Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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Noristheireconomicsystemimpressive.Ironically,inacountrythatexalts

economicdeterminism,thestandardoflivingoftheSovietUnion,alandrichin

resources,stilllagsevenbehindthatofitsEastEuropeansat ellitesoversixty

yearsaftertheadventofCommunism.Overtimethisinefficiencyisboundto

producestrainsandcompetingclaimsontheresourcesnowdevotedso

predominantlytomilitarypreparations.NoristheCommunistPartylikelyto

remainforevermonolithicandunchallenged.Thesystemoftotalplanningleads

totop‐heavycompetingbureaucraciesuneasilyarbitratedbytheagingleadersin

thePolitburo.ItisoneoftheironiesofelaboratedCommuniststatesthatthe

CommunistPartyhasnorealfunctioneventhoughitpermeateseveryaspectof

society.Itisnotneededforrunningtheeconomy,foradministration,orfor

government.Rather,itembodiesasocialstructureofprivilege;itjustifiesitselfby

vigilanceagainstenemies,domesticandforeign—thusproducingaveste d

interestintension.Soonerorlaterthisessentiallyparasiticfunctionisboundto

leadtointernalpressures,especiallyinastatecomprisedofmanynationalities.



Nothingcouldbemoremistakenthantofallinwiththemythofan

inexorableSovietadvancecarefullyorchestratedbysomesuperplanners.

Coexistenceonthebasisofthebalanceofforcesshouldthereforebewithinour

grasp—providedthenatureofthechallengeiscorrectlyunderstood.Butthisis

preciselywhatthedemocracieshavehaddifficultydoing.Thethemesdominant

intheWest’sperceptionsoftheSovietUnionhavebeenrecurrent:first,that

SovietpurposeshavealreadychangedandtheSovietleadersareaboutto

concentrateoneconomicdevelopmentratherthanforeignadventures ;second,

thatimprovementsinatmosphereandgoodpersonalrelationswithSoviet

leaderswillhelpmitigatehostility;andthird,thattheKremlinisdividedbetween

hawksanddovesandthatitisthedutyoftheWesterndemocraciestostrengthen

thedovesbyapolicyofconciliation.



Theeagernessofsomanyinthenon‐Communistworldtodeclareanendto

thetensionsandperilsoftheColdWardoesnotlackpoignancy.Inthe1930sthe

prominentAmericanhistorianMichaelFlorinskyargued:“Theformercrusadersof

worldrevolutionatanycosthaveexchangedtheirswordsformachinetools,and

nowrelymoreontheresultsoftheirlaborthanondirectactiontoachievethe

ultimatevictoryoftheproletariat.”

Inthe1930s,thedemocratic freedoms

describedintheSovietConstitutionwereadmiredinEuropeandtheUnited

StatesevenwhiletheGulagArchipelagowasgrowing,thepurgetrialsmocked

anyconceptofjustice,andtheSovietUnionbecam ethefirstmajorcountryto

makeanoverturetowardHitler.AfterStalindisbandedtheCominternin1943,

SenatorTomConnallyofTexas,hardlyknownforhissoftnessonCommunism,

wasreportedassaying:“Russiansforyearshavebeenchangingtheireconomy

andapproachingtheabandonmentofcommunismandthewholeWesternworld

willbegratifiedatthehappyclimaxoftheirefforts.”

WroteUnderSecretaryof

StateSumnerWelles,“Upontheconclusionofthepresentwar,theSoviet

governmentundoubtedlywillhavetodedicateitschiefenergiesforatermof

yearstotherehabilitationandreconstructionofitsdevastatedcitiesand

territories,totheproblemofindustrialization,andtotheachievementofarisein

thepopularstandardofliving.”



ThisthemethattheSovietUnionshouldprefereconomicdevelopmenthas

neverdied.TheWesterndemocracies,extrapolatingfromtheirowndomestic

experience,assumethatpopularfrustrationsareassuagedbyeconomic advance

andthateconomicprogressisamorerationalobjectivethanforeignadventures.

