Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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strategyandhadhadlittlediplomacytoconduct.Nowitsbureaucracybeganto

becomeactive,foritthrivesnotonanalysisbutonnegotiations.Havingseen

studiescomeandgo,itisinclinednottoargueoverplanningpapers;itwillfight

tothedeath,however,overinstructionstoambassadors.Itisconvincedthat

policyismademostefficientlybycable.Giventherelativelyshortresponsetime

allowedbymostnegotiations,thishastheaddedadvantageofkeepingtoa

minimumtheinterventionbyoutsiders(suchasthePresident,oreventhe

SecretaryofState).



TheWarsawtalkstriggeredallthelatentreflexesoftheStateDepartment

establishment.FirsttobeheardfromwasthegroupthatspecializedinUS‐Soviet

relations.Convincedthatthenuclearsuperpowersheldthekeytopeaceandwar,

theywantedtoruntheminimumriskstothisrelationship;theysawlittle

compensatingadvantageinarapprochementwithChina.Onthecontrary,a

triangularrelationshipwould, theythought,upsetallpredictabilityintheirsphere

ofpolicy.TheargumentthatbetterrelationswithChinamightactuallyimprove

relationswiththeSovietUnionwasconsideredbythisgroupeitherabsurdor

reckless.[

ThiswasexpressedasfollowsinaStateDepartmentpapersubmittedtotheNSC

ReviewGroupinSeptember:SoviettoleranceofU.S.overturestoPekingmaybesubstantial—

buttheseovertureswillneverthelessintroduceirritantsintotheU.S.‐Sovietrelationship.

Moreover,ifasignificantimprovementintheSino‐Americanrelationshipshouldcomeabout,

theSovietsmightwelladoptaharderlinebothathomeandininternationalaffairs.Itis

impossibletoforeseethepointatwhichtheadvantagesinanimprovementinSino‐U.S.

relationsmightbecounterbalancedbyahardeninginU.S.‐Sovietrelationships.Thefactthat

suchapointalmostcertainlyexistsarguesforcautioninmakingmovestowardbetterrelations

withChina…]Theirintellectualleaderwasthebrilliantandde dicatedformer

AmbassadortotheSovietUnionLlewellynThompson,theStateDepartment’s

foremostexpertonSovietaffairs.AsearlyasJuneheandhisequallydistinguished 

colleagueCharles(Chip)Bohlenhad,ontheirowninitiative,calledonNixonwhen

theyhadheardthatwewereplanningtoeasetraderestrictionsagainstChina.

Courageously,theywarnedthePresidentagainstanyattemptto“use”China

againsttheSovietUnion.ThiscouldhavenothingbutdireconsequencesforUS‐

Sovietrelationsandforworldpeace.Ofcourse,weenvisagednothingsocrudeas

“using”thePeople’sRepublicagainsttheSovietUnion;wewantedtocreatean

incentiveforbothtoimprovetheirrelationswithus.Nixonperformedinclassic

fashion—implyingsympathyintheirpres enceandthenmockingwhathe

consideredtheincorrigiblesoftheadednessoftheForeignSe rviceassoonasthey

lefttheroom.



LearningoftheimminentresumptionoftheWarsawtalks,Llewellyn

ThompsonnowsuggestedthatwekeepDobrynininformedofallourcontacts.

Rogerspassedthisproposalontome,withtheargumentthathedidnotendorse

itbutwantedto“givethePresidentthechancetothinkaboutit.”Istrongly

disagreed.SincetheSovietUniondidnotbriefusaboutitscontactswiththe

Chineseoranyothernation,Isawnoreasontoextendtoitanunreciprocated

courtesyorgratuitousreassurance.AndIsawnopointingivingtheRussiansthe

opportunitytogloattoPekingthattheywerebeingkeptinformed,thus

heighteningChinesesuspicionsfromthestart.Nixonagreedwithme.On

December12IinformedRogers:“ThePresident…hasaskedthatunderno

circumstancesshouldweinformDobryninofthetalksortheircontent.If

Dobryninquestions,weshouldrespondwithnonchalancethattheyconcern

mattersofmutualinterestbutnotgobeyondthat.ThePresidentisconcerned

thatlower‐levelofficesnotgobeyondthisininformalconversations.”



