Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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AmericanstrategicforcesthatwerenotpartofNATO.Buttheissueshadbeen

defined,andwewouldhavetherestofthePresidencytoshapetheanswers.

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V

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OpeningMoveswithMoscow

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IntroductiontoAnatolyDobrynin

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heEmbassyoftheSovietUnionintheUnitedStateswasastatelyprivate

mansionwhenitwasbuiltattheturnofthecentury.Butithaslostits

garden.Tallmodernofficebuildingspeerdowncondescendinglyatthis

squat,Victorianintruderwhichisnowneitherfunctionalnorelegant.Onitsroof

isalushforestofradioantennae.Theseparaphernaliasuggesteitheran

extraordinaryinterestinwatchingAmericantelevisiononthepartofSoviet

Embassyemployees,orelseamoreutilitarianpurposesuchassatisfyingan

unquenchablefascinationwithAmericantelephonecalls.

T

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AsoneenterstheEmbassyonefacesalongcorridorattheendofwhicha

Sovietsecurityofficerismonitoringclosed‐circuittelevisionscreens.Onthe

secondfloorareseverallarge,high‐ceilingedroomsthatwerequiterundown

untiltheyweregivenanewcoatofpaintandhadtheirgildingrestoredinhonor

ofLeonidBrezhnev’svisitin1973.Theseroomswereundoubtedlythedrawing

roomswhenthecapitalistownersstillusedtheresidence.Nowtheyareusedonly

forlargereceptionsordinners.



OnFebruary14,1969,Iwasinvitedtomyfirstofficialreceptionatthe

SovietEmbassy.ThisonewasinhonorofGeorgiArbatov,headofaSoviet

researchinstitutespecializinginstudyingtheUnitedStates.Arbatovwasafaithful

expounderoftheKremlinline,whomIhadmetatvariousinternational

conferencesonarmscontrolwhenIwasstillaprofessor.Heknewmuchabout

Americaandwasskillfulinadjustinghisargumentstotheprevailingfashions.He

wasespeciallysubtleinplayingtotheinexhaustiblemasochismofAmerican

intellectualswhotookitasanarticleoffaiththateverydifficultyinUS‐Soviet

relationshadtobecausedbyAmericanstupidityorintransige nce.Hewas

endlesslyingeniousindemonstratinghowAmericanrebuffswerefrustratingthe

peaceful,sensitiveleadersintheKremlin,whowerebeingdrivenrelucta ntlyby

ourinflexibilityintoconflictsthatoffendedtheirinherentlygentlenatures.



OnthisFebruaryeveningtheEmbassyroomswerepackedwiththeusual

Washingtoncocktailcrowd—middle‐levelofficials,somelobbyists,anoccasional

Congressman.ItwasnotabrilliantassemblybyWashingtonstandards.The

Ambassador,AnatolyDobrynin,wasinhisapartmentupstairs,recuperatingfrom

aboutofflu,andthehostwastheSovietchargéd’affaires,YuriChernyakov.



IsaidhellotoArbatov,mingledabit,andwasbeginningtobeatmyretreat

whenajuniorSovietofficialtuggedatmysleeve.HeaskedwhetherIcouldspare

afewmomentsforhischief.



Itwasourfirstmeeting.IfoundDobryninrobedinadressinggowninthe

secondlivingroomofhissmallapartment,whichmusthavebeenthesleeping

quartersintheoriginaldesign.Twomedium‐sizedlivingroomsopenoneontothe

other,furnishedalmostidenticallyintheoverstuffedheavyCentralEuropean

mannerIrememberedfrommyyouthinGermany.Dobryningreetedmewith

smiling,watchfuleyesandthebluffconfidentmannerofonewho hadtakenthe

measureofhisshareofseniorAmericanofficialsinhisday.Hesuggestedthat

sincewewouldworktogethercloselywecalleachotherbyourfirstnames.From

thenon,hewas“Anatol”andIwas“Henry”(ormoreoften“Khenry,”sincethe

Russianlanguagehasno“h”sound).[

WespokeinEnglish.Ididnotmakefunofhim

becausehespokewithanaccent.]HesaidthathehadjustreturnedfromtheSoviet

UnionfromamedicalcheckupinthesamesanitariumfrequentedbyBrezhnev,

Kosygin,andPodgorny.Heleftopenwhethertheyhadbeentherewithhimor

whetherhehadseenthemintheKremlin.Hesaidhehadanoralmessagefrom

hisleadersthathewantedtodeliverpersonallyto thenewPresident.Hetoldme

thathehadbeeninWashingtonsince1962andhadexperiencedmanycrises.