In1959AverellHarrimanwrote:“IthinkMr.Khrushcheviskeenlyanxiousto

improveSovietlivingstandards.IbelievethathelooksuponthecurrentSeven

YearPlanasthecrowningsuccessoftheCommunistrevolutionandahistoric

turningpointinthelivesoftheSovietpeople. Healsoconsidersitamonumentto

himselfthatwillmarkhiminhistoryasoneofhiscountry’sgreatbenefactors.”



Thebitterdisappointmentstofollowdidnotinterthisthought.



ThusinFebruary1964SecretaryofStateDeanRusk,hardlyadove,

confidentlyasserted:“They[theCommunists]appeartohavebeguntorealize

thatthereisanirresolvablecontradictionbetwee nthedemandstopromote

worldCommunismbyforceandtheneedsoftheSovietstateandthepeople.”



ThesuppressionoftheEastGermanandHungarianuprisings,theseveral

confrontationsoverBerlin,theCubanmissile crisis,theinvasionof

Czechoslovakia,themassivesuppliestoNorthVietnam,theexacerbationof

tensionsintheMiddleEast,theneverendingattempttoprobeforweakspotsin

Africa—noneoftheseaffectedthepersistentconvictionofmanythataSoviet

changeofheartwasimminentandthattheSovietswouldprefereconomic

developmenttoforeignadventures.(Ofcourse,onereasonwhyithasbeen

difficulttotestthislastpropositionisthattheindustrialdemocracieshavenever

insistedthattheSovietUnionmakethischoice:creditsandtradehavecontinued

eveninperiodsofSovietaggressiveness.) 



EquallyperennialhasbeentheconvictionthatthereragesintheKremlina

continualstruggleinwhichAmericacanassistthemorepeace‐lovingelementby

aconciliatorypolicy.TheWesthasbeenassiduousinfindingalibisfora

successionofSovietleaders;theincumbentwasalwaysconsideredtheleaderof

the“liberal”faction—evenJosefStalin.Perhapsthedefinitiveexampleofthis

Westernattitudewaswrittenin1945;todaywecanappreciatetheironyofit.

AftertheYaltaConference,WhiteHouseadviserHarryHopkinstoldtheauthor

RobertSherwood:



TheRussianshadprovedthattheycouldbereasonableandfarseeingandtherewasn’t

anydoubtinthemindsofthePresidentoranyofusthatwecouldlivewiththemandgetalong

withthempeacefullyforasfarintothefutureasanyofuscouldimagine.ButIhavetomake

oneamendmenttothat—Ithinkweallhadinourmindsthereservationthatwecouldnot

foretellwhattheresultswouldbeifanythingshouldhappentoStalin.Wefeltsurethatwe

couldcountonhimtobereasonableandsensibleandunderstanding—butwenevercouldhe

surewhoorwhatmightbeinbackofhimthereintheKremlin.



“TheprospectthatthesurvivalofNikitaS.Khrushchev’sliberal regimerests

uponameetingthisyearbetweentheSovietPremierandWesternleadersis

beingdiscussedbyWesterndiplomats,”reportedtheNewYorkTimesonMay5,

1958,aviewthatledtoKhrushchev’svisittoWashingtonin1959.After

Khrushchev’sefforttochangethestrategicbalancewasrebuffedintheCuban

missilecrisis,Washingtonexpertsspeculatedthathewasstrugglingagainsthard‐

linersintheKremlinandneededunderstandingandsupportfromtheUnited

Stateslestthesehard‐linersprevail—ignoringthefactthatitwasKhrushchev

himselfwhohadsentthemissilestoCubaandthathewasbeingattackedmainly

becausehehadfailed.

Aplausibleargumentcanbemadethatwestrengthen

whatevermoderateelementsthereareintheKremlinmorebyfirmness,which

demonstratestherisksofSovietadventures,thanbycreatingtheimpressionthat

seeminglymarginalmovesarefreeofcost.



