Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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States,butalsothevictoryoftheimaginationandcourageoftheAmerican

people.”



ThisattitudeanimatedhistalkwithNixon.HemetinNixonakindredspirit.

AswellashavinggiventhoughttoUS‐Japaneserelations,NixonhadvisitedJapan

sixtimesasaprivatecitizenandhadahighopinionofitspotentialanditsleaders.

HeespeciallyadmiredSato’shalfbrotherNobusukeKishi,theformerPremier

whohadresignedbecauseoftheembarrassmentofhavingtocancel

Eisenhower’splannedvisitin1960.Sato,too,wasfavorablyknowntohim.



Satoconfirmedhisgovernment’sstrongcommitmenttocontinuethe

SecurityTreatyfora“considerablylongperiod.”AnOkinawaagreement, Sato

reaffirmed,wouldgoalongwaytodefuseoppositiontotheUS‐Japan

relationship.WithOkinawaoutoftheway,Satoindicated,Japanwouldbeableto

increaseitsdefensecapability.NixonaverredhispersonalcommitmenttoJapan

alongthelinesofhis1967ForeignAffairsarticle.HeencouragedJapanto assume

agreaterroleinPacificdefenseandexpressedpleasureatrecentJapaneseefforts

toincreaseairandnavalforces.NixonalsohopedthatJapancouldcontributeto

thestrengthoffreeAsiabyeconomicandtechnicalassistance tothedeveloping

nationsintheregion.Satoagreedtothesepropo sitions,andindeedthejoint

communiquéwentfarinassertingJapan’sstakeinthesecurityofSouthKorea,

Taiwan,andSouthVietnam.Japanalsomadeageneralpledgeto “makefurther

activecontributionstothepeaceandprosperityofAsia.”Togivesymbolic

expressiontothesecommonconcernsahotlinewassetupbetweenTokyoand

Washington.(TheseharbingersofJapaneseactivismwereatfirstillreceivedin

Peking.OnmyfirstvisittoPekingChouEn‐laiaccusedusoftemptingJapaninto

traditionalnationalistpaths.IttookmesometimetoconvincehimthattheUS‐

Japanalliancewasnotdir ectedagainstChina;indeed,thatthesurestwayto

temptJapanesenationalismwouldbetosetoffacompetitionforTokyo’sfavor

betweenChinaandtheUnitedStates.)



TheeffectofallthisontheOkinawaissuewasthatthephilosophical

expressionsofJapan’sinterestinthesecurityofKorea,Taiwan,andVietnam

providedtheformulafortheprincipleoftheessentiallyunrestrictedrighttouse

conventionalweaponsinthedefenseofthesecountries.Thisleftthenuclear

question.Nixonhadagreedtogiveuptherighttostorenuclearweaponsin

Okinawa;wethoughtitimportanttoretaintherighttoreintroducetheminan

emergency.Theresultwasa complicatedexchangebetween“Yoshida”andmeto

findaformulatomeetthedomesticnecessitiesofbothsides.TheJapanese

wantedastatementthatnuclearweaponswouldbedealtwithinaccordance

with“thepolicyoftheJapanesegovernmentasdescribedbythePrimeMinister.”

Thiscouldmeananything;intheJapanesecontextitwasboundtobeinterpreted

asprohibitingtheintroductionofnuclearweapons.OurJointChiefs,ontheother

hand,insistedonsomeformulaonwhichtheycouldbasethereintroductionof

nuclearweaponsinanemergency.Inasensewewerearguingaboutwindow

dressing;adecisionofthemagnitudeofintroducingnuclearweaponswouldnot

dependonquotingclausesfromlong‐agocommuniqués butontheconditions

prevailingatthetime.Still,thereversionwouldneeddomesticapprovalinboth

countriesandthatwasunattainablewithoutsomesolutiontothelargelyself‐

imposeddilemma.



AlexJohnsonandIfinallycameupwithaformulaasingeniousasitwas

empty.TheUS‐JapaneseSecurityTreatyhadaprovisionforpriorconsultation

overemergencies.Ifwereferredtoitinthecommuniqué,bothsidescouldsatisfy

theirrequirements:Satocouldmaintaintheantinuclearstanceofhis

government;Nixoncouldclaimthattheclausegaveustherighttoraisetheissue

ofnuclearweaponsonOkinawaeveninadvanceofanactualemergency.Iput

thisformulato“Yoshida,”whointurnobtainedSato’sapproval.