Throughout,hehadmaintainedarelationshipofpersonalconfidencewiththe

seniorofficials;hehopedtodothesamewiththenewAdministration,whatever

thefluctuationsofofficialrelations.Hemusedthatgreatopportunitieshadbeen

lostinSoviet‐Americanaffairs,especia llybetween1959and1963.Hehadbeen

headoftheAmericandivisionoftheSovietForeignMinistryduringthatperiod,

andheknewthatKhrushchevseriouslywantedanaccommodationwiththe

UnitedStates.Thechancehadbeenlostthen;wemustnotlosetheopportunities

athandtoday.



ItoldDobryninthattheNixonAdministrationwaspreparedtorelax

tensionsonthebasisofreciprocity.Butwedidnotbelievethatthesetensions

wereduetomisunderstandings.Theyarosefromrealcauses,whichhadtobe

dealtwithifrealprogressweretobemade.Dobrynin’smentionofthe1959‐1963

periodasalostopportunity,I pointedout,wasboundtosoundstrangeto

Americanears.Thatwas,afterall,thelimeoftwoBerlinultimatums,

Khrushchev’sbrutalbehaviortowardKennedyinVienna,theCubanmissilecrisis,

andtheSovietUnion’sunilateralbreachofthemoratoriumonnucleartesting.If

theSovietleaderssoughtanaccommodationwiththenewAdministrationby

thesemethods,criseswouldbeunavoidable;more“opport unities”wouldbelost.



Dobryninsmiledandconcededthatnotallthemistakeshadbeenonthe

Americanside.IpromisedtoarrangeanearlymeetingwithNixon. 

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TheEnduringPhilosophicalProblemofUS‐SovietRelations

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ewforeignpolicyissueshavebedeviledtheAmericandomesticdebateor

challengedourtraditionalcategoriesofthoughtmorethanrelationswiththe

SovietUnion.Littleinourhistoricalexperiencepreparedusfordealingwithan

adversaryofcomparablestrengthona permanentbasis.Wehadneverneededto

confrontnationssharplyopposedtousformorethanbriefperiodsofgreat

exertion.TheshockofRussia’sanimosityafter1945wasallthegreaterbecause

thewartimegrandalliancehadencouragedaconfidencethatpeacewouldbe

maintainedbyaper manentcoalitionofthevictors.Instead,wefoundourselves

inaworldofpoliticalrivalryandideologi calstruggle,overshadowedbyfearful

weaponsthatatoneandthesametimecompoundedtensionsandmadethem

insoluble.Nowondertheriddleofrelationswiththeothernuclearsuperpower

hasbeenapersistentpreoccupationforpostwarAmericanforeignpolicy.

