Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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4. AlternativeU.S.approachesonChinaandtheircostsandrisks.



ChinaalsofeaturedinNixon’sconversationswithPresidentdeGaulle

duringthevisittoParisonMarch1,1969.NixondidnotactuallyaskdeGaullefor

anyparticularassistance;indeed,itwasdeGaullewhoinitiatedthesubjectand

Nixonwhoseemedtobeskeptical.Incharacteristicallysweepingterms,deGaulle

stressedtheimportanceofChina,ahugeentitywithgreatre sources.Astime

passed,theChinesewouldmaketheirinfluencefeltinallpartsoftheworld;their

ambitionsmatchedtheirskills.Itwasunwisetoisolatethem“intheirownrage”;

contactscouldonlybehelpful.Nixonrepliedthatintheshorttermtherewould

benochangelargelybecauseoftheunsettlingimpactofsuchamoveonthere st

ofAsia;butoverthelongterm—saytenyears—we wouldhavemore

communicationswithChina,especiallyafteritbegantomakeprogressinnuclear

weapons.ThisindirectreplybyNixonwasasuresignthathemeantto keephis

optionsopen.Itwasascompatiblewithanintentiontowaittenyearsaswiththe

objectiveofmovingatthefirstopportunity.Atbest,itreflectedtherealitythat

thenewAdministrationhadnoclear‐cutplan.



ThereforeonMarch14,wetalkedagaininaseeminglyanti‐Chinese

direction.Inannouncingour“Safeguard”ABMprogramthePresidentgaveitin

partthesameanti‐Chineseorientationthathadalsobeentheprincipalrationale

oftheJohnsonAdministration’s“Sentinel”ABMprogramof1967.Thereasonwas

thesameinbothAdministrations:itseemedwisetoobtainsomeprotection

againstaccidentallaunchesordeliberateattacksbysmallernuclearpowers,

withoutattemptingamassivepopulationdefenseagainsttheSovietUnionthat

raisedarmscontrolaswellasbudgetaryproblems.“TheChinesethreatagainst

ourpopulation,”Nixon’sstatementdeclared,“aswellasthedangerofan

accidentalattack,cannotbeignored.Byapprovingthissystem,itispossibleto

reduceU.S.fatalitiestoaminimallevelintheeventofaChinesenuclearattackin

the1970’s,orinanaccidentalattackfromanysource.”Tomakemattersworse

fromtheChinesepointofview,NixonwentontoimplythattheSovietUnionand

theUnitedStatessharedacommoninterestincontainingChina:“Iwouldimagine

thattheSovietUnionwouldbejustasreluctantaswewouldbetoleavetheir

countrynakedagainstapotentialChineseCommunistthreat.Sotheabandoning

oftheentiresystem,particularlyaslongastheChinesethreatisthere,Ithink

neithercountrywouldlookuponwithmuchfavor.”Notsurprisingly,theNew

ChinaNewsAgencyonMarch16denouncedtheABMdecisionasAmerican

“collusionwiththeSovietrevisioniststojointlymaintainthenuclearthreatand

nuclearblackmailagainstthepeopleoftheworld,particularlyagainsttheChinese

people.”



ThusbyMarch1969,Chinese‐Americanrelationsseemedessentiallyfrozen

inthesamehostilityofmutualincomprehensionanddistrustthathad

characterizedthemfortwentyyears.ThenewAdministrationhadanotion,but

notyetastrategy,tomovetowardChina.Policyemergeswhenconcept

encountersopportunity.SuchanoccasionarosewhenSovietandChine setroops

clashedinthefrozenSiberiantundraalongariverofwhichnoneofushadever

heard.Fromthenonambiguityvanished,andwemovedwithoutfurther

hesitationtowardamomentouschangeinglobaldiplomacy.



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

TheUssuriRiverClashes



NtheremotestreachesofNorthEastAsia,abriefstretchofthe4,000‐mile

borderbetweentheSovietUnionandChinaisdemarcatedbytheUssuriRiver.