Thisstilllefttheproblemofhowtheformulawasto emergeandwho

wouldsurfaceit.“Yoshida”andIworkedoutacarefulscriptinwhichwe

rehearsedourprincipalsseveraltimessothattheproperrecordwouldexist.

“Yoshida”checkedwithSato,whothoughtthismightwork.



SatowouldopenwiththestandardJapanesepositionopposingany

introductionofnuclearweapons.Nixonwouldcounterbytablingaverytough

formulationofourmaximumposition.Satouponafewminutes’reflectionwould

thenproducethepreviouslyagreedcompromise.Afterponderingthematterfor

thebenefitofofficials(oratleastoftherecord),NixonwouldacceptSato’s

“compromise.”ThatwaytheformulawasaJapaneseidea;ithadnotbeen

imposed;therecordwouldbepristine. 



Withthatthornyissueoutofthewaytherestfollowedeasily.Nixonand

SatoagreedthatadministrativerightsoverOkinawashouldreverttoJapanand

thattechnicaldiscussionswouldbeginwiththeaim ofcompletingtheturnoverby

1972.(Thedeadlinewasmet;OkinawawasofficiallyturnedovertoJapanonMay

15,1972.)Theuseofthebasesforconventionalconflictwasdealtwithwhen

bothsidesexpressedagreementthatreversionshouldtakeplace“without

detrimenttothesecurityoftheFarEast”andtherefore“shouldnothinderthe

effectivedischargeoftheinternationalobligationsassumedbytheUnitedStates

forthedefenseofcountriesintheFarEastincludingJapan.”Thefinal

communiquéofSato’svisitnotedPresidentNixon’spledgetorecognizewith

respecttoOkinawa“theparticularsentimentoftheJapanesepeopleagainst

nuclearweapons.”Inotherwords,Okinawawouldbeas“nuclear‐free” astherest

ofJapan,butwithoutpr ejudicetothepossibilitiesofjointconsultationin

emergenciesasprovidedintheSecurityTreaty.

Satoprivatelyexpressed“deep

gratitude”toNixonforthis“magnanimous”decisio ntoreturnOkinawa.



Thusendedacomplexnegotiationwithanactofforesightand

statesmanship.Crisesavoideddonotmakeforheadlines.Onthesurfacewe

yieldedinOkinawa;inrealitywepreservedtheUS‐Japaneserelationship.We

removednuclearweaponsfromtheisland andacceptedsomelimitedrestrictions

onconventionaluse.Bythesemeasuresweavoidedlosingeverything.Ourbases

onOkinawahavecontinued tooperatewithoutanyinterferenceorsignificant

publicoppositionsince1972.AndtheOkinawanegotiationslaidthebasisfora

strengthenedpartnershipwithJapan.Nixonwasbuoyantandhewasnotfaroff

themarkwhenhedeclaredonSato’sdeparture:“Itiscustomaryonsuch

occasionstosaythatanewerabeginsintherelatio nsbetweenthetwocountries

involved.Ibelievetoday,however,thatthereisnoquestionthatthisisa 

statementofthefactthatanewerabeginsbetweentheUnitedStatesandJapan,

inourrelationsnotonlybilaterallyinthePacificbutintheworld.”AndSato

repliedinasimilarveininaletter:“Iamconvincedthatourtwocountrieshave 

nowenteredaneraofmutuallycooperativerelationshiprest inguponafar

strongerfoundationthaneverbefore.”



HappinessoverourJapaneserelationshipwasintensifiedbytheresultsof

Japan’sgeneralelectiononDecember27,1969,whichreturnedSato’sLiberal

DemocratstopowerwithaParliamentarymajorityevengreaterthanexpected

(288outof486intheHouseofRepresentatives).Weconsidereditavindication

oftheOkinawanegotiation.JapanesesupportersoftheAmericanrelationship

werestrengthened;Satowouldbeinapositiontoinfluencethechoiceofhis

successorwhenheretired.WithsomejustificationNixon’sForeignPolicyReport

ofFebruary1970citedtheOkinawainitiativeas“amongthemostimportant

decisionsIhavetakenasPresident.”



