Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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Thegroundsforoppositionwerevarious,passionate,andnotneces sarily

consistent.Sixdistinguishedscientists—HansBethe,HerbertYork,George

Kistiakowsky,JamesR.Killian,WolfgangPanofsky,andGeorgeRathjens—testified

inMarchthattheABMwasnotreliable;itwastoo technologicallycomplexto

functionwithadequateaccuracy.AsecondargumentwasthatevenifABM

functionedasplanned,itcouldberelativelyeasilydefeatedbyvariousSoviet

countermeasures.Carriedawaywithenthusiasmforthislineofreasoning,

ProfessorBetheinapublic sessionoutlinedfivescientificmethodstodefeatour

ABMsystem.



Ontheotherhand,theallegedlyineffective,unreliable,andeasilydefeated

ABMsystemwasconsideredamenacebecauseitmightsparkanarmsraceandin

theprocessmightwellweakenthedeterrenteffectofstrategicweapons.Building

anABM,itwasargued,impliedthatwemightawaitaSovietattackandseekto

rideitout,whilethebetterstrategywastolettheSovietUnionbelievewewould

launchourmissilesimmediatelyonwarningofanattack:“IfIweretheRussians,”

saidSenatorFrankChurchbeforeSenatorGore’ssubcommittee,“andknewthat

animmediatecounterlaunchofMinutemenwouldbetheAmericanresponseto

anyfirststrikeagainsttheUnitedStates,Iwouldbefarmorereluctanttolaunch

theattackthanifIthoughttheUnitedStatesmightrelyuponadefensivesystem

inwhichI,asaRussian,hadcontempt.Inotherwords,itseemstomethatthe

verydefensivesystemyouaretalkingabout…mightevenleadtheRussiansto

concludethattheymighthazardafirststrike.”TheSenatordidnotexplainwhy

hewouldfeelmoresecurewhentheUnitedStatescouldprotectitselfonlybya

hair‐triggerresponsewithinthe fifteen‐minutemaximumwarning timeavailable,

astrategythatcouldnotworkunlessthePresidentdelegatedauthoritytofield

commanderstolaunchonthefirstwarningofSovietmissiles—awarningthat

latermightormightnotprovecorrect.



OthersarguedthattheneedforourABMwasbasedonexaggerated

estimatesoftheeffectivenessoftheSovietABMdeployedaroundMoscow.

However,thecriticscontendedthatitmadenodifferenceeveniftheSovietshad

builtaneffectiveABM.AnAmericanABMprogram,whatevertheprovocationfor

it,wouldusherinanewroundofthearmsracethreateningtotheprospectsfor

talksonstrategicarmslimitation.ItwasnotexplainedwhyanAmericanABMstill

manyyearsinthefuturewouldjeopardizetheprospectsforstrategicarms

limitationwhileanexistingSovietABMsystemaroundMoscowwouldnot.



Finally,theABM—asindeedweremanyothermilitaryprograms—was

attackedasawastefuldiversionofresourcesfromdomesticpriorities.Infact,

strategicforceshavealwaysbeenasmallfractionofourdefensebudget;mostof

ourdefensebudgetgoesforconventionalforcesandmanpower.InFiscalYear

1970allstrategicforcesaccountedforaboutone‐ninthofthetotaldefense

budget.YetahighlyvisiblenewprogramlikeABMwasa naturaltargetfor

attacks.IntheSenatedebateontheABM,SenatorMuskieargued:



Thegrimchainofurbansprawlandruraldecline,ofindividualpovertyandsocial

disorganization,ofwastedresourcesandhostileenvironmentswillnotbebrokenbya

governmentwhichisindifferentoraprivatesectorwhichisinactive—orpreoccupiedwith

huntingthenextarmscontract.



SenatorMondaletookasimilarline:



Thisuneasydeterrencebalanceisthreatenedbythedeploymentofthe…Safeguard…

system.Thisthreatcomesfromuncertainties—theuncertaintiesastowhetherananti‐ballistic‐

missilesystemcanwork…theuncertaintieswhichcomewiththeinevitableintroductionof

offensiveweaponstonegatetheeffectivenessofanABMdefense…theuncertaintiesaboutour

intentionswhenthedeploymentofmoreweaponsindicatesadecisiontospendonmilitary

materialsratherthanonpeacefulanddomesticneeds.



Inearly1969SenatorEdwardKennedysponsoredpublicationofabook

compilingafullbatteryofthepolitical,diplomatic,economic,military,and

technicalargumentsagainstanAmericanABM.



ThiswastheatmosphereinwhichtheNixonAdministration’sABMreview

wentforward.DavidPackardconcludedhisstudyinlateFebruary.He

recommendedthattheJohnsonAdministration’s1967“Sentinel”programbe

continuedinasomewhatmodifiedform.First,heproposedthattheABMradars

facenotonlytowardtheNorth,whenceanICBMattackwouldcome,butalso

towardthesea,fromwhichsubmarinescouldlaunchmissiles.Second,Packard

recommendedthatmoreoftheABMinterceptormissilesbeusedtoprotectour

MinutemanICBMfie lds.Third,heurgedaslightthinningoutofthenumberof

missilesdevotedtothedefenseofcities.Thereasonsforthefirsttwo

recommendationsweremilitary:DefenseofthecircumferenceoftheUnited

Stateswaschosentoprotectagainstaccidentalattackfromanyquarterorasmall

(aeuphemismforChinese)deliberateattack.Itwouldalsogiveusanoptionto

expandthedefenseagainsttheSovietUnionifSALTnegotiationsfailed.And

protectingMinutemanfieldsmadeaSovietfirststrikemoredifficult.Thinningout

thedefenseofthepopulationwasapurelypoliticaldecision;itwasdesignedto

reassurearmscontroladvocatesfearfullestaheavydefenseofourpopulation

wouldappearthreateningtotheSoviets.Ourdilemmawasthatwecouldsellan

ABMprogramtotheCongressapparentlyonlybydeprivingitofmilitary

effectivenessagainstourprincipaladversary.



IagreedwiththeconclusionthatweshouldgoforwardwithABM.The

decisiveargumentsinmyviewwerebothmilitaryanddiplomatic.Sovietleaders

andmilitarytheoristshadneverespousedtheWesternacademicnotionsthat

vulnerabilitywasdesirableorthatABMwasthreateninganddestabilizing.As

PremierKosygindeclaredataLondonnewsconferenceinFebruary1967,an

antiballisticmissilesystem“isintendednotforkillingpeoplebutforsavinghuman 

lives.”AndhehadtoldPresidentJohnsonatGlassborothatgivingupdefensive

weaponswasthemostabsurdpropositionhehadeverheard.Moreover,being

somewhatinaweofAmericantechnology,theSovietscouldonlyassessanactive

AmericanABMprogramasaharbingeroffutureAmericansuperiorityinafield

thattheyconsideredimportant.



Thus,notonlywasitdesirabletopursueanareaoftechnologyinwhichthe

Sovietswereactivelyengaged;offeringtolimitourABMcouldbecomethemajor

SovietincentiveforaSALTagreement.Ourownnewoffensivemissileswereyears

away,andgiventheCongressionalclimatetheymightneverbeapproved.Inthe

immediatefuturewewouldnotbeabletocounterthealarmingbuildupofSoviet

offensivemissilesexceptbydeployingadefensivesystemandspurringtheMIRV

program.Ifthesetwoprogramswerecurtailed—assomanyintheCongress

urged—theUnitedStateswouldbewithoutanystrategicoptionsatatimewhen

theSovietswerebuildingtwotothreehundrednewmissilesayear—an

intolerablepositioninthelongrun.Ourreasoningprovedtobecorrect.The

trade‐offofSovietwillingnesstolimitoffensiveforcesinexchangeforour

willingnesstolimitABMswastheessentialbalance ofincentivesthatproduced

thefirstSALTagreementsthreeyearslater.



TherewereotherreasonsthatcausedmetosupportalimitedABM

deployment.Itseemedtomehighlyirresponsiblesimplytoignorethepossibility

ofanaccidentalattackortheprospectofnuclearcapabilitiesinthehandsofyet

morecountries.Chinawasonlythefirstcandidate;otherswouldfollow.Without

anydefenseanaccidentallaunchcoulddoenormousdamage.Evenasmall

nuclearpowerwouldbeabletoblackmailtheUnitedStates.Ididnotseethe

moralorpoliticalvalueofturningourpeopleintohostagesbydeliberatechoice.



Nixonfacedwhatwouldclearlybeacontroversialdecision;hepaused

brieflytocanvasshisassociates.Lairdwasstronglyinfavorofproceeding.Rogers

wasmildlydubious;hecalledoccasionallytotellmethatsomeofhisState

DepartmentcolleaguessuggestedthatweconfineourABMprogramtoresearch

anddevelopment,ratherthanproduction,buthestressedthathedidnot

necessarilyendorsetheirviews.IaskedDave Packardifitwasfeasibletoproceed

inthismanner.Packardrepliedthatthiswasawayofkillingtheprogram.Ifwe

backedoffnow—whichwasthepracticalconsequenceoftheproposal—the

Congresswasnomore likelytosupportdeploymentthefollowingyear.The

argumentsforitwouldnotbebetterthenthannowandtheopponentswouldbe

strengthenedbyhavingimposedaone‐yeardelay.Moreover,apauseofoneyear

wouldresultinanactualdelayoftwotothreeyearsinputtingthesysteminto

operation:productionfacilitiesoncecloseddownwouldtakeanotheryearortwo

tostartupagain.Thereforeadecisiontopostponewouldmeanadecisionthat

theUnitedStateswouldbewithoutanymissiledefensethroughthebetterpartof

the1970sandwithnoassuranceofSovietrestraint.



OnMarch14NixonannouncedhisdecisiontogoforwardwithanABM

program.Nixon’sprogramcalledfortwelveseparatesitesforareadefense,of

whichfourwouldalsoprotectMinutemen,atotalofnineteenradars,andseveral

hundredinterceptormissiles.Itwastobecompletedby1973.Toshoworiginality

theJohnson“Sentinel”systemwasnowrenamed“Safeguard.”Itdifferedfrom

“Sentinel”primarilyincoveringalloftheUnitedStateswithradars,providinga

betterbaseforrapidexpansionagainsttheSovietUnion,andconcentrating

somewhatmoreondefendingICBMbases.Nixon’sstatementadded:



IhavetakencognizanceoftheviewthatbeginningconstructionofaU.S.ballisticmissile

defensewouldcomplicateanagreementonstrategicarmswiththeSovietUnion.



Idonotbelievethattheevidenceoftherecentpastbearsoutthiscontention.The

Sovietinterestinstrategictalkswasnotdeterredbythedecisionofthepreviousadministration

todeploytheSentinelABMsystem—infact,itwasformallyannouncedshortlyafterwards.I

believethatthemodificationswehavemadeinthepreviousprogramwillgivetheSovietUnion

evenlessreasontoviewourdefenseeffortasanobstacletotalks.Moreover,Iwishto

emphasizethatinanyarmslimitationtalkswiththeSovietUnion,theUnitedStateswillbefully

preparedtodiscusslimitationsondefensiveaswellasoffensiveweaponssystems.



Thisannouncementprovokedafierceandprolongeddebatelastingfrom

MarchuntilwellintoAugust.OnAugust6theSenate,inacliff‐hanger,approved

theauthorizationoffundsfortheABMprogrambythebarestmarginofonevote.



Butstilltheopponentsdidnotgiveup.Insucceedingyearstheymanaged

toreduceappropriationsuntiltheoriginaltwelve‐site“Safeguard”progra mof

1969hadshrunktothreesitesin1972.The1972SALT treatylimitedABMtotwo

sitesforeachcountry,includingoneforthedefenseoftheNationalCommand

authorityandoneforanICBMfield.In1974theUnitedStatesandtheSoviet

Unionamendedthetreatytolimiteachsidetoonesite(eitheranICBMfieldor

theNationalCommandauthority).Congressio nalinsiste nceandbureaucratic

demoralizationresultedin1975inaunilateraldecisionbytheUnitedStatesto

scrapeventheonesitetowhichwewereentitledunderthetreaty.Butbythen

theABMprogramhadserveditsminimumpurposeofmakingpossiblethe1972

SALTagreement,whichstoppedthenumericalbuildupoftheSovietoffensive

strategicforces.Nevertheless,Ihavealwaysconsideredthe1975decisionto

abandonourlastsiteamistake,eventhoughIacquiescedinit.



<<Contents>>



****



MultipleIndependentlyTargetableReentryVehicles(MIRV)



T

heMIRVissuewasthereversesideoftheABMproblem.MIRVshadbeen

developedintheJohnsonAdministrationtocounteracttheSovietdeployment

ofanABMdefensebysaturatingitwithincomingwarheadsandtodosowithout

increasingournumberoflaunchers,whichwasthoughttobedestabilizing. The

theorywasthatifinreactiontotheSovietbuildupweincreasedthenumbersof

ourownmissiles,wewouldspurthearmsrace;if,however,weincreasedthe

numberofwarheads carriedoneachindividualmissilewecouldguaranteeour

retaliatorycapacitywithoutrunningthisrisk.IftheSovietsexpandedtheirABM

systemourmissileswithmultiplewarheadscouldoverwhelmit.Andevenifonly

asmallnumberofourmissilessurvivedasurpriseattack,sotheargumentran,

thosefewwouldstillbeabletoinflictunacceptabledamageonanaggressor

becausetheycarriedseveralwarheads.Thereasoningwasalittlecloudybecaus e

MIRV’dforcesagaingaveaconsiderableadvantagetotheattacker.Evenifboth

sideswereequal,with,say,1,000missileswiththreewarheadsoneach,theside

thatstruckfirstwouldbeabletosend3,000warheadsagainst1,000targets,with

atemptingchanceforsuccess.Whyincreasingwarheadswouldbemore

stabilizingthanmultiplyinglauncherswasneitherself‐evidentnorwasit

explained.NorwasattentionpaidtooursituationaftertheSovietsdeveloped

MIRVsoftheirown,whenthenumberoflaunchersandtheirvulnerabilitywould

againbecomerelevant. 



MIRVdidnotarouseasintenseadomesticdebateasdidABM.Onereason

wasthatMIRVhadalreadybeenfundedbytheJohnsonAdministrationand

testinghadstarte dinAugust1968.ThegenieofMIRVwastoallintentsand

purposesoutofthebottle.ButanewandfinalroundofMIRVtestswas

scheduledtostartinMay.Itwasagainstthisthatopponentsconcentratedtheir

fire,especiallyafterNixon’sABMdecisionofMarch14.Theyfollowedwhathad

becomealmostaritualforopponentsofnewweaponssystems.Thenewsystem

isdecriedatoneandthesametimeasunnecessaryanddestabilizing,as

duplicatingaperfectlyadequateexistingweapon,oraspreemptingapotentially

muchbetteronetenyearsdo wntheroad.Aboveall,itisallegedthatour

programs“lead”thoseoftheSoviets;ifweexerciserestraintsowillour

adversary.(Ofcourse,inthecaseoftheABMwewereaskedtoexerciserestraint

eventhoughouradversaryhadnot.)Thiswastheargumentoftheopponentsof

thehydrogenbomb;itwasusedagaininthecaseofMIRV.Inbothinstancesthe

Sovietswerewellalongintheirowndevelopmentprogramswhilethedebate

ragedinAmerica.



InJune,SenatorCliffordCaseofferedanamendmenttoanappropriations

billtocallforanendofMIRVtesting;whenthiswasrejectedbythe

AppropriationsCommittee,Casethreatenedtoreintroduceitonthefloor.On

June17SenatorEdwardBrookeintroducedaresolutionfora MIRVmoratorium.

ItwascosponsoredbyfortyotherSenators,andBrooketoldmetherewereat

leasttenmorewhowouldvoteforit.OnJune15SenatorThomasEagletonurged

thePresidenttohaltMIRVdevelopment.IntheHouse,RepresentativeJonathan

Binghamsubmittedaresolutionurgingamoratorium;overonehundredofhis

colleaguesjoinedhim.OnJune16RepresentativeJohnAnderson,Chairmanof

theHouseRepublicanConference,recommendedahalttoMIRVtestingpending

thearmscontroltalks.OnOctober9,aHouseForeignAffairssubcommittee

issuedareportcalling onthePresidenttogive“highpriority”toafreezeonMIRV

testingintheSALTnegotiations.



ThethrustofthecampaignwasfortheUnitedStatestohaltMIRVtests

unilaterallyasawaytoencouragetheSovietstodothesame.TheNewYork

TimeseditoralizedonJune12:“One waytoenticeMr.KosyginintoaMIRVtest

suspensionwouldbetooffertosuspendAmericanMIRVtests—orevenactually

suspendthemwiththeannouncementthattheywouldnotberesumedsolongas

theSovietUnionrefrainedfromtestingitsmultiple warheads.”OnJune20it

argued:“NodecisionRichardNixonwillfaceasPresidentislikelytobemore

momentousthanthedecisionhefaceswithinthenextfewdaysontheproposals

tosuspendtheflighttestingofMIRV…Continuedtestingforevenafewmore

weeksthreatenstotaketheworldpastapointofnoreturnintoanexpensiveand

dangerousnewroundinthemissilerace.”



AnumberofWhiteHouseCongressionalexpertsurgedthatweaccedetoa

moratoriumonMIRVtestinginordertoimproveCongressionalattitudestoward

theABM.Idoubtedthisreasoning,writingtothePresidentonMay23that

endingMIRVtesting“mightcreatepressurestohalttheMinutemanIIIand

Poseidonprograms[themissilesdesignedtocarryMIRVs]…thusfurther

unravellingtheU.S.strategicprogram.”SinceamajorpurposeofMIRVswasthe

penetrationofABMdefenses,thelogicthatwouldleadSenatorswhofavoreda

MIRVmoratoriumtobecomesupportersof“Safeguard”was“obscure.”



SenatorBrookecontinuedtopresshisproposal.Inanemotional

conversationwithmeonMay23Brookestressedthatifthetestswere

completed,thenindeedthe“genie”wouldbe“outofthebottle”;thewholeissue

wasamatterof“conscience.”Theacademiccommunityweighedin;manyofmy

ownfriendsintheuniversitieswrotemetourgeaunilateralhalttoMIRVtesting.



Wewerebeingpressedtotaketwomomentoussteps:first,toabandonour

ABMwithoutreciprocity;andsecond,topostponeourMIRVdeploymentasa

unilateralgesture—inshort,toforgobothourmissiledefenseandthemeansto

defeatthatalreadydeployedbytheSovietUnion.Allthiswasbeingadvocated

whiletheSovietmissilearsenalwasgrowingattherateoftwotothreehundred

missilesayear.IftheSovietswerebuildingwhileweabandonedourprograms,

whatwouldbetheirincentivetonegotiatelimitationsinanagreement?Our

unilateralrestraintwouldbeanincentivefortheSovietsnottosettlebutto

procrastinate,totiltthebalanceasmuchintheirfavoraspossiblewhilewe

paralyzedourselves.ToabandonABMandMIRVtogetherwouldthusnotonly

haveundercuttheprospectsforanySALTagreementbutprobablyguaranteed

Sovietstrategicsuperiorityforadecade.



AndsoithappenedthatwhentheSALTtalksstartedinNovember,contrary

tothedirepredictionsofarmscontrollerstheSovietsprovedeagertonegotiate

onABM;theyshowed,ontheotherhand,interestonlyinlimitsonthe

deploymentofMIRVs,leavingthemfreetotestandtherebycatchuptous

technologically.NeitherourABMprogramnorMIRVtestingcreateddifficulties

forSALT.Onthecontrary,theyspurredit.



<<Contents>>



****



TheAttackontheDefenseBudget



heassaultonABMandMIRVin1969,however,wassoonenlargedintoan

attackonthedefensebudgetasawhole.Nixonpresentedhisfirstfullbudget

onFebruary2,1970.Hetriedtopreempttheoppositionbyspeakingeloquently

oftheneedtoreordernationalpriorities;inhisStateoftheUnionAddressand

BudgetMessageheproposedincreasedfundingforfamilyassistance,food

subsidies,cleanerair andwater,andtransportationimprovement.Hisdefense

budgetof$73.5billioncutover$5billionindefenseappropriationsfromthe

previousyear.Infact,hisspendingproposalswerethefirstbyaPresidentin

twentyyearsinwhichdefensewasallottedlessthan“humanneeds”:37percent

wenttothearmedservices,41percenttosocialandwelfareprograms.(Inthe

yearbefore—essentiallyJohnson’sbudget—44percentwentfordefense,34

percentforsocialandwelfareprograms.)RichardNixonhadbroughtaboutthe

reorderingofprioritiesthathiscriticshadbeenpassionatelyadvocatingforyears.

T



Iwasnotentirelyhappywiththistrendsince,despiteallthetalkofcutting

only“fat,”Iwascertainwewouldwindupreducingthecombateffectivenessof

ourforces.Hencethemilitaryequationwouldmoveinthewrongdirectionwith

respecttobothstrategicandconventionalforces.OnJanuary14,1970,Itookthe

matterupwithJohnEhrlichman, whoasAssistantinchargeofdomesticprograms

naturallydefendeddomesticpriorities.Ehrlichmansaid“everyone”knewDefense

hadbeengettingtoomuch. Ireplied—withaprescienceIdidnotrealize—that

theywouldnot“know”thisin1973whentheMiddleEastblewup.Despitean

injunctionbyHaldemanthatNixonwastiredofallthebudgetarypullingand

tugging,laterinthedayImadethesamepointtothePresident:“Thetroubleis

youcouldeasilyfindyourselfin a situationtwoorthreeyearsfromnowwhere

youjustdon’thavetheforcesforanemergency.” 



Nixonwassympathetic,buthecalculatedthatifhedidnotoffersome

reductionsthecriticswouldtakeovertheprocessanddismantlethemilitary

programaltogether.Hehadreasontoworry.Hisreductionsdidnothingtostill

thecriesofcriticswhodismissedthemasfartoosmall.Ourconventionalforces

wereallegedtobeexcessiveandincompatiblewiththereducedcommitments

impliedinthePresident’sGuamDoctrine(seepage222).Thestrategicforces

budget,itwasargued,couldbecutfurtherandstillbeacredibledeterrent.The

1971budgetincludedlong‐termprogramswhichitwassaidwouldonlybloat

futurebudgets,suchasaircraftcarriersandtacticalairforcesaswellasexpensive

newstrategicweapons.TheNewYorkTimescomplainedonJanuary17,1970,

thatNixon’sstreamlineddefensebudgetreflectedonlythereductionstobe

expectedfromthescalingdownofVietnamoperations;theyrepresented“no

fundamentalshiftsinstrategy,muchlessanyreorderingofpriorities.”James

RestonwroteonJanuary18thatthedefensebudgetcouldbesafelyreducedto

the$58‐63billionrange,citingformerDefenseSecretaryMcNamaraandhis

deputyRoswellGilpatricasauthorities.FormerAirForceanalystA.Ernest

Fitzgerald,whohadbeenfiredfordenouncingC‐5Acostoverrunsandwasnowa

spokesmanforantidefensegroups,saidonJanuary27that$20billionshouldbe

cutfromthedefensebudget,with$5billionfromprocurementanddevelopment

funds.AlengthyNewYorkTimeseditorialtwodayslaterheldthattherewas

roomforan$8billioncutbeyondthe$5billionanticipated:$2billionfroman

ABM‐MIRVmoratorium;$1.5billionfromacceleratedwithdrawalfromVietnam;

over$4billionfromacutbackofgeneralpurposeforces.



Congressionalopinionreflectededitorialviews.Atameetingofthe

DemocraticPolicyCouncilCommitteeonNationalPrioritiesinFebruary,Hubert

HumphreyaccusedNixonofdevotingbillionstomilitarypurposesattheexpense

ofhealthandeducationneeds.TothesamegroupSenatorEdwardKennedy

suggestedseveralareaswherefurthercutscouldbemade,includingtheB‐1

bomberprogram,the“Safeguard”ABM,andAmericanconventionalforcesin

Europe:



Weshouldnotrepeatthemistakesofthefiftiesandsixties,whenweoverreactedto

coldwarfearsandhelpedtostimulatethespiralingarmsrace…



Sincethefederalbudgetisbeingsharplycutinsomanyareas,noaspectofmilitary

expendituresshouldbefreefromscrutiny…IthinkIhavedemonstratedthatthePresident’s

budgetrequestfortheDepartmentofDefenseisnotrockbottom.Furthermajorcutscanand

willbemadeperfectlyconsistentwithanenhancednationalsecurity.



OnMay2abipartisangroupoftwelveSenators announcedplansfora

rigorousreviewofthedefensebudget,withtheintenttoreorder“therelative

prioritiesbetweenmilitarysecurityanddomesticneeds.”TheSenatorsadded:

“Webelievetheresultofsuchscrutinycanbothsubstantiallyreducethegeneral

levelofexpendituresandprovideforasgreatifnotgreaterrealsecurityforthe

UnitedStates.”AgroupofliberalRepresentativesandSenatorsissuedan

unofficialreportinlateJunerecommending$4.65billion infurthercuts,taken

fromtheprogramsforMIRVtestinganddeployment,andfromprocurementof

theF‐14fighter,F‐111bomber,and“Safeguard”ABM.



Intheevent,bythetimeofitsfinalvoteondefenseappropriationsin

December1970,Congresshadmadeupitsmindtocutanadditional$2.1billion

eventhoughNixonhadalreadyreduceditby$5billion—oratotalreductionfrom

thepreviousyearofover$7billion.Buteventhisdoesnotmeasurethepervasive

antimilitaryatmosphere,thehostilitytodefensespending,theprobabilitythat

anynewmilitaryprogramswouldleadtobitterfights,andtheresultingcloudof

uncertaintyoverdefenseplanningandourlong‐termsecurityasthedecadeof

the1960scametoaclose.



Tobesure,themostsweepingassaultswereintheendturnedback.ABM

waspassed;MIRVtestingcontinued;weevensucceededingetting fundsforthe

B‐1andtheTrident,thoughataslowrate;therewerenodrasticreductionsinour

vitaloverseasdeployments.ButatatimewhentheSovietbuilduprequired

urgentreexaminationofstrategicdoctrineandofforces,theenergiesofthe