Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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seektoimposeitmilitarily.NothingshortofthiscouldhaveproducedSoviet

cooperation,forintheabsenceofcrisistherewasnoincentiveforaconcrete

Sovietstep.(Whenacrisisfinallydevelopedin1972,weinducedsomeSoviet

cooperation.)Ifwehadofferedatonedramaticmomentalltheconcessionswe

eventuallymadeinthreeyearsofwar,andifthemilitaryactionswetookwith

steadilydecliningforcesover1970,1971,and1972,inCambodia,Laos,andNorth

Vietnam(evenwithoutthelastbombingassault),hadbeenundertakenall

togetherinearly1970,thewarmightwellhavebeenappreciablyshortened—

thoughitishardtotellatthisremovewhetherSaigonwouldhavebeenreadyto

carrytheburdenofgoingitaloneafterasettlement.Inthefaceofthedomestic

turmoilandthedivisionswithintheAdministrationIdidnotfightformy

theoreticalanalysis.Ijoinedthegeneralviewthat,allthingsconsidered,

Vietnamizationwasthebestamalgamofourinternational,military,anddomestic

imperatives.



Onceembarkedonit,therewasnolookingback.Iknewthatitwouldbe

painfulandlong—IhadoutlineditsdangersrepeatedlytothePresident—and

thatitmightultimatelyfail.Ialsobelievedthatitwasbetterthanthealternatives

thatwerebeingproposedtousbyourdomesticcritics.



Andsoithappenedthattheyearendedwithtwoassessments;onthe

correctnessofone,theoutcomeofthewarwoulddepend.ThePresident’sfirst

ForeignPolicyReporttotheCongress,issuedonFebruary18,1970,summedup

ourVietnampolicyinstrikinglysoberterms.RarelyhadaPresidentialstatement

beenascandidinadmittingdoubtsandraisingquestions:



ClaimsofprogressinVietnamhavebeenfrequentduringthecourseofourinvolvement

there—andhaveoftenprovedtoooptimistic.Howevercarefulourplanning,andhowever

hopefulwearefortheprogressoftheseplans,weareconsciousoftwobasicfacts:



—Wecannottrytofooltheenemy,whoknowswhatisactuallyhappening.



—Normustwefoolourselves.TheAmericanpeoplemusthavethefulltruth.Wecannot

affordalossofconfidenceinourjudgmentandinourleadership.



Thereportadmittedtheexistenceofproblemsnotyetsolvedandoffereda

benchmarkbywhichprogresscouldbejudgedinthefuture.Weadmittedthat

theAdministrationdidnotyetknowthefinalanswerstoalltheissuesposedby

thewar—aboutenemyintentions,theprospectsforVietnamization, andthe

attitudeoftheVietnamesepeople:



—Whatistheenemy’scapabilitytomountsustainedoperations?Couldtheysucceedin

undoingourgains?



—Whatistheactualextentofimprovementinalliedcapabilities?Inparticular,arethe

Vietnamesedevelopingtheleadership,logisticscapabilities,tacticalknow‐how,andsensitivity

totheneedsoftheirownpeoplewhichareindispensabletocontinuedsuccess?



—Whatalternativestrategiesareopentotheenemyinthefaceofcontinuedallied

success?Iftheychoosetoconductaprotracted,low‐intensitywar,couldtheysimplywaitout

U.S.withdrawalsandthen,throughreinvigoratedefforts,seizetheinitiativeagainanddefeat

theSouthVietnameseforces?



—Mostimportant,whataretheattitudesoftheVietnamesepeople,whosefreechoice

wearefightingtopreserve?AretheytrulybeingdisaffectedfromtheVietCong,orarethey

indifferenttobothsides?Whatdotheirattitudesimplyaboutthelikelihoodthatthe

pacificationgainswillstick?



Thiswasnotaclarioncallfordomesticconfrontationormilitaryvictory;it

wasthesoberreflectionandanalysisofleadersgrowncautiousbythe

disappointmentsofadecade,seriousaboutbasingtheirpolicyonreality,and

willingtoacceptreasonablecompromise.



