ButiftheSovietsprocrastinatedtherewasnoshortageofAmericans urging

anaccelerationofnegotiationsinalmostallareas.



<<Contents>>



****



PreparingforSALT



mbassadorGerardC.SmithwasappointedourchiefnegotiatorforSALTand

headoftheArmsControlandDisarmamentAgencyinearlyMarch1969.

ThoughheandIoftendisagreed,Iconsidereditanexcellentappointment.

Dedicated,indefatigable,andshrewd,Smithwasoneofthosetalentedexecutives

whoservesuccessiveadministrationsandepitomizetheidealofpublicservice.It

waseasytounderestimatehimbecauseofhisoccasionallyponderousmanner.

ButheknewhiswayaroundWashington;hewasnonoviceatthebureaucratic

game.Consideringthathehadnopowerbaseofhisown,hewasabletogenerate

astonishingpressures.Hewasagileindraftinginstructions forhimselfthat

permittedhisnominalsuperiorsonlyaminimum influenceoverhisdiscretionary

powers;hewasnotunskillfuleitherininterpretingdirectiveshedidnothappen

toagreewithtomakethemconformtohispreferences.Withal,hewasalways

cheerfulandhonorable,astolidwarriorforagoodcause.Thatcausewasthe

controlofarms;itwastheassignmentofhisagencytokeepthatobjectivealive

withinourgovernment;hediditwithirre pressiblepersistence.



IhavedescribedearlierthepressuresthatmovedtheAdministration

towardofferingadateforopeningSALTtalksandhow,contrarytothe

campaigners,theSovietsdidnotrespondforfourmonths.Thisfortunatelygave

usthebonusofadditionaltimeforpreparationandenabledustoimpose

coherenceonthenegotiationswhentheyfinallyopened.



IhadissuedadirectiveonMarch6requestingoptionsfortheUS

negotiatingposition.Thisrequestwashonoredmostlyinthebreach.Theofficials

atthesecondandthirdlevelsweremostlyholdoversfromtheprevious

Administration.NaturallytheoptiontheypreferredwastheonethatJohnson

wouldhaveproposedtoKosyginhadhischerishedsummitatLeningradtaken

place.Thebureaucracyhadlaboredthroughthesummerof1968andgivenbirth

toanelaborateconsensusproposal.



AmajoradvantagewasthatithadbeenacceptedbytheJointChiefsof

Staff.Thisminorbureaucratic triumphlostsomeofitsluster,however,whenone

examineditsprincipalfeature:afreezeonbothland‐basedandsea‐based

strategicmissiles.Thoughin1969thegrowingSovietarsenalofland‐based

missileswasbeginningtoapproachoursinnumber,theRussiansremainedfar

behindinsubmarine‐launchedmissiles.Whenoneaddedourlargeadvantagein

intercontinentalbombers(omittedfromtheproposal),theprobabilitythatthe

Sovietswouldacceptthefreezewasnotoverwhelming.



MyefforttobroadenthePresident’schoicesinvolvedunusualbureaucratic

difficulties.NixontookakeeninterestinthestrategyforSALTandinwhat

channelsitshouldbenegotiated.Butthedetailsofthevariousplansboredhim;

ineffecthelefttheselectionofoptionstome.Yetifthebureaucracyhadbecome

awareofthis,allvestigeofdisciplinewouldhavedisa ppeared.Itherefore

scheduledoverNixon’simpatientprotestsa seriesofNSCmeetingswhere

optionswerepresentedtoaglassy‐eyedandirritablePresidentsothatdirectives

couldbeissuedwithsomeplausibilityonhisauthority.



InordertobringsomeorderintotheNSCdiscussionIaskedforarangeof

options,includingbothlimitedandcomprehensiveapproaches.Theconviction

withwhichthesewerepursuedwasshownbythefactthatwhensubjectedto 

analysisalloftheoptionsexceptoneleft usstrategicallyworseoffthanifthere

werenoagreementatall.Theunex pecteddelayintheopeningofSALTprovided

uswiththeopportunitytogetourhouseinorder. Ilearnedagreatdealfroman

interagencypanelRichardsonandIsetupchargedwithasystematicanalysisof

thestrategicimplicationsoflimitsonMIRVs,theverifiabilityofsuchlimits,and

thepossibilitiesandrisksofevasion.AftersomeweeksIexpandedthis

assignmenttocovernotonlyMIRVsbut allstrategicweaponspotentiallythe

subjectofnegotiations.TheCIAwasaskedtoassesstheverifiabilityofeach

weaponlimitationproposed—howwecouldcheckuponcompliance,howmuch

cheatingcouldtakeplacebeforediscovery,andthestrategicconsequencesofthe

possibleviolations.TheDefenseDepartmentwasrequestedtoanalyzewhat

remedialmeasureswereavailableandthetimeitwouldtaketoimplementthem.

