Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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LondonneverusedtheEnglishlanguage,showedhisappreciationbyreplyingin

English:“TellyourPresidentthatheisaverycourteousman.”



NixonanddeGaullemetintheOvalOfficeforwhatturnedouttobethe

lasttime.IwarnedNixonbeforehandtoavoid“anysuggestionthatyousharethe

General’scurrentlybitterattitudetowardtheWilsongovernment”—thelingering

aftermathoftheSoamesaffair(seeChapterIV).DeGaulle,infact,tookNixonon

atourd’horizoncoveringmost ofthepointsmadeamonthearlierinParis.He

addedonenewnote—awarningaboutcarryingcooperationwithGermany

beyondthepointofprudence.HeopposedarecentlyconcludedAnglo‐German

agreementforacentrifugeprocesstoproduceenricheduraniumfornuclear

reactors.HefearedthatthiswastheopeningwedgeforGermany’sentryintothe

nuclearclub;oneshouldtakecarenottoreawakenthedrivingambitionthathad

tornEuropetwiceinthiscentury.Nixonrepliedblandlythathehopedacloseand

friendlyrelationshipbetweenFranceandGermanywouldbemaintained.



TherewasaboutdeGaulleonthisoccasionamelancholyairofwithdrawal,

ofalreadybeingaspectatorathisownactions,ofspeakingintheabstractabouta

futureheknewhewouldnolongershape—aharbingerofhisretirementafew

weekslater.HecalledtomindapoignantstorytoldtomebyChancellorKiesinger

afewweeksearlierinBonn,onthebasisofwhichhepre dictedthatdeGaulle

wouldnotservemuchlongerasChiefofState.AccordingtoKiesinger,duringone

oftheirregularconsultations,deGaullehadcharacterizedFranco‐German

relationsasfollows:“WeandtheGermanshavegonethroughalottogether.We

havetraversedforestssurroundedbywildanimals.Wehavecrosse ddeserts

parchedbythesun.Wehaveclimbedpeakscoveredbysnow,alwayslookingfor

ahiddentreasure—usuallycompetitively,veryrecentlycooperatively.Andnow

wehavelearnedthatthereisnohiddentreasureandonlyfriendshipislefttous.”



Thefuneralwasalsotheoccasionforthedisc ussionofafundamental

defenseissuethatwasraisedbyanoldfriend,DenisHealey,thenMinisterof

DefenseoftheUnitedKingdom.HealeyandIhadknowneachothersincethe

mid‐Fifties,whenwehadbothwrittenonstrategicproblems.Hewasbrilliantand

gregarious,extraordinarilywellreadandimplacableindebate.Hisrestless

intellectsometimescausedhimtoshifthispositionsfasterthanhisadmirers

couldassimilate.Butthoughlikemostpoliticianshewasfinelyattunedtothe

moodsofthemoment,hewasalwaysconstructiveandstimulating. 



Healeyhadwrittenmeaprivateletteraskingwhatourattitudewouldbe

towardgroupingtheWestEuropeannationswithinNATOtoconcerttheir

positionsondefensematters.TheprospectofaEuropeancaucusondefense

raisedaninterestingquestion.The“integrationists”inourbureaucracy,aswellas

outside,passionatelyfavoredEuropeaneconomicunity;atthesametimethey

stronglyopposedaEuropeanidentityinthedefensefieldaslikelytodividethe

Alliance.Ithoughttheoppositewasmorelikelytobetrue.Ineconomicmatters

EuropeandAmericaweretosomeextentrivals;moreover,therewasnoriskor

penaltyforcompetition.Inthemilitaryfieldtherewasnoconceivable

contingencyinwhichEuropewouldbebetteroffwithoutAmericansupport.Our

vitalinterestswerecomplementary;thepenaltyforindependentactionwas

overwhelming.IwasconvincedthataEuropeanidentityinthedefensefield

wouldbelessdivisivethantheEuropeaneconomicunitythatallleading

Americans,includingmyself,welcomed.Onlybyarrivingatindependent

conclusionswouldEuropeseethenecessityofstrengtheningitsdefenseeffort.