AsHanoi’sleadersweredeterminedonvictory,theirperceptionof1969

wastheoppositeofours;theyhadnouncertaintyabouttheoutcome;nordid

theytalkofcompromise.Hanoi’sgoalwasamonopolyofpoliticalpower.This

wasilluminatedbya majorpolicydocumentoftheCommunistmilitaryand

politicalleadershipcapturedin late 1969,ResolutionNo.9oftheCentralOffice

forSouthVietnam(COSVN),theSouthernheadquartersoftheNorthVietnamese

CommunistParty.Itwasadirectiveofguidancetothecadresinthefield,which

viewedAmericanconcessionsnotaseffortsatcompromisebutasevidenceof

failure:



Their“limitedwar”strategyhasmetwithbankruptcy.Theyarecaughtinamostserious

crisisoverstrategyandhavebeenforcedtodeescalatethewarstepbystepandadoptthe

policyofde‐Americanizingthewar,beginningwiththewithdrawalof25,000U.S.troops,hoping

toextricatethemselvesfromtheirwarofaggressioninourcountry…



Afterthegreatvictoryofthe[1969]SpringCampaign,ourarmyandpeoplelauncheda

newlarge‐scaleoffensiveinthemilitary,politicalanddiplomaticfields:wepushedoursummer

offensivewhileintroducingthe10pointpeacesolutionattheParisConferenceandproceeding

withtheconveningoftheNationalCongressofPeople’sRepresentativeswhichelectedthe

ProvisionalRevolutionaryGovernment.ThustheNixonAdministration,alreadybeatenbyour

staggeringattacksofthe1969SpringCampaign,wasdealtadditionalveryheavyblows.

Becauseofthesenewdefeatsonthebattlefieldandattheconferencetable,Nixonisunder

heavyattackbythepeopleoftheU.S.andoftheworld,demandinganendtothewarof

aggressioninViet‐Nam…ThefactthatNixonwasforcedtoissuetheeight‐pointprogram,

organizethemeetingwithThieuatMidway,andbegintowithdraw25,000troops,reflectsthe

obduracyandguileofU.S.imperialism;ontheotherhand,itindicatesthatthecrisisand

impasseinwhichtheNixonadministrationfindsitselfisdevelopingtoanewdegree.Thisisa

newopportunitywhichdemandsthatwemakegreatereffortsinallfieldsofoperationsinorder

towinagreatvictory.



AccordingtoCOSVN,thestrategicobjectivesfor1969werethekillingof

AmericantroopstoincreasedomesticstrainsintheUnitedStates,theweakening

oftheSouthVietnameseArmyandpacificationefforts,andonthisbasisforcing

theUnitedStatestoaccepta “coalitiongovernmentworkingtowardreunifying

Vietnam”:



a.FiercelyattackAmericantroops,inflictveryheavylossesonthem,causethem

increasingdifficultiesinallfields…



b.Stronglystrikethepuppetarmy,annihilatethemostobdurateelementsofthepuppet

armyandadministration,paralyzeanddisintegratetheremainingelements…



c.Strivetobuildupourmilitaryandpoliticalforcesanddeploythemonanincreasingly

strongstrategicoffensiveposition…



d.Continuetodestroyandweakenthepuppetadministrationatvariouslevels;

especially,defeattheenemy’spacificationplan;wipeoutthemajorpartofthepuppet

administration…andpromotetheroleoftheProvisionalRevolutionaryGovernment.



e.Onthisbasis,smashtheAmericans’willofaggression;forcethemtogiveuptheir

intentionofendingthewarinastrongposition,andtoendthewarquicklyandwithdrawtroops

whilethepuppetarmyandadministrationarestilltooweaktotakeovertheresponsibilityof

theAmericans;forcetheAmericanstoacceptapoliticalsolution,andrecognizean

independent,democraticpeacefulandneutralSouthViet‐Namwithanational,democratic

coalitiongovernmentworkingtowardreunifyingViet‐Nam.[EmphasesinOriginal.]