WhenthefirstinteragencyoptionspaperscamebeforetheReviewGroup,Itold

mycolleaguesthatthemindboggledatthepossiblecombinationsofnegotiating

positionsanditwasnotfairtothePresidentto askhimtosortthemout.Sowe

wentbacktothedrawingboardandtriedanewapproach.Weanalyzedthe

possiblelimitationsweaponbyweapon,singlyandtheninco mbinat ion.The

possiblelimitationsweregroupedintosomesevenpackages,eachofwhichwe

thoughtcompatiblewithoursecurity;theseweretoserveasbuildingblocksfrom

whichtoconstructspecificproposalsortomodifythem.Wewerethusina

positiontorespondflexiblytoSovietideaswithouteachtimehavingtodevelopa

newUSpositionamongourselves.Theresultwasthemostcomprehensivestudy

ofthestrategicandverificationimplicationsofthecontrolofweaponsever

undertakenbyourgovernmentandprobablyanygovernment.Ournegotiating

positionwouldreflectnotbureaucraticcompromisebutcarefulanalysisof

consequencesandobjectives.



Anunintendedbenefitofthesestudieswastheeducationandbureaucratic

backstoppingtheyprovidedformylaternegotiationsonSALTwithDobryninin

theWhiteHouseChannel.Itenabledmetotellwhichoptionscommandeda

bureaucraticconsensusandyettomaintainthesecrecyofthetalks.Iwouldthus

dealwithDobryninknowingIwasonrelativelysafeground.(Thisdidnottotally

protectmeagainstMonday‐morningquarterbacking,however.)



ThefirstofficialsessionofSALTwastobegininHelsinkionNovember17,

1969.Asweexaminedthevariousbuildingblocksandtheabsenceofany

governmentalconsensusitseemedtomewisesttotreatthesessionas

exploratory.WedidnotwanttogivetheSovietUnionanopportunitytoscorea

propagandacoup,orriskfailurebyputtingforwardclearlyunacceptable

proposals.GerardSmithsupportedthisviewforhisownreasons;hewasafraid

thathemightnotliketheinstructionswhichthePresidentwasmostprobably

goingtoissue;hehopedtousethefirstsessiontoelicitfromtheSoviets

proposalsthathefavoredfora banonABMsandamoratoriumonMIRVtesting.

Asofteninbigbureaucracies,differentmotivesproducedinstructionstothe

effectthattheopeningtalksweretodevelopaworkprogramandtodr awout

Sovietviewsonprocedures.Wewouldmakeclearourwillingnesstodiscuss

limitationsonbothoffensiveanddefensiveweaponssystems.Verifiabilitywould

bestressed.Tocurbexcessiveenthusiasm,thedelegationwasinstructedtorefer

anyproposalsforMIRVorothermoratoriumstoWashington.



Thefirstroundofthestrategicarmslimitationtalksbeganasscheduledand

lastedtillDecember22.Anearlyimpassedevelopedoverwhatconstituteda

strategicweapon.TheSovietsdefinedas“strategic”anyweaponthatcouldreach

theterritoryoftheotherside,therebysweepinginourforward‐basedaircraftin

WesternEuropeaswellasourcarrier‐basedaircraft,butneatlyexcludingtheir

ownmedium‐andintermediate‐rangeballisticmissilesandlargefleetofmedium

bomberstargetedatWesternEurope.Theschemehadtheadditionalpolitical

advantageofelaboratingadistinctionbetweenoursecurityconcernsandthose

ofWesternEurope,thusstrainingtheWesternAlliance.Needlesstosay,we

rejectedtheSovietdefinition.TheSovietssimilarlyraisedtheissueof“non‐

dissemination”ofnuclearweapons,whichcalledintoquestionourcooperation

withourBritishallyonnuclearmattersandindeedpossiblywiththewholeNATO

defenseestablishment.