F



Itisremarkablethatweeverthoughtwecouldretreatintoourtraditional

isolation.Twoworld warshaddestroyedtheinternationalsystemthathad

dominatedworldaffairsfortwohundredyears.GermanyandJapantemporarily

disappearedasmajorfactors;Chinawaswrackedbycivilwar.Everysignificant

powerabroad,withtheexceptionofGreatBritain,hadbeenoccupiedeither

duringthewarorasaresultofit.AndBritainwassoexhauste dbyitsheroic

strugglethatitcouldnolongerplayitshistoricalroleastheguardianofthe

equilibrium.Somehowwecherishedtheideathatthisvacuumcouldendureas,

withinmonthsofvictory,wedemobilizedourvastmilitaryestablishment.Our

diplomacysoughtconciliation,disarmament,andglobalcooperationthroughthe

UnitedNations.Oursecretdreaminthefirstpostwaryearswastoplaytherole

thatIndia’sPrimeMinisterNehrulaterarrogatedtohimself;wewouldhaveliked

someothercountry,sayBritain,tomaintainthebalanceofpowerwhilewenobly

mediateditsconflictswiththeSovietUnion.Itwassymptomaticofthisa ttitude

thatPresidentTrumanrefusedto stopinBritainonthewaytoorfromthe

PotsdamConferencebecausehedidnotwishtoappeartocolludeagainstour

Sovietally.Ourtraditionalrevulsionagainstbalance‐of‐powerpoliticspostponed

ourawarenessthattheverytotalityofourvictoryhadcreatedagrossimbalance

offorceandinfluenceinthecenterofEurope.Americandemobilizationbecamea

Sovietopportunity;itacceleratedtheCommunistdominationofallofEastern

Europe,whichmaynotevenhavebeenStalin’soriginalexpec tation;andit

producedapervasivealarmandinsecurit yincountriesaroundtheSoviet

periphery.



Ourageofinnocence endedin1947whenBritaininformedusshecouldno

longerassurethedefenseofGreeceandTurkey.Wewereobligedtostepin—but

notmerelyasvocalguarantorsofnationalintegrity.Likeitornot,wewere

assumingthehistoricalresponsibilityforpreservingthebalanceofpower;andwe

werepoorlypreparedforthetask.Inbothworldwarsweequatedvictorywith

peace,andeveninthecrisesof1947westillthoughtthattheproblemof

maintainingglobalequilibriumconsistedincopingwithatemporarydislocationof

somenaturalorderofthings.Wesawpowerinmilitarytermsand,justhaving

dismantledthehugeforcesforaworldwar,weperceivedaneedforsimilar

strengthbeforewecouldhaveaseriousnegotiationwiththeSovietUnion.Once

wehadcontaineditsexpans ionarydrives,wereasoned,diplomacycouldagain

comeintoitsownasanexerciseofgoodwillandconciliation.



Butthemanagementofabalanceofpowerisapermanentundertaking,

notanexertionthathasaforeseeableend.Toagreatextentitisapsychological

phenomenon;ifanequalityofpowerisperceiveditwillnotbetested.

Calculationsmustincludepotentialaswellasactualpower,notonlythe

possessionofpowerbutthewilltobringittobear.Managementofthebalance

requiresperseverance,subtlety,notalittlecourage,andaboveallunderstanding 

ofitsrequirements. 



AsIdiscussedinChapterIII,ourfirstresponsewasthepolicyof

containment,accordingtowhichnoserio usnegotiationwiththeSovietscould

takeplaceuntilwehadfirstbuiltupourstrength;afterward,wehoped,the

Sovietleadershipwouldhavelearnedtheadvantagesofpeace.Paradoxically,this

approachexaggeratedtheSoviets’militaryadvantage,underestimatedour

potentialpowerandpsychologicaladvantages(nottomentionournuclear

monopoly),andgavetheSovietUnionthetimeitdesperatelyneededto

consolidateitsconquestsandtoredressthenuclearimbalance.



Ihavealsomentionedthetran sformationofthenatureofpowerwrought

bynuclearweapons.Becausenuclearweaponsaresocataclysmic,theyarehardly

relevanttoawholegamutofchallenges:probes,guerrillawars,localcrises.The

weaknessofDulles’s“massiveretaliation”strategyofthe1950s(thedoctrinethat

wereservedtherighttoretaliateagainstlocalchallengesbythreateningtolaunch

strategicwar)wasnotthatitbroughtusclosetonuclearwar,butthatinacrisisit

gaveusonlythechoicebetweennuclearwaranddoingnothing.Weendedup

doingnothing(orusingconventionalforces,asinLebanonin1958,which

contradictedourproclaimedstrategy).



ThiswasthecontextinwhichtheUnitedStatesattemptedtograpplewith

thedynamicsoftheSovietsystem.