TheNorthVietnamesewerecocksure;itwasourdutytoprovethem

wrong.Imyselfpursuedtheambiguitiesofourcomplexpolicywithaheavyheart

andnotalittleforeboding.Buttherewasnoacceptablealternative.Wehadthe

dutytoseeitthroughinamannerthatbestserveditschancesforsuccess—

becauseadefeatwouldnotaffectourdestinyalone;thefutureofotherpeoples

dependedontheirconfidenceinAmerica.Wewouldhavetofighton—however

reluctantly—untilHanoi’sperceptionofitspossibilitieschanged.Andifwestuck

toourcourse,intimeHanoimightsueforarespite,ifnotforpeace.Wewould

havetobravediscordintheprocess,becausewewouldbeheldresponsiblefor

disasterevenifitresultedfromoverwhelmingdomesticpressures.We

considereditourpainfulresponsibilitytocontinuethestruggleagainstan

implacableopponentuntilwehadachievedafairsettlementcompatiblewithour

values,ourinternationalresponsibilities,andtheconvictionsofthemajorityof

theAmericanpeople.



<<Contents>>



****



IX



EarlyTestinAsia



ietnamwastemptingusintoanobsessionwithasmallcornerofavast

continentwhilethatcontinentonalargerscalewasbecomingevermore

importantinworldaffairs.



V

ThesecurityinterestsofallthegreatworldpowersintersectinAsia,

particularlyinNorthEastAsia.Chinacomprisestheheartlandofthecontinent.

TheSovietFarEastspreadsacrossthetopofAsia.TheJapaneseislandsspantwo

thousandmilesofoceanoffthemainland.America’sPacificpresence

encompassestheentireregion.WesternEuropehasimportanteconomiclinks

withAsiaandfeelsindirectlytheeffectsofanydist urbanceoftheequilibriumin

thearea.



Asiacontainsmorethanhalfoftheworld’spopulationandresources.In

thelastthreedecades,theAsian‐Pacificeconomyhasexperiencedmorerapid

growththanthatofanyotherregion.Itisherethatwehavefoughtallourwars

since1945.ItisherethattheUnitedStateshasitslargestandfastest‐growing

overseascommerce.TheinfluenceofAmericaandtheWeststimulatedthe

transformationofmuchofAsiaduringthepasthundredyears.Fromthedaysof

theNewEnglandtranscendentaliststothemodernperiod,Asiancultureand

ideashavesignificantlytouchedAmericanintellectuallife—reflectingthe

universalityofhumanaspirations.



Earlyin1969weweretestedinourfirstmajorcrisis,whichhappenedtobe

inAsia,andreceivedpraisethatwedidnotdeserve.Inanothertest,inthesame

regionoftheworld,anactofforesightandstatesmanshipwentunheralded.

TheseparadoxesoftheearlyAdministrationwereprovidedbytheaffairofthe

EC‐121,whereweacquiescedinthecallousshootingdownofanunarmed

Americanplane,andOkinawa’sreversiontoJapanesesovereignty,wherewelaid

thebasisforarelationshipofgrowingintimacythatweatheredmanyshocksand

turnedintoakeyelementofUnitedStatesforeignpolicy.Ourlongalliancewith

theextraordinaryJapanese—notwithoutmomentsoffarceandfrustration,

especiallyineconomicmatters—Iwilldiscusslaterinthis chapter.Itmustbegin

withtheEC‐121,wherewelearnedsomanylessonsforevengrimmercrisesthat

layahead.