TheSovietsweremosteagertotalkabouttheweaponssystemthatso

manyexpertshadopposedbecausetheyallegedthatitwouldmakeallSALT

negotiationsimpossible—theABM.AndmuchtothesurpriseofourSALT

delegation,theSovietsshowednointerestinaMIRVban.Theydidnotraiseit,or

respondwhenwebroughtitup.Onthewholetheirtonewasprecise,

nonpolemic,businesslike,andserious.



IevaluatedtheresultsinaWashingtonbackgroundbriefingonDecember

18:



WeweretoldbeforewewenttoHelsinkibymanypeoplethatifwedidn’tgotherewith

aposition,theSovietswouldloseconfidenceinus,orweweretoldifwedidn’tgotherewitha

detailedpositiontheSovietswouldpreemptthefieldwithaspectacularoftheirown.



InfactthecuriousthingseemstohavehappenedthattheSovietpreparationshave

takenaboutthesameformasours;thatis,theyhavemadeadetailedanalysisoftheproblems

andIconsiderthatoneofthemorehopefulsigns,regardlessofwhatmaycomeoutinthenext

phaseofthetalks.



TheSALTprocesswithallitsbureaucraticstresseshadbroughtmatters

aboutwherewewantedthem.Wehadgivenupnostrategicprogramsasan

admissionprice.Wehadmadenounilateralconcessions.Wehadeducatedour

governmentinboththeimportanceandthecomplexityofthesubject.Wehad

madecleartotheSovietsthattheywouldhavetobeprecise,thattheywouldget

nowherewithpropaganda.Butwewerealsocommittedtoprogress.Wewould

nottreatthenuclearweaponassimplyanotherweapon;oncestartedonthe

coursewewouldproceedtowardthelimitationofstrategicarmswithoutillusion

butalsowithoutrespite,withdedicationtosecurityandalsowiththeconviction

thatfuturegenerationsshouldknowthatweseizedallopportunitiestopushback

thespecterofnuclearwar.Wewouldnotneglectourdefenses;wewouldnotrisk

fallingbehind;weneverforgotthatthefutureoffreedomdependedonour

nuclearstrength.Butthenuclearbuildupwasunlikeanyotherarmsracein

history.Itstakedthelivesofallhumanbeings.Itimposedanobligationforarms

controlthatwehadnorighttoshirk.



<<Contents>>



****



East‐WestTrade



neofthecuriositiesofCommunismisthatanideologyfoundedonthe

inexorableinfluenceofeconomicsshoulddosopoorlyindeliveringthe

goods.WhenevermarketeconomiesandCommunisteconomieshavecompeted

inroughlycomparablecircumstances,theCommunisteconomieshavebeenleft

farbehind.BywhateverstandardonecomparesWestandEastGermany,Austria

andCzechoslovakia,SouthandNorthKorea,orSouthandNorthVietnambefore

theforcibleunification,themarketeconomiesproducemoreandbettergoods

andservices,fulfillmorehumanneeds,andcreatefarmorepluralistsocieties

thantheirCommunistcounterparts.OnlyinonecategoryhaveCommunist

economiesscored:theaccumulationofmilitarypower.Unfortunately,history

offersnoguaranteethatamorehumaneandbeneficentstyleoflifeinevitably

prevails.Thosepreparedtodeprivethemselvesoverdecadesmaybeableto

achievemilitarydominance;soonerorlatersuperiorpoweralmostinevitably

producespoliticaladvantagesforthestrongerside.Thisisachallengethe

industrialdemocraciesdarenotfailtomeet.

O



Therearemanyreasonsfortheinferioreconomicperformanceof

Communistsocieties.Evenwiththedevelopmentofmoderncomputers—

themselvesasophisticatedcentralindustryinwhichCommunisteconomiesare

backward—planningcannotescapebottlenecksandbureaucracy.Communist

planningcreatesincentivesformanagersnottoproducemorebuttounderstate

theproductivepotentialsothattheyarenotcaughtbyfailingtofulfillquotas.

Communistexecutivestendtohoardscarcematerialstomakethemselves

independentofthevagariesoftheplanningprocess.Whateverthecauses,itis

littlewonderthat,withshortagesandbureaucraticstumbling,theSovietUnion

andtheEastEuropeanCommuniststateshavesincethelate1950ssoughtto

expandtradewiththeWestasashortcuttomoderntechnologyandcapital.We,

forourpart,haveimposedrestrictionssincetheonsetoftheColdWarinthelate

Forties,eitherunilaterallyorinconcertwithourallies.Americanlawprohibited

theextensionofMostFavoredNationtreatmenttoimportsfromCommunist 

countriesexceptPolandandYugoslavia.