TheideaoftheKremlinstrugglethatAmericashouldseektoinfluenceadds

impetustotheotherdomina nt ideathattensionsarecausedbypersonal

misunderstandingswhichcharmandsinceritycaneradicate.Alittlemorethan

twoyearsaftercomingintoofficewiththeargumentthatitwouldrollback

Communism,theEisenhowerAdministrationundertooka summitwiththe

SovietsatwhichthepersonalmagicofthePresidentwaswidelyhailedas

usheringinanewera.“Noonewouldwanttounderestimatethechangeinthe

Russianattitude,”saidtheNewYorkHeraldTribuneonJuly21,1955.“Without

that,nothingwouldhavebeenpossible…ButitremainsPresidentEisenhower’s

achievementthathecomprehendedthechange,thatheseizedtheopeningand

turnedittotheadvantageofworldpeace.”LifemagazineaverredonAugust1,

1955:“ThechiefresultoftheGenevaconferenceissosimpleandbreath‐taking

thatcynicsandcomma‐chasersstillquestionitand Americans,forotherreasons,

finditalittledifficultto grasp.Thechampionshipofpeacehaschangedhands.In

themindofEurope,whichjudgesthisunofficialtitle,ithaspassedfromMoscow

toWashington.”Itwasopentoquestionhowacountrythathadinshortorder

turnedallofEasternEuropeintosatellites,blockadedBerlin,andsuppresseda

revoltinEastGermanyshouldhavequalifiedforthechampionshipofpeaceinthe

firstplace.Butthebeliefthatpeacedependedongoodpersonalrelationswas

extraordinarilypervasiveeveninthe1950s.Themosteloquentstatementofthis

attitudewasmadebythenBritishForeignSecretaryHaroldMacmillan attheend

oftheForeignMinisters’Conferencein1955.Thismeetinghaddeadlocked

preciselybecausetheprecedingsummitconferencehadachievedtheSovietaim

ofrelaxingtensionsentirelythroughatmospherics:



Whydidthismeeting[thesummit]sendathrillofhopeandexpectationroundthe

world?Itwasn’tthatthediscussionswerespeciallyremarkable…Itwasn’tthattheyreachedany

verysensationalagreement.Itwasn’treallywhattheydidorsaid.Whatstrucktheimagination

oftheworldwasthefactofthefriendlymeetingbetweentheHeadsofthetwogreatgroups

intowhichtheworldisdivided.Thesemen,carryingtheirimmenseburdens,metandtalked

andjokedtogetherlikeordinarymortals…TheGenevaspiritwasreallyareturntonormal

humanrelations.



AyearlaterthesesameSovietleader ssuppressedtheuprisinginHungary

andthreatenedBritainandFrancewithnuclearwaroverthecrisisintheMiddle

East—aftertheUnitedStateshadostentatiouslydissociateditselffromitsallies.A

decadelater,however,PresidentJohnsoninhis1965StateoftheUnionAddress

expressedthehopethatKhrushchev’ssuccessorscouldalsovisittheUnited

States,inordertoreducetherisksofpersonalmisunderstandings:



Ifwearetolivetogetherinpeace,wemustcometoknoweachotherbetter.



IamsurethattheAmericanpeoplewouldwelcomeachancetolistentotheSoviet

leadersonourtelevision—asIwouldliketheSovietpeopletohearourleadersontheirs.



IhopethenewSovietleaderscanvisitAmericasotheycanlearnaboutourcountryat

firsthand.



