Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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ByAugustof1969wehadofferedorundertakenunilaterallyallofthe

termsofthe1968doveplankoftheDemocrats(whichhadbeendefeatedin

Chicago).WehadexceededthepromisesoftheRepublicanplatform,expecting 

byourdemonstrationofflexibilitytofostermoderationinHanoiandunityat

home.Wewerenaivelywronginbothexpectations.Hanoiwantedvictory,not

compromise.Anditsrefusalto bargainwasacceptedasconclusivebymany

critics.Atthesametimeseveralofthenewlyretiredofficialsoftheprevious 

administrationsdidnotfeelinhibited,eitherbytheirroleingettingusintothe

warorbythefactthattheirfileswerebareofanypeaceproposals,fromadding

topublicpressureswithproposalsoftheirown.(SecretaryofDefenseClark

CliffordhaddeclaredonDecember10,1968:“Letmereiteratethatatthepresent

timethereisnoplanforanynetreductioninourtrooplevelinVietnam.”Thisdid

notpreventhim,withinsixmonthsofleavingoffice,fromcallingonthenew

AdministrationtoannouncetotalwithdrawalofAmericanforces.)Theonlyextant

Americannegotiatingproposalwastheso‐calledManilaformulaofOctober24,

1966,whichprovidedthat“alliedforces…shallbewithdrawn,aftercloseconsul‐

tation,astheothersidewithdrawsitsforcestotheNorth,ceasesinfiltration,and

thelevelofviolencethussubsides.Theseforceswillbewithdrawnassoonas

possibleandnotlaterthansixmonthsaftertheaboveconditionshavebeen

fulfilled.”TheSouthVietnamesegovernmentoffered,in“aprogramofnational

reconciliation,toopenitsdoorstothoseVietnamesewhohavebeenmisledor

coercedintocastingtheirlotwiththeVietCong.”UnitedStatesnegotiators

AverellHarrimanandCyrusVanceindicatedtotheNorthVietnameseinprivate

talksinParisonSeptember15,1968,thattheManilaformulareallymeant

mutualwithdrawal,beginningsimultaneously,butwiththeprovisothatsomeUS

forceswouldremainuntilsixmonthsafteralltheNorthVietnamesehadleft.



DuringthetransitionIsolicite dtheprivateviewsofbothHarrimanand

Vanceonpossiblestrategiesforanegotiation.Theydidnotdiffermuchfromthe

formalpositionsoftheJohnsonAdministration.



AverellHarrimanwascompletingthelastregulardiplomatic assignmentof

adistinguishedcareer.IhadfirstmethimwhenhewasservingasAssistant

SecretaryofStateforEastAsianAffairsintheearlyKennedyAdministration.The

grizzledveterancarriedoutwithextraordinarydeterminationthedutiesofan

officethatlessermenwouldhavespurnedasademotion.Hewasofageneration

thatconsideredpublicofficeanopportunitytoservethecountryandnotan

occasionforpersonaladvancement.Oncehehadenteredgovernmentservicein

hisforties(beforeWorldWarII)heneverdevotedhimselffull‐timetoanyother

activity.Harriman’spatricianstylewasalliedtoapowerfuldeterminationto

prevailinpursuitofstrongbeliefs. Heaffectedacrotchetymanner,andheused

hisrelativedeafnesstogreatadvantage.Hewouldsitthroughmeetings

pretendingtohearnothingunlesssomeremarkcaughthisinterest,inwhichcase 

hecouldbedevastatingorinspiring,dependingonwhetherhelikedwhathe

heard.Thedrowsymannerthatcouldgivewaytoasuddensnapofthejaws

earnedHarriman,notfornothing,thenicknameof“thecrocodile.”