Asaresult,bigtariffcutsinlatertradenegotiationsdidnotapplyand

importshadtopaytheveryhightariffsofthe1930Hawley‐SmootAct.American

exportsofproductsortechnicaldatathatcouldenhanceCommunistmilitaryand

economicpotentialneededlic enses—rarelygiven—undertheExportControlAct

of1949.UnitedStatesExport‐ImportBankcreditsorguaranteesforanycountry

tradingwithNorthVietnam(effectivelyallCommunistcountries)werebarredby

theso‐calledFinoAmendment.Anyfinancialorcommercialtransactionswith

NorthKorea,NorthVietnam,orCubaand(until1971)Chinaneededspecial

license.Acommonlistofprohibitedstrategicexports,notquiteassevereasthe

Americanembargoes,wasoperatedfrom1950bytheCo‐ordinatingCommittee

onExportControls(COCOM),representingtheNATOcountriesandJapan.Travel

tomanyCommunistcountrieswasrestrictedbyUSlaw.



TheNixonAdministrationcameintoofficewhennearlyalltheserestrictions

wereunderattackintheUnited States.Liberalopinionregarde dthemas

archaismsoftheColdWar,which,theyargued,wasintheprocessofliquidation.

OnOctober7,1966,PresidentJohnsonhadanno uncedashiftfrom“thenarrow

conceptofco‐existencetothebroadervisionofpeacefulengagement.”Thiswas

expressedinaseriesofminorliberalizingmeasuresontradeandcreditswhichhe

wasabletotakewithinhisadministrativediscretion.Theoverturewasrebuffed

byBrezhnevonOctober16:TheUnitedStateslaboredundera“strangeand

persistentdelusion”ifitbelievedthatrelationscouldbeimprovedwhilethe

Vietnamwarcontinued—makingBrezhnevthefatherofthelinkagetheory.



Theissuewasquiescentfortwoyears.Theninthespringof1968,former

PresidentialCounselor TheodoreSorensenandformerUnderSecretaryofState

GeorgeBallledacampaignurgingremovalofrestrictio nsonEast‐Westtrade.

SenatehearingswereheldinJuneandJuly1968.SenatorWalterMondale

introducedaresolutionurgingthatthesetradebarriersbelowered.The

discussionof1968wasonlybrieflysubmergedbytheSovietinvasionof

CzechoslovakiaandthePresidentialelection;itquicklyheatedupagaininearly

1969,afterNixon’sInauguration,forthe1949ExportControlActwasdueto

expireonJune30ofthatyear.



HearingswereheldfromAprilthroughJulyof1969.Theonlyissuein

disagreementwasnotwhetherbuttowhatdegreetheexistinglawshouldbe

eased.TheNewYorkTimesdeclaredonJune3thatUStraderestrictionswere

“self‐defeating.”Theywere“coldwarpolicies”thatwere“inconsistentwiththe

NixonAdministration’stheorythatitistimetomovefromaneraofconfrontation

intooneofnegotiationandcooperation”—helpfullyinstructingthePresidenton

whathisownpolicywas.TheAdministration’sapparentreluctancetoliberalize

theExportControlActwas“inexplicable.”ThebasicargumentofSenatorslikeJ.

WilliamFulbright,WalterMondale,andEdmundMuskiewasthattheColdWar

wasover,thatlinkingtradetoforeignpolicyonlycausedsuspicionsandtensions.

Mondalesaidtherestrictions“holdbackeconomicgrowthintheU.S.,notin

EasternEurope.”Muskiepointedoutthatsomeitemscouldbeboughtfromour

Europeanallies.NicholasKatzenbach,formerUnderSecretaryofState,builta

politicalpyramid:TrademeantfreerchoicesforSovietconsumersandmanagers,

whichwasthebeginningofafreersociety,andamoresophisticatedSoviet

economywouldundercutSovietideologyandstimulatedissent.Maintainingthe

restrictionsforpolitical reasonswasdenouncedasself‐denyingeconomically,as

futilepolitically,andasplayingintothehandsofStalinisthar d‐liners.



Myownviewwasofapiecewithmygeneralattitude.GivenSovietneeds,

expandingtradewithoutapoliticalquidproquowasagift;therewasverylittle 

theSovietUnioncoulddoforuseconomically.Itdidnotseemtome

unreasonabletorequireSovietrestraintinsuchtroublespotsastheMiddleEast,

Berlin,andSouthEastAsiainreturn.Nixonhadsimilarviews,withapolitic aledge.