InthefaceoftheSovietUnion’sambiguouschallenge,theWe stparalyzed

itself,moreover,notonlybyexcessesofconciliationbutbyexcessesof

truculence.Ineverydecadethealternativetopolic iesofsentimentalconciliatio n

wasposedintermsofliturgicalbelligerenceasiftheemphatictrumpetingofanti‐

Communismwouldsufficetomakethewallscometumblingdown.Sidebyside

withtheideathattherehadbeenabasicchangeintheSovietsystemthere

existedthebeliefthatSovietpurposescouldneverbemodified,whichwould

maketheSovietstatethefirstinhistorytobeimmunetohistoricalchange.Those

whodenouncedAmericanintransigencewereopposedbyotherswhocouldnot

imaginethatanyagreementwiththeSovietUnioncouldpossiblybeinour

interest;sometimestheveryfactthattheSovietswantedanagreementwas

adducedasanargumentagainstit.Boththeseattitudessprangfromthesame

fallacythattherewassometerminalpointtointernationaltension,thereward

eitherforgoodwillorfortoughness.Theyneglectedtherealitythatwewere

dealingwithasystemtoo ideologicallyhostileforinstantconciliationand

militarilytoopowerfultodestroy.Wehadtopreventitsseizingofstrategic

opportunities;butwealso hadtohaveenoughconfidenceinourownjudgments

tomakearrangementswithitthatwouldgaintime—timefortheinherent

stagnationoftheCommunistsystemtoworkitscorrosionandtopermitthe

necessityofcoexistencebasedonrestrainttobeunderstood.



Ihadbeenacriticofboththeseschools—whichhadinfluencedallpostwar

administrationsinthedecadebeforeIenteredpublicservice:



TheobsessionwithSovietintentionscausestheWesttobesmugduringperiodsof

détenteandpanickyduringcrises.AbenignSoviettoneisequatedwiththeachievementof

peace;Soviethostilityisconsideredtobethesignalforanewperiodoftensionandusually

evokespurelymilitarycountermeasures.TheWestisthusneverreadyforaSovietchangeof

course;ithasbeenequallyunpreparedfordétenteandintransigence.



Theheatoftheirargumentsometimesobscuredthefactthattheadvocatesandthe

opponentsofnegotiationagreedintheirfundamentalassumptions.Theywereinaccordthat

aneffectivesettlementpresupposedachangeintheSovietsystem.Theywereatonein

thinkingthatWesterndiplomacyshouldseektoinfluenceSovietinternaldevelopments.Both

groupsgavetheimpressionthatthenatureofapossiblesettlementwiththeCommunistworld

wasperfectlyobvious…Theydifferedprimarilyabouttheissueoftiming.Theopponentsof

negotiationmaintainedthattheSovietchangeofheartwasstillinthefuture,whilethe

advocatesclaimedthatithadalreadytakenplace…



Intheprocess,moreattentionwaspaidtowhetherweshouldnegotiatethantowhat

weshouldnegotiateabout.ThedisputeoverSovietdomesticdevelopmentsdivertedenergies

fromelaboratingourownpurposes.Itcausedustomakeanissueofwhatshouldhavebeen

takenforgranted:ourwillingnesstonegotiate.Anditdeflectedusfromelaboratingaconcrete

programwhichalonewouldhavemadenegotiationsmeaningful.



BythetimetheNixonAdministrationtookoffice,thepoliticalbalancesheet

washardlyincredit.TheSovietUnionhadjustoccupiedCzechoslovakia.Itwas

supplyingmassivearmsto NorthVietnam;withoutitsassistancetoHanoi,a

successfulnegotiationcouldhavebeenassured.Ithadshownnowillingnessto

helpbringasettlementintheMiddleEast.AndtheSovietUnionatthispointwas

nearingequalityinstrategicweapons.ThedecisiveAmericansuperiority,which

hadcharacterizedtheentirepostwarperiod,hadendedby1967,haltingatself‐

imposedceilingsof1,000MinutemanICBMs,656PolarisSLBMs,and54Titan

ICBMs.[

ICBM:intercontinentalballisticmissile;SLBM:submarine ‐launchedballisticmissile.]

By1969itwasclearthatthenumberofSovietmissilescapableofreachingthe

UnitedStateswouldsoonequalthatofallAmericanmissilesavailablefor

retaliationagainsttheSovietUnion,and,ifSovietbuildingprogramscontinued

throughtheSeventies,wouldcometoexceedthem.