<<Contents>>



****



TheTextileFiasco



extilesremainedafartrickierproblem.“Mr.Yoshida,”whowaspresentin

Washingtonandresumedhiscovertintermediaryrole,calledmetheevening

afterSato’sarrivaltotellmethatSatohadsecondthoughtsonthetextile

scenariobywhichourformulaforcomprehensiveexportlimitswouldbe

arrangedatGenevaandwantedto“thinkitover”overnight.Iexpresseddismay

thatourunderstandingshouldfallthroughsoquickly.Thenextmorning

“Yoshida”calledbacktosaythat“hisfriend”wouldsticktotheplannedscenario.

AftertheJapaneseelectionSatowouldmovematterstotheagreedoutcomein

theformaltalksatGeneva.Butthiscouldworkonlyiftherewasnoreferenceto

textilesinthecommuniqué.Sincethesolutionhadto emergefromanegotiation

thathadnotyetstarted,Satocouldhardlyindicateitsoutcomeinadvance.Andit

wouldimpairthenewrelationshipifitappearedthatwehadtradedOkinawafor

concessionsontextiles.Theeconomicportionsofthecommuniqué,therefore,

waxedeloquentaboutotherofMauryStans’sfavoritethemes,committingSato’s

governmenttoloweringthebarrierstoforeignimportsandinvestment inJapan.

Butnothingonthetextileproblem.

T



Still,thingsseemedtobeontrack.Inthesecondday’stalkswithNixon,

SatoexplicitlypromisedthattextileswouldberesolvedasthePresidentdesired.

Satodeclaredthathetookfullresponsibility,thatitwashis“personalcredo” and

“vow”tokeephisword,thathecommittedhissincerityandallhiseffortstothat

end.Nixonsaidthatwasgoodenoughforhim;thetwoleadersshookhands.Sato

didnotusetheword“comprehensive,”but“Yoshida”assuredmeina

conversationthateveningthatSatowouldhonortheunderstanding.AfterSato

returnedhome,“Yoshida”calledmeagaininDecembertoconfirmSato’s

assurancethattherewouldbeabilateralaccordontextilesthatwouldbe

comprehensiveineffect,althoughthewordwouldnotbeused,toeaseSato’s

domesticproblem.Thiswasreasonableenough,sinceSatohadjustcalleda

generalelectionforDecember27.



Innegotiationsitisdangerousto aimforsuccessesthatgobe yondthe

capacitiesofthedomesticstructureofoneoftheparties,letaloneofboth.The

textileproblemwasneverfinallyresolvedasNixonandSatohadagreedbecause

practicallynooneineithergovernmentunderstoodhowtoreachtheobjectiveor

evenpreciselywhattheobjectivewas.Lower‐levelJapaneseo fficialsimmediately

rejectedourofficialproposalsbasedontheSato‐Nixonagreement.Icalled

“Yoshida,”whotoldmeagainthatSatowouldhonortheunderstandingbutthat

SatowaskeepingitsexistencesecretinJapaninthehopethatthiswouldmakeit

easierforhimpoliticallyandbureaucraticallytoproducethedesiredresult.I

passedonallthistoAlexJohnson,tellinghim,“It’saKabukiplay.”Itturnedoutto

bemorelikeaKafkastory.



FormalUS‐Japanesediscussionsovertextilescontinuedatseverallevels;at

noneofthemdidtheJapanesegovernmentofferoracceptapositionresembling

whatSatohadpledged.SatowasfacingimmovableoppositionfromtheJapanese

textileindustryandfromitsadvocatesintheMinistryofInternationalTradeand

Industry(MITI),theJapanesecounterparttoourCommerceDepartment.There

wasnolegalwaySatocouldforceasolutiononhisunwillingindustry.Atone

pointSatoeffectedacabinetreshufflethatreplacedtheMITIMinister,butthe

newMinisterendedupjustasopposedtoconcessions.