Noonecouldfailtobemovedbyhisdedication,intensity,experience,and

wisdom.Harrimanwasthelastactivestatesmanwhohaddealtpersonallywith

thegreatleadersoftheSecondWorldWar,Churchill,Roosevelt,andStalin.His

endurancewasinpartduetohisstamina,butina deepersensethestamina

reflectedavitalandyouthfulintellect.Heundertooknoassignmentinwhichhe

didnotdeeplybelieve;hetendedtotransformeverymissionintoapersonal

crusade.Ifhefailedtoachievethehighestofficestowhichhistalents

unquestionablyentitledhim,thiswaspartiallybecauseoftheinsecurityhis

powerfulpersonalityevokedinlessermenandpartiallybecauseofhistendency

tobecomeapassionatespokesmanforhismandateofthemoment,sometimes

totheexclusionoflargerconsiderations.



EarlyintheVietnamconflictHarrimanhadbecomeconvincedthata

militarysolutionwasimpossible,partlybecausehethoughtthattheactions

necessaryforvictorymighttriggerChineseintervention.Thereafterheturned

intoatirelessadvocateofnegotiations.Hewasanunrelentingbureaucratic

infighterwhodidnotshrinkfromusinghischarmandthepr estigeofhiswealthto

spinawebofsocialrelationshipstofurtherhiscause.Andhewasskillfulinusing

thepress.



WhenIsawhimduringthetransition,hewasthenation’sveteranpublic

servant,onthevergeofleavingtheParistalksjustastheywereturningto

substanceandasIwasabouttoenterofficeforthefirsttime.Astheyearswent

bywehadourshareofdisagreements.Theydidnotaffectmyadmirationand

affectionforhimorhisunfailing courtesyandhelpfulnesstowardme.Ihave

alwaysregrettedthatPresidentNixon’sprofounddistrustofthe“Eastern

Establishment”andHarriman’sownpartisanshippreventedtheadministrationsin

whichIservedfromusing Harrimanformally—thoughthroughoutmyyearsin

officeIsawhimregularlyonaprivatebasis,tomygreatbenefit.



OnJanuary7,1969,Harrimansubmittedamemorandum,not“cleared”by

theJohnsonAdministration,whichsetoutwhathethoughtweshouldaimfor.All

NorthVietnamesepersonnelshouldbeaskedtoleaveSouthVietnam,notonly

regulararmyunitsandcadres,butevenNorthVietnamesereplacementsinViet

Congguerrillaunits.Providedthetalkswentwell,hewaspreparedtorecommend

de‐escalationofmilitaryoperations.ButheemphaticallyreaffirmedtheManila

formula:“some[US]forcesmayhavetoremaininVietnamforaconsiderable

perioduntilwearesatisfiedthatalltheNorthVietnamesehavebeenwithdrawn.”

OnthepoliticalsideHarrimanwasequallyfirm,inthiscasewithSaigon.He

favoredthe“two‐track”approach(whichIhadrecommendedinmyForeign

AffairsarticleofJanuary1969),withthemilitaryissuesdiscussedbetweenthe

UnitedStatesandHanoiandthepoliticalissueslefttotheVietnamese parties.He

addedacidlythattheUnitedStatesdidnot“haveanobligationtoretainthe

presentgovernment.”Harriman’sdeputy,CyrusVance,endorsedthesame

approachinamemorandumhesentmeonDecember31,1968.



Thusbothourseniornegotiators,whobecameactiveintheantiwardebate

soonafter,leftofficestressingtheimportanceofmutualwithdrawal,asix‐month

delayforthecompletionoftheagreedAmericanpullouttotestNorth

Vietnamesecompliance,freeelections,andleavingthepoliticalissuestobe

negotiatedbytheVietnamesepartiesalone.Bothwereconvincedthatan

Americanresidualforcewouldhavetoremainindefinitely.Neitherurgedoreven

hintedattheunilateralAmericanwithdrawal,coalitiongovernment,or

unconditionalcease‐firethatwithintheyearbecamethestapleoftheVietnam

debateandoftheirowncontributiontoit.



TheotherpartytothedisputewasHanoi.Intheinnocenceandexhilaration

ofnewlyacquiredpowerIencouragedNixon,evenwhilePresident‐elect,tolose

notimetoestablishhisgoodintentions.Iencouragedhimtoopena private

channeltoHanoithroughmyfriendJeanSainteny,aformerFrenchDelegate‐

GeneraltoHanoi,theninprivatebusiness.OnDecember20,1968,wesenta

messagetotheNorthVietnamesestressingourreadinessforserious

negotiations:



1. TheNixonAdministrationispreparedtoundertakeserioustalks.



2. Thesetalksaretobebasedontheselfrespectandsenseofhonorofallparties.



3. TheNixonAdministrationispreparedforanhonorablesettlementbutfornothing

less.



4. IfHanoiwants,theNixonAdministrationwouldbewillingtodiscussultimate

objectivesfirst.



5. IfHanoiwishestocommunicatesomeoftheirgeneralideaspriortoJanuary20,they

willbeexaminedwithaconstructiveattitudeandinstrictestconfidence.



TheNorthVietnamesereplyofDecember31,1968,waslessconcerned

withhonororself‐respect.Itstatedbrutallytwofundamentaldemands:thetotal

withdrawalofallAmericanforcesandthereplacementofwhatHanoicalledthe

“Thieu‐Ky‐Huongclique,”itspetphrasefortheleadershipinSaigonwithwhich

Hanoiwassupposedtobenegotiating.Hanoisimplyrepeatedtheformalposition

setforthbytheCentralCommitteeoftheNationalLiberationFront(VietCong)on

November3,1968,twodaysaftertheJohnsonbombinghalt.Farfromevoking

anysenseofreciprocityassomanyhadexpected,thebombinghaltencouraged

Hanoitoputforwardmaximum demandsinthepoliticalfieldbeginningwiththe

overthrowofthegovernmentthatweweresupporting.



ThuswastheNixonAdministrationfirstexposedtothemaddening

diplomaticstyleoftheNorthVietnamese.Itwouldhave beenimpossibletofind

twosocietieslessintendedbyfatetounderstandeachotherthantheVietnamese

andtheAmerican.Ontheoneside,Vie tnamesehistoryandCommunistideology

combinedtoproducealmostmorbidsuspicionandferociousself‐rig hteousness.

ThiswascompoundedbyalegacyofCartesianlogicfromFrenchcolonialismthat

producedaninfuriatinglydoctrinairetechniqueofadvocacy.EachNorth

Vietnameseproposalwasputforwardasthesolelogical truthandeachdemand

wasstatedintheimperative(theUnitedStates“must”).By1971wehadbeenso

conditionedthatwhentheNorthVietnamesesubstituted“should” for“must”we

thoughtgreatprogresshadbeenmade.Ontheotherside,therewasthe

Americanbeliefintheefficacyofgoodwillandtheimportanceofcompromise—

qualitieslikelytobedespisedbydedicatedLeninistswhosawthemselvesasthe

inexorablespokesmenofaninevitablefuture,absolutetruth,andsuperiormoral

insight.



Throughouttheirhistory,survivalfortheNorthVietnamesehaddepended

onasubtleskillinmanipulatingphysicallystrongerforeigners;theappearanceof

weaknesswastobeavoidedatalmostallcosts,andadmittingthepossibilityof

compromiseappearedtothemasgrantingsomevaliditytothepointofviewof

theotherside,initselfanunacceptableconcessio n. ThereforetheVietnamese

styleofcommunicationwasindirectand,byAmericanstandards,deviousor

baffling.BecausetheUnitedStateshadbecomegreatbyassimilatingmenand

womenofdifferentculturesandbeliefs,wehaddevelopedanethicoftolerance;

havinghadlittleexperiencewithunbridgeableschisms,ourmodeofsettling

conflictswastoseekasolutionsomewherebetweenthecontendingpositions.

ButtotheVietnamesethismeantthatwewerenotseriousaboutwhatweput

forwardandthatwetreatedthemasfrivolous.Theyhadnotfoughtforforty

yearstoachieveacompromise.TheVietnamesemethodofcommunicationwas

opaque,designedtokeepopenasmanyoptionsaspossibleandtoundermine

ourdomesticposition.Ourswasmatter‐of‐factandgearedtofindingformulasto

reconciletheirreconcilable,whichHanoiconsideredeitheratricktoberesisted

oraweaknesstobeexploited.



Butthefundamentalproblemwentdeep erstill.TheNorthVietnamese

consideredthemselvesinalife‐and‐deathstruggle;theydidnottreat

negotiationsasanenterpriseseparatefromthestruggle;theywereaformofit.

TothemtheParistalkswerenotadeviceforsettlementbutaninstrumentof

politicalwarfare.Theywereaweapontoexhaustuspsychologically,tosplitus

fromourSouthVietnameseally,andtodivideourpublicopinionthroughvague

hintsofsolutionsjustoutofreachbecauseofthefoolis hnessorobduracyofour

government.TheNorthVietnamesewereconcernedlestweusethefactofthe

negotiationstorallypublicsupport;theywouldnotcompromise becauseany

appearanceof“progress”mightenhanceourstayingpower.Theypreferred

secrettalksbecausethisgavethemanopportunitytoreconnoitertheterrain

withoutpayingthepriceoftheappearanceofprogress.Whentheysettledan

issuetheirmotivewastohave amaximumdomesticimpactintheUnitedStates.

Thebombinghaltoccurredjustbeforethe1968electioninordertocommitboth

Presidentialcandida testoit;theshapeofthetablewassettledjustbefore

InaugurationtopreventthenewAdministrationfromenhancingitspo sitionby

beginningwitha“success.”Throughoutthewarweweretauntedbythe

appearanceofgreatreasonablenessbytheNorthVietnamesetowardvisitors,

especiallythoseopposedtotheAdministration.Theseguestsweretreatedwith

greatcivilityandacatalogueofskillfulandintriguingcodewordsthatpermitteda

varietyofinterpretations,noneofthemsoclearorfirmastobereliableorso

meaningfulasthevisitorimagined.Allofthemevaporatedassoonaswetested

theminaseriousforum.



ThesuccessoftheNorthVietnamesediplomaticcampaignforthebombing

haltconfirmedtheirfaithinnegotiationsasaformofpsychologicalwarfare.They

hadinvadedSouthVietnam,Laos,andCambodiawithsubstantialarmiesand

withoutprovocation;theyhadflagrantlyviolatedtheGenevaagreementof1962

onLaos,towhichwewereaparty.YetwhentheUnitedStatessoughttouphold

internationalagreementsandtomaintainthefreedomofalliedpeoples,Hanoi

haddemandedtheendofbombingastheadmissionpricetotheconference

roomandithadprevailed.



Fromthepointofviewofnegotiations,thebeststrategyforuswouldhave

beentoformulateaverygenerousproposalandthentostandonitwithout

furtherconcessionsuntiltherewasreciprocity.Buttotheextentthatwe

maintainedafirmpositionweweresubjecttodomesticandbureaucratic

pressuresthatgaveHanoievenmoreincentivetopersevereinitsintransigence.

Alternatively,wecouldhavemadeoneortwoconciliatorygesturesofde‐

escalationandwithdrawaltodemonstrateourgoodwillbutthenrefusedany

more,pendingsomeconcessionfromHanoi.Thistoowasprecludedbyour

domesticsituation.Hanoiusedeverysteptowardde‐escalationorwithdrawalas

proofofthevalidityofitscauseandthencondemneditasinadequate.The

definitionof“adequacy” wasHanoi’smaximumposition.Weexpendedmostof

ourenergyineffectnegotiatingwithourselves.



TheParistalksquicklyfellintoapattern.IntheconferenceroomtheNorth

Vietnameseactedlikeasterntutorberatingawaywardpupil;thestudentwas

beinggradedonanswerstoquestionshehadnorighttoparticipateinframing,by

criteriadeterminedexclusivelybytheprofessor.Outsidetheconferenceroomthe

NorthVietnamesecreatedtheimpressionthatthenegotiationswerelikea

detectivestory.Theythrewoutvaguecluesatwhoseanswerswehadtoguess;if

wemissedtheriddlethewarwouldgoonandwewouldbeaccusedofhaving

“missedanopportunity.”Manyofourcriticsfellinwiththisprocedure.Inour

publicdebateitwasrarelychallenged;hardlyanyoneaskedwhyHanoididnot

putforwardanintelligiblepropositionandwhytheyshouldproceedsoallusively

andindirectly.OfcoursewhenHanoiwasfinallyreadytosettle(inOctober1972)

itprovedasadeptatrealnegotiating,ascapableofframingconcreteproposalsas

ithadprev iouslybeenskillfulinobfuscation,andasimpatientasithadpreviously

beendilatory.



BetweenthehammerofantiwarpressureandtheanvilofHanoi,itwasnot

surprisingthattherewereimportantdifferencesintheattitudesandexpectations

ofthevariousleadersofthenewAdministration.Itwasthebetterpartofayear

beforewehadasettledstrategyfornegotiations.ThePresidentwasthemost

skeptical.Hedidnotbelievethatnegotiationswouldamounttoanythinguntilthe

militarysituationchangedfundamentally.HethoughtHanoiwouldaccepta

compromiseonlyifithadnootherchoice.Onthewhole,hefavoredapolicyof

maximumpressure;hewasnottooeagerfornegotiationsuntilsomemilitary

progresshadbeenmade.



Rogerswasattheotherextreme.Hisexperiencehadbeeninthedomestic

arena;hehadnose ttledviewsonforeignpolicy.Hisprimaryobjectiveswereto

avoiddomesticcontroversyandthechargeofrigidity.ManyintheState

Departmentsharedtheoutlookadvocatedbytheleadingnewspapersorthe

moredovishfiguresintheCongresspartlyoutofconviction,partlyoutoffear.

ThepracticalresultwasthatweweredelugedbyStateDepartmentproposals

whosemainfeaturewasthattheycontainedelementstheothersidehadvaguely

hinteditmightaccept.(Aswillbeseenlater,thisalmostinvariablyturnedoutto

beamirage.)Rogersoftenputtheseschemesforwardwiththeargumentthathe

wasnotendorsingthembutthatwewouldnotbeabletomanagepublic

pressuresunlesswewerepreparedatleasttodiscusstheminParis.Ofcourse,

onceanyofthesepropositionswasontheagendafordiscussionwehadadmitted

theirlegitimacyandwouldsoonbefacedonlywiththechoiceofhowmuchto

concede.



Laird’sviewwasmorecomplicated.Hewasasskepticalabouttheutilityof

negotiationsasaboutthepossibilityofmilitaryvictory;andhewaspolitically

astute.HismajorconcernwastogettheUnitedStatesoutofVietnambeforewe

losttoomuchdomesticsupport.Buthewantedtodosowithout acollapseofthe

SouthVietnamese.Hencehisall‐outadvocacyofVietnamization.Hegenerally

supportedahardlineinnegot iationsandthemostrapidpossiblepaceoftroop

withdrawals.HehadconvincedhimselfthatVietnamizationwouldwork;it

becamehistoppriority.



Ihadgreathopefornegotiations—perhaps,aseventsturnedout,more

thanwaswarranted.Ieventhoughtatolerableoutcomecouldbeachievedwithin

ayear.Muchoftheimpetusfornegotiationscamefromme.AsIwillexplain,I

hadmydoubtsaboutVietnamization;nordidIthinkwehadthetimeforvictory—

thatopportunity,ifiteverexisted,hadbeenlostbyourpredecessors.For

diplomacytosucceed,however,wehadtohusbandournegotiatingassets.We

neededastrategythatmadecontinuationofthewarseemlessattractiveto

Hanoithanasettlement.Iembracedthetwo‐tracknegotiatingstrategywhich

HarrimanandVancehadurge dintheirtransitionmemorandaandwhichIhad

outlinedinmyForeignAffairs article.Nixononthewholesupportedthis

approach.



