Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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Nosoonerweretheseinstructionsissuedthanthedepartmentsbeganto

nibbleawayatthem.Departmentsacceptdecisionswhichgoagainstthemonlyif

vigilantlysupervised.Otherwisethelower‐levelexegesiscanbebreathtakinginits

effrontery.ItfallsonthePresident’sAssistantforNationalSecuritytodothis

policinginthefieldofnationalsecurity.Isoonhadmyhandsfull.Despitethe

President’sexplicitordersattheMay21NSCmeetingthattradewasnottobe

liberalized,theCommerceDepartmentinJulywasabouttoannounce

administrativedecontrolofaboutthirtyitemsforexporttotheUSSRandEastern

Europe.ThiswasbasedonthepropositionthatNixonhadruledonlyagainst

liberalizedlegislatio n,notagainsteasingtradebyadministrativefiat;Commerce

thereforeconsidereditselffreetoundertakeamajorliberalizationofEast‐West

tradewithinexistinglaw.Istoppedthismove,buthadtofightoffsimilarschemes

atregularintervals.InOctober,forexample,StateandCommercerequested

authorityforasaleofcomputerstotheUSSRforitscommunicationswithEastern

Europe;CommerceSecretaryMauriceStanswantedtodecontrolalonglistof135

itemswithoutanypoliticalreciprocity.Idisapprovedtheserequests,in

accordancewithNixon’sdecisionattheNSC.



WeweresomewhatmoreobligingwithrespecttoEasternEurope,

however,butagainintheserviceofapoliticalstrategy.Ourtradewasusedasa

carrotforthosecountriespursuing policiesrelativelyindepe ndentoftheSoviet

Union.ThuswhenthePresident’striptoRomaniawasannouncedonJune28,I

askedElliotRichardsonandtheUnderSecretariesCommitteeoftheNSCto

recommendtradeconcessio nsthatcouldbeofferedtotheRomanians.Afterthe

President’svisittoRomania,theWhiteHouseactivelypromotedtradewith

Romaniabywhateveradministrativestepscouldbetaken.MauryStanswas

imaginativeandtheScienceAdvisor,LeeDuBridge,cameupwithexcellentideas

ontechnicalcooperation.NosoonerhadwemovedtowardRomania,however,

thanvariousdepartmentspressedfortheliberalizationoftradewithallof

EasternEurope.Thiswouldhaveunderminedourdeliberatestrategyofusing

tradeselectivelytoencouragepoliticalautonomy.Ittookmanymonthsbeforewe

madeourpoint.



Afterprolongeddebate,theCongresspassedabillinDecember,theExport

AdministrationActof1969,thatliberalizedtheoldExportControlActand

declareditUSpolicytofavorexpansionof peacefultradewiththeSovietUnion

andEasternEurope.ButmuchofitsimplementationwaslefttoPresidential

discretion.[Ironically,inlightoflaterevents,thePresidentwasnotgiventherighttogrant

MostFavoredNationstatustotheSovietUnionandEasternEuropealthoughwecouldhave

gottenithadweaskedforit.Thiscamebacktohauntusafewyearslaterwhenwesoughtthis

authority,andtheCongressionalmoodhadmeanwhileshifted180degrees.]Afterawhile

Moscowbegantounderstandthatifitwantedliberalizedtradeitwouldhaveto

showrestraintinitsinternationalconductandarrangeforprogressonkeyforeign

policyissues.Eventuallythetimewouldcomewhen,consistentwithourstrategy,

wewouldseektooffersomeconcessionsaftertheSovietUnioncooperatedwith

usinthepoliticalfield.Thenwesuddenlyencounteredareversalofattitudes.

ManyofthosewhohadcastigatedusforseekingtolinktradetoSovietforeign

policybegantocriticizeusfornotlinkingitmoreaggressivelytoSovietdomestic

policy.Then,too,wewouldhavetocometogripsinearnestwiththe

fundamentalissueofEast‐Westtrade:ifwell‐designeditforgeslinkswhose

cumulativeeffectcanreinforcerestraintsagainstSovietaggressiveness;butalsoit

canaddtothesinewsofSovietpower.Itisaswrongtooverlookthepossibilities

astoignorethedangers.