Unfortunately,anothercogofthebureaucraticmachinerywasalsoworking

overtime.TheStateDepartmentfunctionsthroughawondroussystemof

clearancesbywhichthevariousofficesoftheDepartmentaswellasforeign

governmentsareinformed,moreorlessautomatically,ofimportant events.The

motivesarevarious:tomakecertainthatkeyofficialsareawareofmattersthat

mayaffecttheminthedischargeoftheirresponsibilities;togenerateasenseof

participation;toreassurenervousallies;andsometimes—inaprofessionwhere

informationispower—tocreateanobligationforthereciprocalsharingof

information.Thedifficultyisthattheseworthycriteriaaretoooftensubordinated

toveryshort‐runconsiderationsofvanityorbureaucraticprestige,andare

implementedsoroutinelythatseniorofficialsfindithardtocontrolthem.Within

daysitbec ameapparentthattheStateDepartmenthadsentaccountsofthe

WarsawmeetingtoourembassiesinTokyo,Taipei,andMoscowandtoour

ConsulateGeneralinHongKong.ThegovernmentsoftheUnitedKingdom,

Australia,Canada,France,Italy,andNewZealandhadbeenbriefedeitherbefore

orafterStoessel’smeeting.Whileeverybodywaswarnedagainstpublic

comment,suchdisseminationofafairlyjuicypieceofnewswasboundtoradiate

throughthediplomaticworld.WhenImentionedwhathadbeendone,the

Presidentsighed,“We’llkillthischildbeforeitisborn.”Thedifficultyof

controllingtheenormousbureaucraticcommunicationsmachinerywasaprincipal

reasonwhycontrolofChinadiplomacywasgraduallymovedintotheWhite

House.



OnDecember19wetookyetanotherinitiative.Alow‐keyannouncement

intheFederalRegisterannouncedaneweasingoftraderestrictions:liftingofthe

$100ceilingontouristpurchases;permittingUS‐ownedforeignsubsidiariestodo

businesswiththePeople’sRepublicofChina;andshiftingtothegovernmentthe

burdenofproofwithrespecttowhatwasChinese‐manufactured,thuseasing

importsofartobjects. 



Suddenlyallchannelsseemedtospringtolife.OnDecember17,Romania’s

FirstDeputyForeignMinisterGheorgheMacovescuhadcalledonmetoreport

theChinesereactiontoNixon’sconversationwithCeauşescu.TheChinesehad

listenedpolitely,theysaidtheywereinterestedinnormalrelationswiththe

West;theyhadnothingspecifictocommunicate.ThePeople’sRepublicseemed

tobesayingtwothings:Itwasreadyforcontact,butnotnecessarilythroughthe

Romanianchannel.Twodayslater,AmbassadorAghaHilalyconveyedthelatest

newsofthePakistanichannel.Hehadmuchmoretosay.Readingfroma

handwrittenletter—thewayallPakistanimessagesinthechannelwere

transmitted,forsecurityreasons—HilalyreportedthatYahyahadtoldtheChinese

Ambassadorofbothourgeneralinte restinimprovingrelationsandourdecision

towithdrawtwodestroyersfromtheTaiwanpatrol.TheChineseAmbassadorhad

firstreactedverycoolly,castingaspersionsonAmericanmotives,butafterafew

days—obviouslyonreceivinghisinstructionsfromPeking—hadreturnedwitha

moreconciliatoryreply.HenowexpressedPeking’sgratitudeforPakistan’srole

andefforts.TheChinesereleaseofthetwoAmericanyachtsmenonDecember6

hadbeenatangibleresponsetoouroverture,saidHilaly.



ThePresidentkepttheballinplaywithalonglettertoYahyaonUS‐

Pakistanirelations.OnChina,Nixonwrote:“Youknowofmyinterestintryingto

bringaboutamoremeaningfuldialoguewithChineseleaders.Thisisaslow

processatbest,butIhavenotabandonedit.”WhenIhandedthislettertoHilaly

onDecember23hehadalreadyreceivedanothermessage.Yahyanowinformed

usofhis“impression”(indiplomaticvernacular,anonattributablecommunication

fromahighChineseofficial)thattheChinesewerewillingtoresumetheWarsaw

talkswithoutpreconditions.ItwasclearthattheChineseattachedspecialvalue

tothePakistanichannel,Pakis tanbeinginalesscomplicatedpositionvis‐à‐vis

Sino‐SovietrelationsthanRomania. 