HedidofferDobryninincreasedtradeforhelponVietnambuthewasdoubtful

thattheSovietswouldtakethebait.Ifnot,hesawnosenseinantagonizinghis

oldconstituencybyacceptingliberalizinglegislation.Onthecontrary,giventhe

“soft”positionhewastakingonVietnamheusedEast‐Westtradetorefurbishhis

conservativecredentials.



Withinthebureaucracy,East‐Westtradeevokedthefamiliaroppositionto

linkage.OnlytheDefenseDepartmentgenerallysupportedtheWhiteHouseview.

TheStateDepartmentfavoredliberalizationonthegroundthatitwouldimprove

thepoliticalatmosphere,whichwasofcourseexactlytheoppositeoftheWhite

Houseviewthattradeshouldfollowpoliticalprogress.TheCommerce

Department’sviewwasthemostinterestingbecauseitreflectedthesurprising

attitudeofmuchoftheAmericanbusinesscommunity.Businessleadersareof

coursevocallyanti‐Communist.Intheabstracttheypreachhardbargainingwith

theCommunistsandtheyarequicktoblametheirgovernme ntfor“giveaways.”

Butwhenitcomestotrade,theirattitudechanges. Duringmyperiodinofficethe

mostferventadvocatesofEast‐Westtradewithoutstringswereinthegroupof

capitalistssovilifiedbyLeninisttheory.Theyarededicatedtothefreemarket,at

leastifitmeansmorebusinessfortheircompanies.Theyresentas“government

interference”theapparatusofregulationsandrestrictionsthatistheonlywayto

subordinateeconomicrelation stopoliticalgoals. IftheSovietUnioncanenter

ourmarketforcreditorgoodsonthebasisofpurelyeconomiccriteria,allpo litical

leveragedisappears.Perhapsbusinessmenareinadditionespeciallysusceptible

tothebonhomiewithwhichSovietofficialsflatterthosewhomtheywishto

influence—astyleofslightlyinebriatedgoodfellowshipnottotallyunknownin

someofthereunionsofcapitalisttradeassociations.



East‐WesttradecameupfordiscussionatanNSCmeetingonMay21.The

AdministrationhadtotakeapositionontheproposalsinCongresstoreplacethe

expiringExportControlActwithamoreforthcominglaw.Thegovernmentalso

hadtodecideonanumberofspecificlicensesthathadbeenrequested:for

materialsforafoundryatanewSoviettruckplant,foranoilextractionplant,and

forasmallsaleof$15millionofcorntotheUSSRatworldmarketprices.Before

themeetingIsentNixonabriefingpapersumminguptheagencies’

recommendationstogetherwithmyown.Myviewwasnottoopposebutto

acquiesceinanewlawgrantingthePresidentdiscretionaryauthoritytoexpand

trade,whileexercisingthisauthorityonlyinreturnforapoliticalquidproquo.I

alsorecommendedbringingtheUnitedStatesexportcontrollistintolinewiththe

somewhatmoreliberalCOCOMlist,sinceotherwisewemerelylostbusinessto

ourallieswithoutaffectingCommunistconduct.Finally,Ifavoredissuingalicense

fortheoilextractionplantbecausethelongleadtimeforitsconstructionwould

giveuscontinuingle verage.Iopposedlicensesforthefoundryandthecornsale.



Nixonwentagainstmyrecommendations.SmartingfromtheSovietrefusal

tohelpusonVietnam,hetoldtheNSCmeeting:“Idonotacceptthephilosophy

thatincreasedtraderesultsinimprovedpoliticalrelations.Infactjustthe

converseistrue.Betterpoliticalrelationsleadtoimprovedtrade.”Thiswasmy

belieftoo,butNixontookitonestepfarther.HedecreedthattheAdministration

wouldopposealllegislativeeffortstoliberalizetrade;thespecificproj ects,

includingtheoilextractionplant,weretobe“putonice”forthetimebeing.I

pointedoutthegeneralconsensusthatweshouldbringourrestrictedlistinline

withtheCOCOMlist,exceptforcomputersandotherkeyitemsinwhichwestill

hadineffectamonopoly.ThePresidentagreed.AdirectivewasissuedonMay

28.Isawtoitthatthedirectivewasphrasedinarelativelypositiveway,keeping

openthepossibilityofincreasedtradeifthepoliticalcontextchanged.