IfonedrewastraightlinefromVladivostokNorth‐NorthEasttoKhabarovsk,the

Ussuriwouldrunalongmostofitslength.Atadesolatepointintheriverabout

twohundredfiftymilesfromVladivostokisatinyislandcalle dDamanskybythe

RussiansandbytheChineseChenpao.(Seetheaccompanyingmap.)Theislandis

aboutathirdofasquaremile inarea,woodedanduninhabited.Itissomewhat

closertotheChinesebankoftheriver;thelandoppositeonbothsidesismarshy

andbarelypopulated.Apartfromoccasionalfishermenandloggersfromboth

sides,theonlyhumanpresenceintheregionistheborderoutposts,Sovietand

Chinese,guardingtheirrespectiveriverbanks.Theborderwithrespecttothe

islandhasneverbeendelimited.TheChinesehadforsometimeassertedthatthe

demarcationlinerandownthemiddleoftheriver,whichwouldhavemadethe

islandChinese.TheSovietsmaintainedthatthehistoricalborderputtheentire

UssuririverbedunderRussiancontrol.Tothisdaynoonehasadequately

explainedwhyeithersideattachedsomuchimportancetoanuninhabitedisland

inabarrenandlargelyemptyterritory.



OnthemorningofMarch2,1969,accordingtoSovietpressaccounts,300

ChinesetroopsontheislandambushedaRussianpatroloffrontierguardswith

machine‐gunfire,killingtwenty‐threeandwoundingfourteeninthetwenty‐

minutebattlethatresulted.Sovietreinforcementsweresent,andtheytoowere

ambushedonarrival.Thereuponbothsideswithdrewfromtheisland.



TheSovietsgavetheclashenormousandimmediatepublicity.Thiswas

itselfunprecedented.Itseemstohavebeenthefirsttimeeithercountryhad

reportedanarmedincidentoracknowledgedcasualties.Thetwosidestraded

protestnotesandpropagandacharges.TheChineseallegedthatSoviettroops

hadmadesixteen“intrusions”onChenpaosince1967,eightoftheseinJanuary

andFebruaryof1969;theyrecitedalonglistofSovietincursionsonother

disputedislandsintheUssuri,andincide ntsofharassmentandabuseofChinese

fishermen,frontierpatrols,andlocalinhabitants.AbouttenthousandChinese

demonstratorsmobbedtheSovietEmbassyinPekingonMarch3;areportedone

hundredthousandSovietdemonstratorsattackedtheChineseEmbassyin

MoscowonMarch7,smashingwindowsandthrowinginkbottles.

DemonstrationsspreadtoeighteenotherSovietcitiesoverthenextfourdays.

RedStar,theSovietDefenseMinistrynewspaper,reportedonMarch8thatSoviet

troopsintheFarEastwereonalert.ApressconferenceattheSovietForeign

MinistrydisplayedphotographsofSovietsoldierssaidtohavebeenkilledand

mutilatedbytheChinese,andSoviettelevisionbroadcastaspecialprogramon

theborderclashes.ChinesenewspapersonMarch4proclaimed,“Downwiththe

NewTsars!”PekingRadioreportedthatoverfourhundredmillionpeople(half

thecountry’spopulation)tookpartinvariousdemonstrationsacrossChina.



InWashingtonwewerestilltoopreoccupiedwithVietnamtorespondto

eventswhoseoriginwelittleunderstoodandwhosesignificancetooksome 

weekstobecomeapparent.AndwhileIfavoredestablishingatriangular

relationshipasamatteroftheory,bothNixonandIstillconsideredthePeople’s

RepublicofChinathemoreaggressiveoftheCommunistpowers.Wethoughtit

morethanlikelythatPekinghadstartedthefighting.



Ironically,itwasheavy‐handedSovietdiplomacythatmadeusthinkabout

ouropportunities.OnMarch11,anemotionalAmbassadorDobryninraisedthe

Ussuriincidentwithme.Ihadnotevenaskedaboutit,butheinsistedongiving

meagoryaccountoftheatrocitiesallegedlycommittedbytheChineseandan

extendedbriefing.WhenItriedto changethesubjectbysuggestingthatitwasa

Sino‐Sovietproblem,Dobrynininsistedpassionately thatChinawaseverybody’s

problem.Ilistenedpolitely,thoughtalot,butmadenocomment.Laterthat

eveningIdescribedtheencountertothePresident.Nixonwasintrigued,and

remarkedhowsometimesunexpectedeventscouldhaveamajoreffect.I

suggestedthatwestoodtogainagreatdealstrategically.Nixonagreedthatthe

incidentmusthaveshakentheChinese.



OnthemorningofMarch15therewasasecondborderclashon

Damansky/Chenpao.IncontrastwithMarch2,thistimebothsideswere

prepared.Thebattlelastedlongerandcasualtieswerehigher.TheSovietshad

increasedtheirpatrolling,andascoutingpartyhadcampedontheislandonthe

nightofthefourteenth,probablytosetatrap.Heavyfightingbrokeoutand

continuedonandoffforninehours;tanks,armoredcars,artillery,andantitank

rocketswereused.Bothsidesclaimedvictory(althoughtheChineseseemtohave

retainedpossessionoftheisland).