ThenewAdministrationhadtoattempttoresolveaseriesof

contradictions.WhatevermightbesaidaboutgrowingSovietpower,Communist

ideology,Russianexpansionism,andSovietinterventionism,anyonecomingto

officeinthelateSixtiescouldnotfailtobeawedbytheunprecedented

dimensionsofthechallengeofpeace.Nobellicoserhetoriccouldobscurethefact

thatexistingnuclearstockpileswereenoughtodestroymankind;noamountof

distrustoftheSovietUnioncouldendorseadoptionofthetraditionalbalance‐of‐

powerpoliticsofresolvingcrisisbyconfrontation.Therecouldbenohigherduty

thantopreventthecatastropheofnuclearwar.Yetmeresentimentalitywas

treacherous.ItwouldmisleadourpeopleandCommunistleadersalike,exposing

thefirsttoshockandtemptingthesecondtoregardnegotiationasaviable

instrumentofpoliticalwarfare.Wehadtorecognizethatathomeandamongour

allieswecouldgainsupportforfirmactionincrisisonlyifwecoulddemonstrate

itwasnotofourmaking.Butintryingtoconstructamorepeacefulworlditwould

alsobefollytolullpeopleintoignoringthenatureofanideologicaland

geopoliticalchallengethatwouldlastforgenerations,ortoshirktheunpopularity

ofspendingfortacticalandstrategicdefense.Itwasnotgoingtobeeasyfora

democracy,inthemiddleofadivisivewarinAsia.



Forthoseinpositionsofresponsibility,devotiontopeaceandfreedomis

nottestedbytheemotionoftheirpronouncements.Wehadtoexpressour

commitmentbythedisciplinewithwhichwewoulddefendourvaluesandyet

createconditionsforlong‐termsecurity.Wehadtoteachourpeopletofacetheir

permanentresponsibility,nottoexpectthateithertension—orouradversary—

wouldevermillenniallydis appear.Suchacoursemightnotbe comfortableor

easy,especiallyforapeopleasimpatientasours.Butwewouldbejudgedby

futuregenerationsbywhetherwehadleftasaferworldthanwefound,aworld

thatpreservedthepeacewithoutabdicationandstrengthenedtheconfidence

andhopesoffreepeoples.



<<Contents>>



****



ReflectionsduringtheTransitionPeriod



T

heKremlintendstoapproachanewAmericanAdministrationwithacute

wariness.Bureaucraciescravepredictability,andtheSovietleadersoperatein

aByzantinebureaucraticenvironmentofuncompromisingstandards.Theycan

adjusttosteadyfirmness;theygrownervousinthefaceofrapidchanges,which

underminetheconfidenceoftheircolleaguesintheirjudgmentandtheirmastery

ofevents.Itwaspointless,weconcluded,totrytoovercomethisuneasinessat

thestartofanewAdministrationbyappealstoasenseofmoralcommunity,for

theSovietleaders’entiretrainingandideologydenythispossibility.Self‐interest

isastandardtheyunderstandbetter.Itisnoaccidentthatinrelationsbetween

theSovietUnionandothersocietiesthoseWesternleadersmostbentonshowing

“understanding”fortheirSovietcounterpartshavebeenleastsuccessful.ASoviet

leadershipproudofitssuperiorunderstandingoftheobjectivesourcesofpolitical

motivationcannotadmitthatitisswayedbytransitoryconsiderations.Thusthe

almostpleadingeffortsoftheKennedyAdministrationfailedtomakeprogress

untilapsychologicalbalancewasrestored,firstwiththeUSmilitarybuildupafter

pressuresonBerlinandthenbytheCubanmissilecrisis.Aftertheseeventssome

progresswasmade.