<<Contents>>

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

TriangularPolitics



husbytheendof1969,America’srelationshipwiththeCommunistworldwas

slowlybecomingtria ngular.WedidnotconsiderouropeningtoChinaas

inherentlyanti‐Soviet.Ourobjectivewastopurgeourforeignpolicyofall

sentimentality.Therewasnoreasonforustoconfineourcontactswithmajor

CommunistcountriestotheSovietUnion.WemovedtowardChinanottoexpiate

liberalguiltoverourChinapo licyofthelate1940sbuttoshapeaglobal

equilibrium.ItwasnottocolludeagainsttheSovietUnionbuttogiveusa

balancingpositiontouseforconstructiveends—togiveeachCommunistpowera

stakeinbetterrelationswithus.Suchanequilibriumcouldassurestabilityamong

themajorpowers,andeveneventualcooperation,intheSeventiesandEighties.

T



OnDecember18ina year‐endpressbriefingintheEastRoom,Itriedto

sketchourgeneralapproachtobothofthemajorCommunistcountries:“We

havealwaysmadeitclearthatwehavenopermanentenemiesandthatwewill

judgeothercountries,includingCommunistcountries,andspecificallycountries

likeCommunistChina,onthebasisoftheiractionsandnotonthebasisoftheir

domesticideology.”Ispokefavorablyofthematter‐of‐factstylethathad

developedinourrelationswiththeSovietUnion,oftheabsenceofthe

tendentiouspropagandathathadcharacterizedpreviousexchanges.Wewere

readyforseriousnegotiations.Wewouldprepareourselvesmeticulously.Butwe

wouldinsistonreciprocity.Wewerepreparedtohaveasummitmeetingwiththe

Sovietleaders,butwewouldprefertohavethesummitregisterconsiderable

progress,notbeanendinitself.IspokeofChinainamorephilosophicalvein,

sincewehadsomuchfarthertogotoawakenthatrelationship:



TheChinesepeopleareobviouslyagreatpeople.Theyhavethelongestunbroken

recordofgovernmentinoneareaofanyoftheexistingcivilizations;andsecondly,800million

peoplerepresenting25percentofthehumanraceareafactorthatcannotbeignored.They

willinfluenceinternationalaffairswhateverweintendtodoanddeclaratorypolicyweadopt.

Theyareareality.Andtheirpolicy,forgoodorill,willdeterminethepossibilitiesforpeaceand

progress.Andthatisirrespectiveofwhatwedo.



…ifitistruethatthebigproblemoftheimmediatepost‐WorldWarIIperiodwasto

avoidchaos,andifitistruethatthebigproblemofthenext20yearsistobuildamore

permanentpeace,thenitseemstousimpossibletobuildapeace,whichwewoulddefineas

somethingotherthanjusttheavoidanceofcrisis,bysimplyignoringthese800millionpeople.

…



Nordoweover‐estimatewhatwecandobyunilateralactionstowardsthem.



Theywillmaketheirdecisionsonthebasisoftheirconceptionsoftheirneeds,andof

theirideology.Buttothedegreethattheiractionscanbeinfluencedbyours,weareprepared

toengageinadialoguewiththem.



OnDecember22Ihadaprivateyear‐endreviewwithDobrynin.Iwasso

certainthathewouldbringupChinathatIwroteoutmyresponse forthe

President’sappro val,whichhegave.Iwrote:



Iwillreiteratethat



1. wedonotacceptthepropositionthatpermanenthostilityistheironlawofUS‐

Chineserelations;



2. ourpolicyisnotaimedagainsttheUSSR;



3. wetakenosidesintheSino‐Sovietdispute.



Iwasnottobedisappointed.DobryninraisedthesubjectofChinayet

again,askingwhatwewereuptoandwhattheChinesehadresponded.I

sidesteppedthequestion,givingonlythegeneralassurancesIhadprepared.