Oursidecompoundedtheproblem.TomaketheSato‐Nixonscenario work

weweresupposedtopresentaverytoughpositionthatwouldenableSatoto

surfacehisagreementwithNixonasacompromise.However,ourmiddle‐level

officials,whoseknowledgeofwhatwaspossiblewasbasedonthestatementsof

theirJapanesecounterparts,neverbelievedthatwecouldachievemaximum

demands.Theyinsistedonputtingforwardwhattheyconsideredrealistic

positionsandwouldnotlongholdtothehard‐linepositionsthatthescenario

required.Ournegotiatorsputforwardwhatwetoldthemwastheagreed

outcome,ratherthanahard‐lineposition.That,ofcourse,putSatointothe

untenablepositionofbeingaskedto accepttheAmericanpositionandevoked

desperatephonecallsfrom“Yoshida”accusingmeofwelshingonthepromiseof

atoughAmericanopeningposition—surelyoneoftheveryfewoccasionswhena

foreigngovernmenthascomplainedaboutbeinggiventooconciliatorya

proposal.AllthetimepressuresgrewintheUSCongresstowheeloutthe

heaviestartilleryofeconomicwarfare—legislationtoimposeseverequota

restrictionsonJapanesetextileimports.Insteadofbeingsolvedharmoniously,

thetextileissuethreatenedtoturnintoaconfrontation.



InFebruary1970“Yoshida”invitedmetoJapantosettletheproblem.Not

atalleagertoimmersemyselfsodeeplyinanegotiationIlittleunderstoodandto

whosesolutionIcouldmakenosubstantivecontribution, IurgedAlexJohnsonto

comeupwithanalternative.AlexsuggestedPhilTrezise,aStateDepartment

tradeexpert.“Yoshida”rejectedTreziseasbeingtoolow‐level;hewanteda

Cabinetmember.ThechoicefellonMauryStans.Havinggothiswish,“Yoshida”

calledfivedayslatertotellmethatweshoulddelay.TheJapanesecouldnotget

theirhouseinorder;therewouldbenopointyetinStans’scoming.



Instead,aJapanesenegotiatorarrivedinWashingtoninMarchwith

proposalsthatwereunsatisfactory;“Yoshida”calledmetosaythattheJapanese

proposalonly“looked”unacceptable;theactualJapanesepositionwasmore

flexible.ThiswasnotapparenttoAlexJohnson,MauryStans,orme.Ithengot

furtherphonecallsfrom“Yoshida”promisingbetterproposalsandbeggingme

nottobreakoffthenegotiation.Ididmynowcustomaryroundofcheckingwith

JohnsonandStans,andtold“Yoshida”wewouldwaitforhisnewproposals.We

willneverknowwhatmighthavehappened,butatthatpointaprominentUS

businessmanfavoringfreetradeandseekingtoavertrestrictivelegislatio nput

forwardinTokyohisownsuggestionsforacompromise.Hewasactingonhis

own;buttheJapanesetookrefugeinhisproposals.Thesewerelessthanwhat

theStateDepartmenthadsuggested,whichinturnhadbeentoo“soft”topermit

Satotocomeupwithacompromise,andlessthanwhat“Yoshida”hadcausedme

tobelieveSatomightbereadytooffer.NowonderthenthattheJapanesequickly

acceptedthebusinessman’sideas;ontheadviceofStansandJohnsonIhadto

call“Yoshida”totellhimthathewasactingonhisown,withoutauthority.Nixon

toldmeto“workoutthedeal”withSato’semissary;therewere“toomany

peopleintheact.”Iagreed;itwashardlywisetolettheJapaneseshoparoundfor

theoffertheylikedbest.



Thecomedywentonforanothertwoyears,withalmosttheidentical

script.JapaneseMITIMinisterKiichiMiyazawavisitedWashingtoninJune1970

andmetwithStans(withmyandJohnson’sapproval).Miyaza wa’sproposals

seemedtoStanstorenegeoneverythingtowhichtheJapanesehadeveragreed

duringthecourseofthenegotiations,muchlesstoembodytheSatoplan(a

“kamikazeattitude,”suggestedStansgrimly).ThisledthePresidenttoshiftthe

Administration’spositiontooneof“reluctantly”endorsingquota legislation.

SeveraltimesItoldStansandJohnsonofmyeagernesstogetoutofthenegotia ‐

tion.Theyencouragedmetostayin;my“backchannel”seemedtooffertheonly

hopeofachievinganykindofcoordinationamong thetwosides’chaoticefforts.

PeterFlanigan,PresidentialAssistantforInternationalEconomicPolicy,was

broughtintotheactinthefallof1970,andanotherabortiveattemptwasmade

toachieveanagreementwiththeJapanese.