<<Contents>>

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EasternEurope:Nixon’sVisittoRomania



hedivisionofEuropealongtheElbeRiverinCentralGermanycorresponded

neithertohistoricaltraditionnortotheaspirationsofitspeoples.Inevery

countryofEasternEuropeanessentiallyalienregimehadbeenimposedbySoviet

troops;inthreeofthempopularrevoltshadbeencrushedbytheRedArmy.Inno

countryofEasternEuropecouldtheCommunistswinafreeelectionevenaftera

generationoftotalitarianrule.TheSovietUnionhadstartedontherouteof

selectivedétentebyseekingto splitouralliesfromus;itseemedtousthat

détente,tobegenuine,hadtoapplyinEasternEuropeaswellasWestern

Europe.

T



Butthisraisedaproblemofextraordinarycomplexityandindeedtragedy.

Clarioncallstoliberationhadbeenmockedin1956whenwestoodbyasHungary

wasbrutallysuppressed.Andagainwewereparalyzedin1968whenthePrague

uprisingwascrushed.Oursinwaslessbetrayalthantheraisingofexpectations

wecouldnotpossiblyfulfill.TheJohnsonAdministrationhadannounce dapolicy

of“peacefulengagement”seekingtopromotetradeandculturalrelationswith

EasternEuropebuthadnotachievedmuchbeyondenunciationofaclever

theory.Weattemptedamoredifferentiatedpolicytoencouragethecountriesof

EasternEuropetoactmoreindependentlywithintheirpossibilities.Wemadeno

promiseswecouldnotbackupnorusedrhetoricthatmighttriggeractions

doomedtodisaster.Wewouldrewardthosewithamoreindependentforeign

policyandstayaloofwhereanation,bynecessityorchoice,slavishlyfollowedthe

Sovietline.Differentialdétentecouldworkbothways.



ReactingtoareportofthetumultuousgreetinggivenastronautFrank

BormaninCzechoslovakia,thePresidentsentmeanoteinearlyJune1969:

“Henry,IbelievewecouldneedleourMoscowfriendsbyarrangingmorevisitsto

theEasternEuropecountries.Thepeopleinthosecountries,ifgivenachance,

willwelcomeourCabinetofficersandotherswithgreatenthusiasm.”



Afewweekslater,Nixonhadamoreconcreteidea—thatheshouldvisit

EasternEuropehimself.HesuggestedincludingRomaniaonhisaround‐the‐world

trip,makinghimthefirstAmericanPresidenttopayaStatevisittoaCommunist

country.Hehaddonethisfortworeasons:Whenhewasoutofofficehehad

beentreatedwithgreatrespectbytheRomanianleadershiponavisitin1967,in

contrasttohistreatmentinotherEastEuropeancountries.Nixonneverforgot

courtesiesofthiskind.ButhisprincipalreasonwastoneedletheSoviets,or,as

hetoldme,“Bythetimewegetthroughwiththistriptheyaregoingtobeoutof

theirmindsthatweareplayingaChinesegame.”



OnJune21,onNixon’sinstructions,IcalledinAmbassadorCorneliuBogdan

ofRomaniaandnotedthatthePresidentwasthinkingoftakinganaround‐the‐

worldtripinthesecondhalfofJulyafterwatchingtheApollo11splashdownin

thePacific.WoulditbeconvenientforthePresidenttostopinBuchareston

August2and3?Withinforty‐eighthours,onJune23,weweregiventheofficial

replythattheRomaniangovernmentwelcomedthevisit—despitethefactthatit

wouldforcepostponementofalong‐scheduledRomanianpartyconferenceto

whichtheSovietleadershiphadbeeninvited.Therecouldbenogreaterproofof

theimportancethatRomaniaattachedtoaseparateopeningtoWashingtonand

toaPresidentialvisit.



ThedramaticannouncementwasmadeonJune28.Forthefirsttimean

AmericanPresidentwouldvisitaCommunistnation inEasternEurope.Iblandly

toldapressbriefingthatitwasnot“ananti‐Sovietgesture.”ThePresidenthad

“verypleasantrecollections”ofhismeetingswiththeRomanianleaderswhen

theyreceivedhimwarmlyasaprivatecitizen:“TheUnitedStatesisinterestedin

dealingwiththecountriesofEasternEuropeonthebasisofmutualrespect…We

feelundernoobligationtocheckwiththeSovietUnionbeforemakingvisitsto

sovereigncountries.”