TheKremlinknewNixon,bycontrast,asaCommunist‐baiter;butithad

neverpermittedpersonalantipathytostandinthewayofSovietnational

interest.Stalin,afterall,hadmadeanoverturetoHitlerwithinweeksoftheNazis’

adventtopower.Despitethemutualdistrust,relationsbetweentheKremlinand

theNixonAdministrationweremorebusinesslikethaninmostpreviousperiods

andgenerallyfreeof theroller‐coastereffectoffirstexaltedandthen

disappointedhopes.Thatstrangepair,BrezhnevandNixon,ultimatelydeveloped

amodusVivendibecauseeachcametounderstandtheother’sperceptionofhis

self‐interest.Nixonhadvisite dtheSovietUnionearlierinhiscareer,whenasVice

Presidenthehadhadhisfamous“KitchenDebate”withKhrushchev.Nixonhada

farkeenergraspofthecharacteristicsofitsleadershipthananyotherrecent

Presidentialcontender.MoscowwasconcernedlestthenewPresidentbegina

freshroundofweaponsprocurement,whichwouldstraintheSovieteconomy.

Butitwaspreparedtoinquireintothepriceforavertingthisprospect,evenwhile

itputupitstime‐testedpretenseofimperviousnesstothreatsandresort edtoits

traditionaltacticofseekingtoundermineAmericandome stic supportforthe

policyitfeared.



Ittooksometimefortherelationship toprosperbutwhenitdiditwasnot

bychance.NosubjectoccupiedmoreoftheattentionofthePresident‐elect

duringthetransitionperiod;heandIspenthourstogetherchartingourcourse.

NixonhadcometotheproblembyamorepoliticalroutethanI.Havingmadehis

reputationthroughatough,occasionallystridentanti‐Communism,hewas

committedtomaintaininghistraditionalconservativeconstituency.He

consideredhisreputationasahardlinerauniqueassettotheconductofour

policy.ButheunderstoodthatasPresidenthewouldneedtostretchhispolitical

basetowardthepoliticalcenter;indeed,heshrewdlysawinEast‐Westrelationsa

long‐termopportunity tobuildhisnewmajority.Hetendedtocombinethese

keeninstinctswithextremelypersonaljudgments.Hehadbeenafraidthatthe

GlassborosummitmightrestoreJohnson’sfortunes—henceheconsideredthat

theSovietshadcolludedwiththeDemocratstothwarthim.Buthehadalsoseen

howtheinconclusiveoutcomecausedJohnson’spopularitytodissipateasrapidly

asithadspurted—hencehisdeterminationnottohaveasummitunlesssuccess

couldbeguaranteed.



Myapproach—asoutlinedabove—wasinessencequitesimilar,if,givenmy

academicbackground,somewhatmoretheoretical.OnDecember12,1968,the

President‐electaskedmetobriefthenewCabinetonourapproachtoforeign

policy.Itseemedtome,Itoldmynewcolleagues,thatSovietforeignpolicywas

beingpulledintwodirections.Therewerepressuresforconciliationwiththe

West,comingfromarisingdesireforconsumergoods,fromthefearofwar,and

perhapsfromthosewhohopedforarelaxationinpolice‐statecontrols.Atthe

sametimetherewerepressuresforcontinuedconfrontationwiththeUnited

StatesarisingoutofCommunistideology,thesuspiciousnessoftheleaders,the

Partyapparatus,themilitary,andthosewhofearedthatanyrelaxationof

tensionscouldonlyencouragethesatellitestotryonceagaintoloosenMoscow’s

apronstrings.Moscow’sforeignpolicysincetheAugustinvasionof

Czechoslovakiahadfocusedontwoproblems:howtoovercometheshockeffect

oftheinvasionontherestoftheCommunistworld,andhowtocutitslosses

elsewhere,especiallyhowtoholddowndamagetoUS‐Sovietrelations.