Bytheendof1969itwasapparentthatChina,too,hadmadeastrategic

decisiontoseekrapprochementwithus,evenwhileitfendedofftheSovietUnion

byresuminganintermittentdialogueontheborderdispute.As1970began,the

ChineseagreedtoanotherinformalmeetingatwhichStoesselwastoproposethe

formalresumptionoftheWarsawambassadorialtalks.Themeetingwastotake

placeattheAmericanEmbassyonJanuary8.Preparingforitledtoanotherminor

disputewiththeStateDepartment.ThePresidentandIwereanxioustousethe

occasiontotelltheChinesethatwewouldnotparticipateinaUS‐Soviet

condominiuminAsiaoranywhereelse.WewantedtohavetheChinesehear

directlywhathaduntilnowbeensaidtothemonlythroughthirdparties.There

wasalsothedangerthatwewouldunderminethecredibilityofourprivate

channelsifAmericandiplomatsdidnotreiteratewhatthePresidentandIhad

repeatedlysaidthroughintermediaries.



AssistantSecretaryofStateforEastAsianandPacificAffairsMarshallGreen

resisted,arguingthatweshouldavoidsubstanceat ameetingdevotedto

procedure.Therewereundoubtedlydeeperreasonsforthisresistance:irritation

atWhiteHouseinterference;afeelingamongEastAsianspecialiststhat

introducingageopoliticalconsiderationhavingtodowiththeSovietUnionwas

gratuitous;andperhapsstillcautiontowardtheChinaopeningamongexperts

accustomedtoviewChinaasa majorthreat,orelseinhibitedbypainfulmemories

ofthepenaltiesexactedforboldstepstowardCommunistChinaduringthe

McCarthyera.



Intheevent,theWarsawmeetingofJanuary8wentextraordinarilywell.

TheChinesechargearrivedflamboyantlyattheUSEmbassyinalimousineflying

theChineseflag.Proceduralissueswereamicablysettled.Itwasagreedto

resumetheformalandregularWarsawmeetingsbetweenambassadors.Andthe

President’smessageaboutcondominiumwasconveyed.Bothsidesavoided

polemics(eventhoughtheChinesepresswasstillinformingitspublicofthe

“iniquities”oftheNixonAdministration).TheChineseacceptedtheprincipleof

meetingalternatelyinthetwoembassies.ThenextmeetingwassetforJanuary

20,intheChineseEmbassy.LeiYangproposedthatthemeetingbeannounced.



Thus,oneyeartothedayaftertheInaugurationofthePresident,the

People’sRepublicofChinaandtheUnitedStatesweretoengageinsubstantive

talksagainforthefirsttimeinovertwoyears.Buttheseweretobedifferentfrom

anyofthe134meetingsthathadprecededthem.Theyhadbeenpainstakingly

preparedovermonthsbymessages,firstindirectbutgrowingincreasingly

explicit,ofawillingnessto bringaboutafundamentalchangeinourrelationship.

Westillhadalongwaytogo.Butwewereatlastinthefoothillsofamountain

rangethatitwouldtakeusanothereighteenmonthstotraverse.



Itwasamomentofextraordinaryhope.Beyondtheadvantagesoftri‐

angulardiplomacy,therewereotherreasons.OnewasVietnam.Anopeningto

Chinamighthelpusendtheagonyofthatwar.XuanThuy’soutburstofMarch22

hadvividlyshownHanoi’ssensitivitytotheescalatingfeudbetweenitstwomajor

allies.ThisSino‐SovietconflictcomplicatedNorthVietnam’sposition,for(among

others)thesimplepracticalreasonthatmuchmilitaryaidfromtheSovietUnion

cameoverlandbyrailthroughChinaandthereforerequiredsomeminimalSino‐

Sovietcooperation.Hanoimighthavesensedthemaneuveringroomthefeud

wouldgiveusasitdidin1972.Andanyinitiativethathelpedhealourdomestic

divisionsalsodeprivedHanoiofoneofitsmajorassets.