PrimeMinisterSatocametoAmericafortheUnitedNationsanniversary

celebrationinthefall.Theubiquitousemissaryprecededhim—thoughthistimeit

wasnot“Yoshida.”ThenewmaninsistedthatwhenSatovisitedNixonhewished

tosettlethetextileissueasamatterofhonor.Iurgedhimstronglynottoraiseit

unlessSatocoulddeliver.Nixonunderstoodthatsometimesinsuperabledomestic

obstaclescouldfrustratethebestintentionsofstatesmen;hehadhadthat

experiencehimself.Butanothermisfiremightshakeconfidence.



Satoinsistedonanothergoatthetextileproblem,however.The

performanceofthepreviousyearwasrepeated.Satopurportedtoagreeon

fourteenofsixteenoutstandingissues;hesaidhewantedtosavetheremaining

twoforhisreturn,sothatthefinaldecisioncouldbemadeinTokyoratherthan

Washington.AftersayinggoodbyetoNixon,SatodrovearoundtheWhiteHouse

toWestExecutiveAvenueandappeare dunexpectedlyinmyoffice.Hewantedto

reaffirmhiscommitmentinfrontofmyassociates,hesaid.Hethereupon

proceededtorepeatwhathehadtoldNixon.



HedidandreturnedtoTokyo.Stillnothinghappened;thetalksremained

stalemated.IhavenodoubtthatSatowassincereinhispledges.Hewasfartoo

intelligenttoattemptsuchclumsyevasions,fartoohonorabletoresorttotricks

withacountryhegenuinelylikedandtowarda Presidentherespected.Wehad

demandedtoomuchofhim;hepromisedmorethanheshouldhave,andhewas

deeplyembarrassedbyhisinabilitytodeliver.Theblamemustbeshared.



Inearly1971,CongressmanWilburMills,ChairmanoftheHouseWaysand

MeansCommittee,performedtheextraordinaryfeatofnegotiatinganagreement

directlywiththeJapanesetextileindustry.TheUStextileindustryandtheWhite

Housedenounceditasunsatisfactory.Ambassador‐at‐largeDavidKennedy,

formerTreasurySecretary,wasputinchargeoftextilenegotiationsin1971.The

disputethenmerge dwiththeNewEconomicPolicyannouncedbyNixonon

August15,1971;thiswasthesecond“Nixonshock”of1971(afterthesecretvisit

toChina),anditwastoagreatextentaproductofthefailureofpreviousUS‐

Japanesetradediscussions.Finally,underthisse verebuff eting,combinedwith

theobnoxiousthreatofquotasbyExecutiveOrderunderthe1917Tradingwith

theEnemyAct,theJapanesereachedagreementwithAmbassadorKennedyon

October15,1971.



Thecriticismhasbeenmadethattheso‐calledNixon‐Kissingerdiplomacy

hereshoweditsusualmisunderstandingofthepluralisticpoliticalsystemofa

democratically,inwhichnationalleaderscouldnotdominatethedecision‐

makingasinadictatorship.

WhileIdidnotthengraspallthesubtletiesofJapan’s

politicalculture,Icametounderstandtheproblemwewerefacingalltoowell.In

reality,itwasnota“back‐channelnegotiation”intheusualsense;Ikeptin

contactwiththekeyofficialsof theStateandCommercedepartmentsatevery

turn,bynecessity,whateverNixon’surgingstothecontrary.Theotheragencies

indeedhopedthattheWhiteHousechanneltoSatocouldmakesomesenseout

oftheconfusiononbothsides.NordidthedisputearisebecauseNixon

misunderstoodanellipticalpledgebySato,ashasbeensuggested.

Sato’sexplicit

promisewasreiteratedoverandoveragainbyhisdesignatedemissary.Itcould

besaidthatthebasicmistakewasNixon’scampaignpledgeof1968,whichcost

toohighapriceintermsofourforeignpolicyobjectives.