Ithoughttheissuesufficientlyimportant toaskthePresident’sguidanceon

howtorespondtoHealey:



SomeUSofficials…havenotedthataEuropeancaucuscouldgrowintoathirdforce

groupedaroundFrance,drawingitschiefimpulsetounityfromanti‐Americanism.…



IbelievethateffortstocreateamorecoherentEuropeanvoiceinNATOareinournet

interest,thoughnotwithoutsomeshorttermproblems.GreaterEuropeancoherencewouldbe

quiteconsistentwithwhatyouhavesaidaboutthedesirabilityoverthelongerrunofourbeing

abletodealwithEuropeasatrueandmoreequalpartner.



IthereforerecommendedthatIinformHealeyofourgenerallyfavorable

reaction,providedsuchagroupingwasnotusedasadevicetoisolateFrance.We

wouldbepreparedtotellotherEuropeansthat“astrongerandmoreunited

Europeanvoicewillmakeforamoreequitableandhenceamoreproductive

Atlanticpartnership.”Nixonapprovedthisapproach.The“Eurogroup”gradually

tookshape,butnoEuropeanconsensusondefenseemerged.Thereasonwaslack

ofagreementonEurope’spoliticalstructure.Fra ncewantedaunitedEuropean

voice,butnotwithinNATO;itwasboundtoconsidertheBritishinitiativeasaway

ofgettingaroundtheissueofBritishmembershipintheCommonMarket.The

Americanbureaucracy,whateverthedecisionofthePresident,waslukewarm;it

supportedtheschemeweaklyandwhereverpossiblesurreptitiouslyopposedits

implementation.TheotherEuropeanswereambivalent.Theyfavoredunityinthe

abstract,buttheyfearedthattheattempttoarticulateaEuropeanidentitywithin

NATOmightgivetheUnitedStatesanexcuseforreducingitsmilitary

establishmentinEurope.



****



TheseattitudescameintofocusagainduringtheWashingtonmeetingofforeign

anddefenseministerstocelebratethetwentiethanniversaryoftheAlliance.Ina

memorandumofApril9IhadurgedNixontoemphasizeourcommitmentto

maintainstrongAmericanforcesinEurope;butheshouldstressalsothat

CongressionalsupportintheUnitedStatesrequiredproportionatecontributions

fromourallies.Second,heneededtocounteractthenotionthatdétentewasjust

aroundthecornermerelybecausetheSoviettonehadsoftened. Weshould

indicateageneralreadinesstoexploreconcreteareasforagreement,ratherthan

mereatmospherics,withtheSovietUnion.Third,withrespecttointernal

EuropeanarrangementsIrecommendedthatweencouragetheEuropean

membersofNATOtoimprovecooperationamongthemselves.Butweshould

avoidsupportforaparticularmethod;weshouldneitherjoininanyeffortto

isolateFrancenorconveytheideathatspecialrewardsawaitedthosewho

contractedoutoftheAlliance.



Aboveall,IurgedthePresidenttounderlinetheprinciple“thatthesecurity

ofthisallianceshouldbebroadlyconstruedto involvenotonlyitsphysicalsafety

againstexternalattackbuttheabilityofourcountriestocopewiththeproblems

withinoursocieties.”Todevelopasenseofcommoninterestaboveandbeyond

defense,Iendorsedanidea,whichPatMoynihanhadinspired,foraCommittee

ontheChallengesofModemSociety.Asmodernindustrialnationsweallshared

theproblemsofprotectingtheenvironmentorimprovingtransportation,and

surelytheresourcesandimaginationoftheWesternnationscouldbebroughtto

bearonthequalityoflife.Inaddition,togivetangibleexpressiontohis

commitmenttoincreasedconsultation,IrecommendedthatthePresident

proposethatDeputyForeignMinistersmeetatleastoncebetweenthe

semiannualForeignMinisters’meetings.Theycouldattemptlonger‐range

planning,especiallyonEast‐Westrelations.Nixonacceptedthese

recommendationsandputthembeforetheNorthAtlanticCouncilinaneloquent

speechinApril1969.



Onemighthaveexpectedthat,afteryearsofcomplainingabout

inadequateAmericanattentionandinsufficientconsultation,ourallieswould

haveembracedourproposalswithenthusiasm.Butthisignoredthepsychological

undercurrents.TheAlliance’spassionfor“consultation”meantinpracticethe

desiretolimitAmerica’sfreedomofaction;notallofourallieswereequally

preparedtoconstraintheirown.ApoliticalplanningmechanismranintoFrance’s

questfor“indepen dence”andreceivedalukewarmreceptionfromtheFederal

RepublicofGermany,advocatingamorenationalpolicy.TheCommitteeonthe

ChallengesofModernSocietywasgreetedwiththeobjectionthatNATOwas

neverdesignedtoaddresssuchquestions—afarcryfromtheprivateexpressions

ofallalliedleadersduringNixon’striptoEuropethatthecommondefensewas

nolongersufficienttoinspiretheyoungergeneration.