<<Contents>>



****



TheEC‐121Shootdown



nApril14,1969,at5:00p.m.EST,aUSNavyEC ‐121ofFleetAir

ReconnaissanceSquadronOne(anunarmedfour‐enginepropeller‐driven

Constellation)tookofffromAtsugiAirBaseinJapanonaroutinereconnaissance

missionovertheSeaofJapan.Theseflightswereimportanttogiveusinformation

abouthostiletroopmovementsanddispositions.Theywerecrucialtowarnusof

surpriseattack—especiallyinKorea.TheplanecarriedacrewofthirtyNavymen

andoneMarineandsomesixtonsofequipment.Theaircraftwasdirectedtofly

fromAtsugitoapointofftheMusupeninsulaontheNorthKoreancoast(seethe

nextmap),makeanumberoforbitsonanellipseabout120mileslongparallelto

thecoastofNorthKorea,andlandatOsanAirBaseintheRepublicofKorea.

Standinginstructionsforthiskindofmissionprovidedthattheaircraftwasnotto

approachclosertothecoastofNorthKoreathanfortynaut ical milessothatthe

planewouldbeatalltimesclearlyoverinternationalwaters.

NorthKorea

claimedatwelve‐mileterritorialsea.OnApril14theaircraftcommanderwas

underordersfromtheCommander‐in‐ChiefofthePacificFleettoflyevenfarther

awayfromtheNorthKoreancoast,notapproachingcloserthanfiftynautical

miles.

O



Aslaterdetermined,theaircraft—trackedatalltimesbyourradar—

deviatedslightlyfromitsapprovedtrack,presumablytoinvestigateanelectronic

signal.Butatnotimediditapproachclosertothecoastthanforty‐eightmiles.

Whenitwasalertedtothefactthatanattackmightbepossible—thre etimes

withintenminutes—itacknowledgedinstructionstoabortthemissionandleftits

routinere connaissancetracktomovefartheroutoverinternationalwaters.



AtadistancesomeninetymilesSouthEastofChongjin,NorthKorea,at

11:50p.m.EST,theaircraftdisappearedfromourradarscreens.TheEC‐121had

beenattackedandshotdownbyNorthKoreanMiGaircraftovertheSeaofJapan.

Itcrashedaboutninetynauticalmilesfromthecoast.Nosurvivorswerefound.

ThuswastheNixonAdministrationpropelledintoitsfirstmajorcrisis.



NonewPresidentcanreallyknowwhatkindofa“team”hehasuntilfaced

withsuchacrunch.Itsessenceistheneedtomakehigh‐riskdecisionsquicklyand

underpressure.Innormalconditionsitisneverclearwhethersenioradvisersare

givingtheirownconvictionsorsimplyreflectingtheconsensusoftheir

bureaucracies.Itiseasiertoplaysafe.Areputationformoderationorwisdomcan

bepickedupcheaplybecausesuccessorfailureisdeterminedonlyafteran

intervalwhencauseandeffecthavebeenobscured.Butacrisiscastsan

immediateglareonmenandpolicies.Itilluminatesaboveallthosewhohusband

theirreputationsandthosewillingtotaketheheat.APresidentisinasenselucky

ifheisfacedwithacrisisearlyon;itenableshimtoshakedownhisteam.



ItcannotbesaidthatthenewNixonAdministrationmetthetestwith

distinction.Itwasnotso muchthatthewrongdecisionwasmade,thoughI

believeitwas.Itwasaboveallthatourdeliberationswerebanalorirrelevant;we

rarelyaddressedthecentralissue.TheNSCsystembecameadeviceto

accumulateoptionswithoutsupplyingperspectiveorasenseofdirection.