SopervasivewastheassumptionthattheNixonAdministrationwas

hopelesslybellicoseandanti‐SovietthattheRomaniavisitwasimmediately

denouncedasreckless.SomeintheStateDepartmentobjectedtotheRomania

visit(whichhadbeenarrangedthroughWhiteHousechannels) asdangerously

provocative;theyfeareditwouldundermineSALTandothernegotiations.The

leadingnewspaperssharedthisview.TheRomaniavisitwasattackedas

“disturbing,”andasapossiblethreattoSALT;itwasa“blunder”thatwould

unnecessarilyantagonizetheSoviets,hardentheSovietattitudeonallEast‐West

questions—andalsobestowAmericanblessingona“brutalCommunist

dictatorship.”



TheSovietsalsoreacted—ina mannerthatmadecleartheyunderstoodthe

significanceofthevisit.TheplannedattendanceofBrezhnevandKosyginatthe

rescheduledRomanianpartyconferencewascanceled.IaskedBogdanonJuly3if

hisgovernmenthadgiventheSovietsanyadvanceword.Hesaidhedidnotknow;

hethoughttheymighthavebeeninformedshortlybeforetheannouncement.

Romaniamadeitsowndecisions,hesaid.



ThePresidentarrivedinBucharestonAugust2andreceivedwhattheNew

YorkTimescalled“awarmreceptionfromhundredsofthousandsofflag‐waving

Romaniansinthelargestandmostgenuinelyfriendlywelcomeofhisglobaltour.”

Hetouredamunicipalmarketandafolkdancingschoolandjoinedinadance

withRomanianPresidentNicolaeCeauşescu.TheTimes,nowconvinced,

exclaimededitoriallyonAugust5thattheenthusiasticwelcomedemonstrated

theenormousgoodwilltheUnitedStatesenjoyedinEasternEurope;thatthe

President’sthemesofpeace,nationalsovere ignty,andpeacefulcoexistencewere

notclichéstoEasternEuropeans,whovividlyrecalledtheCzechinvasion.



TheoverwhelmingexuberanceofthereceptionaccordedNixonwasof

courseinpartinspiredandstagedbythegovernment.Butevenifthereception

hadbeenorganized,itremainedanextraordinarydemonstrationofRomania’s

independencefromtheSovietUnion.Anditwouldhavebeendifficultifnot

impossibleforanygovernmenttocreatetheemotional,joyful,humanqualityof

thepublicoutpouring.ThestreetsofBucharestwerelinedbyhundredsof

thousandsofpeopleatalltimes,waitingforamereglimpseofthePresidential

automobile.Theydidnotmerelylineupalongtheboulevardscominginfromthe

airport,oronlyaroundtheguesthousewherethePresidentstayed;theywaited

hourbyhourinacontinuousrainforthemereappearanceofNixonanywhere.It

wasprofoundlymoving,theemotionalresponseofthepeopleofaCommunist

statewhosowelcomedthisfirstchancetogreetthePresidentofanationthatfor

manyofthemstillstood,asitdidinthenineteenthcentury,asthesymbolof

democracyandhumanfreedom.



Nixon’spublicremarksinBucharestreflec tedtherecurringthemesof

UnitedStatespolicy:theimportanceofcoexistence,repudiationoftheBrezhnev

Doctrine,ourdesireto settleproblemsbyconcretenegotiations:



Weseevalueneitherintheexchangeofpolemicsnorinafalseeuphoria.Weseekthe

substanceofdétente,notitsmereatmosphere.



Weseek,insum,apeacenotofhegemoniesandnotofartificialuniformity,butapeace

inwhichthelegitimateinterestsofeacharerespectedandallaresafeguarded.



ItwasalsoapparentthatEastEuropeanleaders,notunlikeourownallies,

fearedaSoviet‐Americandealattheirexpense.Thiswasnotourpolicy;the

President’svisit—andhislaterunprecedentedvisitsto YugoslaviaandPoland—

werethebestdemonstration.



<<Contents>>



****



Conclusion

O



neoftheinnovationsoftheNixonPresidencywasthepreparationofan

annualreportonforeignpolicyinthenameofthePresident.Ihadproposed

thisinamemorandumtoNixoninthetransitionperiod.Itwastoserveasa

conceptualoutlineofthePresident’sforeignpolicy,asastatusreport ,andasan

agendaforaction.Itcouldsimultaneouslyguideourbureaucracyandinform

foreigngovernmentsaboutour thinking.