ThefinalcommuniquéoftheAprilcommemorativeconferencewas

thereforeextremelyreserved.Itcalledfor“consideration”ofthePresident’s

proposalforperiodicmeetingsoftheDeputyForeignMinistersandfor

“examination”ofhowthecountriesmight“improvetheexchangeofviewsand

experience…whetherbyactionintheappropriateinternationalorganizationsor

otherwise,inthetaskofcreatingabetterenvironmentfortheirsocieties.”Itwas

clearthatEuropewasambivalentaboutmajorAmericaninitiatives;itwelcomed

Americancommitmentsaslongastheydidnotconstrainitsownfreedomof

action.Atthesametime,thenewAdministrationwasbeginningtofaceagrowing

reluctanceinthiscountrytomeet,letaloneexpand,ourowncommitmentsto

Europe.Wewouldhavetonavigatebetweentheseshoalsfortheremainderof

Nixon’sterm.



<<Contents>>



****



DeGaulle’sDepartureandEuropeanUnity



n1969,actually,wesucceededindefusingmuchofthetensionwehad

inheritedwithintheAtlanticAlliance.Nixon’shighregardfordeGaullewas

reciprocated.DeGaulle,tobesure,didnotchangehisbasicprinciples,butheno

longerpressedthemsobrutally.ThereceptiongivenNixoninFrance,deGaulle’s

attendanceatthereturndinnerattheAmericanEmbassy,hisgraciousgestureof

comingtoPresidentEisenhower’sfuneral—allhelpedeasethepreviousstrains.

TheimprovementinFranco‐Americanrelations,inturn,madethespecialAnglo‐

AmericanrelationshipappearlessofanobstacletoBritishmembershipinEurope.

ThesetrendswereacceleratedwhenPresidentdeGaulleabruptlyresignedon

April27,1969.Hehadbeendefeatedintworeferendaones sentiallyse condary

issues,onedealingwiththestructureoflocalgovernmentinFrance,theother

withreformoftheSenate.Toresignoversuchmattersraisedthesuspicionthat

thereferendahadbeenarrangedatleastinparttoprovidedeGaullewitha

pretextforleavingoffice. Hehadperformedthedramaticfeatsrequiredbythe

crisesthathadbroughthimtopower.Hehadconsolidatednewpolitical

institutions.HehadachievedthedecolonizationofFrenchAfricawhile

maintainingFrenchself‐confidenceathomeanditsprestigeintheformer

colonies.Barelyovercomingincipientcivilwar,hehadrestoredFrenchprideby

givingitacentralroleinthepoliciesofEuropeandtheWesternAlliance.His

challengetotheUnitedStateshadtoagreatdegreethepurposeofinspiring

Frenchself‐assurance.



Butthestudentupheavalsof1968hadshakendeGaulle.Andthe

challengesfacinghimthereafterwerenotofamagnitudeheconsideredrelevant

tohisvisionofhimself.Toensureagrowingeconomy,toarbitratecontending

claimsonlimitedresources,toorganizeandmanageabureaucraticstate—these

weretasksforwhathehalf‐contemptuouslycalled“quartermasters,”notfor

heroicfigures.ThereferendaofApril17providedtheoccasionforadramatic

departureinsteadoftheslowerosionofauthoritythathesofeared.Afterward,

allwassolitudeasdeGaulleretiredto Colombey.Hesawnopoliticalfigures,

madenoprono uncements,workedonhismemoirs,andawaitedhisdeath.



