Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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Theprincipleofconcreteness.Wewouldinsistthatanynegotiations

betweentheUnitedStatesandtheSovietUniondealwithspecificcausesof

tensionsratherthangeneralatmospherics.Summitmeetings,iftheyweretobe

meaningful,hadtobewellpreparedandreflectnegotiationsthathadalready

mademajorprogressindiplomaticchannels.Wewouldtakeseriouslythe

ideologicalcommitmentofSovietleaders;wewouldnotdeludeourselvesabout

theincompatibleinterestsbetweenourtwocountriesinmanyareas.Wewould

notpretendthatgoodpersonalrelationsorsentimentalrhetoricwouldendthe

tensionsofthepostwarperiod.Butwewerepreparedtoexploreareasof

commonconcernandtomakepreciseagreementsbasedonstrictreciprocity.



Theprincipleofrestraint.Reasonablerelationsbetweenthesuperpowers

couldnotsurvivetheconstantattempttopursueunilateraladvantagesand

exploitareasofcrisis.WeweredeterminedtoresistSovietadventures;atthe

sametimewewerepreparedtonegotiateaboutagenuineeasingoftensions.We

wouldnotholdstillforadétentedesignedtolullpotentialvictims;wewere

preparedforadétentebasedonmutualrestraint.Wewouldpursue acarrot‐and‐

stickapproach,readytoimposepenaltiesforadventurism,willingtoexpand

relationsinthecontextofresponsiblebehavior.



Theprincipleoflinkage.Weinsistedthatprogressinsuperpowerrelations,

tobereal,hadtobemadeonabroadfront.Eventsindifferentpartsoftheworld,

inourview,wererelatedtoeachother;evenmoreso,Sovietconductindifferent

partsoftheworld.Weproceededfromthepremisethattoseparateissuesinto

distinctcompartmentswouldencouragetheSovietleaderstobelievethatthey

couldusecooperationinoneareaasasafetyvalvewhilestrivingforunilateral

advantageselsewhere.Thiswasunacceptable.Nixonexpressedthisviewathis

veryfirstpressconferenceonJanuary27,1969.Strategicarmslimitationtalks

withtheSovietUnionwouldbemoreproductive,hesaid,iftheywereconducted

“inawayandatatimethatwillpromote,ifpossible,progressonoutstanding

politicalproblemsatthesametime.”InabriefingforreportersonFebruary6,I

usedtheterm“linkage”explicitly:“Totakethequestionofthelinkagebetween

thepoliticalandthestrategicenvironment…[thePresident]…wouldliketodeal

withtheproblemofpeaceontheentirefrontinwhichpeaceischallengedand

notonlyonthemilitaryone.”



SostrongisthepragmatictraditionofAmericanpoliticalthoughtthatthis

conceptoflinkagewaswidelychallengedin1969.Itwasthoughttobe an

idiosyncrasy,agratuitousdevicetodelayarmscontrolnegotiations.Ithassince

beenrepudiatedasifitreflectedthepolicypreferenceofaparticular

administration.Inourview,linkageexistedintwoforms:first,whenadiplomat

deliberatelylinkstwoseparateobjectivesinanegotiation,usingoneasleverage

ontheother;orbyvirtueofreality,becauseinaninterdependentworldthe

actionsofamajorpowerareinevita blyrelatedandhaveconsequencesbeyond

theissueorregionimmediate lyconcerned.



ThenewAdministrationsometimesresortedtolinkageinthefirstsense;

forexample,whenwemadeprogressinsettlingtheVietnamwarsomething ofa

conditionforadvanceinareasofinteresttotheSoviets,suchastheMiddleEast,

trade,orarmslimitation.Butinthefarmoreimportantsense,linkagewasa 

reality,notadecision.DisplaysofAmericanimpotenceinonepartoftheworld,

suchasAsiaorAfrica,wouldinevitablyerodeourcredibilityinotherpartsofthe

world,suchastheMiddleEast.(Thiswaswhywewereso,determinedthatour

withdrawalfromVietnamoccurnotasacollapsebutasanAmericanstrategy.)

Ourpostureinarmscontrolnegotiationscouldnotbeseparatedfromthe

resultingmilitarybalance,norfromourresponsibilitiesasthemajormilitary

powerofaglobalsystemofalliances.Bythesametoken,armslimitationcould

almostcertainlynotsurviveaperiodofgrowinginternationaltensions.Wesaw

linkage,inshort,assynonymouswithanoverallstrategicandgeopoliticalview.

Toignoretheinterconnectionofeventswastounderminethecoherenceofall

policy.



Linkage,however,isnotanaturalconceptforAmericans,whohave

traditionallyperceivedforeignpolicyasanepisodic enterprise.Ourbureaucratic

organizations,dividedintoregionalandfunctionalbureaus,andindeedour

academictraditionofspecializationcompoundthetendencyto

compartmentalize.Americanpragmatismproducesapenchantforexamining

issuesseparately:tosolveproblemsontheirmerits,withoutasenseoftimeor

contextoroftheseamlesswebofreality.AndtheAmericanlegaltradition

encouragesrigidattentiontothe“factsofthecase,”adistrustofabstractions.



Yetinforeignpolicythereisnoescapingtheneedforanintegrating

conceptualframework.Indomesticaffairsnewdeparturesaredefinedbythe

legislativeprocess;dramaticinitiativesmaybetheonlywaytolaunchanew

program.Inforeignpolicythemostimportantinitiativesrequirepainstaking

preparation;resultstakemonthsoryearstoemerge.Successrequire sasenseof

history,anunderstandingofmanifoldforcesnotwithinourcontrol,andabroad

viewofthefabricofevents.Thetestofdomesticpolicyisthe meritofalaw;that

offoreignpolicy,nuancesandinterrelations.



Themostdifficultchallengeforapolicymakerinforeignaffairsisto

establishpriorities.Aconceptualframew ork—which“links”events—isan

essentialtool.Theabsenceoflinkageproducesexactlytheoppositeoffreedomof

action;policymakersareforcedtorespondtoparochialinterests,buffetedby

pressureswithoutafixedcompass.TheSecretaryofStatebecomesthecaptiveof

hisgeographicbureaus;thePresidentisdrivenexcessivelybyhisagencies.Both

runtheriskofbecomingprisonersofevents.



Linkage,therefore,wasanotheroftheattemptsof thenewAdministration

tofreeourforeignpolicyfromoscillationsbetweenoverextensionandisolation

andtogrounditinafirmconceptionofthenationalinterest.



<<Contents>>

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

PublicandCongressionalAttitudes:ASpringFlurry



NEofthebizarreelementsoftheelectionofRichardNixonwasthatmanyof

thosewhohadfoughthimbecauseofhisstridentopposition toCommunism

shouldinterprethiselectionasamandatefornewoverturestotheSovietUnion.

TheNixonAdministrationwasgreetedwithabarrageofadvicetomoveforward

rapidlytoimproverelations withtheSovietUnion.Nixonwassoonfoundwanting

inthisregard,toosuspiciousofSovietintentions,tooobsessedwithmilitary

strength,tooresistanttothenecessitiesofdétente.

O



A“get‐acquainted”summitwasoneproposal;itspurposewouldbeto

initiatethestrategicarmstalksthattheJohnsonAdministrationhadprepared,

andtoimprovetheclimateofpersonalrelations.Thiswaswidelyespousedby,

amongothers,ZbigniewBrzezinski,whowrotethata“usefuldevice—both

symbolicallyandpractically—wouldbetoinitiatethepracticeofholdingannually

aninformaltwo‐dayworkingdiscussio nmeetingbetweenAmericanandSoviet

headsofgovernments…Themeetingneednotalwayshaveaformalagenda…Its

purposewouldbetoprovidetheheadsofthe…twoleadingnuclearpowerswith

aregularopportunityforpersonalexchangeofviewsandforthemaintenanceof

personalcontact.”



AcampaignbegantourgetheAdministrationto removethebarriersto

East‐Westtradeandusethepromiseofanexpandedeconomicrelationshipas

thewedgetoopenapoliticaldialogue.Thetwosuperpowershadincreasingly

complementaryeconomicinterestsandthese,itwasargued,coulderodepolitical

distrust.MarshallShulman,aprominentexpertontheSovietUnion,wrote:

“Thesecommoninterestsmaynotdissolvethedifferencesthatnowdrivethe

Soviet‐Americancompetition,buttheymayintimecometomakethese

differencesseemlessimportant.”

ApaneloftheUnitedNationsAssociation

chairedbyArthurGoldbergandconsistingofseveralexpertsissuedareporton

February1,1969—barelyfivemonthsafterCzechoslovakia—urgingtheeasingof

restrictionsonEast‐Westtradeas“amatterofmajorpriority.”TheCongresstook

upthecall.HearingshadbeenheldintheSenateduring1968andanewseriesof

hearingswereheldonthevirtuesofgreatertradewiththeSovietUnion.



Armscontrol,ofcourse,wasseenalmostuniversallyasanareafora

breakthrough:firstbecauseofthemutualityofinterestinavoidingnuclearwar,

andsecondbecausethelevelsofstrategicforceswerethoughttoberoughly

equalin1969.ACouncilonForeignRelationsstudygroupchairedbyCarlKaysen

(deputynationalsecurityadviserintheKennedyAdministration)andjoinedby

manyoftheforemostacademicspecialistsonarmscontrolsentthePresident‐

electareportinJanuary1969urginganearlystrategicarmslimitationagreement

as“imperative.”Itarguedthatarareopportunitymightslipaway,andcalledfora

unilateralmoratoriumonAmericandeploymentofantiballisticmissiles(ABMs)

andmultipleindependentlytargetablereentryvehicles(MIRVs) inordertomake

astrategicarmslimitationagreementpossible.TheUnitedNationsAssociation

panelcitedaboveurged“thenecessaryandurgentearlyinitiationofbilateral

strategicmissilenegotiationswiththeSovietUnion.”



InEurope,atendencyemerged,intensifiedtosomeextentbyourVietnam

involvement,todistanceitselfsomewhatfromAmericanpolicytowardtheSoviet

Union.DeGaullehadpioneeredindoingbusinessbilatera llywiththeUSSR;he

visitedMoscowin1966.BritishPrimeMinistersofbothpartieshadposedatthe

Kremlininastrakhanhatstoshowtheirc ommitmenttopeace.InWestGermany,

evenbeforeWillyBrandt’saccessionasChancellorin1969,theGrandCoalitionof

whichBrandtwasForeignMinisterthawedGermany’searlierrigidstancetoward

EasternEuropeandengagedindirecttalkswiththeSovietUnion.Themorerigid

thepostureoftheUnitedStatestowardtheSovietUnion,thegreaterthe

temptationofalliedleaderstoplaytheroleof“bridge”betweenEastandWest.It

wastemptingtoEuropeanleaderstoassuretheirpublicsthattheywouldnot

allowAmericanrecklessnesstoproduceaworldwar.Alliedcountriesfoundit

prudenttoshowinterestinmutualforcereductionsandthelong‐standingSoviet

proposalofaEuropeanSecurityConference.Inthesecircumstancestheprospect

wasrealthata“differentialdétente”woulddevelop;theSovietUnioncouldplay

totheseattitudesinEuropewhileremainingintransigentonglobalissuesof

concerntous,thusdrivingawedgebetweenusandourallies.



TheoverwhelmingimpulsethroughouttheWest,intheUnitedStatesas

wellasinEurope,wastoresumetheactivepursuitofdétenteandnottoallow

theCzechinvasiontodisruptit.PresidentJohnsondeclaredinaspeechtoB’nai

B’rithonSeptember10,1968,barelythreeweeksafterCzechoslovakia:“We

hope—andweshallstrive—tomakethissetbackaverytemporaryone.” Itwas

strangethatinthewakeofCzechoslovakiaitwasAmericathatwasaskedto

demonstrateitsgoodfaith.Norwasitclearwhatconcretefactsjustifiedthe

undoubtedsenseofhopeandurgencysummedupbyaWashingtonStareditorial

whichconcludedonMarch9that“Ifthereistobeatimefordétentethisisit.”In

thisatmospheretheSovietUnionchoseInaugurationDaytospeakoutfor

immediatecommencementofstrategicarmslimitationtalks(whichcametobe

referredtoasSALT).



ThePresidentwasnotwillingtobestampeded.Hewasdeterminedto

impressontheSovietleadersthatwewouldnotnegotiatesimplytocreatea

betteratmosphere,wouldnotmeetatthesummitwithoutpreparationandthe

prospectofsomegenuineachievements,andwouldnotacceptaprocessinwhich

theSovietUnioncoulddeterminetheagendaofthe conferences.Isharedthese

views.Weneededtimetodefineourpurposes,todevelopourstrategy,andto

determineSovietattitudesonthemattersweconsideredvital.Wedidnotthink

thattheopportunitywouldproveasfleetingastheadvocatesofimmediatetalks

impliedorthatSovietleaderswouldreactsopetulantly.Infact,webelievedthe

perfectwaytowreckanegotiationwastoenteritunpreparedortolettheSoviet

leadersbelievethatwecouldbepressuredbyprop aganda.



Infact,wewerequitewillingtoenternegotiations,perhapsof

unprecedentedscope,aimingforfundamentalsettlements.Butwewantedthese

negotiationstoreflectadeliberatestrategy,notareactiontoSovietmaneuvers;

wethoughtitessentialtocreatethecorrectbalanceofincentives.InmyFebruary

6backgroundbriefingtothepressIstressedtheimportanceoflinkage:“Whatwe

haveaskedfor…isthatthereshouldbesomeindicationofawillingnesstolower

thelevelofpoliticaltensions,somedemonstrationofsomethingotherthan

wordsthattogetherwithreducingthecompetitiononarmstherewillbean

attempttoreducetheconflictinthepoliticalfields. ”Inconcretetermsthismeant

thatwewouldnotignore,asourpredecessorshaddone,theroleoftheSoviet

UnioninmakingthewarinVietnampossible.Norwouldwerefrainfromseeking

toexploitSovietanxieties(forexample,aboutChina)tomoveittowardamore

broadlyaccommodating policy.



ButthepublicandCongressionaltemperwasdecidedlydifferent.Unusual

forthehoneymoonperiodofaPresident’stermwasthebarrageofcriticismof

theconceptoflinkageandthePresident’sstrategytowardtheSovietUniononce

thesebecameapparent.“ThemissiletalksevidentlycanstartatMr.Nixon’s

convenience,”theWashingtonPosteditorializedonedayaftertheInauguration.

“Theyofferhimanimmediateopportunity,hisfirst,toapplyhisexpressedbelief

thatthe‘eraofconfrontation’inEast‐Westrelationshasgivenwaytoan‘eraof

negotiations’…Histestinginthehighestrolehehasstakedoutforhimself,thatof

‘peacemaker,’isuponhim.”Timemagazineinitspost‐inauguralissue(January

31)raisedexpectationsofearlyprogress:“TheRussianschoseNixon’s

inaugurationdaytoprodtheUS—andtoemphasizeto theworldthatthenext

moveisuptoWashington…Some diplomatsanddisarmamentexpertsin

WashingtonbelievethatNixonandRogershavealreadyconcludedthattalks

shouldbeheld—andthataconferencemayactuallybeginintwotofour

months.”



But,sothehelpfuladviceran,ifthisopportunitywastobeseized,the

openingfortalkshadtobefreedofanypreconditionsorlinkage.“ThePresident

hasindicated,”editorializedtheNewYorkTimesonFebruary18,



thatheintendstoreverseAmericanpolicyofthepastdozenyearsbylinkingprojectedSoviet‐

Americannegotiationsonstrategicarmscontrolwiththoseonpoliticalissues.Butnothingis

morelikelytoalarmtheNATOallies…[T]hekindofacross‐the‐boardnegotiationwiththe

SovietUnionthatheseemstohaveinmind,coveringanumberofEast‐Westissues,

undoubtedlywouldarouseconcerninmostWestEuropeancountriesjustwhenMr.Nixonis

seekingtogaintheirconfidence.Moreover,East‐Westpoliticalissues,suchastheMiddleEast,

VietnamandGermany,willbedifficulttosettle,whilestrategicarmsissuesareripefor

resolution.



(Withinmonthsourallieswereto bealarmedpreciselybytheprospectof

unlinkingtheissues.)TheWashingtonPostweighedinwithasimilarthemeon

April5:



PresidentNixonhasgottostopdawdlingandmovequicklyintomissiletalkswiththe

Russians.ThegraceperiodallowedanewPresidenttobebriefedandtosethisowntacticsis

over.YettheNixonAdministrationisstillfutzingaround…Well,when?TheRussianshavebeen

readyalmostayear.



Andonlinkage:



RealityistoocomplexandstickytopermitanyPresidenttobelievehecanlineupso

manydifferentducksinarow.Armscontrolhasavalueandurgencyentirelyapartfromthe

statusofpoliticalissues.



Moreover,thewholehistoryofEast‐Westrelationswarnsagainstlinkage.



Itwas“moreurgentthanever”tostartthetalks,wroteBusinessWeekon

March22.“TheNixonAdministrationisdraggingitsfeet,”R.H.Shackfordofthe

Scripps‐HowardnewspapershadwrittenonFebruary19.TheNewYorkPost

demandedonMarch27thattheAdministration“cease stalling forthwith.”



LeadingSenatorsandotherpublicfiguresstruckthesamethemes;our

predecessorsgaveusaperiodofgracelasting afewweeksatmost.SenatorFrank

ChurchofIdahoontheSenateflooronFebruary4warnedthatwehadtocome

totherescueofKremlin“doves”:“Thepositionandcredibilityofthosewithinthe

SovietGovernmentwhoargueformissiletalkswillbedamaged,perhapsbeyond

repair,ifPresidentNixonlist ensto thoseintheUnitedStateswhoargueagainst

immediatetalksonmissilelimitation.”SenatorAlbertGoreofTennesseeopened

hearingsofhisdisarmamentsubcommitteeinearlyMarchbydeclaring:“Itmay

bethatwehaveanunparalleledopportunitytoarrestadevelopingescalationof

anothernucleararmamentsrace.”FormerDefenseSecretaryClarkClifford,who

twomonthsearlierhadsubmittedadefensebudgetcontainingfundsforboth

ABMdefenseandMIRVs,madeaspeechinmid‐Marchcallingforafreezeinthe

programshehadhimselfproposed:“Thehardfactisthatwemayneveragain

expecttobeinasfavorableapositionaswenowenjoyforentryintotalksabout

afreezeinstrategicnucleararmaments.Technologicaldevelopmentsmaywell

makeanyarmslimitationagreementmoredifficulttodevelopandenforceayear

fromnow,or6monthsfromnow,thanitistoday.”



Theseviewsfoundr esonancewithinthebureaucracy.Diplomatsarealways

infavorofnegotiations;theyarethelifebloodoftheprofession.Sovietaffairsin

theStateDepartmenthadattractedsomeofourmostdistinguishedForeign

ServiceOfficers,menlikeLlewellynThompson,CharlesBohlen,andGeorge

Kennan.Theirshadbeenalittleappreciatedspecialty.Theyhadsoughttokeep

aliveaninterestintheSovietrelationshipduringaperiodwhenthebare

recognitionoftheSovietUnion(notaccomplisheduntil1933)seemedthe

ultimatelimitforUnitedStatesdiplomacy.Theywereappalledwhenduringthe

SecondWorldWaruncriticalrejectionofallthingsSovietgavewayto

undiscriminatingacceptance.Theywroteprescientanalysesonthedynamicsof

Sovietsocietyduringthatperiod.GeorgeKennancameasclosetoauthoringthe

diplomaticdoctrineofhiseraasanydiplomatinourhistory.Perhapsitwas

inevitablethatalifetimeofspecializationwouldproduceacommitmenttoUS‐

Sovietrelationshipsthatwasnot withoutitsemotionalcomponent.Having

sufferedthroughdecadeswhencommunicationswerepracticallycutoff,partly

bytheseverityofourapproachbutaboveallbytheparanoiaoftheSoviet

leadershipunderStalin,thesediplomatssawintheperiodicpost‐Stalinpeace

offensivesthebeginningatlastoftherealizationofhopesofalifetime.



Whenwecameintooffice,LlewellynThompson,inparticular,thensenior

StateDepartmentadviseronSovietaffairs,urgedtherapidacceptanceofSoviet

overtureslestthebalanceofforceswithintheKremlinshiftagaintoahardline.It

didnotstemthetidethatNixonataNationalSecurityCouncilmeetingonJanuary

25stressedhisdeterminationtocontrolnegotiations withtheSovietUnionfrom

theWhiteHouse.ItdidnotaffectthebureaucraticmomentumthatthePresident

usedeveryopportunitytoemphasizethathedidnotwishtocommithimselftoa

specificdatefortalksonarmslimitationuntilhehadexploredSoviet

cooperativenessonpoliticalissues,especiallyVietnam.



TheNSCproceduresthatsupposedlyestablishedmydictatorialcontrol

werenotableinthisinstancetoproduceanycohere ntapproachorsettledpolicy.

LatethatmonthIaskedforastudyofalternativeapproachesandviews“onthe

natureofU.S.‐Sovietrelations…intheirbroadestsense.”Itresultedina synthetic

optionspaperpreparedbytheStateDepartmentwhich,inafashionsoonto

becomestandard,bracketedtheonlyviableoption,“LimitedAdversary

Relationship,”betweentwoobviouslyphonyones,hostilityandall‐out

conciliation,giventhedefinitionof“LimitedAdversaryRelationship”wasworded

insuchawayastopermiteachagencytopursueitspreferencesunimpeded.A

principalproblemwastheflatrefusalofthePresidenttoconfronthisadvisers 

directlyonthecentralquestion.Therenevertookplaceameetingatwhichthe

issuewasformallythrashedoutandsettledbecauseNixonwantedtoavoida

face‐to‐faceconfrontationwithhisSecretaryofState.Instead,Nixonsentouta

letteronFebruary4toRogers,Laird,andHelms—butreallyintendedforRogers—

thatreiteratedlinkageasofficialpolicy:



Ibelievethatthetoneofourpublicandprivatediscourseaboutandwith

theSovietUnionshouldbecalm,courteousandnon‐polemical…



Ibelievethatthebasisforaviablesettlementisamutualrecognitionofourvital

interests.WemustrecognizethattheSovietUnionhasinterests;inthepresentcircumstances

wecannotbuttakeaccountofthemindefiningourown.WeshouldleavetheSovietleadership

innodoubtthatweexpectthemtoadoptasimilarapproachtowardus....Inthepast,we

haveoftenattemptedtosettlethingsinafitofenthusiasm,relyingonpersonaldiplomacy.But

the“spirit”thatpermeatedvariousmeetingslackedasolidbasisofmutualinterest,and

therefore,everysummitmeetingwasfollowedbyacrisisinlessthanayear.



Iamconvincedthatthegreatissuesarefundamentallyinterrelated.Idonotmeanthis

toestablishartificiallinkagesbetweenspecificelementsofoneoranotherissueorbetween

tacticalstepsthatwemayelecttotake.ButIdobelievethatcrisisorconfrontationinoneplace

andrealcooperationinanothercannotlongbesustainedsimultaneously.Irecognizethatthe

previousAdministrationtooktheviewthatwhenweperceiveamutualinterestonanissue 

withtheUSSR,weshouldpursueagreementandattempttoinsulateitasmuchaspossible

fromtheupsanddownsofconflictselsewhere.Thismaywellbesoundonnumerousbilateral

andpracticalmatterssuchasculturalorscientificexchanges.But,onthecrucialissuesofour

day,Ibelievewemustseektoadvanceonafrontatleastbroadenoughtomakeclearthatwe

seesomerelationshipbetweenpoliticalandmilitaryissues.IbelievethattheSovietleaders

shouldbebroughttounderstandthattheycannotexpecttoreapthebenefitsofcooperationin

oneareawhileseekingtotakeadvantageoftensionorconfrontationelsewhere.Suchacourse

involvesthedangerthattheSovietswillusetalksonarmsasasafetyvalveonintransigence

elsewhere…



…IwouldliketoillustratewhatIhaveinmindinonecaseofimmediateandwidespread

interest—theproposedtalksonstrategicweapons.Ibelieveourdecisiononwhenandhowto

proceeddoesnotdependexclusivelyonourreviewofthepurelymilitaryandtechnicalissues,

althoughtheseareofkeyimportance.Thisdecisionshouldalsobetakeninthelightofthe

prevailingpoliticalcontextand,inparticular,inlightofprogresstowardstabilizingtheexplosive

MiddleEastsituation,andinlightoftheParistalks[onVietnam].IbelieveIshouldretainthe

freedomtoensure,totheextentthatwehavecontroloverit,thatthetimingoftalkswiththe

SovietUniononstrategicweaponsisoptimal.Thismay,infact,meandelaybeyondthat

requiredforourreviewofthetechnicalissues.Indeed,itmeansthatweshould—atleastinour

publicposition—keepopentheoptionthattheremaybenotalksatall.



TheletterstatedwhatinfactNixoncarriedout,ifwithmanydetours.But

sincetheletterwasassumed—quitecorrectly—tohavebeendraftedbymystaff

andme,itwasdismissedasreflecting themalignimpactofthePresident’s

adviser.TheStateDepartment wasmosteagerforliberalizingEast‐Westtrade

unilaterally,forinjectingusintotheMiddleEastconflictinawaythatmagnified

ratherthanreducedSovietinfluence,andaboveallforbeginningSALTassoonas

possible.AnyWhiteHousedir ectivetothecontrarywasinterpretedwiththe

widestpossiblelatitudeifitwasnotignoredaltogether.(Inthiscasetheletter,

beingapersonalonetotheCabinetSecretaries,undoubtedlyneverreachedthe

bureaucracy.)



InspiteofthePresident’sseeminglyexplicitandunambiguousstate ment

thathebelievedinlinkageandwasnotyetcommittedtotheunqualifiedopening

ofSALT,onMarch19ourdisarmamentnegotiatorGerardC.SmithtoldhisSoviet

counterpartAlexeiRoshchininGenevathatthestartofSALT“neednotbetied,in

somesortofpackageformula,tothesettlementofspecificinternational

problems.”OnMarch27SecretaryofStateRogerstestifiedbeforetheSenate

ForeignRelationsCommitteethat“wehopesuchtalkscanbeginwithinthenext

fewmonths…WehavealreadyagreedwiththeSovietUnionthatwewillhave

thesetalksfairlysoon.”AskedatanApril 7pressconferencewhethersomething

stoodinthewayofSALT,Rogersreplied:“No,thereisnothingthatstandsinthe

way,andtheycangoforwardsoon.Weareintheprocessofpreparingforthem

now,andweexpecttheywillbegininthelatespringorearlysummer.”AState

DepartmentdraftforthePresident’saddresstotheNorthAtlanticCouncilfor