Forthelatterreason,theSovietsseemedparticularlyanxioustokeepopen

thepossibilityoftalksonstrategicarmslimitation.Thishadmanymotives:It

couldbeatacticaldevicetoregainrespectability;itmightbeamaneuvertosplit

theAlliancebyplaying upfearsofaUS‐Sovietcondominium;itcouldbethatthey

believedareasonablystablestrategicbalancewasinevitableandhadtherefore

decidedtotrytostabilizethearmsraceatthepresentlevel.Ourresponse

dependedonourconceptionoftheproblem.Ourpastpolicyhadoftenbeenone

of“confidencebuilding”foritsownsake,inthebeliefthatasconfidencegrew

tensionswouldlessen.Butifonetooktheviewthattensionsaroseasaresultof

differencesoverconcreteissues,thenthewaytoapproachtheproblemwasto

beginworkingonthosedifferences.Alastingpeacedependedonthesettlement 

ofthepoliticalissuesthatweredividingthetwonuclearsuperpowers.



Infact,IspokeinalmostthesameveintoakeySovietrepresentative.

WhenIsawBorisSedov,theKGBoperativemasqueradingas anEmbassy

counselor,onDecember18atthePierreHotel,Itoldhimthat thePresident‐elect

wasseriouswhenhespokeofaneraofnegotiation.TheSovietleadershipwould

findthenewAdministrationpreparedtonegotiatelastingsettlementsreflecting

realinterests.Webelievedthattherehadbeentoomuchconcernwith

atmosphericsandnotenoughwithsubstance.Intheviewofthenew

AdministrationtherewererealdifferencesbetweentheUnitedStatesandthe

SovietUnionandthesedifferencesmustbenarr owediftherewastobea

genuinerelaxationoftensions.Wewere,Isaid,preparedtotalkaboutlimiting

strategicweapons.Butwewouldnotbestampededintotalksbeforewehad

analyzedtheproblem.WewouldalsojudgetheSovietUnion’spurposesbyits

willingnesstomoveforwardonabroadfront,especiallybyitsattitudeonthe

MiddleEastandVietnam.WeexpectedSovietrestraintintroublespotsaround

theworld.(Thiswasthefamousdoctrineof“linkage.”)Ihopedhewouldconvey

theseconsiderationstoMoscow.



Moscowsentasoothingreply.SedovbroughtmeamessageonJanuary2,

1969,inwhichSovietleadersdissociatedthemselvesfromthe“pessimisticview”

theyclaimedtohaveseenexpressed“inmanypartsoftheworld”aboutthe

President‐elect.The“keyconcernofMoscow”wasnotNixon’spastrecordbut

whetherourleadershipwasanimatedby“asenseofreality.”Disarmamentwas

ofpreeminentimportance.TheSovietleadersrecognizedthatourrelationswould

befavorablyaffected byasettlementoftheVietnamproblem,apoliticalsolution

intheMiddleEast,and“arealisticapproach”inEuropeasawholeandin

Germanyinparticular.TheKremlindidnotfailtonoteitsown“specialinterests”

inEasternEurope.



Bothsideshadnowstatedtheirbasicpositions.ThenewAdministration

wantedtousetheSovietconcernaboutitsintentionstodrawtheKremlininto

discussionsonVietnam.Wethereforeinsistedthatnegotiationsonallissues

proceedsimultaneously.TheSovietleaderswereespeciallyworriedaboutthe

impactofanewarmsraceontheSovieteconomy;theythereforegavetop

prioritytoarmslimitation.Thishadtheadditionaladvantagetothemthatthe

merefactoftalks,regardlessoftheirresults,wouldcomplicatenewdefense

appropriationsintheUnitedStatesand—thoughwedidnotyetperceivethis—

woulddisquiettheChinese.



Ofcourse,nothingfurthercouldhappenuntilthenewAdministrationwas

inoffice.ButinourdeliberationsatthePierreHotelthePresident‐electandI

distilleda numberofbasicprinciplesthatweretocharacterizeourapproachto

US‐Sovietrelationsaslongaswewereinoffice:

