Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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toanilliterate,didnotunderstandguerrillawarfare;theylackedthemobilityof

theAmericanforces.Ididnotpursuethematter,asmyinterestinVietnamin

thosedayswasrathersuperficial.



ItwasnotuntilNovember1963thatItookstrongexceptionto a

governmentpolicyandthenitwasonamatterthatenjoyedwidesupport.Iwas

appalledbythedirectroletheUnitedStateshadevidentlyplayedinthe

overthrowofSouthVietnam’sPresidentNgoDinhDiem,whichledto his

assassination.Thisfollycommittedustoacoursewecouldnotforeseewhile

underminingthepoliticalbaseforit;inthepurgefollowing,thecountrywas

bereftofalmostitsentireciviladministration.Forustobeseentoconniveinthe

overthrowofafriendlygovernmentwasboundtoshaketheconfidenceofother

alliesinSouthEastAsia.Iquestionedtheassumptionsthathadledusintosucha

gamble.NgoDinhDiemhadtobeoverthrown,soarguedhisopponents,including

muchofthepresscorpsinSaigon,becausethewaragainsttheCommunists

wouldneverbepursuedwithadequateenergyorpopularsupportwhileDiem

wasinoffice.Hisbrotherwasaccusedofseekingacompromisewiththe

Communists—preciselywhatsevenyearslaterbecametheorthodoxyofmanyof

thesamecriticsandfortherefusalofwhichtheynowwantedtooverthrow

Diem’ssuccessor,NguyenVanThieu.Butsincethewarconcernedthelegitimacy

ofthenon‐CommunistgovernmentinSouthVietnam,tooverturnthat

governmentwasanovelwaytowinit.Thepresumedmilitarygainscouldnot

outweighthelossofpoliticalauthority.Andwewouldbemuchmoredeeply

committedmorallytothegovernmentwehadbroughttooffice.Weknowtoday

thatHanoireachedthesameconclusion.Whileithadactivelysupportedguerrilla

warfare,itdidnotcommititsregularforcesuntilaftertheoverthrowofDiem.I

wasintheprocessofwritinganarticlealongtheselines,predictingadrastic

deteriorationinVietnam,whenPresidentKennedywasassassinated.Idecidedit

wouldbeinbadtastetoproceed.



In1964IencouragedGovernorRockefellertospeakstronglyonVietnamin

hisprimarycampaign.NeitherhenorIhadaclear‐cutviewofanappropriate

strategyandneitherhenorIenvisionedsendingAmericancombattroops.By

1965,however,IbelongedtothesilentmajoritythatagreedwiththeJohnson

Administration’scommitmentofcombatforcestoresistHanoi’snowcleardirect

involvement.



IceasedbeingaspectatorinearlyAugust1965whenHenryCabotLodge,

anoldfriendthenservingasAmbassadortoSaigon,askedmetovisitVietnamas

hisconsultant.ItouredVietnamfirstfortwoweeksinOctoberandNovember

1965,againforabouttendaysinJuly1966,andathirdtimeforafewdaysin

October1966—thelasttripwasmadeattherequestofAverellHarriman.Lodge

gavemeafreehandtolookintoanysubjectofmychoice;heputthefacilitiesof

theEmbassyatmydisposal.



Isoonrealizedthatwehadinvolvedourselvesinawarwhichweknew

neitherhowtowinnorhowtoconclude. Theenemy’ssanctuariesinLaosand

Cambodiapreventedtheachievementoftheclassicmilitaryobjectiveofwar—the

destructionofthemilitarypoweroftheenemy.InNorthVietnamwewere

engagedinabombingcampaignpowerfulenoughtomobilizeworldopinion

againstusbuttoohalfheartedandgradualtobedecisive.Thusouradversarywas

inapositionto controlthepaceofmilitaryoperationsandthelevelofcasualties,

bothhisandours.AndthelevelofAmericancasualtieswastobecomeapivota l

elementinAmericanpublicopinion.



Ibecameconvincedthatinacivilwar,military“victories”wouldbe

meaninglessunlesstheybroughtaboutapoliticalrealitythatcouldsurviveour

ultimatewithdrawal.Negotiat ionswouldoccuronlywhenHanoirealizedthatit

facedtheprogressivelossofitspoliticalinfluenceoverthelocalpopulationthe

longerthewarlasted.Thiswasamonumentaltask.TheNorthVietnameseand

VietCong,fighting onfamiliarterrain,neededonlytohangontokeepinbeing

forcessufficientlystrongtodominatethepopulationaftertheUnitedStatestired

ofthewar.Ourchallengewasmuchmorecomplex:Wehadtofightthewarand

simultaneouslystrengthentheSouthVietnamesetosurvivewithoutus—inother

words,tomakeourselvesdispensable.Itisacardinalprinciple ofguerrillawarfare

thattheguerrillawinsifhedoesnotlose;theregulararmylosesunlessitwins.

Wewerefightingamilitarywaragainstanelusiveenemy;ouradversaryfoughta

politicaloneagainstastationarypopulation.FromthefirstIdoubtedthatour

plannershadgraspedthis.OnmywaytoVietnaminOctober1965,Istoppedat

ourPacificheadquartersinHawaii.Aftermyfirstformalbriefing onVietnam,I

wroteinmydiary:



Iwasimpressedbythefactthatnoonecouldreallyexplaintomehowevenonthe

mostfavorableassumptionsaboutthewarinVietnamthewarwasgoingtoend…Idonotthink

wehaveevenbeguntosolvethebasicproblemwhichispsychological.Itseemstomethatthe

VietCongandtheNorthVietnamesemustbesayingtothemselvesthateventhoughtheir

hopesforavictorythisyearweredisappointed[becauseofAmericanintervention],thereisa

possibility,evenaprobability,thatiftheycanprolongthewarsufficientlytheywillexhaustus.

Howdoesoneconvinceapeoplethatoneispreparedtostayindefinitely10,000milesaway

againstopponentswhoarefightingintheirowncountry?…IfwefailinourPacificoperationsit

willnotbebecauseofafailureinthetechnicalrealm,butbecauseofadifficultyof

synchronizingpoliticalandmilitaryobjectivesinasituationforwhichthisenormouslycomplex

militaryestablishmentisnotdesigned.



ItseemedtomethatregularNorthVietnameseunits,whichwerethechief

targetofourmilitaryoperations,playedtheroleofthematador’scape:they

temptedourforcestolungeintopoliticallyinsignificantareaswhiletheVietCong

infrastructureunderminedtheSouthVietnamesegovernmentinthepopulated

countryside.AfteravisittoaVietnameseprovinceonOctober21,1965,Iwrotein

mydiary:



Itisobviousthattherearetwoseparatewarsgoingonhere:(1)reflectedinthearmy

statisticsaboutsecurityofmilitaryunits;and(2)thatwhichaffectsthepopulation.Thetwo

criteriadonotmatch.Forthearmyaroadisopenwhenitcantravelinconvoyalongit.Forthe

villageraroadisopenwhenhecantravelitwithoutpayingtaxes.Forthearmyavillageis

securewhenitcanstationitsforcesthere.Forthepopulationavillageissecurewhenithas

protectionnotonlyfromattacksbyorganizedVCunitsbutalsofromVCterrorism.



Intheabsenceofcriteriaofsuccess,self‐delusiontooktheplaceofanalysis.

WhenIvisitedtheprovinceofVinhLonginOctober1965,Iaskedtheprovince

chiefwhatpercentageofhisprovincewaspacified;heproudlytoldme80

percent.WhenIvisitedVietnamforthesecondtimeinJuly1966,Imadea point

ofvisitingthesameprovincesinordertoassessthechanges.InVinhLongthe

sameprovincechieftoldmethatenormousprogresshadbeenmadesincemy

earliervisit.WhenIaskedhimhowmuchoftheprovincewasnowpacified,he

proudlytoldme70percent!



IsummedupmyviewsofmyfirstvisitinalettertoHenryCabotLodge

datedDecember3,1965:



Overshadowingeverythingisasocialormaybeevenphilosophicalproblem:The

Vietnamesehaveastrongsenseofbeingadistinctpeoplebutlittlesenseofnationhood.Our

deepestchallengethenistodiscoverhowanationcanbebuiltwhenthesocietyistornby

internalschismsandinthemiddleofacivilwar.Allnewcountrieshavehadtheproblemof

achievingpoliticalcohesion;nonehavehadtodosointhefaceofsuchoverwhelmingpressures

asVietnam.



OnAugust18,1966,aftermysecondvisittoVietnam,Iwroteanother

lettertoLodge:“CandorcompelsmetosaythatIdidnotfindanysubstantial

changeintheprovinces…”TheattemptbyAmericanofficialstojudgesecurityin

thecountrysidewasanattempttoquantifyintangibles.Perhapsbecaus eofthe

inexperienceofourprovinceadvisers(whosetourofdutywassoshortthatby

thetimetheylearnedtheirjobtheyhadtoleave),oureffortlackedpolit i cal

perspective.Forexample,someareaslistedaspacifiedmighthavebeenso

becausetheVietCongfounditconvenienttoleaveagricultureundisturbedasa

sourceofsupplyforthemselves,becausetheywereregularlycollectingthetaxes.

Iaddedsomerecommendations:thattheEmbassyshouldattemptamore

accurateassessmentofthesecuritysituation,thatlocalgovernmentshouldbe

strengthened,andthatprioritiesshouldbefirmlyestablished.Also,weurgently

neededastrategyforthenegotiationsforwhichtheAdministrationconstantly

proclaimeditseagerness.Foranegotiationwouldbethebeginning,nottheend,

ofourdifficulties.



AndIhadhadsomelimitedexperienceindealingwiththeNorth

Vietnamese.



BetweenJulyandOctober1967,attherequestoftheJohnson

Administration,Iservedasanintermediaryinanefforttogetnegotiations 

started.IconveyedmessagesthroughtwoFrenchintellectualsIknew,oneof

whomhadbefriendedHoChiMinhintheForties,offeringhimthehospitalityof

hishousewhenHowasinParistonegotiatewiththeFrench.Iwasauthorizedto

encouragemyfriendstovisitHanoitooffercompromisetermsforahaltto

Americanbombingasapreludetoanegotiation.TheywentandmetwithHoChi

Minh.ForseveralmonthsItraveledtoParisatintervalstoconveyorreceive

messagesfromtheNorthVietnamese.Eventuallytheeffortaborted,thoughit

wasastepinthedirectionoftheagreementthatproducedabombinghaltand

theopeningofpeacetalksayearlater.



Afterthesenegotiationshadatlast begun,attheendof1968Ipublished

myassessmentinanarticleinForeignAffairs.

ItwaswrittenbeforeIwas

appointedsecurityadviserbutpublishedafterward.Iexpressedmybasic

conclusions:



•thatourmilitarystrategywasincapableofproducingvictory;



•thatourmilitaryoperationshadtobegearedtoclearlydefinednegotiatingobjectives;



•thattheSouthVietnamesegovernmentcouldsurviveonlyifitdevelopedapolitical

programtowhichnon‐CommunistSouthVietnamesecouldrally;



•thattheUnitedStatesmustcedeincreasingresponsibilityfortheconductofthewar

totheSouthVietnamese;and



•thatifinnegotiations“Hanoiprovesintransigentandthewargoeson,weshouldseek

toachieveasmanyofourobjectivesaspossibleunilaterally.”



•thatinournegotiationsweshouldconcentrateonmilitaryissuessuchascease‐fire

whileleavingthedistributionofpoliticalpowertotheVietnameseparties.



Tosomeextent,Iagreedwithcriticsonbothsidesofthepoliticalspectrum.

TheJohnsonAdministration,byitsconductofthewar,hadabandonedwhatever

prospectofaconventionalmilitaryvictoryexisted;ithadsetaceilingonourforce

levelsandacceptedabombing halt.Anhonorableoutcomedependedonour

abilitytocreatepoliticalincentivesforHanoitocompromise—whichwouldbe

impossibleunlesswecouldconvertourmilitarypositiononthegroundintoa

durablepoliticalstructure.Ournegotiatingpositionhadto enlistenduringpublic

supportathomeinordertomakeitcleartoHanoithatitwouldnotgainbyen‐

meshingusinprotractedtalks.Toholdallthesepiecesinplacewhiledisengaging

wouldbethetaskofanynewAdministration.



ButwhilebyJanuaryof1969Ihadbeco meprofoundlyuneasyaboutthe

war,Idifferedwithmanyofthecriticsinseveralrespects.Ididnotfavoran

unconditionalwithdrawal.By1969theoverhalf‐millionAmericanforces,the

70,000alliedforces,andthe31,000whohaddiedtherehadsettledtheissueof

whethertheoutcomewasimportantforusandthosewhodependedonus.Nor

didIgoalongwiththemanycriticsofthewarwhoactedasifpeacedepended

aboveallonourgoodwill.ThehardmeninHanoi,havingspenttheirlivesin

struggle,didnotconsidercompromiseamoralcategory.Drivenbytheepicsaga

ofVietnamesehistory—ahistoryofwarsagainsttheChinese,theFrench,the

Japanese,andnowus—theyhadsustainedtheirundoubtedheroismbythe

dreamofvictory;theywouldsettleforcompromiseonlyonthebasisof

calculationandnecessity.Anegotiatedpeacewouldresultfromthereckoningof

risksonbothsides,notfromaburstofsentiment.Thisjudgmentwouldforever

separatemefrommanyoftheprotesters—evenwhenIagreedwiththeiranalysis

thatthewarwasdrainingournationalstrengthandhadtobeliquidated.



<<Contents>>



****



WhatWeFound



Tisadubiousachievementofmanyofourcritics,includingmanyfrom

theadministrationsthatbroughtaboutourVietnaminvolvement,tohave

focusedtheVietnamdebateontheactsoftheNixonAdministration,asifitwere

NixonwhohadgotusintoVietnam.ItiswelltorememberthatonJanuary20,

1969,whenNixoncameintooffice,overhalfamillionAmericantroopswerein

Vietnam;indeed,thenumberwasstillrisingtowardtheceilingof549,500men

thathadbeenestablishedbythepreviousAdministrationinApril1968.(The

actualpeakoftroopstrengthwasabout543,000inApril1969.)Thecostofour

Vietnamefforthadbeen$30billioninFiscalYear1969.[

Ofthis,S24billionwasthe

“additionalcost”ofthewar,thatis,excludingthecoststhatwouldhavebeenincurredanyway

inmaintainingourforceshadthewarnotbeentakingplace.]Americancasualtieshad

beenaveraging200menkilledinactionperweekduringthesecondhalfof1968;

atotalof14,592Americansdiedincombatin



OnJanuary20thecumulativetotalofAmericanskilledinactioninVietnam

since1961stoodatover31,000;SouthVietnamesecasualtieswerecloseto

90,000.



Thefightingseemedtobestalemated.WehaddecisivelydefeatedtheTet

offensivein1968;butitsshocktoAmericanpublicsupportforthewarledtothe

bombinghaltandmultipliedpressuresforourwithdrawal.Theregularforcesof

ourSouthVietnameseallynumbered826,000,greatlyexpandedfromthoseofa

yearearlier(743,000).Theywerealsomuchbetterequipped.Buttheirtaskwas

daunting:toguardatracklessfrontierof600milesandatthesametimeassure

securityforthepopulation.AndalthoughtheVietCongcadreshadbeen

decimatedintheTetoffensive,NorthVietnamesere gulararmyforcestookupthe

slack.AlmostallofthefightingwasnowdonebyNorthVietnamesemain‐force

units—contrarytothemythologyof“people’swar.”



SouthVietnamseemedmorestable politicallythanatanytimeinthe

previousfouryears.NguyenVanThieu,aNorthernerbybirth,hadbeenelected

Presidentin1967andincludedinhisgovernmentmoreSouthernersand

respectednationalists,suchasPremierTranVanHuong.YetourEmbassyin

SaigonestimatedthataCommunistinfrastructurestillexistedin80percentofthe

hamlets.Sixty‐fivepercentofthetotalpopulationand81percentoftherural

populationwereestimatedtobesubjecttosomeCommunistinfluence,ifonlyto

Communistleviesontheirriceandproduction.Inotherwords,thesituationin

thecountrysidehadnotchangedsignificantlysincemylastvisitinOctober1966.



Theenemy’sstrategywastocreateamaximumsenseofinsecuritywithout

seekingtoholdanyterritorythatcouldbecomeatargetforAmericanattacksand

thusleadtoapitchedbattle.Instead,theNorthVietnameselaunchedsporadic

attacksinallareasofSouthVietnam.Main‐forceunitsattackedAmericanforces

toinflictcasualties;guerrillaoperationsweredesignedtodisruptpacification;all

thetimeeffortsweremadetostrengthe ntheCommunistpoliticalinf rastructure

foraneventualtakeover.



Inthesecondhalfof1968,GeneralCreighton(“Abe”)Abramshadreplaced

GeneralWilliamWestmore land asUnitedStatescommanderinVietnam.Abrams

hadbeenatankcommanderunderGeorgePattonandhadledthebattalionthat 

liberatedBastogneintheBattleoftheBulge.AbramshadalteredtheAmerican

strategy.Heabandonedlarge‐scaleoffensiveoperationsagainsttheCo mmunist

mainforcesandconcentratedonprotectingthepopulation.Americantroops

weredeployedfordefenseindeptharoundmajorcities.Hehadredeployedtwo

AmericandivisionsfromtheNorthernpartofthecountrytothemorepopulated

Southernpart.Thiswasonemilitarybenefitofthebombinghalt President

JohnsonhadenteredintoonNovember1,1968,sincetheNorthVietnamesehad

thenagreednottoviolatetheDemilitarizedZone(DMZ)nortolaunch

indiscriminateattacksonmajorcities. 



Thebombinghalthadcomeaboutforessentiallytworeasons.Opponents

ofthewarhadfocusedonthebombingpartlybecauseofitscost,partlybecause

itwassomethingtheUnitedStatescouldhaltunilaterally(unliketherestofthe

fighting),partlybecauseHanoihadskillfullysuggestedthatanendofthebombing

wouldleadtorapidnegotiationandnegotiationwouldprod uceaquick

settlement.OnMarch31,1968,PresidentJohnsonannouncedhiswithdrawal

fromthePresidentialraceandabombinghaltabovethetwentiethparallel.A

negotiationbeganinParisbetweentheUnitedStatesandtheDemocratic

RepublicofVietnam,[

TheDemocraticRepublicofVietnam(abbreviatedDRVorDRVN)was

theofficialnameofNorthVietnam.]butitwasconfinedtotheproceduralquestionof

howtostarttalks.OnNovember1,PresidentJohnsonagreedtoacomplete

bombinghalt,thoughbombingoftheNorthVietnamesesupplycorridorthrough

Laos(theso‐calledHoChiMinhTrail)andreconnaissanceflightscontinued.There

wasan“understanding”thattherewouldbe“noindiscriminateattacksonthe

majorcities”(suchasSaigon,Danang,andHué);nofiringofartillery,rockets,or

mortarsfrom,across,andwithintheDMZ;nomovementoftroopsfrom,across,

orwithintheDMZ;andnomassingormovementoftroopsneartheDMZ“ina

mannerthreateningtotheotherside.”Hanoineverexplicitlyagreedtothese

provisionsbutrather“assentedbysilence, ”reinforcedbyanassurancefrom

SovietPremierAlexeiKosygintoPresidentJohnsoninaletterofOctober28,

1968,that“doubtswithregardtothepositionoftheVietnamesesideare

groundless.”AmericanchiefnegotiatorAverellHarrimantoldtheNorth

VietnameseinParisonNovember4thatindiscriminateattacksonthemajorcities

“wouldcreateasituationwhichwouldnotpermitserioustalksandthusthe

maintenanceofacessation[ofthebombing].”



Asmattersturnedout,serioustalksdidnotbeginasrapidlyasHanoihad

ledustobelieve.AsIhavealreadydescribedinChapterII,therewasathree‐

monthhaggleovertheshapeofthetable,whichwasreallyadisputeoverthe

statusofHanoi’sfrontorganizationintheSouth,theNationalLiberationFront

(NLF).TheproceduralhagglewasendedonJanuary16,1969,orfourdaysbefore

wecameintooffice.OnthedayNixonwasinaugurated,notasinglesubstantive

negotiatingsessionhadoccurred.



Whenthenewteamtookover,ourfirstnecessitywasareliableassessment

ofthesituation.Ourdesiretodevelopacoherentstrategyimmediatelyranup

againstthepaucityoffacts,ourattempttomodifyestablishedpracticeagainst

theinertiaofconventionalwisdom.VietnamwasbrieflydiscussedatthefirstNSC

meeting,onJanuary21,andmoreextensivelyatanNSCme etingonJanuary25.

Buttheteamwastoonewandthecareerofficialstoodemoralized.Thebriefings

didnotofferimaginativeideastoanewPresidenteagerforthem,evenfromthe

military.Foryears,themilitaryhadbeencomplainingaboutbeingheldonaleash

bythecivilianleadership.ButwhenNixonpressedthemfornewstrategies,all

theycouldthinkofwasresumingthebombingoftheNorth.Theonlynew

instructionissuedbyNixonatthispointwastostoptheconstantcontroversies

withSaigon;hehadnointentionoffulfillingHanoi’s desirebyunderminingthe

politicalstructureofSouthVietnam.



Ourhungerforinformationwastheoriginofthefirststudydirectiveissued

bythenewAdministration.NationalSecurityStudyMemorandum(NSSM)1,

entitled“SituationinVietnam,”requestedthedepartmentsandagenciesto

respondtoanenormoussix‐page,single‐spacedlistoftwenty‐eightmajorand

fiftysubsidiaryquestions.Eachagencywasaskedtorespondseparately,to

sharpenanydisagreementssothatwecouldpinpointthecontroversialquestions

andthedifferentpointsofview.NSSM1askedforexplanationsofevents(for

example,“WhyistheDRVinParis?”



“WhydidNVA[NorthVietnamesearmy]unitsleaveSouthVietnamlast

summerandfall?”).Itinquiredintopoliticalfactorsaffectingthenegotiations,the

enemy’smilitarycapabilities,SouthVietnamesecapabilities,theprogressof

securityinthecountrys ide,thepoliticalsceneinSaigon,andUnitedStates

militarystrategyandoperations.Ineverycaseweasked,“Whatistheevidence?”

or“Howadequateisourinformation?”



Unfortunately,questionssometimesconfirmtheperplexitiesthathave

givenrisetothemratherthanleadtotheirresolution.TheresponsestotheNSSM

IquestionnairearrivedinFebruary;mystaffsummarizedandanalyzedthemina

forty‐four‐pagepaperthatwascirculatedtothemembersoftheNSCReview

GrouponMarch14.

Perhapsnotsurprisingly,thesummaryfoundthatthe

bureaucracywasdividedalong linesverysimilartotherestofthecountry.There

wasarelativelyoptimisticschoolofthoughtthatincludedEllsworthBunker(our

AmbassadorinSaigon),theJointChiefsofStaff,GeneralAbrams,andAdmiral

JohnMcCain(ourPacificcommander).ThisgroupbelievedthattheNorth

VietnamesehadagreedtopeacetalksinParisbecauseoftheirmilitaryweakness,

thatpacificationgainswererealand“shouldholdup,”andthat“thetidesare

favorable.”TheoppositepointofviewreflectedtheciviliansideofthePentagon,

theCIA,andtoalesserextenttheStateDepartme nt.Itacknowledgedthe

improvementsinSouthVietnamesecapabilitiesbutheldthat“thesehave

producedessentiallyastalemate.”Itarguedthatpacificationgainswere“inflated

andfragile,”that“inadequatepoliticalprogress”wasbeingmade,thattheenemy

wasnotdealingfromweaknesseitherinParisorontheground,andthat“a

compromisesettlementistheonlyfeasibleoutcomeforVietnam.”



TherewasagreementthattheVietCongandNorthVietnameseinitiated

themajorityofmilitaryactions,andthisdeterminedthelevelofcasualtieson

bothsides;thattheenemyhadnotchangeditsobjectives;andthatHanoiwas

“chartingacoursebasicallyindepe ndentofMoscowandPeking.”Therewere,

however,disturbinglylargedisagreementswithintheintelligencecommunity

oversuchelementaryfactsasthesizeanddeploymentofenemyforces,andthe

importanceofCambodia,particularlytheportofSihanoukville,asasupplyroute.

Theanswersmadeclearthattherewasnoconsensusastofacts,muchlessasto

policy.



Beforewecouldresolveourinternaldebate—orevenconductit—on

February22,1969,Hanoipreemptedouranalysesbylaunchingacountrywide

offensiveinSouthVietnam.



<<Contents>>



****



NorthVietnameseAttacksandCambodianBombing



he1968understandingwiththeNorthVietnamesethatledtothebombing

haltincludedthe“expectation”thattherewouldbenoattacksonmajorcities

oracrosstheDMZ.Whenwetookoffice,however,enemyinfiltrationwas

mounting,whichstronglyindicatedthatanewoffensivewasintheoffing.

T



Theonlyplanwefoundforsucha contingencywasforrenewalofbombing

oftheNorth.OnNovember24,1968,SecretaryofDefenseClarkCliffordhad

declaredonABC‐TV’s“IssuesandAnswers”:“Ifthey,atsometime,showusthat

theyarenotseriousandthattheyarenotproceedingwithgoodfaith,Ihaveno

doubtwhatsoeverthatthePresidentwillhavetore turntoourformerconcept

andthatistokeepthepressureontheenemyandthatwouldincludebombingif