Alltheprincipalsweresofascinatedbytheprocessofdecisionmakingthat

theyoverlookeditspurposesinorderingprioritiesforaction.Likemanynew

administrations,theyweremoreconcernedtoavoidthechargestheyhadmade

againsttheirpredecessorsthantodecidetheissueonitsmerits.Thisreverence

forcampaignrhetoricisoneofthemost serious—andmosttempting—mistakes

ofanewadministration,sooftenleadingittobelieveitwillbejudgedbyits

differenceinstylefromitspredecessors.Infact,withinayearthechorusesofthe

electoralcampaignalmostalwaysfadeintooblivion.Thetestofthenew

administrationmustinevitablybecomenotitsmemorybutitsmasteryof

challenges.Itwillsuffernopenaltyforprevailingwiththemethodsofits

predecessor;itwillreapnoplauditsforfailingwithastyleallofitsown.Nixon

wasconvincedthatPresidentJohnsonhadsufferedfromthe“SituationRoom

syndrome,”meaningthathehadsuccumbedtothemelodramaticideathatthe

worldcouldbemanaged,incrisis,fromthisroominthebasementoftheWhite

House.Ironicallyenough,thoughNixontookupthecryofthe“SituationRoom

syndrome,”hefellvictimtoithimselfthenexttimearound.



TheimageoftheSituationRoombeliedthereality.Itisatiny,

uncomfortable,low‐ceilinged,windowlessroom,whichowesitschiefutilitytoits

locationnextdoortoabankofteletypesandothercommunicationsequipment

linkingtheWhiteHousetoembassiesaroundtheworld.Itsnamederivedfrom

theillusionofanearlierPre sidentthattheinternationalsituationcouldbe

representedcurrentlybymapsonthewall.Inmyday,mapswereneithercurrent

norvisible;intheirplaceweredrapestoaddahumantouchtotheaustereand

crampedsurroundings.Nixon’sperceptionhadsomemerit,inthatJohnsonliked

toconveytheimpressionhewasspendingagreatdealoftimeplanningindividual

bombingsorties,butultimatelyNixonbecamethevictimofhisowncriticism.

BecauseofhisattackontheSituationRoomsyndromeheandhisassociateswere

reluctanttoassembleadvisersthere(oranywhere)atthefirstsignoftrouble.He

didnotwanttobeinvolvedintacticsorplanningbattles.Everythinghadtobe

playedcool.



AndsoitwaswhenwelearnedthattheEC‐121hadgonedown.Wesetthe

crisismachineryintomotionwithgreatdeliberation, watchingourselveswithrapt

attentionateachstoptomakesurewewerenotshootingfromthehip.

Unfortunately,slowmotionisnomorelikelythanfrenzytoguaranteecorrect

judgment.TheSituationRoomwasnotifiedat12:50a.m.onApril15thattheEC‐

121hadbeenattackedbytwoNorthKoreanaircraft.Mymilitaryassistant,

ColonelAlexanderHaig,wasnotifiedat1:07.ThreeminuteslaterHaigtoldme

thattherewasanunconfirmedshootdow n.Iaskedhimtocollectallinformation

andtocallbackassoonastheincidentwasconfirmed.Iwouldnotdisturbthe

Presidentuntiltheshootdownwasconfirmedortherewasadecisiontobemade

byhim.At1:45a.m.HaigcalledColonelRobertPursley,Laird’smilitaryassistant.

PursleydecidedasIhad:Sincetheshootdownwasunconfirmedhewouldnot

wakeupLaird.



At2:17a.m.RadioPyongyangannouncedthatNorthKoreahadshotdown

aUnitedStatesreconnaissanceplanewhenitintrudedintoKoreanairspace.This

wasablatantlie,fortheplane,whichwastrackedatalltimesbyourradar,was

neverclosertotheKoreancoastthanforty‐eightmilesandwasshotdownata

distanceofninetymiles.Butforreasonsunfathomabletomeatthisremove,

everybodydecidedtoignorethebroadcast.Onthegroundthatwehadno

independentconfirmation,theshootdownwasstilllistedas“unconfirmed”as

lateas7:20a.m.,whenIbriefedNixon.WhyNorthKoreawouldannouncethe

shootdownofanAmericanplaneunlessithaddonesowasneverexplained.



Itwasasifsomeonehadpushedabuttonlabeled“crisismanagement”and

theanswerthatcameupwas“nonchalance.”NixonthrewhisvauntedNSC

machineryintoslowmotion;itwasagoodwaytocollectoptionsbutalsoto