Thisidea,patternedaltertheannualDefensePostureStatementinitiated

byRobertMcNamara,createdawholehostofproblems.Tobeginwith,theState

Departmentasserte daproprietaryinterest,inspiteofthefactthatintheentire

historyoftheRepublictheStateDepartmenthadneverthoughtofissuingsucha

report.Thisledtothenowcustomarytug‐of‐warbetweenRogersandmeof

whichthemostcharitabledescriptionisthatneitherofusconductedourselves

betterwithrespecttotheannualreportthanwithrespecttoothermatters. Both

theNSCstaffandtheStateDepartmentstartedpreparingdraftswhileseeking to

concealthisfactfromeachother.Iandmystaffershadtheadvantageof

propinquitytothePresidentandmuchgreaterknowledgeofhisviews.TheState

Departmentdraftfurtherhandicappeditselfbyseekingtopleaseevery

bureaucraticfiefdominthatunwieldystructure;witheverydeskofficerinsisting

onamentionofhiscountryorcountriesofresponsibility,theStateDepartment

draftwasnotdistinguishedbyconceptualthrustortheabilitytomakeany

particularpoint.



Nixonresolvedthisdisputebymethodsthatwerebecomingtypical.He

waiteduntilRogerswasoutofthecountryonanAfricantripandthenruledthat

boththeNSCandtheStateDepartmentcouldpublishreportsbutthatthe

PresidentialonewouldappearatleastamonthbeforeState’s.Thissetoffa

franticoutburstofdraftingonthePresidentialreportwhilemyexhauste dstaff

triedtodealwithmyrevisionsoftheirdraftsandtheobjectionsofthe

bureaucracy.Thehighpointofinteragencywranglingwasreachedin1971,when

theStateDepartmentobjectedtoasentenceaboutinternationalprotectionof

endangeredspecies;ourdraftobservedwithsomeattemptatliteraryflairthat

suchcreatureswereafittopicforinternationalcooperationsincetheymoved

withoutrespecttonationalboundariesandcouldnottotallybeprotectedby

nationalaction.TheStateDepartment,evercareful,recommendedchangingthe

sentencetoclaimonlythat“some”ofthesecreaturesmovedwithout respectto

nationalboundaries.Ididnotacceptthechange,takingtheriskofoffending

somepatrioticbird.



OncethePresident’sannualreviewbecameestablished,itproducedsome

ofthemostthoughtfulgovernmentalstatementsofforeignpolicy.Tooursorrow

wenevermanagedtogetacrossitsbasicpurposeofraisingfundamental

questionsandexpressingaphilosophy.Tryaswemight,themediawouldcover

onlythesectiononVietnam,probingforhotnewsorcredibilitygaps,ignoringthe

remainderasnotnewsworthy.In1973weraninto anotherproblem.Thereport

wasissuedinearlyMay,afterayearofChineseandSovietsummitsandclimactic

Vietnamnegotiations;thedatewehadchosenweeksearlierforreleaseofthe

reportcamefourdaysaftertheresignationofHaldemanandEhrlichman.

Nevertheless,thereportsperf ormedausefulfunction.Theyservedasrough

guidestothebureaucracy.Theywereunusuallycandid.Theywereinvaluablein

conveyingnuancesofchangetoforeigngovernments.AsIwillshowinvarious

chapters,changesinattitudetowardChina,indefensepolicy,intheMiddleEast

andelsewherewereoftenforeshadowedinthePresident’sannualreports.



ThePresident’sfirstreport,publishedonFebruary18,1970,statedbluntly

that“ouroverallrelationshipwiththeUSSRremainsfarfromsatisfactory.”In

Vietnam,“tothedetrimentofthecauseofpeace,”theSovietshad“failedto

exertahelpfulinfluence ontheNorthVietnameseinParis”andborea“heavy

responsibilityforthecontinuationofthewar”becauseofitsarmssupplyofNorth

Vietnam.IntheMiddleEast,thereportchargedthat“wehavenotseenonthe

Sovietsidethatpracticalandconstructiveflexibilitywhichisnecessaryfora

successfuloutcome”;evenmore,thereportnoted“evidence…thattheSoviet

Unionseeksapositionintheareaasawholewhichwouldmakegreatpower

rivalrymorelikely.”(ThiswouldbeprovedtrueintwoMiddleEastcrisesduring 

1970.)