Thedomesticim pactinAmericaofourChinainitiativehadafardeeper

significance.TheagonyofVietnamseemedtobringonadespairaboutthe

possibilityofcreativepolicy,anabhorrenceofforeigninvolvement,andinsome

quartersaninsidiousself‐hatred.Thedramaofendingestrangementwiththis

greatpeople,inhumantermsandforwhatitmeanttotheglobalprospectsof

peace,wouldbeabreathoffreshair,areminderofwhatAmericacould

accomplishasaworldleader.Todosointhemidstofadivisivewarwouldprove

toourselvesandothersthatweremainedamajorfactorinworldaffairs,ableto

actwithboldnessandskilltoadvanceourgoalsandthewell‐beingofallwho

relieduponus.



<<Contents>>



****



VII



DefensePolicyandStrategy



DefenseandtheStrategicBalance



hroughouthistorythepoliticalinfluenceofnationshasbeenroughly

correlativetotheirmilitarypower.Whilestatesmightdifferinthemoral

worthandprestigeoftheirinstitutions,diplomaticskillcouldaugmentbut

neversubstituteformilitarystrength.Inthefinalreckoningweaknesshas

invariablytemptedaggressionandimpotencebringsabdicationofpolicyinits

train.Somelessercountrieshaveplayedsignificantrolesontheworldscalefor

briefperiods,butonlywhentheywereactinginthesecureframeworkofan

internationalequilibrium.Thebalanceofpower,aconceptmuchmalignedin

Americanpoliticalwriting—rarelyusedwithout beingprecededbythepejorative

“outdated”—hasinfactbeenthepreconditionofpeace.Acalculusofpower,of

course,isonlythebeginningofpolicy;itcannotbeitssolepurpose.Thefact

remainsthatwithoutstrengtheventhemostelevatedpurposerisksbeing

overwhelmedbythedictatesofothers.

T



ThishasbeenahardlessonforAmericanstolearn. Protectedbytwo

oceans,wewerepersuadedfor overacenturythatitwasunnecessaryforusto

addressissuesofstrategy.Aloneamongthegreatpowers,weimaginedthatwe

couldprevailthroughthepurityofourmotivesandthatourimpactontheworld

wassomehowunrelatedtoourphysicalpower.Wetendedtooscillatebetween

isolationandspurtsofinvolvement,eachconceivedinmoralisticterms.Evenour

militaryeffortshadanabstractqualityaboutthem,focusedmoreonlogistics

thanongeopolitics.Inourwars,wegenerallyworedownouradversarybythe

weightofresourcesratherthanbyboldnessorstrategicconceptions.



Bythelate1960swewereonceagaintemptedbywithdrawal. The

frustrationsofaninconclusivewarencouragedsometoascribeourproblemsto

beingtooheavilyengagedaroundtheworld.Criticismoriginally aimedatthewar

inVietnamwassoonextendedtotheentirespectrumofourmilitaryprograms

andcommitments.Theinformedopinionthathadsustainedagenerationof

enlightenedpostwarinternationalinvolvementseemedtobeturningsharply

againstit.



Thisthreatenedtoputournationandotherfreepeoplesintoa precarious

position.ThepoliticalstabilityofEuropeandJapanandthefutureevolutionof

thedevelopingcountriesofLatinAmerica,Africa,andAsiawouldturnonwhether

theUnitedStatespossessedpowerrelevanttoitsobjectivesandwasperceivedas

abletodefenditsinterestsandthoseofitsfriends.IfthewarinVietnameroded

ourwillingnesstoba ckthesecurityoffreepeopleswithourmilitarystrength,

untoldmillions wouldbeinjeopardy.



Unfortunately,ourdomestictravailwasmostacuteatamomentwhen

technology,combinedwithearlierdeliberatedecisions,wasalteringthenatureof

thestrategicbalanc e.Throughoutthepo stwar periodtheSovietUnionhad

enjoyedanenormousadvantageinconventionallandforces.Sovietmilitary

capabilitiessufferedfromtwohandicaps,however:theSovietreachwas

relativelyshort;itwasconfinedineffecttoareasadjoiningtheSovietUnion.And

theAmericanpreponderanceinnuclearstrategicforceswasoverwhelming.The

SovietUnioncouldnotpressitslocaladvantageforfearofbeingconfrontedby

thenuclearsuperiorityoftheUnitedStates.Thiswastheprimaryreasonwhythe

SovietUnion,despiteitsoccasionalbluster,neveruseditsvastconventional

forcesagainstcountriesalliedwiththeUnitedStates.Itisoneoftheironiesofour

timethatsince1945theRedArmyhasbeenemployedinforceonlyagainstallies

oftheSovietUnion(inEastBerlinin1953,inH ungaryin1956,inCzechoslovakia

in1968,andontheborderwithChinain1969).