Theoriginoftheseincidents—whostarte dwhat—willprobablybeforever

unclear.ButtheChineseargumentthattheywererespondingtoalongseriesof

Sovietintrusionshasacertainplausibility.Afterall,inferiorforcesdonotusually

invitedefeatbymakingunprovokedattacks.Overtwoyearslater,asIhave

mentioned,ChouEn‐laiclaimedthattheSovietsdeliberatelystartedtheincidents

todistractattentionfromtheirfailuretoblocktheWestGermanelectionofthe

FederalPresidentinWestBerlin.Whatevertherealcause,Communistdiplomats

sawtoitthatwecouldnotignoretheclashes.Inmid‐March,inBudapest,the

SovietsreportedlysoughtWarsawPactcondemnationofChinaastheaggressor

intheUssuriincidents.TheyalsoappealedtoeachWarsawPactallytosend

“symbolicmilitarydetachments”totheSino‐Sovietborderarea.TheRomanians

blockedbothmoves.



AtthefirstprivatemeetingofournewParisnegotiatorswiththeNorth

VietnameseonMarch22,XuanThuyvolunteeredthesurprisingoutburstthatthe

UnitedStateshadnothingtogainbyseekingtotakeadvantageofthedivisions

betweentheSovietUnionandChina.TheVietnamesewouldrelyonthemselves,

hedeclared.TheUnitedStateshadraisednosuchissueeitherinWashingtonor

Paris(althoughIhadspeculatedabout itinmyForeignAffairsarticle).ButXuan

ThuyinsistedthatbothMoscowandPekinghadaidedNorthVietnamforyearsin

spiteofdisputeslastingnear lyadecade;hehadnodoubtthattheywould

continuetodoso.



OnMarch28,inadirectivecallingforareviewofrestrictionsontradewith

Communistcountries,Ispecificallyrequestedareexaminationofourembargoon

tradewith“AsianCommunistcountries.”



OnApril3,Dobryninreturnedtothecharge.Hehadreadapressaccount

thatIwasheadingupareviewofChinapolicy(presumablythestudydirectiveof

February5).Hewantedtolear nmoreaboutit.Eventhoughwehadnothadany

communicationwiththeChinese,Igaveanevasivereplywhichimpliedthatthe

choiceofrapprochementwasuptous.Dobryninsuggestedthattherewasstill

timeforthetwosuperpowerstoorderevents,buttheymightnothavethis

powermuchlonger.HeaddedthatitseemedtomanyintheSovietUnionthat

Taiwanmightwellbecomeanindependentstate.Summoningallmypowerto

seemenigmatic,Ididnotrespond.



OnApril22ourAmbassadortoMoscow,JacobBeam,deliveredaletter

fromPresidentNixontoPremierKosygincoveringa widerangeofsubjectsinUS‐

Sovietrelations;Chinawasdeliberatelynotmentioned.However,wehad

instructedBeamtoaddorallythatwedidnotintendtoexploitSino‐Soviet

difficulties—implying,ofcourse,thatwehadthecapacitytodosoifwechose.

TheSovietstookthebait.OnMay27,ForeignMinisterGromykocalledinBeamto

deliverKosygin’sreply.GromykoaddedorallythattheSovietUnionwouldnot

exploitourtroubleswithChinaeither,andthatingeneralUS‐Sovietrelations

shouldbebasedon“long‐rangeconsiderations.”



Thetriangularrelationship,stillhighlytenuous,hadshownitsfirsttremor.



Inthemeantime,Chinahadnotbeendormant.OnApril1,LinPiao,soonto

benamedMao’sheir,gavehispoliticalreporttotheNinthNationalCongressof

theChineseCommunistParty:



Wemustonnoaccountrelaxourrevolutionaryvigilancebecauseofvictoryandonno

accountignorethedangerofU.S.imperialismandSovietrevisionismlaunchingalarge‐scale

warofaggression…ChairmanMaosaidlongagowewillnotattackunlessweareattacked;if

weareattacked,wewillcertainlycounter‐attack.Iftheyinsistonfighting,wewillkeepthem

companyandfighttothefinish.TheChineseRevolutionwaswononthebattlefield.