ThemostsingularfeatureofSovietforeignpolicyis,ofcourse,Communist

ideology,whichtransformsrelationsamongstatesintoconflictsbetween

philosophies.Itisadoctrineofhistoryandalsoamotivatingforce.FromLenin,to

Stalin,toKhrushchev,toBrezhnev,andtowhoeversucceedshim,Sovietleaders

havebeenpartlymotivatedbyaself‐proclaimedinsightintotheforcesofhistory

andbyaconvictionthattheircauseisthecauseofhistoricalinevitabilit y.Their

ideologyteachesthattheclassstruggleandeconomicdeterminismmake

revolutionaryupheavalinevitable.Theconflictbetweentheforcesofrevolution

andcounterrevolutionisirreconcilable.Totheindustrialdemocraciespeace

appearsasanaturallyattainablecondition;itisthecompositionofdifferences,

theabsenceofstruggle.TotheSovietleaders,bycontrast,struggleisendednot

bycompromisebutbythevictoryofoneside.Permanentpeace,accordingto

Communisttheory,canbeachievedonlybyabolishingtheclassstruggleandthe

classstrugglecanbeendedonlybyaCommunistvictory.Hence,anySovietmo ve,

nomatterhowbelligerent,advancesthecauseofpeace,whileanycapitalist

policy,nomatterhowconciliatory,servestheendsofwar.“Untilthefinalissue

[betweencapitalismandCommunism]isdecided,”saidLenin,“thestateofawful

warwillcontinue…Sentimentalityisnolessacrimethancowardiceinwar.”



StatementsofWesternleadersoranalystsstressingtheimportanceofgoodwill

canonlyappeartoSovietleaderseitherashypocrisyorstupidity,propagandaor

ignorance.



Sovietpolicythususesavocabularyallitsown.In1939,itwastheLeague

ofNationsthatinSovietpropagandathreatenedpeacebycondemningtheSoviet

attackonFinland.WhileSoviettankswereshootingdownciviliansinHungaryin

thefallof1956,itwastheUnitedNat ionsthatwasaccusedbyMoscowof

threateningpeacebydebatingSovietarmedintervention.Whenin1968the

SovietUnionanditsWarsawPactalliesinvadedCzechoslovakia,theydidsoamid

asmokescreenofaccusationsagainsttheUnitedStates,WestGermany,and

NATOfor“interfering,”eventhoughtheWesthadbentoverbackwardnotto

involveitselfinCzechoslovakia.In1978,theUSSR“warned”theUnitedStates

againstinterferinginIran,notbecausetheyfeareditbutbecausetheyknewit

wouldnothappen;itwasa waytoacceleratethedemoralizationofthosewho

mightresisttheupheavalalreadytakingplace.TheSovietleadershipisburdened

bynoself‐doubtorliberalguilt.Ithasnoeffectivedomesticopposition

questioningthemoralityofitsactions.Theresultisaforeignpolicyfreetofill

everyvacuum,inexploiteveryopportunity,toactouttheimplicationsofits

doctrine.Policyisconstrainedprincipallybycalculationsofobjectiveconditions.

Sovietproclamationsofpeacefulintentmustbejudgedbythisvocabulary.They

maywellbe“sincere”butforpragmaticreasons.Wherethereexistsadangerof

nuclearwartheyareunquestionablysincerebecauseSovietleadershaveno

intentionofcommittingsuicide.Butfundamentallytheyreflectlessofaprinciple

andmoreofajudgmentthattherelationofforcesisunfavorableformilitary

pressure.AndevenduringthemoststrenuouspeaceoffensivesSovietleaders

haveneverdisguisedtheirintentionofwagingapermanentwarformen’sminds.



InhisreporttothePartyCongressoutlininghisnewcommitmentto

coexistence,Khrushchevexplainedhispolicyinpurelytacticalterms,asadevice

toenablecapitaliststosurrenderpeacefully:“Thereisnodoubtthatinanumber

ofcapitalistcountriesviolentoverthrowofthedictatorshipofthebourgeoisie…

[is]inevitable.Buttheformsofsocialrevolutionvary…Thegreaterorlesser

intensitywhichthestrugglemayassume,theuseornon‐useofviolenceinthe

transitiontosocialismdependontheresistanceoftheexploiters…”



Historicaltrendsareconsideredimmunefromtacticalcompromise.Marxist

theorycombineswithRussiannationaladvantagetoplacetheSovietUnionon

thesideofallradicalanti‐WesternmovementsintheThirdWorld,regardlessof

whatpracticalaccommodationsaremadebetweenEastandWestonnuclear

matters.LeonidBrezhnevdeclaredatthetwenty‐fourthPartyCongressattheend

ofMarch1971:



Wedeclarethat,whileconsistentlypursuingitspolicyofpeaceandfriendshipamong

nations,theSovietUnionwillcontinuetoconductaresolutestruggleagainstimperialism,and

firmlytorebufftheevildesignsandsubversionsofaggressors.Asinthepast,weshallgive

undeviatingsupporttothepeople’sstrugglefordemocracy,nationalliberationandsocialism.



Hiscolleague,SovietPresidentNikolaiPodgorny,declaredinNovember

1973:



AstheSovietpeopleseeit,ajustanddemocraticworldcannotbeachievedwithoutthe

nationalandsocialliberationofpeoples.ThestrugglebytheSovietUnionfortherelaxationof

internationaltensions,forpeacefulcoexistenceamongstatesanddifferentsystemsdoesnot

represent,andcannotrepresent,adeparturefromtheclassprinciplesofourforeignpolicy.



Thearenaofinternationalstruggletherebyexpandstoincludetheinternal

policiesandsocialstructuresofcountries,mockingthetraditionalstandardof

internationallaw thatcondemnsinterferenceinacountry’sdomesticaffairs.In

thecenturiesinwhichtheEuropeannationsdominatedtheworld,acountry

couldincreaseitsinfluenceonlybyterritorialacquisitions;thesewerevisibleand

evokedafteratimetheunitedresistanceofthosethreatenedbytheupsetofthe

establishedorder.Butinthepostwarperioditispossibletochangethebalance of

powerthroughdevelopments—upheavals,revolutions,subversion—withinthe

sovereignterritoryofanothercountry.Ideologythuschallengesthestabilityof

theinternationalsystem—liketheNapoleonicupheavalsaftertheFrench

Revolution,orthereligiouswarsthatconvulsedEuropeforcenturies.Ideology

transcendslimits,eschewsrestraints,anddisdainstoleranceorconciliation.



Sovietpolicyisalso,ofcourse,theinheritorofanancienttraditionof

Russiannationalism.OvercenturiesthestrangeRussianempirehasseeped

outwardfromtheDuchyofMuscovy,spreadingEastandWestacrossendless

plainswherenogeographicalobstacleexceptdistancesetalimittohuman

ambition,inundatingwhatresisted,absorbing whatyielded.Thisseaoflandhas,

ofcourse,beenatemptationforinvadersaswell,butasithaseventually

swallowedupallconquerors—aidednolittlebyahardclimate—ithasimpelled

theRussianpeoplewhohaveenduredtoidentifysecuritywithpushing backall

surroundingcountries.Perhapsfromthisinsecurehistory,perhapsfromasense

ofinferiority,Russia’srulers‐Communistsortsars—haverespondedbyidentifying

securitynotonlywithdistancebutalsowithdomination.Theyhavenever

believedthattheycouldbuildamoralconsensusamongotherpeoples.Absolute

securityforRussiahasmeantinfiniteinsecurityforallitsneighbors.The 

distinctionofLeninistCommunismwasthatit,forthefirsttimeinRussianhistory,

gavetheexpansionistinstinctatheoreticalformulationthatapplieduniversally

aroundtheglobe.ItsalvedRussianconsciences;itcompoundedtheproblemfor

allotherpeoples.



ThesedurableimpulsesofnationalismandideologythatliebehindSoviet

policyemphasizetheirreleva nceofmuchWesterndebatewhetherthisorthat

Sovietmoveisthepreludetoaglobalshowdown,or,alternatively,whethersome

newoverturemarksathaw,a changeofheart.Thequestioniscontinuallyasked:

WhataretheSovietUnion’sultimateaims?WhataretheSovietleaders’real

intentions?Itmaybethewrongquestion.Itseemstoimplythattheanswerliesin

thesecretrecessesofthemindsofSovietleaders,asifBrezhnevmightdivulgeit

ifawakenedinthemiddleofnightorcaughtinanunguardedmoment.Focusing

onthequestionofultimateaimsisboundtoleavethedemocraciesuncertainand

hesitantateachnewSovietgeopoliticalmove,astheytrytoanalyzeanddebate

amongthemselveswhethertheintrinsicvalueoftheareaatstakeisofany

“strategicimportance,”orwhetheritheraldsaturntoahardline.Thesearenot

thealternativesastheSovietleadersseethem.TheSovietpractice,confidentof

theflowofhistory,istopromotetheattritionofadversariesbygradual

increments,nottostakeeverythingonasinglethrowofthedice.“Toaccept

battleatatimewhenitisobviouslyadvantageoustotheenemyandnot tousisa

crime,”wroteLenin.

Bythesametoken,thefailuretoengageintheconflict

whentherelationofforcesisfavorableisequallyacrime.ThechoiceofSoviet

tacticsis,therefore,ateachtimeandplacedeterminedbytheirassessmentofthe

“objectivecorrelationofforces,”whichasMarxiststheypridethemselveson

discerning.



Itseemstomemoreuseful,therefore,toviewSovietstrategyasessentially

oneofruthlessopportunism.Nochanceofincrementalgainmustbegivenupfor

Westernconceptsofgoodwill.Theimmensereservoirofsympathybuiltupduring

WorldWarIIwassacrificedwithouthesitationtoobtainabastioninEastern

Europe.TheGenevasummitconferenceof1955wasusedtoperpetuatethe

SovietpositioninEastGermanyandopenedthewaytotheSovietarmsdealwith

Egypt,whichhelpedtoproducetwodecadesofturmoilintheMiddleEast.In

1962anewAdministrationthathadeagerly—almostpleadingly—expressedits

desireforaneweraofUS‐Sovietrelationswasconfrontedwithanultimatum

overBerlinandaCubanmissilecrisis.In1975‐1976apossibleSALT agreementdid

notpreventthedispatchofSoviet‐backedCubanforcestoAngola.In1977the

hopefulprospectofanewAdministrationeagertorevivedétentedidnottiltthe

balanceinfavorofrestraintwhenanopportunityforproxywarpresenteditselfin

Ethiopia.IneverypolicychoicetheSovietleadershaveidentifiedtheirinterests

notwiththegoodwillofcountriesthatSovietdoctrinedefinesasorganically

hostilebutwithstrategicopportunityastheysawit.ToexpecttheSovietleaders

torestrainthemselvesfromexploitingcircumstancestheyconceivetobe

favorableistomisreadhistory.ToforecloseSovietopportunitiesisthusthe

essenceoftheWest’sresponsibility.ItisuptoustodefinethelimitsofSoviet

aims.



Thisisanattainableobjective.Theimposingmonolithoftotalitarianstates

oftenobscurestheirlatentweaknesses.TheSovietsystemisunstablepolitically;

ithasnomechanismforsuccession.OfthefourGeneralSecretariesoftheSoviet

CommunistPartytwohavediedinoffice;thethirdhasbeenremovedbycouplike

procedures;thefateofthefourthisunsettledatthiswriting.Preciselybecause

thereisno“legitimate”meansofreplacingleaderstheyallgrowoldtogetherin

office.Aponderousbureaucraticmachineryandthecomplexityofcollectivelead‐

ershipmakeitrarethatSovietforeignpolicyshowsgreatbrillianceorevenquick

responsestofast‐movingevents.