ThesejudgmentsreflectedtherealitythattheSovietUnionwasimmobile

in1969.But,almostimperceptibly,therewerethebeginningsofaslow

movementforward.Theforeignpolicydecisionsofanylargestateemergefroma

complicatedpatternofbureaucratic,domestic,andinternationalpressures;the

Sovietbureaucracyandpolicyprocessareespeciallytortuous.In1969theSoviets

hadtocontendwithanewUSAdministration,whichisalwaysamassive

analyticalproblemforSovietleaders,andwe,inaddition,werechanging

procedures.Operatingonabroadfrontinsimultaneousnegotiations,for

example,maynothavebeenmerelyunfamiliartotheSovietadministrative

process;itmayhavestraineditscapacity.Eventhoughtheapparatusishuge,it

narrowstoaveryfewdecision‐makersatthetop.Theirordersthenfilterback

throughanunwieldylineofcommand.Decisionstendtobemadepainstakingly,

andsincetheyputatstaketheprestigeofthetopleadershiptheyarechanged

onlywiththeutmostreluctance.In1969,furthermore,theconflictwithChina

musthaveoccupie dmuchoftheattentionspanofSovietleaders.Seriousmilitary

clashesalongtheSino‐SovietborderinMarchandinthesummerprompteda

majorpropagandabattle,probablyseriouspolicydebates,andlatertheopening

ofbordertalks.



ThedeepestreasonforSovietimmobilismin1969,however,was

undoubtedlythatconditionshadnotyetgeneratedincentivesandpenaltiesof

sufficientmagnitudetoimpeldecision.OnVietnam,theSovietsmayhavebeen

moderatelysincereintheiravowedinterestinhelpingussettlethewar,knowing

thatitobstructedUS‐Sovietrelations,butthedifficultdecisiontoexertpressure

ontheirallywouldneverbemadeintheabstract.Indeed,aslongastherisksto

US‐Sovietrelationsremainedhypothetical,andthebenefitsofanIndochina 

settlementconjectural,thelineofleastresistanceinMoscowwas

procrastination.Circumstances,inotherwords,failedtoprovidea spurtoa

Sovietdecision.Theyfacednopenaltyforevadingourrequestsforhelp.Their

warningsagainstourescalationwetookseriouslyatthetime,thoughin

retrospectIbelievethiswasamistake.Inrereadingtherelevant documentsfor

thisvolume,IamstruckbythehedgingandcautioustoneofSovietstatements.

Theydisparagedescalationas“solvingnothing,”as“aggravatingtheinternational

situation,”asbeinginageneralway“dangerous.”AtnotimedidtheSovietseven

approachthehintofathreat.OnoneoccasionDobryninpointedoutthatifwe

resumedbombingofHanoiandHaiphong,haltedbyPresidentJohnsonin1968,

ChineseengineerbattalionswithdrawnafewyearsearliermightreenterVietnam,

whichwouldincreaseChineseinfluenceinHanoi.Isaid,“Ifyoucanlivewithit,we

can”;Dobryninwassilent.



Inretrospectitisclearthatonlyifweposedspecifictangiblerisksto 

importantSovietinterestswouldtheSovietshaveanincentivetoexertpressure

ontheirmonomaniacalclientsinHanoi.Offeringpositiveinducementswould

help,butunlesscombinedwithrisksposedbyus,inducementswouldberejected

astooembarrassingtoSovietstandingintheCommunist world.Whenwefinally

didobtainSoviethelpin1972,itwasthroughjustsuchacombinationof

pressuresandincentives.ButbeforetheNorthVietnameseEasteroffensiveof

1972wewereneverpreparedtofacethedomesticandinternational

consequencesofsuchacourse.



IfthepenaltieswereuncleartotheSovietleadership,soweretherewards.

ThePresidentstatedrepeatedlythatnegotiationswouldaccelerateintheMiddle

EastonceVietnamwassettled;Ireinforcedhiscomments.Butwewerenotina

positiontoanswerinprecisetermsDobrynin’squestiontomeonMay14:

“Supposingthewarweresettled,howwouldyougoaboutimprovingrelations? ”

ThebestanswerIcouldcomeupwithwasasummitandanunspecifiedpromise

toimprovetrade.IntheMiddleEastourinterestrancountertoMoscow’s;itwas

thegoalofourstrategy,afterall,toreduceSovietinfluenceintheMiddleEast,

thatoftheSovietstoenhanceoratleasttopreserveit.Norwerewepreparedto

tradethatMiddleEastinterestforasettlementinVietnam.



NodoubtdomesticpoliticsinAmericaencouragedSoviettendenciesto

procrastinate.TheearlyfearthatNixonwouldembarkonmassiverearmament

wassoonsupersededbyawarenessthatinthefaceofmountingCongressional

oppositiontheAdministrationwouldbeluckytomaintaintheexistingdefense

budget.Newmilitaryprogramswerefiercelyattacked;some passedonlybythe

thinnestofmargins;oncetheywereauthorizedtheirimplementationwas

systematicallywhittleddownandfundsforthemreducedannually.Allpressures

wereinthedirectionof“reorderingpriorities”awayfromdefense.Nordidit

seemprobablethatAmerica’sallieswouldsupportahigh‐riskcourseinVietnam.

ThusagaintheSovietshadlittlereasontobeforthcoming.



ButwhilewemayhavebeentoooptimisticaboutUS‐Sovietrelationsatthe

beginningof1969,webegantolaythebasisforulti mateprogressbyourmoves

inotherareas—demonstratingthevalidityoflinkage.Wecreatedthestrategy

thatledtothereversalofalliancesintheMiddleEast.Webegantomove

decisivelytowardChina.OurcourseinVietnammadeSoviethelpdispensablefor

threeyearsandthenachievablein1972.WestrengthenedAlliancerelations.

Throughturmoilandtensions,wegotacrosstotheSovietsthatifourstylewas

sober,ourpolicywouldbeseriousanddeliberateandattherightmomentbold.



IsentthePresidentananalysisofSovietpolicyattheendof1969,whichI

preparedwiththehelpofHalSonnenfeldtandBillHylandofmystaff.Itbeganby

rejectingthepropositionthatSovietpolicynecessarilyfollowedamasterplan:



ItisalwaystemptingtoarrangediverseSovietmovesintoagranddesign.Themore

esotericbrandsofKremlinologyoftenpurporttoseeeachandeverymoveaspartofthe

carefullyorchestratedscoreinwhicheventsinexorablymovetothegrandfinale.



Experiencehasshownthatthishasrarelyifeverbeenthecase.FromtheCubanmissile

crisis,throughtheArab‐Israeliwar,totheinvasionofCzechoslovakia,therehasbeenalarge

elementofimprovisationinSovietpolicy.



Isuspectedthatthiswasthecaseatpresent.TheKremlinhadseveralballs

intheair.ButSovietactionsseemedresponsestoparticularsituations.Some

analystssawaclose tacticalconnectionbetweentheSino‐Soviettalksandthe

SovietconductofSALT.BytyingtheUnitedStatesupinprolongedSALT

negotiations,theSovietscouldexploittheappeara nceofSoviet‐American

collusionagainstChina.ThemainproblemwiththistheorywasthattheSoviet

positioninSALTmadegoodsensewithoutreferencetotheChinesesituation,and

thedeteriorationoftheChinesetalkscouldeasilybeexplainedonthemeritsof

theissues.TheSovietshadbeennoncommittalinSALTprincipallytoexplorethe

terrainasweweredoing,andalsotodetermineto whatdegreewewereunder

domesticpressuretomakeconcessionsorunilateralcutbacksinourmilitary

programs.TheChinesewererespondingtoSovietmilitarypressuresbyfeelers

towardus.Thus,iftheSovietsdesignedtheirSALTmovesto impresstheChinese,

theysucceededtosomeextent,buttheresultmightnothavebeentoSoviet

liking;itmight,infact,havespeededupChinesecontactswithus.InEurope,

insteadoftakingaconciliatorylineinordertofreetheirenergiestodealwith

China,theSovietsweredrivinga hardbargainininitialtalkswithWillyBrandt’s

newgovernment—largelybecausetheevidentyearninginWesternEuropefor

détenteseemedtoprovideanopportunityforcheapgainsthroughintransigence.



Myanalysisconcluded:“Insum,theredoesnotseemtobeanysingle

unifyingthreadtoSovietpolicy.”



Beforethisunifyingthreadcoulddevelop,theSovietleadershadprobedin

severaldirectionsatonce.Onlyafterwehadresistedinsomebitter

confrontationsthroughout1970and1971didourrelationstakeaturnforthe

better.

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<<Contents>>

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