Despiteitsbelligerenttonethespeechhadinteresting,indeedtantalizing, 

innuendos.ItemphasizedthatChinawouldnotattackunlessattackedfirst,thus

easingourfearofChineseinterventioninIndochina.ItlistedtheSovietUnionand

theUnitedStatesasequalthreatstothePeople’sRepublic,fulfillingoneofthe

preconditionsoftriangulardiplomacy,thattheUnitedStatesshouldnotbethe

principalenemy.



OnApril29,IsentthePresidentawrap‐upoftheChinesePartyCongress.

TheCongressseemedtoreflectacontinuingstruggleinChinaoverdomestic,

economic,andsocialpolicyandpoliticalcontrol.Foreignpoliciesseemedequally

uncertain,butChinesepreoccupationwiththeSoviet,ratherthantheAmerican,

dangerseemedtobegrowing.IinformedNixon:



Thedirectionofpolicywasnotdetermined…SupportforclassstrugglesinSouthEast

Asia,IndiaandIsraelwasreaffirmedbyLinPiao,butgivenlittleemphasis.



DenigrationoftheUSwasproforma.



LinPiaomentionedthattheChinesehadrefusedanurgentSovietrequesttodiscussthe

borderissue,butheindicatedthatChinawasconsideringwhethertoengageinborder

discussions…



ThepublicstatementsdidnotmanifestanyChineseconcernthatwarwiththeUSorthe

USSRisimminent.



TreatmentofVietnamwasperfunctory,andtheChinesehavenotendorsedtheNorth

Koreanpositionduringtherecenttension.[ReferringtotheNorthKoreanshootdownofaUS

EC‐121reconnaissanceaircraft.SeeChapterIX.]



…TheCongresshadkindwordsfornogovernmentsandforonlyoneParty,the

Albanian.AcombinationofmoralisticrigiditytowardsotherCommunists,togetherwitha

professeddesiretoseetheoverthrowofnon‐Communistneighbors,wouldappearlikelyto

earnthehostilityofboth.



Whateverthelong‐termsignificanceofmyanalysis,areferenceinitto

Mao’scontinuingbattletorevampeducationalpolicycausedNixontodiscovera

communityofpurposewithhiserstwhilenemesis.Hewroteinthemargin:“HK:

NoteMao[too]fightstheeducationalestablishment!”



WhilethePartyCongresswasgoingoninPeking,morefightingbrokeout

alongtheSino‐SovietborderonApril16‐17—thistimetwenty‐fivehundredmiles

totheWestonthefrontierbetweenSinkiangandKazakhstan.Anotherclash

occurredthereonApril25,andyetanotheronMay2.OnApril26,theUSSR

publiclyproposedtoChinatheresumptionofthemeetingsoftheJoint

CommissionforNavigationonBoundaryRivers,whichhadbeensuspendedsince

1967.OnMay8,theSovietpressdisclosedmilitarymaneuversbySovietforces

neartheChineseborder.OnMay9,DefenseMinisterMarshalAndreiGrechko’s

OrderoftheDaycommemoratingthetwenty‐fourthanniversaryofV‐EDay

rankedChinawiththeUnitedStatesandWestGermanyamongtheUSSR’smajor

foes.



Apparentlyfeelingtheheat,theChineseonMay11acceptedtheSoviet

proposaltoresumediscussionsonrivernavigation.Buttherewasmorefighting

allalongtheAmurRiveronMay12,15,25,and28;andfurtherclashesonMay20

andJune10ontheSinkiangborder(seethemapabove).Thehostilitiesin

Sinkiangtippedthescalesinmymindastotheprobableaggressor.OriginallyI

hadacceptedthefashionableviewthattheChinesewerethemoremilitant

country.ButwhenIlookedatadetailedmapandsawthattheSinkiangincidents

tookplaceonlyafewmilesfromaSovietrailheadandseveralhundredmilesfrom

anyChineserailhead,itoccurredtomethatChinesemilitaryleaders wouldnot

havepickedsuchanunpropitiousspottoattack.AfterthatIlookedatthe

problemdifferently.IftheSovietUnionwastheaggressor,however,wehada

problemaswellasanopportunity.Theproblemwasthatafull‐scaleSoviet

invasionofChinamighttipnotonlytheg eopoliticalbutalsothepsychological

equilibriumintheworld;itwouldcreateamomentumofirresistibleruthlessness.

Butitwasnotaneasymattertoresistsuchaggressiononbehalfofacountrywith

whichwehadneitherdiplomaticrelationsnoreffectivecommunicationatany

level.