Buttherealproblem,ofcourse,wasdeeper,anditisoffundamental

importancetothefutureofalltheindustrialdemocracies.WhileJapan,the

UnitedStates,Canada,andthenationsofWesternEuropearepoliticaland

militaryallies,wearealsoinevitableeconomiccompetitors.Asdemocracies,

indeed,oursystemsdisperseeconomicpoweraswellasthepoliticalauthorityby

whichdecisionsaremadeoneconomicquestions.Nogovernmenthassolvedthe

problemofhowautonomousnationaleconomicpoliciescanbepursuedwithout

growingstrainswithpoliticalallieswhoarealsotraderivals;evenlesshavewe

solvedthechallengeofcoordinatingeconomicgoalstoreinforcethecohesionof

freepeoples.Weproclaiminterdependencebutwehavebeenreluctanttoaccept

thatthisinvolvesameasureofdependence.



Thustradedisputesamongtheindustrialdemocraciesarestillwithus;the

competitiveandprotectionistpressuressurgedagainafterthe1973‐1974energy

crisisthrewtheindustrialworldintoa protractedrecession.Thetextilesfiasco

wasonemajorlapseinJapan’sotherwiseimpressiverecordofeconomicdecision‐

making.YetthevulnerabilityofAmericanpolicytoprotectionistpressures,which

forcedustostakesomuchontheefforttogetsuchanagreementfromthe

Japanese(ifonlytoheadoffmorebrutallegislativeimpositions),remainsa

seriousweaknessoftheAmericansystem.Protectionismistheresortofthe

economicallyweak;awisernationalpo licywouldseektoenhancethemobilityof

laborandresourcessothatwecanshiftoutofdecliningindustriesandexpand

ourmoreproductivesectors.Andprotectionismisaboveallanuntenableposture

foranationthatseekstobetheleaderoftheallianceofindustrialdemocracies.

Thishasthrownusintoconflictwhenthenecessityofstatesmanshipisto

reemphasizeintheeconomicfieldthefundamentalcommunityofinterestthat

wouldsurelyoperateinthefaceofobviousexternalthreatstooursecurity.The

danger,conversely,isthateconomicclashesofmountingbitternesscould

underminethatveryunityofinterestandaspirationthatisthebulwarkofour

freedom.Wehaveyettorisetothischallenge.

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<<Contents>>

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X

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WordsandShadows:Evolutionof

MiddleEastStrategy

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henIenteredofficeIknewlittleoftheMiddleEast.Ihadnevervisited

anyArabcountry;IwasnotfamiliarwiththeliturgyofMiddleEast

negotiations.ThefirsttimeIheardoneofthestapleformulasofthe

region’sdiplomacywasatadinnerattheBritishEmbassyinFebruary1969.

SomeoneinvokedthesacramentallanguageofUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil

Resolution242,mumblingabouttheneedforajustandlasting peacewithin

secureandrecognizedborders.IthoughtthephrasesoplatitudinousthatI

accusedthespeakerofpullingmyleg.ItwasamistakeIwasnottorepeat.Bythe

endofmytimeinofficeIhadbecomelikeallotheroldMiddleEasthands;word

hadbecomereality,formandsubstancehadmerged.Iwasimmersedinthe

ambiguities,passions,andfrustrationsofthatmaddening,heroic,andexhilarating

region.Ifthereaderfindsthediplomacyoutlinedinthischapteranagonizing

swampofendlessma neuveringandconfusion,heknowshowIfelt.



Mypersonalacquaintancewiththeareabefore1969waslimitedtothree

briefprivatevisitstoIsraelduringthe1960s.Irecallparticularlyvividlymyvisitto

KibbutzGinossar,thehomeofYigalAllon,astudentinmyInternationalSeminar

atHarvardin1957andlatermycolleagueasDeputyPrimeMinisterandForeign

MinisterofIsrael.HiskibbutzisontheshoresoftheSeaofGalilee.Everysquare

inchofitsintensivelycultivatedsoilhadbeenwrestedbyfaithandsufferingfrom

thehostilecircumstancesofgeographyandconflict.AcrosstheSeaofGalileeI

rememberseeingasolitaryfishingboatattheedgeoftheescarpmentofthe

GolanHeights,withineasyrangeofSyrianrifles.Ithoughtthenhowlittlethe

materialist philosophersunderstoodofhumanmotivation.Herewereapeople,

sustainedbyfaiththroughtwomillenniaofpersecution,cometoreclaimdreams

thatforallthistimehadbeenmorepowerfulthantheirtragicreality.ButI

thoughttoothatthemeaningofthisfaithmustnotbeexhaustedintheheroic

defenseofacountrythatthreatenedtoturnintoanotherbeleagueredghetto.