UpondeGaulle’sresignationIwrotetothePresidentoutliningwhatIsaw

tobethec o nsequences.IexpectedGeorgesPompidoutoemergeasdeGaulle’s

successorinamorecomplicatedpoliticalsituation.DeGaullehadmanagedto

standaboveparties,appealingtotherightwithamoderatedomesticprogram

andtotheleftwithhisindependentforeignpolicy.Ithoughtitmorelikelythatin

thefutureFrenchpoliticallifewouldbecharacterizedby“alarge,well‐organized

CommunistPartyonthefarleft,andaconstantlyshiftingamalgamofleft,center

andrightpartiesgoverningthroughanarrowconsensuswhichpermitslittleinthe

wayofpositiveprograms.” IanticipatedlittlechangeinthesubstanceofFrench

foreignpolicy,thoughthestylemightbemoreaccommodating.Overthelonger

term,however,Ithoughtthat“Frenchforeignpolicymaybecomemoredifficult

forustolivewith.WithalessdecisiveGovernment,theleftmaywellbeableto

moveintoaposition—so commoninotherWesternEuropeandemocracies—of

exercisingavetooverforeignpolicyinitiativesitdoesnotlike.” Thesepredictions

proved,ifnotplainwrong,atbestpremature.Pompidouturnedouttobea

strong,decisive,anddominantPresident,atleastuntilhislastyearinofficewhen

hewastormentedbyacruelillness(hediedin1974).



AtthetimeofdeGaulle’sdepartureaninteragencystudyunderthe

chairmanshipoftheDepartmentofStatepreparedathoughtfulanalyticalpaper

thatpredictedthatPompidouwouldmoveawayslowlyandunobtrusivelyfrom

deGaulle’soppositiontoBritain’smembershipintheCommonMarket;hewould

acceleratetheimprovementinrelationswiththeUnitedStatesthathadalready

startedunderdeGaulle. Irecommendedthatwenottakeanyspecificinitiative

duringtheFrenchpresidentialelectioncampaign.Rather,weshouldcontinueto

expand“uponrecentUSeffortstogivepracticalcontenttocloserpoliticalrapport

withFrance”andencourage“discreetlyanytrendtowardamorecooperative

FrenchattitudetowardNATO.”



Shortlyafterthesecondroundofthepresidentialelections,whichgave

PompidouavictoryoverAlainPoher,ImetwithourAmbassadortoParis,Sargent

Shriver,todiscussapossiblevisitbyPompidoutotheUnitedStates.Iproposed

thatthesimplestsolutionwouldbetosubstitutePompidoufordeGaulle,who

hadagreedtovisittheUnitedStatesinJanuaryorFebruary1970.Shriverwasto

soundoutPompidouandthenaformalinvitationwouldbesent.ItoldShriver

thatthePresidentwaswelldisposedtoexplorethepossibilitiesofmilitary

cooperationwithFrance.ThePresidentwouldnotlet“NATOtheology”standin

thewayofanincreaseinFrenc hmilitarycooperationwiththeUnitedStates.Not

eventhepossibilityoflimitedcooperationinthenuclearfieldwasexcluded.



Beforehisofficialvisit,however,Ihadanopportunitytomeet Pompidou

onthewaybackfromNixon’svisittoAsiaandRomaniainAugust1969.The

Presidentstoppedat anairfieldinBritainto briefPrimeMinisterWilson,andIleft

thepartytobriefPompidouandtheNorthAtlanticCouncil(andalsotomeet

XuanThuy).ChancellorKiesingerwascomingtoWashingtoninafewdaysand

wouldreceivehisbriefingthere.



PompidouexpressedhisappreciationforNixon’sgestureinsendingmeto

Paris.AsinallmylatercontactsIfoundhiminvariablypoliteandextremely

penetrating,withtheslightlysardonicmannerofagraduateofoneofthegrandes

écoles—thegreateducationalinstitutionsthathaveshapedsomuchofFrench

leadership.HeexpressedsupportforNixon’sGuamDoctrinethatAsiansshould

assumeagreaterresponsibilityfortheirfuture;hethoughtthisshouldapplyto

Europeaswell.HeacceptedinprincipletheinvitationtotheUnitedStatesforthe

earlypartof1970.HewaswillingtobehelpfulonVietnamifweasked,andmade

clearthathewouldnotseekopportunitiestoharassus.



ThepreconditionfordeGaulle’saloofpoliciestowardtheUnitedStatesor

BritainwasinanyeventdisappearingwiththeadventoftheBrandtgovernment

inWestGermanyasaresultoftheelectionsofSeptember1969.Brandtwason

recordasfavoringBritain’sentryintotheCommonMarket;hisnewpolicytoward

theEast(Ostpolitik)raisedthespecterofa moreindependentandmorenational

coursebyGermany.AllofthismadeBritain’sparticipationinEuropeseemmore

attractivetotheFrench.Therefore,atameetingoftheheadsofgovernmentof

theEuropeanEconomicCommunityonDecember2,1969,itwasannouncedwith

FrenchconcurrencethattheCommunitywaspreparedtonegotiatewithBritain

andtoconsiderpoliticalcooperationwithin“thecontextofenlargement.”