Buttheissuedidnotcomeupinquitethisway.Rather,forseveralmonths

wehadadisputeovertheinheritedpolicyofmutualwithdrawalembodiedinthe

Manilaformula.Inthosefarawaydaystherewasstilladebateaboutwhetherour

withdrawalsshouldbeginonlyaftertheNorthVietnamesehadcompletedtheir

ownwithdrawalorsimultaneouslywithit.Thedebatewasabsurd,firstbecause

Hanoihadnointentionofwithdrawingitsownforces,andsecondbecause

everyoneknewthatweintendedtostartaunilatera lwithdrawalinafewmonths.

Asecondissuewewrestledwithforseveralmonthswashowlargearesidual

forceshouldbeleftafterthemutualwithdrawal.Allagenciesagreedthatsome

substantialresidualforcehadtoremain,probably100,000supporttroops.

(HarrimanandVancehadembracedthisviewintheirtransitionmemoranda.)The

DefenseDepartmentfavoredleavingcombatpersonnelaswell.Thisissuetoowas

soonovertakenbyeventsandpublicpassions.



Athirddebateconcernedde‐escalationofthefightingonthebattlefield.

OurnegotiatingdelegationinParisanticipated(wrongly,asitturnedout)that

Hanoiwouldraisethisissueandurgedthatwewouldbeobligedtoreply. The

StateDepartmentandourParisteamarguedthatweoffertodiscussthe

curtailmentofB‐52strikes,ofUSoffensiveoperations,andoftheuseofartillery

forinterdiction.BothourcommanderinSaigonandtheJointChiefsofStaff

disagreedstrongly, insistingthatsuchmeasureswouldcedethemilitaryinitiative

totheenemyandallowhimtorebuildhisstrengthinthepopulatedareas.That

tooturnedouttobeamootissue,sinceHanoinevershowedtheslightestinterest

inde‐escalation,evenasweimplementeditunilaterally.TheNorthVietnamese

werelessinterestedinsto p pingthefightingthaninwinningit.



AgainstHanoi’sobduracywehadthebuilt‐inmomentumofimaginative

bureaucracy,undisciplinedatthisstagebyanystrategyfornegotiations.

WhatevertheAdministrationandregardlessoftheissue,Americannegotiators

usuallyliketosucceed.TheydelugeWashingtonwithproposalstobreak

deadlocks;theyaretirelessinthinkingupinitiatives.Imperceptiblyatfirst,they

tendtoaddtheirownpressurestotheproposalsoftheotherside.Animatedby

thehighvaluetheyplaceonwillingnesstocompromiseoratleasttheappearance

ofit,theygrowrestivewithdeadlock.SinceWashington’sdecisionsasoftenas

notaremadebyadversaryproceedings,negotiatorsfeelsecureinurging far‐

reachingconcessions,safeintheknowledgethatotheragenciesholdingopposite

viewswillbeequallyone‐sidedinopposition.ThePresidentisleftwithseekinga

compromisebetweencontendingpressures,notwithdevelopingastrategy.And

ifheisreluctanttodominatetheprocessindetailherunstheriskthateach

bureaucraticcontenderpursueshisfavoritecourseunilaterally.