BythelateSixties,however,thestrategicnuclearbalancewastending

towardparity.Thisshouldhavechangedalltheassumptionsofourpostwar

strategy.Unfortunately,attheprecisemomentthatournationaldebateshould

haveconcentratedontheimplicationsofthisnewsituation,allourdefense

programswerecomingunderincreasingattack.Theyweredecriedasexcessive,

blamedonrecklessleaders,andcriticizedascontributingtocrisesandconflicts.



TheadministrationsinofficeintheSixtiesdecidedconsciouslytoaccepta

parityinstrategicweaponstheyconsideredinevitable;byacceptingit,however,

theyalsoacceleratedit.IntheSixtiestheUnitedStatesvolunt arilyhaltedits

constructionofland‐basedICBMsandsea‐basedSLBMs.Wehadnoprogramsto

buildadditionalstrategicbombers.Itwasdecidedtomaintaina strategicforce

consistingof1,054land‐basedICBMs,656SLBMs,andabout400B‐52bombers.

Weadoptedtheseceilingsatatimewhenwefaroutnumberedthestrategic

forcesoftheSovietUnion.Buttheseceilingswerenotchangedevenwhenit

becameclearthattheSovietUnion,reactinginparttoitshumiliationinthe

Cubanmissilecrisisof1962,hadundertakenamassiveefforttoaugmentits

militarystrengthacrosstheboard.



InAmericanfolkloretheCubancrisisisrememberedasagreatAmerican

victory.Andindeeditwas.ButtheAmericanandSovietgovernmentsdrew

diametricallyoppositeconclusionsfromit.InAmericanpolicyitledtothepursuit

ofarmscontrolanddétente,exemplifiedbytheTestBanandNon‐Proliferation

treatiesandindeedinthedecisiontoceaseourmissileconstructiononcewehad

reachedafixednumber.IntheSovietUnion,bycontrast,Khrushchev’s

humiliationinCubawasonecauseofhisoverthrowtwoyearslater.Theessence

oftheSovietresponsetotheCubanexperienceisembodiedinthepungent

remarkofVasilyV.KuznetsovtoJohnMcCloy,whenthesetwoveteranSovietand

AmericandiplomatsnegotiatedthedetailsoftheremovalofSovietweaponsfrom

Cubaattheendof1962:“YouAmericanswillneverbeabletodothistous

again!”

TheSovietUnionthereuponlauncheditselfonadetermined,systematic,

andlong‐termprogramofexpandingallcategoriesofitsmilitarypower—its

missilesandbombers,itstanksandsubmarinesandfighterplanes—in

technologicalqualityandglobalreach.The1962Cubancrisiswasthusanhistoric

turningpoint—butnotforthereasonsomeAmericanscomplacentlysupposed.



ThreeyearsaftertheCubanconfrontation,in1965,theSovietstrategic

arsenalcomprisedabout220ICBMsandover100SLBMs.By1968thenumbers

hadgrowntonearly860ICBMsandover120SLBMs.By1971theSovietshad

caughtupwithus—andtheycontinuedtobuild.Ourestimatesoftheirplans

invariablyturnedouttobelow.ThebrilliantanalystAlbert Wohlstetterhas

demonstratedconvincinglythatthebelieffashionableinthe1960s—thatthe

PentagonexaggeratedSovietprogramstowinhigherappropriations—wasexactly

theoppositeofthetruth.AmericanplannersintheFiftiesandSixtiesconsistently

underestimatedtheSovietbuildup.

TheSovietprogramsalwayswereatthe

highestlevelofourestimates—notwhatwasdescribedas“mostprobable”but

whatwasputforwardasthe“worstcase.”Insteadofhaltingoncetheyreached