Thusatyear’sendtheUnitedStateswasfacetofacewiththeachievement

ofoneofitslong‐he ldobjectives—theexpansionofEuropeanunity.Fortwo

decadesithadbeenassumedthataunitedEuropewouldeaseAtlanticrelatio ns,

thatitwouldinevitablypursuecompatiblepolicieswhilesharingagreaterpartof

ourburdens.IhadneverbelievedtheresultsofEuropeanintegrationtobenear ly

soautomatic.Diverg encesonmonetaryandtradepolicywerealready

increasinglyapparent.ApoliticallyunitedEuropewasmorelikelytoarticulateits

ownconceptionsinotherareasaswell.AtaninteragencymeetingonDecember

11InotedthatwewouldbefacedwithmoreassertiveEuropeanpositionson

suchquestionsasEast‐Westnegotiationsandontheprotectionistimplicationsof

thestrengthening oftheCommonMarket.



Butitwasaluxurytocontemplatesuchproblems,becausetheywerethe

resultsofsuccess.Our“lowprofile”onEuropeanunityhadimportantlyimproved

Britain’sprospects;ourrefusaltoparticipateinintra ‐Europeanquar relshad

strengthenedbothEuropeanandAtlanticrelations.Tobesure,adherentsofthe

previouspolicyofvocalAmerican“leadership”wereunhappywithourrestraint.



InresponsetoaqueryfromNixonIwrotethePresidentonDecember29:



Therehasbeensomecriticismofour“lowprofile”inEuropefromthosewhobelieve

thatweshouldcontinuethepolicyofthepreviousAdministrationofactivelyinvolving

ourselvesinintra‐Europeanaffairsalongconceptuallineswhichwehaveconcludedarebestfor

Europe.Thereremainsagroupofscholars,formerofficialsandjournalistsonbothsidesofthe

AtlanticwhobelievethatunlesstheUSprovidesthemomentum,themovementforEuropean

unitywilldie,particularlysincethestimulusoffearoftheRussianshaslargelydisappeared.



Actually,ourrelationswithEuropehaveimprovedimmeasurably.Therevisedapproach

whichyoulaunchedduringyourEuropeantripandwhichisbasedonincreasedconcernfor

whattheEuropeanswantforthemselvesandagreatlyimprovedconsultativeprocessonthe

majorissueswhichaffectEuropehasbeenexceptionallysuccessful.Acaseinpoint,ofcourse,is

yourreversaloftheformerlydeterioratingrelationshipwithFrance.Iampersonallyconvinced

thatyouareontherighttrackandthishasbeenconfirmedbymynumerousEuropeancontacts

ofvaryingpoliticalpersuasions.



During1969thenationsoftheAtlanticareawereincreasinglyabsorbed

withdomesticproblems;wewithVietnam,theEuropeanswithchanging

governments,theireconomies,orEuropeanintegration.Andloomingbeforeall

membersoftheAlliancewasanentirelynewchallenge:howto maintainsecurity

whileseekingtoimprove—forthefirsttimesystematically—relationswiththe

East;howtoreconcileoursolidaritywithapolicyofdétente.



<<Contents>>



****



TheCommonDefense:TheAmericanPerception



T

hreeissuesdominateddiscussionsonNATOdefense.Firstwasthevalidityof

thestrategicdoctrineof“flexibleresponse,”whichhadbeenofficia lly

adoptedbyNATOin1967underAmericanpressure.Secondwastheallocationof

the“burden”ofthecommondefensebetweenEuropeandtheUnitedStates;

specifically,whetheragreaterEuropeaneffortwaspossible.Thirdwasthelevel

ofAmericanforcestobestationedinEurope.