SoitwaswiththenegotiationsinParis.DuringFebruaryandearlyMarch,

therewasconstantpressurefromourParisdelegationtoinitiateprivatetalks

withtheNorthVietnamesebasedonallsortsofcompromiseschemes.Whenthe

firstsubstantiveprivatemeetingfinallytookplaceonMarch22,itproducednota

negotiationbutNorthVietnamesedemandsfortheuncondit ionalwithdrawalof

allAmericanforcesandfordismantlingtheThieu‐Ky‐HuongAdministration.[

The

onlynoteworthyoccurrenceatthefirstprivatemeeting,alreadymentionedinChapterVI,was

thetotallygratuitousandunexpectedoutburstbyNorthVietnamesenegotiatorXuanThuyto

LodgeinParisthattheUnitedStatesshouldnotcountontheSino‐Sovietsplittohelpussettle

thewarinVietnam,which,Imustsay,causedustonoticeopportunitiesofwhichwehadnot

beenfullyconscious.

]



Insteadoftakingstoc k,thevariousdepartmentsreactedbypushing

seeminglyinexhaustibleideasforcompromise.



Rogerswasfirstoffthemark.InaconversationwithSovietAmbassador

DobryninonMarch8,Rogersunilaterallyabrogatedthetwo‐trackapproachof

separatingmilitaryandpoliticalissues.RogerstoldDobryninthatwewerewilling

totalkaboutpoliticalandmilitaryissuessimultaneously.Contrarytothe

President’sdecisionnottoholdprivatetalkswhileSaigonwasbeingshelled,

RogersproposedimmediateprivatetalkswithHanoi.Contrarytoprecedent,he

impliedthattheprivatetalksincludeSaigonandtheNLF.Rogersdidnot even

requireanendofattacksonmajorpopulationcentersasacondition.Nowonder

thatDobryninrepliedthathebelievedwhathehadheardrepresentedamajor

changeinourposition.



Iwasindespair.Rogershadinmyviewgivenawayessentialelementsof

ourpositionwithouttheslightestreciprocityandtonopurpose;hewas

dissipatingassetsforoneday’sheadlines—assumingthetalksevercameoff.

Nixonwasmorephilosophical.Nothingismoreaskewthanthepopularimageof

NixonasanimperialPresidentbarkingordersatcowedsubordinates.Nixonhated

togivedirectorders—especiallytothosewhomightdisagreewithhim.Herarely

disciplinedanybody;hewouldneverfacedownaCabinetmember.Whenhemet

insubordinationhesoughttoaccomplishhisobjectivewithouttheoffender’s

beingawareofit.Thismightachievethegoal;itdidlittlefordisciplineor

cohesion.Asoftenasnotitrevealedtooutsidersadisunitythattheymightseek

toexploit.OvertimeitledtoafragmentedAdministrationinwhichunder

pressurealmosteverymemberlookedoutforhimself.Inthesenseofisolation

thisproducedinNixonandthelackofcohesionamonghisteamlayoneofthe

rootcausesofWatergate.ThusitwasinNixon’sreactiontoRogers’sgaffe.Hedid

notreiteratehisstrategytohisSecretaryofStateorcalla meetingofadvisersto

insistonhisapproach.InsteadhesentmetoseeDobryninonMarch11totell

himthattheSovietimpressionofachangeintheUSpositionwas“premature.”I

explaineddelicatelytoRogersonMarch14thatthePresident’sbasicconcernwas

thatwestarttheprivatetalksonabilateralbasisbetweenusandHanoi,before

broadeningthemtoincludeSaigonandtheNLF.Rogersrepliedsimplythathe

was“veryanxious”togetthetalksstarte d.



Lairdthenfollowedwithaunilateralstepinthemilitaryfield.OnApril1,

afterseveralmeetingsonthesubject,Nixonissuedadirectiveprohibitingany

proposalsonde‐escalationoutsidethecontextofmutualwithdrawal.Onthat

veryday,thePentagonannouncedpubliclythatwewerereducingB‐52sortiesby

over10percent,effectiveJune30,becauseofbudgetaryconsiderations.WhenI

complained,Lairdexplainedblithelythathecouldnotpayforthehigherrate

beyondJune30andthathewasactuallycontinuingthehigherratethreemonths