TheopportunitywasthatChinamightbereadytoreenterthediplomatic

arenaandthatwouldrequireittosoftenitsprevioushostilitytowardtheUnited

States.Insuchcircumstances,theChinesethreatagainstmanyofourfriendsin

Asiawoulddecline;atthesametime,byevokingtheSovietUnion’sconcerns

alongitslongAsianperimeter,itcouldalsoeasepressuresonEurope.Butfor

suchpossibilitiestobeclearer,weneededsomecommunicationwiththeChinese

leaders.Ifwemovedtooquicklyorobviously—beforetheCulturalRevolutionhad

fullyrunitscourse—theChinesemightrebufftheoverture.Ifwemovedtoo

slowly,wemightfeedChinesesuspicionsofSoviet‐Americancollusion,which

coulddrivethemintomakingthebestdealavailablewithMo scow.Asforthe

Soviets,weconsideredtheChineseoptionusefultoinducerestraint;butwehad

totakecarenottopursueitsoimpetuouslyastoprovokeaSovietpreemptive

attackonChina.Andathomewehadtoovercomeahabitofmindthathadseen

inthePeople’sRepubliceitheranirreconcilableenemyoraput‐uponcountry

concernedonlywiththeissueofTaiwan.



Mymajorconcernatthisstagewastomakesurethattherightquestions

werebeingaskedinourgovernment.MydirectiveofFebruary5hadproducedan

interagencypaperonChina,whichtheNSCReviewGroupmettodiscussonMay

15.ThepaperpaidheavyattentiontotheconventionalChinese‐American

bilateralproblems:Taiwan,admissiontotheUnitedNatio ns,tradeandtravel,and

variousdisarmamentschemes;italsodiscussedouropposinginterestsinAsia.All

theseconcernsweretreatedasiftheyexistedinavacuum.Noreferencewas

madetotheglobalimplicationsofSino‐Soviettensionsandtheopportunitiesfor

usinthetriangularrelationship.AtthemeetingIchallengedwhatseemedtome

excessiveemphasisonChina’sideologyandallegedmilitancy; Ithoughttheissue

shouldbeposeddifferently.TheinteragencypaperassumedthatAmericanpolicy

hadtheessentiallypsychologicalgoalofchangingthemindsoftheChinese

leadership,toturnChinesemindsfrommilitancytowardconciliation.Thisignored

China’sroleinthepowerequation.Anationof800millionssurroundedby

weakerstateswasageopoliticalproblemnomatterwhogovernedit.Whichof

ourproblemswithChinawerecausedbyitssizeandsituationandwhichbyits

leadership?WhatdidwewantfromChinaandhowcouldwereasonablyinfluence

itsdecisions?HowdidweviewtheevolutionofSino‐Sovietrelations;howmuch

couldweinfluencethemandwhichsideshouldwefavor?Ialsoquestionedthe

viewofmostKremlinolog iststhatanyattempttobetterourrelationswithChina

wouldruinrelationswiththeSovietUnion.Historysuggestedthatitwasusually

moreadvantageoustoalignoneselfwiththeweakeroftwoantagonisticpartners,

becausethisactedasarestraintonthestronger.



OnJune8,theSovietsresumedtheirdiplomaticoffensive.Brezhnev,ina

speechtotheInternationalConferenceofCommunistPartiesinMoscow,

denouncedMaoandfloatedtheconceptof“asystemofcollectivesecurityin

Asia.”Hedidnotelaborate,butsucha “system”couldonlybedirectedagainst

China.InlateJune,Sovietambassadorsmadecoordinatedeffortsto“expose”

ChinesepolicytotheirhostgovernmentsandtodiscouragevariousWest

EuropeannationsfromrecognizingPeking.TheSovietUnionsoughttoexpandits

contactswithnon‐CommunistAsiannations;feelerswereevenextendedto

Taiwan.InacampaigntothwartanyChineseefforttobreakoutofitsisolation,

SovietdiplomatshintedthatinorderbettertoisolateChinatheSovietUnionwas

preparedtoavoidcomplicatingrelationswiththeUnitedStates.Isummedup

theseaccumulatingsignsinareporttothePresident:



IbelievethisissolidevidenceofthegrowingobsessionoftheSovietleaderswiththeir

Chinaproblem…atleastitsuggeststhattheSovietsmaybecomemoreflexibleindealingwith

East‐Westissues…Thus,Sovietconcernmayhavefinallyreachedthepointthatitcanbeturned

toouradvantage,iftheyareinfactattemptingtoensureourneutralityintheirChinese

containmentpolicy,ifnotouractivecooperation.



ThePresidentmadeenthusiasticcommentsinthemargin,suchas,“Thisis

ourgoal.”Hesuggestedwe“subtlyencourage”allthecountriesbeingurgedby

theSovietsnottoestablishrelationswithPekingtoproceed(adramaticshift

fromhiscomplaintsaboutourAmbassadorinEuropefivedaysafterhis

Inauguration).



WenowredoubledourowneffortstoestablishcontactwithPeking.On

June26thePresidentsentmeamessagethatweshouldencourageSenatorMike

Mansfield,whohadlongbeeninterestedinChina,togothroughwithhisplanto

seekavisatovisitChina.ItookthePresident’sinstructionsastepfurtherby

urgingBryceHarlow,theninchargeofCongressional relationsattheWhite

House,toencourageMansfield tomakehisinitiativepublic.Butamoreexplicit

gesturewasnecessary.Thetimehadcometomodifyourtradeembargoagainst

China.Theactualchangewasunimportantbutthesymbolismwasvast.The

worrieddeliberationsnecessarytobring aboutthisrelativelyminorsteparea

measureofthedistancewehavetraveledsince.Thedecisiongrewoutofan

overallstudyoftraderestrictionsorderedonMarch28.Wedecidedtodealwith

Chinesetradeasaspecialcase.OnJune26Isignedadirectiveto theagencies

that:“ThePresidenthasdecided,onbroadforeignpolicygrounds,to modify

certainofourtradecontrolsagainstChina.”TheNSCUnderSecretaries

Committee,ablychairedbyElliotRichardson,wasaskedtopreparedetailed

recommendationstoimplementthePresidentialdecision.



Itwasatfirstassumedthatanyactualimplementationhadtoawait

passagebytheCongressoftherevisedExportControlActexpectedinSeptember.

ButRichardsonandIsoonrealizedthatifwewaiteduntilthenwemightbe

overtakenbyeventsinAsia,whichseemedtobebuildingtoaclimax. Ipointed

outtoNixonthatthedirectiveofJune26wassuretoleakandperhapsstarta

domesticdebatethatwoulddilutethefavorableimpactinPeking.Thentherewas

theproblemofUS‐Sovietrelations.Weexpectedatanytimetoannouncethe

commencementoftheSALTtalks;ifwecoupledthiswitharelaxationofChina

traderestrictions,wewouldbeopentochargesbyproponentsofUS‐Soviet

relationsthatitwasagratuitousslapattheSovietsandwewouldbeheldto

blameforanydeadlocksinSALT.Similarly,ifthedecisionwereannouncedafter

thePresidentreturnedfromhisforthcomingtriptoRomania(afriendofChina),

thattripwouldtakeonan“overlyovertanti‐Sovietsignificance.”



RichardsonandIfinallysettledonthreerecommendations:(1)permitting

Americantouriststopurc haseupto$100ofChinese‐madenoncommercialgoods;

(2)eliminatingthebanontraveltothePeople’sRepublic;and(3)allowing

shipmentofgrain.ThePresidentagreedtothefirsttwoitems,butontheadvice

ofconservativeSenatorsdisapprovedthethird.Justaswewerereadytomake

theannouncementthereoccurredoneofthosetrivialunforeseeneventsthatcan

wreckthebest‐laidplans.OnJuly16,ayachtcrewedbytwoAmericanshad

capsizedoffHongKong;theirlifeboatdriftedintoChinesewatersandtheywere

capturedbytheChinese.RichardsonandIdecidedtopostponethe

announcementforafewdaystoseewhethertheChinesewouldplaytheincident

intoananti‐Americancampaign.ButPekingremainedsilent.OnJuly21,1969,

justbeforethePresident’sdepartureforhisaround‐the‐worldtrip,theState

Departmentmadea low‐key,matter‐of‐factannouncementthateased(butdid

noteliminate)restrictionsontradeandtraveltothePeople’sRepublic.The

announcementaskedfornoreciprocity;theChinesecouldconsideritwithout

reactingformally.OnJuly24theChinesereleasedtheAmericanyachtsmen.Chou

En‐lai,too,knewhowtomakemovesthatrequirednoreciprocity.Pekinghad

understood.



BythistimeNixonhadsetoffonthetriproundtheworld,duringwhichhe

intendedleavingvisitingcardsfortheChineseateverystop.Nixonbeganatonce

spreadingthewordofourreadinesstoopencommunicationwithPeking.In

IndonesiaandThailandhetoldleadersthatwewouldhavenothingtodowiththe