TheofficialstrategyofflexibleresponsewaspushedthroughNATOby

DefenseSecretaryRobertMcNamaraafterFrancehadwithdrawnfromthe

integratedNATOcommand.Inthe1950s Alliancemilitarystrategyhadreliedon

thethreatofmassiveretaliatio n—anyattackonEuropewouldbeansweredbyan

immediateall‐outAmericannuclearstrike.WiththegrowthoftheSovietnuclear

stockpiletheUnitedStates—inevitably—soughtotheroptionsandawider

spectrumofchoice.Underthedoctrineofflexibleresponsewewouldstillresort

toall‐outwarifnecessary,butwewouldreachthispointonlybygraduated

escalation,startingwithconventionalweaponsandmovinguptonuclear

weaponsbydiscretestagesgearedtothescaleofthethreat.Thestrategyhad

beenacceptedbyourEuropeanallieswithextremeuneasinessandonlyaftera

debateextendingoverfiveyears.Theysawit—correctly—asthesymptomof

growingreluctancebytheUnitedStatestouseitsnuclearforces.Theyfearedthat

ademonstratedreluctancetoresorttonuclearwarmightcausetheSovietsto

seektoexploittheimbalanceinconventionalforce s.Theywereconcernedthata

strategywhichreducedthedangerofnuclearwarmightmakeconventional

aggressionmorelikely.



TheMcNamaraattitudeswere stillprevalentinourgovernment.OnJune

17,1969,IwarnedthePresident:



ThereseemstobeastronglyheldviewintheGovernmentthatthereisverylittle

relationshipbetweenourstrategicposture(andourtacticalnuclearpostureaswell)and

deterringorcopingwithconventionalwar.Thisviewseemstobebasedontwoconclusions:(a)

ourstrategicforcescancontributetothedeterrenceofconventionalwaronlyifwehavea

crediblefirststrikecapability,whichitisnotpossibletoattain,and(b)tacticalnuclearwarin

Europewouldprobablyendinourdefeat,sowehavenoincentivetorelyontacticalnuclear

weaponsasahedgeagainstweaknessesinourconventionalposture.



Butifthesejudgmentsweretrue,wefacedanearlyinsolubledilemma.If

resorttoourstrategicforceswasbecomingtooriskyandifatacticalnuclearwar

wouldprobablyendinourdefeat,wehadineffectabdicatedfromtheserious

defenseofEurope.Tobesure,onecouldargue—andmanydid—thatnations

whosecombinedpopulationsandGrossNationalProductswereatleastthree

timestheSovietUnion’sshouldbeabletomountaconventionaldefenseagainst

theWarsawPact.ThedifficultywasthatnomemberoftheAlliance,includingthe

UnitedStates,waspreparedtomaketheeffort.(InpreparationforanNSC

meetingonSeptember10,mystaffestimatedthattheadditionalcostofa

conventionaldefenseofEuropewouldbe$12billionayearfortheUnitedStates

alone,attheverytimetheCongresswasinsistingondrasticcutsinourdefense

budget.)NorwasthereanyprospectthattheEuropeanswouldincreasetheir

owneffortsbyanythingliketheamountnecessarytoprovideasustained

conventionaldefense.Theywereunderdomesticpressuretoshowprogress

towarddétente;amassiveincreaseindefensespendingwaspolitically

impossible.Andtheywereconvincedthatanyincreaseintheirconventional

forceswouldonlyencourageafurtherreductionofAmericanforces. Theresult,in

theirperception,wouldbelowerednuclearprotectionatnoincreasein

conventionaldefensecapabilities.



ThislineofreasoninghadledPrimeMinisterWilsontoaffirmduring

Nixon’sEuropeanvisitthathewasallinfavorofanewstrategicdoctrineprovided

itdidnotleadtoamajorincreaseindefenseexpenditures.DeGaulle’sdoubts

thattheSovietswouldmarch“West”reflectedessentiallythesameview;hewas

convincedthateveniftheSovietsweretoenjoyaninitial successtheUnited

Stateswouldhavenochoiceexcepttouseallofitspower—includingstrategic

weapons—topreventthelossofWesternEurope.Hence,deGaullewasmore

interestedinasmallstrategicforceofhisownasahedgeagainsttheoff‐chance

ofAmericanfailuretoperceiveUSintereststhaninaconventionalbuildup.Put

crudely,thepredominantviewinEuropewasthatadisparityinconventional

strengthonthegroundwastolerableandevendesirablesincethedefenseof

EuroperestedultimatelyontheAmericanstrategicnucleardeterrent.



TheUnitedStatesgovernmentundertookin1969toreexamineNATO

strategy.Inessencewesawfouralternatives:



•AtokenAmericanforceinEuropetoactasa“tripwire.”



•Aconventionaldefenseposturecapableofashort‐term(ninety‐day)non‐

nucleardefenseofEurope.(ThiswascurrentNATOstrategy.)

